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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FIGHTING REBELLION, CRIMINALIZING DISSENT:
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CRIMINALITY IN
MEXICO AND COLOMBIA, 1870s – 1910s
by
Adrian Alzate Garcia
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Victor Uribe, Major Professor
Political Crimes represent one of the most neglected areas in the historical scholarship on
modern Latin America. It is an enduring absence that, for decades, has prevented historians
from developing richer understandings about the functioning of politics, the evolution of
legal phenomena, and the workings of both war and peace in the region. This dissertation
addresses this historiographical void trough a comparative study of governmental
responses to political criminality in Mexico and Colombia between the 1870s and the 1910s
–years that frame the rise and fall of the Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian
Regeneration.
A study of political, legal, and social history, the dissertation explores and analyzes
how governments in Mexico and Colombia understood and responded to political offenses
such as treason, rebellion, and subversion. How legalistic were these responses? How
respectful of the rule of law they were? What do these responses reveal about the logics of
justice, state power and repression in late-nineteenth century Latin America? What do they
tell about the relationships between state and citizens in the region? A wide collection of
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primary sources helps answer these questions. Sources include newspapers; memoires;
collections of laws and decrees; legislative debates; legal essays; criminal expedients;
judicial processes; and a diverse number of petitions for judicial protection and state
leniency.
Overall, the dissertation argues that governmental responses to political criminality
entailed different yet complementary purposes. First, they aimed to protect public order
from episodes of rebellion and insurrection. Second, they had the goal of neutralizing the
activities of dangerous dissidents. Third, they allowed governments to trace and retrace the
limits between legitimate and criminal expressions of political dissent. Political crimes
were a fluid and mutable criminal category that allowed authorities to prevent and fight
rebellion and maintain dissenters under strict control. Responses to political crimes
involved both legal and extralegal strategies, and often redefined the limits of what laws
and constitutions considered valid regarding the state’s actions against its own citizens.
These redefinitions had different meanings and consequences in Mexico and Colombia,
conditioning substantial differences in the legal and judicial experiences of political
dissidents in each country.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 1904, the Mexican journalist Ricardo Flores Magón arrived to Laredo,
Texas, after fleeing his homeland. A few months after crossing the border, Flores Magón
had walked out of Mexico City’s prison, after serving some time as a political prisoner.
Authorities had arrested him after shutting down one of his many newspapers and accusing
him of attacking and slandering governor Bernardo Reyes and other high-profile people at
the service of President Porfirio Díaz. It was not the first time that Flores Magón had gone
to jail under such accusations. Since the early 1890s, when he and his brother Enrique
started what would become a protracted career as opposition journalists and antiporfirista
agitators, Ricardo Flores Magón had had several encounters with Porfirian authorities. In
1901, for instance, authorities had shut down his paper El Demócrata and forced him to
flee Mexico City and seek refuge in the town of Pachuca. Later that year, the Porfirista
General Bernardo Reyes ordered the suspension of another of his publications,
Regeneración. This time, the brothers Flores Magón would be arrested on charges of
slander and spent a few months in prison. A year later, the same Bernardo Reyes ordered
the arrest of the writers of El Hijo del Ahuizote on analogous charges, which put the
brothers Flores Magón back in jail. Ricardo and Enrique walked free soon after, but a judge
allied of Reyes ordered their re-imprisonment after charging them with insulting the
government.
By the moment Ricardo Flores Magón left his country, it was more than clear that
there were no guarantees for his journalistic work in the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz. Little did
he know that his years as a political exile in the United States would be even harder. Settled
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down in St. Louis, Missouri, the brothers Flores Magón reopened Regeneración and
founded, with other fellow exiles, a political organization with the goal of coordinating
antiporfirista resistance on both sides of the border. The thousands of miles between
Ricardo Flores Magón and Mexico City, nevertheless, could not save the journalist from
Díaz’s iron fist. In 1906, Mexican authorities hired a private detective company in Missouri
with the goals of gathering information about their political organization and collecting
proofs that could lead to eventual arrests by American authorities. The detective company
succeeded in making a case against Flores Magón, and soon American authorities would
order the shutting down of the paper and the temporary arrest of Ricardo and many of his
fellows. His alleged participation in a frustrated revolutionary plot against Díaz that same
year worsened his situation. Cornered, Ricardo moved to Los Angeles, where he
clandestinely continued his journalistic work. By August 1907, the Missouri detectives
discovered his hideout and, with no formal warrant or judicial order, arrested him and put
him in jail.
Mexican authorities immediately requested Ricardo’s extradition. American
authorities rejected the request by arguing that Flores Magón was a political prisoner, and
the law protected political criminals and refugees from extradition. Díaz and his people did
not give up, and filed a second extradition request after accusing Ricardo of a series of nonpolitical crimes including robbery, homicide, and criminal libel. This second request
proved unsuccessful as well, not only because of the far-fetched nature of the charges but
also because American authorities refused to treat the prisoner as a non-political criminal.
Finally, their Mexican counterparts realized that, although it was impossible to have Flores
Magón back in Mexico, it was still plausible to ensure his sentencing and imprisonment in
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the United States. In consequence, Porfirian authorities tried to make a case against Ricardo
and his people that could lead to a trial for violation of neutrality laws. They succeeded. In
1909, Flores Magón and other Mexican exiles faced a trial in Arizona for conspiracy to
initiate a military expedition against Mexico from American territory. Jurors found them
guilty and a judge sentenced them to 18 months of prison. Their release in August 1910
would not mark the end of Ricardo’s life as a prisoner in the United States. In fact, Flores
Magón would spend in jail more than half of the time between his arrival to the United
States in 1904 and his death in a prison in Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1922.1
The story of Ricardo Flores Magón is nothing but an over-dramatic, tragicomic
version of many other stories involving dissenters, opposition journalists, political
agitators, and revolutionaries in Porfirian Mexico, between the late 1870s and the late
1900s. Across the Caribbean Sea, in Colombia, the experiences of dozens of liberal
journalists and politicians during the same period paralleled those of their Mexican
counterparts. Dissident leaders like Santiago Pérez and Rafael Uribe Uribe paid with
prison, exile, and political and judicial persecution their challenges to the Regenerationist
regime, a series of Conservative administrations that ruled the country between the 1880s
and the first decade of the twentieth century. The cases of Flores Magón, Pérez, Uribe
Uribe and many others on both sides of the Caribbean have more in common than the many
circumstances linking the Porfiriato and the Regeneration in the late-19th and early 20th
centuries. They all are cases of political dissenters whose actions were labelled as criminal;

1

For two detailed accounts on Ricardo Flores Magón’s life and his time in the United States, see: Claudio
Lomnitz, The Return of Comrade Ricardo Flores Magón (New York: Zone Books, 2014); and Colin
MacLachlan, Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution: The Political Trials of Ricardo Flores Magón in the
United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
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experiences of dissidents suffering from state repression manifesting itself in several
different forms; stories of political malcontents who paid with their freedom the price of
their dissidence.
The case of Flores Magón also sheds light on a series of matters directly and
indirectly related to these many stories. It illustrates the workings of a government that
responded to “dangerous” political dissidence with criminalization, and that was able –and
willing– to use a variety of legal and extra-legal strategies in order to prosecute and punish
those who challenged it. It also shows that there existed a series of crimes and punishments
more or less applicable to criminalize political dissidents, and that there were differences
between “political” and “non-political” crimes. Likewise, it exemplifies the legal and
judicial experiences of political criminals and prisoners when dealing with the relentless
logics of state repression. On a deeper level, Flores Magón’s story raises a number of
questions regarding, for instance, the existing legislation that allowed governments to
criminalize and punish political agitators and revolutionaries, or the legal and constitutional
limits between “legal” and “illegal” political dissent. Other possible questions that the story
raises have to do with the differences between “common” and “political” crimes; what
political crimes meant to legislators, judges, legal experts, and political authorities; and
how these actors reflected about the most appropriate ways to punish these offenses.
Additional questions could include, for instance, whether or not punishment and repression
were the only possible responses to these kinds of actions, and if there were other ways in
which governments could have treated political criminals.
This wide set of matters and questions sum up the subject of this monograph, a
comparative study of governmental understandings of and responses to political crimes in
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Mexico and Colombia between the 1870s and 1910s. As such, it is a work of legal history,
interested in analyzing these responses in terms of the laws that made them possible, the
legal reinventions they fostered, and the legal conversations that accompanied them. It also
pays attention to the ways in which people and the state interacted through the law and the
justice system, and reflects on how these interactions worked for the benefit of both parts.
It is, as well, a work of political history that explores questions regarding state power and
legitimacy; citizenship and political agency; and political dissent and resistance. As a
political study, this monograph also revolves around a more general question concerning
the nature and functioning of Latin American authoritarianisms in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. It is, finally, a work of social history, focusing not only on the social –and
political– uses of law and legislation, but also in how these laws and legal conversations
affected people’s lives, actions, and expectations.

The Porfiriato and the Regeneration: Comparing the Mexican and Colombian
experiences
This is a comparative study framed within the context of two political regimes that
emerged, evolved, and collapsed more or less simultaneously between the late 1870s and
the 1910s: The Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration. The Porfiriato
encompasses a period of 34 years, starting with the election of Porfirio Díaz as President
of Mexico in 1877, and concluding with his departure to exile, in May 1911, during the
first year of the Mexican Revolution. Díaz rose to power as the victorious leader of the
Tuxtepec Revolution, an armed movement that in 1876 overthrew the administration of
Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, Benito Juarez successor. It was not the first attempt of Díaz at
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seizing power. Before 1876, he had participated and lost in two presidential elections –one
against Juarez and another against Lerdo– and led a failed rebellion in 1871. Both as a rebel
and a presidential candidate, Díaz advocated for an anti-authoritarian and anti-centralist
government, respectful of the constitution and of the division of public powers. His
campaign against presidential reelection –a recurrent practice during the Juarez regime–
was one of the most representative efforts of Díaz as an opposition leader during the earlyand mid-1870s.2
As a new president, Díaz faced serious political and economic challenges. Decades
of civil war had left Mexico in a critical state, with a ruined and poorly developed economy,
high levels of external debt, a fragmented and disconnected national community, and a
country plagued with local and regional strongmen unwilling to submit to a central
authority. These challenges determined the goals of his administration: the reestablishment
of public order and the prevention of civil warfare, the improvement of the country’s
finances and the modernization of its economy, and the consolidation of his political
hegemony throughout the country. “Peace and progress,” as well as “less politics, more
administration,” became from the beginning the main banners of the Porfiriato.3
Díaz tackled these challenges with relative success. During his administration, he
and his officials managed to stabilize public finances –by reducing public expenditures and
creating new taxes– and to restructure Mexico’s foreign debt, which in turn stimulated the

2

Elisa Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” in Nueva historia mínima de México ilustrada (México: El Colegio
de México, 2008), 337-338.
3

Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 362. Also: Sandra Kuntz Ficker and Elisa Speckman Guerra, “El
Porfiriato,” in Nueva Historia General de México, ed. Erik Velásquez García et al (México: El Colegio de
México, 2010), 487-488.
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flow of foreign capital and investment. The construction of railroads and the enhancement
of ports helped connect the country’s many and diverse regions and boosted its economy.
Porfirista administrations also succeeded in developing industry and foreign trade, as well
as in integrating Mexico to the international economy through the exportation of mineral
and agricultural products. An unprecedented demographic growth and strong migration
processes that invigorated the Mexican population accompanied these economic changes.
In the political field, Díaz tried to consolidate peace and order through a strategic
combination of pragmatism, patronage, force, and intimidation. Although peace remained
an elusive goal during most of his administration, these strategies would certainly help
Díaz build and maintain a delicate balance of power between the center and the provinces.
This would grant Mexico a level of political stability that, although relative, contrasted
strikingly with what the country had gone through during most of its post-independent life.4
The Porfiriato experienced different phases throughout the three decades of its
existence. Its first phase corresponds to Díaz’s first administration, from 1877 to 1880.
During these first years, Díaz attempted to lay the foundations for the restructuring of the
Mexican economy, the pacification of the country through the neutralization of potential –
and actual– contenders, and the building of a network of regional and local political
alliances. Consistent with his initial political program, he would also promote a
constitutional reform in 1878 prohibiting the immediate reelection of presidents, and once

4

Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 370-372; Romana Falcón, “La desaparición de jefes politicos en
Coahuila. Una paradoja porfirista,” Historia Mexicana 17, no. 3 (1988), 423-424; William Beezley, Judas at
the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1987),
16-17; and Paul Garner, “The Civilian and the General, 1867-1911,” in A Companion to Mexican History
and Culture, ed. William Beezley (Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 296.
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his term was over, in 1880, he handed the presidency to his fellow Manuel González.5 Díaz
would return to the presidency in 1884. This second phase of the Porfiriato would extend
towards the early1900s, and was characterized, among other things, by Díaz’s efforts to
concentrate and centralize power and consolidate his hegemony throughout the country.
The consolidation of the Porfirian hegemony during these years relied on multiple
strategies of cooptation, patronage, manipulation and negotiation. Díaz used state
governments, political jefaturas –local political headships–, and other mid- and high-rank
administrative positions to both reward allies and bring potential contenders into the fold.
He also managed to build and strengthen ties with regional political bosses in control of
extensive clientele networks, and to maintain political stability in the regions through the
strategic rotation of governors and jefes politicos in debt with him. By manipulating the
appointment of regional and local authorities, Díaz succeeded in spreading his power
throughout all Mexico and neutralizing possible threats against his hegemony. This
network of allegiances, favors, and rewards also helped Díaz ensure the political cohesion
of the nation and align the multiple and diverse regional powers under his wing.6
During this second phase, Díaz’s style became increasingly personalist, and the
figure of the democratic leader that rallied against reelection and supported the division of
public powers experienced significant changes. The president would progressively
diminish the power of the legislative and judicial branches, until making them mere
appendixes of the federal Executive. Two constitutional reforms, one in 1887 and another

5

Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 338.

6

Garner, “The Civilian,” 296; Falcón, “La desaparición,” 425-428; Kuntz Ficker and Speckman Guerra, “El
Porfiriato,” 489; and Friedrich Katz, dir., Porfirio Díaz frente al descontento popular regional (1891-1893):
Antología documental (México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 1986), 21.
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in 1890, eliminated all restrictions to the immediate reelection of presidents and state
governors, which allowed Díaz to be consecutively reelected in 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900,
1906, and 1910. Several governors in the states seized this opportunity and managed to
remain in power for a decade and even longer. In Tlaxcala, for instance, Prospero
Cahuantzi remained in power for 26 years; Mucio Martínez, in Puebla, ruled for 18 years
straight; while Bernardo Reyes, in Nuevo León, did it for 20 years. The progressive
concentration of power into Díaz’s hands, the consolidation of his networks of patronage,
and his uninterrupted reelections allowed him to claim for himself a role as “patriarch of
the nation […], custodian and arbiter of the rules of conduct of political life.”7 The rise of
Díaz as Mexico’s patriarch went hand in hand with the growing authoritarianism of his
regime and the increasing repression against political dissent both in the states and at the
federal level.
The third phase of the Porfiriato corresponded to its crisis and ultimate debacle
during the first decade of the twentieth century. Opposition to Díaz, his manipulation of
regional politics, and his authoritarian style escalated throughout the decade, and became
a serious threat with the foundation of the Partido Liberal Mexicano or PLM in 1906. Led
by a group of antiporfiristas exiled in the United States, and supported by a handful of
political clubs throughout Mexico, the PLM progressively succeeded in channeling
discontent towards Díaz. Led by the brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón, the PLM
had a political agenda that combined claims for economic nationalism, political freedom,
and presidential rotation , all combined with plans to overthrow Díaz through an armed

7

Kuntz Ficker and Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 493; and Garner, “The Civilian,” 297. The quote
corresponds to Garner.
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insurrection.8 Díaz’s repressive reactions against the PLM and its members both in Mexico
and abroad not only proved unsuccessful, but also bolstered criticism of and opposition
against his political style. His decision to run again for president in 1909 would stoke even
more the flames of opposition. The Mexican revolution broke out just a few months after
Díaz’s electoral victory in 1910.9
The end of the regime and the outbreak of the Mexican revolution were not
exclusively the result of a growing political dissidence under the leadership of the PLM.
Years of political stagnation, internal factionalism, and deep rivalries between civilian and
military Porfiristas also erode the regime and forced it to implode. The perpetuation in
power of Díaz and several of his governors rendered the regime old and worn out. The
regional networks of allegiance that supported the Porfirian hegemony turned stagnant and
unable to respond to changing social and political circumstances in the states. Competition
between Porfirista factions for political and administrative positions tore the regime apart,
affected its self-confidence, and ultimately broke up the delicate balance of power that for
years had maintained loyalties in relative order keeping rivalries at bay. The 1909 electoral
campaign not only signaled the definitive breakup between the civilian and the military
groups, but also made evident profound disagreements and uncertainties regarding Díaz’s
succession and, therefore, the continuity of the regime. By Díaz’s new and final
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inauguration in 1910, almost nothing remained of the powerful and cohesive political
machinery that had prevailed almost unquestioned throughout more than three decades.10
Díaz’s success at consolidating his hegemony throughout the country, stabilizing
regional politics, and neutralizing or co-opting potential political and military contenders
did not necessary translate into permanent peace and total absence of internal conflict.
Despite the Porfiriato’s many efforts to prevent rebellion and internal turmoil, political
turbulence proved unavoidable and the country experienced dozens of insurrections,
insurgent movements, and revolutionary expeditions. The late 1870s, for instance, would
witness a series of agrarian revolts in central Mexico involving people from the states of
Mexico, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí. They extended from 1877 to 1881.11
In June 1879, a Lerdista rebellion took place in the port of Veracruz, leaving a tragic
balance for the rebels.12 Several rebellions and revolts took place in the 1880s. Only in
1885 alone, the state of Veracruz would experience three revolts ranging from armed
political movements to peasant uprisings. There were at least two regional rebellions in
1886, one in Tamaulipas, led by Pedro Dávila, and another in Zacatecas, led by Trinidad
García de la Cadena. 1887 would experience at least one regional insurrection, once again
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in the state of Veracruz. This state, in fact, remained in almost constant turmoil during a
great part of the Porfiriato, with a total of 27 revolts between 1876 and 1898.13
The 1890s were a particularly conflictive decade, resulting from mounting
dissatisfaction towards Díaz, changing rivalries over regional power, and an agrarian crisis
that affected a great portion of Mexico’s countryside.14 The decade started with the
rebellion of Juan Galeana and Cornelio Álvarez in Guerrero, in April 1890, and the armed
incursions from the United States led by Francisco Ruiz Sandoval, in mid-1890, and
Catarino Garza, in September 1891.15 Between 1891 and 1892, at least two peasant revolts
with religious overtones erupted in Guerrero and Chihuahua. The first one involved a shortlived catholic insurrectionist movement led by José Cuevas in 1891. The second one was
the indigenous and millenarian rebellion of Tomochic, which started in December that year
and finished in October 1892 with the extermination of all rebels and the almost total
eradication of the town by the federal military.16 1893 experienced at least four regional
insurrections, one in Coahuila, led by the Carranza family, another in Chihuahua, led by
Luis Terrazas, and three more episodes in Guerrero. The incidents in Guerrero included the
rebellion of Canuto Neri, the uprising of Diego Álvarez, and an agrarian movement led by
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some Father Castañeda. In April that year, a multitudinous demonstration against governor
Bernardo Reyes in Monterrey, Nuevo León, ended up in a serious riot that left dozens of
casualties and a large number of political prisoners.17 The 1900s were far less conflictive
than the previous decade, with only a major revolutionary attempt promoted by the PLM
that Porfirian authorities discovered and frustrated on time.18
This sequence of rebellions and insurrectionary events not only helps debunk the
myth of the “Pax Porfiriana” that the early historiography on the Porfiriato made common
during most of the twentieth century.19 It also provides this study with numerous
opportunities for exploring and analyzing how Díaz and his regime responded to political
turbulence and internal strife. Partially inspired by the Mexican experience, the Colombian
Regeneration also offers diverse opportunities to explore these questions in a comparative
manner.

As a period in Colombia’s political and legal history, the Regeneration covers roughly from
the mid-1880s to the early 1900s. These years include, among other major processes and
events, the temporary arrival of “independent Liberalism” to power; growing political
centralization symbolized by the enactment of the 1886 Constitution; the rise to power of
the Conservative party; the enhanced presence of the Catholic church in multiple spheres
of life; a renewed emphasis on and celebration of Hispanic roots; and, related to some of
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these aspects, the civil wars of 1885, 1895, and 1899-1902 known as the Thousand Days’
War. During the decades in question, Colombia would experience important political,
legal, and economic transformations, as well as complex political conflicts whose
escalation over time would bring serious and lasting consequences to the country.
As a political regime, Colombia’s Regeneration came into existence between the
late 1870s and early 1880s. It emerged out of the debacle of the federal regime that the
Liberal Party had inaugurated decades ago, with the 1863 Constitution. After almost twenty
years of existence under liberal rule, the federal experiment had left behind a long series of
local and regional insurrections, alarming degrees of political instability, and a weak and
undeveloped domestic economy. The federal period also had important consequences
concerning the organization of partisan struggle in Colombia. It left behind a deeply
fragmented Liberal Party, divided into “radical” and “moderate” or “independent” liberals,
and a Conservative party eager for power after two decades of political exclusion. Both
conservatives and independent liberals claimed for a substantial reform of the federative
regime and the end of the political hegemony of radical Liberals, in control of the federal
government since 1867. The electoral victories of General Julián Trujillo, in 1878, and
Rafael Núñez, in 1880, marked the arrival of the independent faction to the national
presidency, as well as the beginning-of-the end of the Liberal federal regime. Under the
motto “Regeneration or Catastrophe,” independent presidents advocated for a
“reconstitution” of the nation based on political centralism, economic protectionism, and a
stronger Executive able to ensure political stability and prevent further challenges to public
order. The materialization of this political program, nonetheless, required the displacement
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of radical Liberals from power, which independents managed to accomplish only by the
mid-1880s.
By 1884, during the second presidency of Rafael Núñez, independent Liberals had
managed to control the entire country with the exception of the department of Santander –
historic stronghold of radical Liberalism. Cornered, Santander’s radicals decided to make
a final attempt at regaining power and started a rebellion against Núñez by the beginning
of 1885. A coalition of independent and Conservative troops backed the president and
suffocated the rebellion in a few months. The government’s victory allowed Núñez to
control the entire country and obtain national support for a constitutional reform that put
an end to the federal regime and set the grounds for materialization of the independent
program. Both independent liberals and conservatives worked in the drafting of a new
Constitution, finally enacted in 1886. The new charter replaced the federal order with a
centralist political organization, created a powerful Executive with wide legislative
privileges, and gave the Catholic Church recognition as guardian of social order, public
morality, and public education. It also provided the government, and especially the
President, with multiple legal tools to prevent political unrest and contain actual or
potential enemies of public peace. It was, to a large extent, a Constitution designed to “grant
the government the necessary power to inspire respect towards authority and to warrant
political stability.”20
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The regenerationist program of Núñez revolved around the notions of order,
progress, stability, security, liberty, and justice. The independent leader believed that it was
time for Colombia to join the wave of political change that was sweeping most of Latin
America, where nations were looking for “conservative institutions able to grant them
secure and solid peace.” To Núñez and other contemporaries, Porfirian Mexico provided
the most exemplary case of this continental process. In his opinion, Díaz had been more
than successful in centralizing power, maintaining peace and order, and promoting
progress. Under Díaz, Núñez maintained, Mexico finally enjoyed a situation of total peace.
Díaz not only had been able to ensure security and order, but also to foster national unity,
industrialization, and economic development. The Mexican leader, Núñez believed, had
brought the regenerationist program to its full realization.21 Others, like Presbyter Federico
C. Aguilar, maintained that Mexico, by the hand of Porfirio Díaz, had succeeded in leaving
behind decades of civil, partisan hatred, political instability, and economic stagnation. To
Aguilar, Porfirian Mexico provided Latin American nations with a proof that a strong
government was the key for securing peace and fostering economic development.22 Núñez
and his people did not succeed in replicating the Porfirian experience in Colombia,
especially in economic terms. Yet, they still managed to introduce some important reforms
tending to the modernization of Colombia’s economy.23
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Throughout the 1880s, Núñez created a national bank, stimulated with a timid
success the growth of national industry, and tried to make the economy less dependent on
foreign trade and external loans. Later on, both Núñez and his successor, the Conservative
Miguel Antonio Caro, tried to improve state finances by establishing a monetary system of
nonredeemable paper money. The economic reforms of the Regeneration took advantage
of the spectacular rise in world coffee prices between the late1880s and the mid1890s. The
coffee boom benefited Colombian exportations, stimulated the expansion of the coffee
economy throughout the country, and sparked processes of internal migration and
colonization and expansion of the agrarian frontier that would continue until well into the
20th century. The coffee bonanza, nonetheless, would last only until 1896, when world
coffee prices began to fall precipitously.24 The coffee crisis increased the government’s
dependence on its own paper money, which in turn caused a serious inflation that would
reach its highest peak right after the Thousand Days.
In the political field, regenerationist administrations also faced multiple challenges.
After Núñez’s third presidential period (1887-1888), the Conservative Party took over the
presidency and held it until the end of the Thousand Days. The Conservative regime
excluded the Liberal Party from all positions of power, drastically limited its participation
in Congress, enacted laws and decrees tending to criminalize its attempts at reorganization,
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and imprisoned and exiled many of its leaders.25 The situation of Colombian Liberals
forced them to combine their efforts to regain power through electoral ways with multiple
parallel attempts to overthrow the government through armed insurrections. In 1893,
Liberals plotted a rebellion that should start on August, but the government, already in alert
since a massive artisan revolt that had taken place in Bogotá in January that year,
discovered the plot on time and was able to dissolve the conspiracy. A second attempt at
rebellion, in April 1904, would suffer the same fate. Finally, in January 1895, a fraction of
the Party took up arms against the Caro administration and managed to keep its rebellion
alive until March that year. The Liberal defeat in the 1895 war would not put an end to the
Party’s warlike efforts. On the contrary, it forced Liberals to regroup and prepare for a
final, massive insurrection that would finally take place in October 1899.26
Regenerationist administrations not only were incapable of containing the
progressive reorganization of the Liberal Party, but also proved powerless to prevent
division within its own ranks. Discrepancies over the regime’s authoritarianism and
monetary policies would cause, during the 1890s, a division between “Nationalist” and
“Historical” conservatives. While Nationalist conservatives backed the rigid policies of
presidents Carlos Holguín (1888-1892), Miguel Antonio Caro (1892-1898), and Manuel
Antonio Sanclemente (1898-1900), the “Historical” dissidence criticized their extreme
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exclusion of the Liberal Party as well as the disastrous financial consequences of the paper
currency regime in place. The government’s reticence to reform its policies would cause a
formal split between the two factions in 1896. From then on, Historical Conservatives
would act as an opposition force, pushing not only for financial reforms but also for a more
inclusive and less repressive government. During 1897 and 1898, the political platforms of
Liberals and Historical Conservatives were almost similar, which made the Liberal Party
believe that it was an appropriate moment to launch a final offensive against the Nationalist
administration. Liberals tried in several occasions to lure Historical Conservatives into
their revolutionary endeavor, but their efforts were in vain.27 The Liberal Party went to war
in October 1899 without the support of the Conservative dissidence and even without the
unanimous approval of its directorate.
The Thousand Days War broke out in October 18, 1899 in Santander and finished
in November 21, 1902, in Panama. It was the biggest, costliest, and most destructive civil
war in nineteenth-century Colombia. It caused the state immense material loses and
indebtedness, and left behind a balance of casualties whose estimations range between 60
thousand and 150 thousand people, equivalent to approximately 2% of the country’s
population at the time. It was also one of the factors that contributed to the loss of Panama
in 1903.28 The first phase of the war involved the confrontation of large regular armies in
the Colombian north-east, and concluded in May 1900 with the defeat of the bulk of the

27

Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 48, 66-67, and 85; see also: Jorge Villegas and José Yunis, La guerra de los
mil días (Bogotá: Carlos Valencia Editores, 1979), 30-32, and 45-46.
28

Adolfo Meisel Roca and Julio E. Romero Prieto, La mortalidad de la guerra de los mil días, 1899-1902
(Bogotá: Banco de la República, 2017), 1-3.

19

Liberal army in the battle of Palonegro. Soon after the end of this phase, Historical
Conservatives carried out a successful coup that overthrew the Nationalist president
Manuel Antonio Sanclemente on July 31, 1900. The dissident faction replaced
Sanclemente with the apparently more moderate José Manuel Marroquín, from whom they
expected a conciliatory attitude towards the rebellion and a willingness to reward a
potential rebel surrender with political reforms. Marroquín, nevertheless, did not comply
with the expectations of the faction that put him in power and, thus, the war continued.29
The second phase of the conflict would last until the end of the hostilities. During
these years, the maintenance of the rebel movement remained primarily in the hands of
multiple guerrilla groups dispersed throughout the country’s central regions. Nonetheless,
during the last year of the war, the guerrilla warfare in the center of the country went hand
in hand with larger regular campaigns in Cauca, to the south, and Panamá, to the west, led
by the rebel general Benjamín Herrera, and also in the Caribbean coast, under the direction
of Herrera’s fellow Rafael Uribe Uribe. The capitulations of Uribe Uribe, in October 1902,
and Herrera, a month later, signaled the end of the rebellion. Two treaties gave the war a
formal closure: The Neerlandia Treaty, signed by Uribe Uribe on October 24, and the
Wisconsin Treaty, signed by Herrera on November 21, 1902. The pacification of the center
would take a few more months. Marroquín remained in power until 1904, when he handed
the power to the democratically elected Rafael Reyes.30 Reyes would stay in power until
1909, a period commonly known in Colombian historiography as the Quinquenio.

29

Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 172-174, 176-178, and 180-181; see also: Carlos E. Jaramillo, Los guerrilleros
del novecientos (Bogotá: CEREC, 1991), 37-39 and 42-43.
30

Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 186-188.

20

Rafael Reyes, a Conservative veteran of the civil war of 1895, was a more ardent
admirer of Porfirio Díaz than Núñez had been. A two-year trip to Mexico had made him
familiar with the Porfiriato’s work and Díaz’s achievements in matters of economic
development, industrialization, and political stability. Convinced that Colombia needed to
walk the path Mexico had been walking since the late 1870s, Reyes was determined to
foster industrialization, build railroads, reorganize the country’s fiscal policies, and prevent
any possible political disturbance. “The example of Mexico is and should be a model to be
copied by those Spanish-American nations which have not succeeded so far in solving in
a stable and permanent manner the problem of public peace, which of necessity is linked
to the economic and financial problems,” Reyes wrote in 1906.31 Reyes’s interest in
reproducing Díaz’s work in Colombia made him even borrow the “less politics, more
administration” motto, turning it into one of his government’s banners.32 In the post-war
era, “less politics” meant leaving aside traditional partisan hatred and useless –if not
detrimental– ideological and programmatic conflicts. In contrast, “more administration”
meant a greater focus on practical priorities linked to economic growth and prosperity. 33
In correspondence with the Mexican model, Reyes would make multiple efforts to promote
economic development, foster international trade, restructure the nation’s foreign debt, and
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protect and stimulate domestic industries. A new rise in international coffee prices set the
conditions for a favorable economic growth during most of the quinquenio.
In political terms, Reyes arrived to the presidency with a message of national unity,
political reconciliation, and attenuation of partisan hatred. Consequent with this message,
Reyes granted the Liberal Party a significant participation in the Congress and put several
liberal veterans in influential positions both in his government and in the military. This
would grant him the almost unconditional support of many members of the Liberal Party,
but also the animosity of several Conservative circles.34 Resentment against Reyes’s spirit
of reconciliation was particularly high among those conservatives that had fought the
liberals during the Thousand Days. Conservative resistance against the President’s policies
and reform plans manifested soon after the beginning of his period. Resistance in the 1904
Congress to Reyes’s project of territorial division forced him to shut down the Legislative,
and to replace it the following year with a National Assembly with no members from the
Conservative dissidence.35
The measure did not deter the opposition, but rather radicalized it. Dissident
Conservatives planned a coup that should take place in December 1905 but was ultimately
thwarted by the government. Months later, on February 10, 1906, the same faction would
carry out a failed attempt against the President’s life.36 The Government’s energetic
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reaction to both plots disassembled most of the Conservative dissidence, but voices of
discontent against the regime’s administrative policies and a growing authoritarianism
remained. Resistance against Reyes and his government escalated in 1907 after the
negotiation of a treaty with the United States concerning the separation of Panama. The
imminent approval of the treaty by the National Assembly in March 1909 sparked a wave
of violent protests in Bogotá that forced Reyes to temporarily resign the presidency. The
treaty finally sank in the Assembly. In June that year, Reyes would call for a congressional
election whose results did not favor him. This final drawback forced him to resign once
again and leave the presidency in the hands of Jorge Holguín. Soon after his resignation,
Reyes would leave the country going into exile.37 His departure marked the end of the
quinquenio.

How comparable are the Mexican and Colombian experiences between the late 1870s and
the 1910s? As the previous pages show, there are a number of similarities between one
country and another. The Porfiriato and the Regeneration emerged and developed in
response to analogous interests of securing peace and progress through a strong, centralized
government, for instance. This premise materialized in both countries in similar ways:
strong political centralism, high levels of presidentialism, political exclusion, and
governmental authoritarianism. There were also multiple links connecting both countries
during the period. The Porfiriato was, to a certain point, a model for the Regeneration, and
Porfirio Díaz represented an important source of inspiration for presidents like Rafael
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Núñez and Rafael Reyes. Commonalities between both countries went beyond these
connections and parallelisms, and even preceded the period in question. As James Sanders
explains in The Vanguard of the Atlantic World, nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia
had very similar stories. Both countries faced civil warfare in their early stages, developed
distinct Liberal and Conservative parties by mid-century, and suffered several civil wars
resulting from power struggles between these two factions. Likewise, they both undertook
extensive project of liberal reform of colonial institutions, and embraced republicanism and
democratic innovation around mid-century. The Porfiriato and the Regeneration, in fact,
represent analogous projects of “reorganization” tending to counter the effects and
consequences of this early republicanism, as authors such as Sanders, María del M.
Melgarejo and a few others maintain.38
Besides these political commonalities, Mexico and Colombia shared a common
constitutional and legal culture. The constitutional frameworks of the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration privileged the maintenance of public order and the concentration of public
powers in the hands of the Executive, for instance. They also shared the conviction that
society’s integrity should prevail over the rights of its individuals. Mexican and Colombian
criminal codes also involved common ideas that were part of broader, transnational
developments in the field of criminal law. Many of these ideas shaped similar
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understandings of what political crimes were and how governments should react to them,
which in turn inspired relatively analogous ways of reacting to political crimes and
criminals, as this dissertation shows.
All these parallelisms, connections, and shared attributes make up a framework of
commonalities that invite to comparison and make it methodologically possible. The
Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration represent, at least to a certain point,
analogous experiences, involving a shared set of common attributes and reasonably close
in terms of both time and space. This sort of characteristics, according to Magnus Mörner,
provide a basic ground for a proper comparative analysis.39 Furthermore, as geographical
neighbors and historical contemporaries, Porfirian Mexico and Regenerationist Colombia
share a common set of “over-all causes,” in terms of Marc Bloch’s classical work on
comparative history.40 These “common causes” have to do not only with a relatively
analogous past as post-independent Latin American nations, but also with a shared legal
and constitutional culture combining elements and influences both from the colonial and
the modern Atlantic world.
There were, of course, important differences between the Mexican and Colombian
contexts. Levels of economic development and insertion into world economy were
drastically different between the two cases. Political differences were also substantial.
Mexico had a federal organization, while Colombia was a centralized republic from 1886
on. Mexico had only two presidents between 1877 and 1911, and one of them, Porfirio
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Díaz, ruled for more than three decades. Colombia, on the contrary, had more regular and
continuous changes in the Executive –regardless the fact that, from the late 1880s to the
end of the quinquenio, all presidents belonged to the same political party. There were also
important contrasts in terms of rebellion and insurrection. Although both countries suffered
several episodes of internal turmoil between the late-nineteenth and the early-twentieth
centuries, widespread, long-lasting rebellions were more common in Colombia than in
Mexico –at least before the outbreak of the Mexican revolution.
Do these differences affect the comparability of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration
as subjects of historical analysis? This dissertation maintains that they do not. These
contrasts, in fact, make comparison more rewarding and valuable from an analytical point
of view. Historical comparison does not only involve similarities but also differences, as
authors such as Magnus Mörner, Marc Bloch, Theda Skocpol, and Philippa Levine argue.41
Combining similarities and differences, comparison between Mexico and Colombia has
the advantage of uncovering and exploring processes that were common to both countries
while emphasizing the particularities of each country regarding the problems in question.
Furthermore, as these authors claim, this sort of comparative work pushes the study away
from the simple description and typification of commonalities and towards the definition
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of analytical concepts and the advancement of new, richer hypotheses and interpretations.42
That is, precisely, what this study attempts to do when comparing the experiences of
Mexico and Colombia regarding their governmental responses to political criminality. By
studying these responses in two contexts or environments that encompass both similarities
and differences, the dissertation aims to do much more than describing how Mexican and
Colombian governments dealt with rebellions and rebels in their midst. It intends, also, to
further a series of analytical and theoretical reflections concerning the workings of law,
legislation, and state power in Mexico and Colombia, as a window into the broader legal
and political experiences of modern Latin America.
Accepting now that comparison between the Porfiriato and the Regeneration is
possible, what does exactly the dissertation compare? More than comparing two
“societies,” “structures,” or “contexts” that might not seem fully equivalent, the
dissertation compares a problem that was both common and relevant for the two countries
–the way in which governments in one country and another understood and responded to
political crimes and criminality.43 The study is not interested in comparing neither the
rebellions or insurrections that took place in Mexico and Colombia during the period nor
the political circumstances in which they occurred. It simply intends to compare –and
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contrast, of course– the ways in which both countries responded to these episodes.44 In
analytical terms, these responses represent a common ground, a single, coherent unifying
principle that brings together the specificities of the Mexican and Colombian historical
experiences. It is a way of avoiding artificial comparisons that obscure the social and
historical particularities of each case in search of some abstract similarity that only exists
in the imagination of the researcher.45 The dissertation, in fact, conceives these responses
neither as empty and abstract categories nor as a priori notions existing outside the
historical experience of both countries. Rather, it defines and understands them in
relationship with the specific contexts in which they emerged and developed. Facing
rebellion and internal turmoil, Mexican and Colombian governments had to develop
specific understandings and responses to political criminality. These concrete responses,
with their socio-historical meanings and specificities, represent thus the central focus of
comparison.

Problematizing Political Crimes and Responses to Political Criminality
This is a comparative study on political crimes and political criminality, their historical
understandings in two Latin American countries, and the ways in which their respective
governments responded to them. What is, precisely, political criminality? How does this
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monograph understand political crimes? There are multiple ways of defining political
offenses. Historical literature on the matter includes a panoply of definitions, some more
concrete than others. Some scholars define political crimes as all offenses committed for
altruistic or ideological purposes. Other authors conceive them as crimes against the state,
the government, and its institutions. Some of these scholars even divide these offenses into
several categories or sub-notions depending on their level of violence, their aims and
impact, and the kind of political threat they entail –i.e. “violent” and “non-violent” political
crimes; “oppositional” or “state” political crimes; “pure” or “mixed” political crimes.46
This study draws on an “intermediate” definition of political crimes, inspired on the
approaches of Barton Ingraham, Austin Turk, and Karl Harter.47 Political crimes, from this
perspective, are actions and/or expressions of political dissidence, violent or non-violent,
that state authorities and government officials consider criminal regardless their real nature
and the motivation of their perpetrators. To the state, these acts are criminal because they
entail more or less severe threats to the established structure of the government, the
government institutions and/or representatives, the state authorities, and the public order.
As criminal manifestations of dissent, political crimes usually involve violent
offenses such as terrorism, rebellion, sedition, political assassination, and political riot, as
well as non-violent crimes such as “illegitimate” resistance or dissidence, disobedience,
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political and seditious libel, espionage, and treason –considered here as a mere violation of
allegiance.48 Nonetheless, as authors like Jeffrey Ross, Karl Harter, and Thomas Walter
point out, the sphere of “political crimes” is commonly imprecise, flexible, and mutable.49
Governments, judges, and legislators can alter existing definitions of political crimes in
order to criminalize political acts that were not originally criminal, or to prosecute political
dissidents whose actions are not necessarily criminal according to the current legislation.
It is a process of “reinvention” of political criminality that depends on multiple
circumstances: local, national, and even international political contexts, existing
mechanisms for social and political negotiation, current practices and proceedings of
criminal justice, and existing legislation and legal doctrine.50 In correspondence with these
considerations, this monograph understands political crimes and their historical
reinventions in two complementary ways. On the one hand, they are legal and political
resources for protecting the government, the state, and the public order against actual or
potential threats by eventual “internal enemies.” On the other hand, they represent a
flexible tool for controlling and repressing political opposition and dissidence, as well as
for strengthening social policing and control.
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Analytical inspirations for this monograph come from American and European
scholarship on political crimes and criminality. A combination of approaches from
sociology, criminology, and political science characterize American studies on political
offenses, as illustrated by the works of Barton Ingraham, Austin Turk, Jeffrey Ross, and
Nicholas Kittrie and Eldon Wedlock.51 This interdisciplinary perspective allows them to
delve into the social and historical making of notions of political crime as well as into the
evolution of political criminality in the United States. They also pay special attention to
the ways in which American and other governments have responded to dissent, resistance,
collective violence and, more recently, terrorism. European scholarship involves more
historical overtones, merging approaches from legal, social, and political history. This
literature includes the works by Angela De Benedictis on revolts, disobedience, and the
“right to resistance” in early modern Europe; Karl Harter on the legal responses to political
crimes in early modern and modern Europe; and Beatrice De Graaf on political criminality
and social policing.52 The studies by Thomas Walter, Johannes Dillinger, Malte Griesse,
and Michael Lobban also add to this scholarship.53 Together, they shed light on the making
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and unmaking of penalties for political crimes; the historical reinvention of certain political
offenses; and the transnational nature of some legal and political discourses on collective
political violence. They also delve into the legal invention of different classes of
“illegitimate” and “dangerous” dissidence, as well as into the evolution of state repression
and mercy concerning political crimes and violence.
Despite their differences in disciplinary approaches and historical contexts,
American and European scholarship on political criminality provides this study with a
series of questions that, for the case of modern Latin America, still await response. These
questions include, among others, how legal and doctrinal notions of political criminality
emerged and evolved, and how and why legislation on and penalties for political offenses
changed throughout the period. There is also a question about the relationship between
local and national discourses and laws on political violence, on the one hand, and
transnational legal discourses on revolt, war, political rights, dissent, and social policing,
on the other hand. This monograph attempts to answer some of these questions in the
contexts of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. As such, it is interested in uncovering and
analyzing the logics through which Mexican and Colombian authorities criminalized
dissent and dealt with criminal –or criminalized– dissenters. It is an analysis that also aims
to shed light on the workings of law, politics, authoritarianism, and state power not only in
Mexico and Colombia but also in modern Latin America.
Overall, this study maintains that governmental responses to political criminality in
Mexico and Colombia were the result of a series of concerns about the maintenance of

Unlawful Assembly: Peterloo and the Changing Face of Political Crime, c1770-1820,” Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 10, no. 3 (1990).
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public order and the relationship between government and dissidence. They originated in
multiple places at the time: in constitutional and criminal law provisions; in legal and
doctrinal conversations; in interpretation of current legislation; in the logics of justice
administration; and in a series of legislative, judicial, and executive acts and decisions.
Similarly, they emerged and evolved in response to changing legal, political, and military
conjunctures and interests, as well as in correspondence with changing dynamics of
political negotiation between governments and opposition. As a consequence, they were
neither uniform nor stable. Fluidity and contingency characterized governmental
understandings to political criminality legal definitions of political offenses, and penalties
against political criminals alike. Legal definitions of political criminality, as well as
governmental responses to political crimes experienced important transformations over
time. Between the late 1870s and the 1910s, the repertoire of actions considered political
offenses increased and diversified in both countries, while official responses to them
became slightly more legalistic and reliant on judicial procedures. It was a subtle process
of “legalization” that suggests a progressive change in the ways in which Mexican and
Colombian governments addressed and reacted to political conflict and violence in their
midst.
The dissertation also argues that legislation on political criminality in Mexico and
Colombia never involved single, uniform notions defining what political crimes were.
Constitutions and criminal codes involved ambiguous, imprecise notions of political
crimes, and did not draw a clear line between “common” and “political” offenses. These
ambiguities shaped a series of legal and constitutional grey areas that gave authorities
ample wiggle room for deciding which offenses were political and how to proceed against
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them. Ultimately, the definition and treatment of political offenders depended less on clear
constitutional and criminal law provisions and more on the discretion of those who
interpreted, applied, and reinvented the law.
These ambiguities and uncertainties impacted the exercise of armed and unarmed
political opposition in at least two ways. On the one hand, they conditioned a changing
legal framework according to which authorities could target and prosecute, as criminal,
almost any manifestation of dissent, from simple opposition journalism to straightforward
insurrection or rebellion. On the other hand, they allowed governments to repress criminal
manifestations of dissent that often pushed the limits of what constitutions and codes
prescribed for the punishment of political offenses –and crimes in general. That is the case,
for instance, of the guarantees of the due process, the principle of no extradition of political
offenders, or the constitutional prohibition of the death penalty for political crimes.
Building on these ambiguous and malleable legal frameworks, responses to
political crimes in Mexico and Colombia often subjected criminal dissenters to alternative
judicial and jurisdictional regimes. They were parallel legalities that involved their own
sets of crimes and punishments and remained under the control of administrative and
military authorities that operated with certain independence from the formal judicial power.
These alternative legalities account for some sort of legal pluralism within the logics of
state law, state power, and state repression in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. They
reveal, for instance, that state law concerning the treatment of political criminals was not
necessarily uniform or coherent, and in certain circumstances could involve multiple, even
conflicting authorities, jurisdictions, and legislations –ordinary and extraordinary,
governmental and military, judicial and administrative, state-centered and international, for
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instance.54 These parallelisms impacted governmental understandings of and responses to
political crimes in different ways. They allowed the emergence of shifting and clashing
definitions of the legal status of criminal(ized) dissenters. Likewise, they sparked legal and
legislative conflicts over the existence of separate legal spheres for the prosecution and
punishment of political crimes and criminals. Moreover, and in more practical terms, they
allowed governments and authorities to put hundreds of dissenters away from the reach
and protections of the formal justice system. It was a maneuver that, for many dissidents
in both countries, translated into scarce judicial guarantees, limitations to the right to
defense, judicial arbitrariness, and lack of proportionality in the administration of
punishment.
Governmental endeavors against criminal dissenters involved much more than
these legal and jurisdictional maneuvers. With the arguments of fighting revolutionary
plots, preventing rebellion, and suppressing insurrections, Mexican and Colombian
governments criminalized both armed and unarmed dissidents, repressed combatants and
non-combatants alike, and generalized repression throughout their entire societies. This
generalization of repression had dramatic manifestations. In Mexico, for instance, it led to
massive imprisonments of journalists; extrajudicial assassinations of dissenters by
paramilitary forces; and even political kidnappings and “forced” extraditions. In Colombia,
it manifested through hundreds of “preventive” imprisonments and confinements; the
realization of dozens of extrajudicial executions; and even the pecuniary punishment of
entire towns just on the grounds of their political affiliation. These experiences account for
54
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repertoires of punishment that combined formal and informal, legal and extralegal, judicial
and extrajudicial penalties for political crimes and criminals, as well as both retributive and
merciful displays of state power. Far from clashing, contradicting, or annulling one
another, these multiple penalties and displays reveal complementary strategies of state
retribution strategically crafted in response to a variety of legal, political, and military
goals. They demonstrate that punishment and retribution did not work in a univocal,
straightforward way, and that governmental responses to political crimes were diverse,
complex, and fluid.
Dissenters in Mexico and Colombia rarely accepted their criminalization and the
legal and judicial treatment that came with it. Just as there was retribution, punishment and
repression, there was also resistance, rejection, bargaining, and negotiation. Resistance to
governmental responses to political crimes sparked heated debates on the constitutional
limits of state power and the interpretation and application of basic constitutional precepts.
Bargaining and negotiation fostered a series of mechanisms of political and legal
transaction between political criminals and authorities that often benefitted both parts. On
the whole, resistance and bargaining had the ambiguous effect of upholding state’s power
and sovereignty while providing criminal dissidents with some degree of redress from the
logics of state punishment.
The dissertation reveals that, despite such commonalities, there were important
differences between the Mexican and the Colombian experiences. Although politics in the
Porfiriato appeared to be more authoritarian than in the Regeneration, the treatment of
political criminals in Mexico involved greater degrees of legal security and judicial
protection than in Colombia. It also encompassed more contained displays of state
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retribution, as well as a more centralized and straightforward administration of justice.
Levels of legal exceptionality underlying the treatment of political offenders were also
different between the two cases. Compared to Colombia, Mexico relied less on
extraordinary, alternative legalities and more on the provisions of its criminal code and the
proceedings and decisions of its ordinary justice system. State law concerning political
crimes was, therefore, more coherent and unified in Mexico than it was in Colombia. In
this second case, the treatment of political criminals was subject to a complex jurisdictional
network of ordinary judges and legislation, military tribunals and laws, and administrative
authorities and prescriptions.
While it is tempting to think that the treatment of political criminals was more
unpredictable, unregulated, and devoid of basic protections in Mexico than in Colombia,
this study shows that the opposite was true. Political criminals in Colombia, unlike their
Mexican counterparts, remained for most of the period at the mercy of a series of logics of
state retribution that unfolded away from the procedures, limitations, and protections of the
ordinary law and the formal justice system. Compared to the Mexican case, procedural
guarantees for political offenders in Colombia were scarce, with a justice system that only
on extraordinary occasions could intervene on their behalf. As authoritarian as the
Porfiriato might have seemed, and as dramatic as its strategies against dissidents were, it
still granted dissidents a series of legal and judicial conditions that dissenters in Colombia
would never be able to fully enjoy.
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Political Crimes and the Scholarship on Mexico, Colombia, and Latin America
Political crimes represent one of the most neglected areas in the historical scholarship on
modern Latin America. To be sure, there is a significant body of historical literature that
addresses, directly and indirectly, the multiple social, political, and legal questions that
were commonly linked to the problems of political criminality and its legal treatment in
the region. Yet, this diverse –and certainly extensive– scholarship commonly pays scarce
attention, if any, to the ways in which modern Latin American societies understood,
defined, debated about, treated, and punished political crimes and criminals. It is a
historiographical limitation that affects not only comparative literature on law, state
formation and civil warfare in the continent, but also scholarship on the legal and political
experiences of nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia.
Comparative studies on state formation and civil warfare in modern Latin America
are particularly rich in social, political, economic, and even legal problematizations. Works
like State Formation and Democracy in Latin America (2000), by Fernando López-Alves,
and Blood and Debt (2002), by Miguel Angel Centeno, offer thorough analyses of the role
of civil warfare in the processes of state making in the region. Monographs like Brian
Loveman’s The Constitution of Tyranny (1993) shed light on the links among law,
constitutionalism, political repression, and authoritarianism in Latin America.
Comparative volumes like Rebecca Earle’s Rumours of Wars: Civil Conflict in NineteenthCentury Latin America (2000) offer additional insights into the social, political, military,
and legal experiences of political conflict and civil warfare in the region. The works by
López-Alves, Centeno, and Loveman share the particularity of considering Latin America
a whole, relatively coherent unit of analysis. Drawing on this methodological premise, each
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author attempts to find regularities and differences among national experiences in the
region by paying attention to specific units of comparison –defined in every case as sociohistorical problems. López-Alves, for instance, compares processes of state building (civilor military-led) and patterns of political and military mobilization of subaltern groups,
specially within contexts of civil warfare. Centeno contrasts modalities of warfare (internal
or external), together with taxation systems. Loveman, finally, compares constitutions and
constitutional provisions regarding state power and public order.
Regardless their specific units of comparison, the three books share an interest in
comparing ways of waging and regulating internal warfare in Latin America. This
comparative preoccupation about civil warfare in the region is also present in this
dissertation. There are, nonetheless, important methodological differences between these
works and this study. The comparative scope of the dissertation is much more restricted,
for instance. Similarly, it does not consider Mexico and Colombia parts of a single,
coherent socio-historical entity. Its unit of comparison is also different, as are the major
problems linked to it. By comparing governmental responses to political criminality in the
Porfiriato and the Regeneration, this study tackles a series of voids that are common to
these other comparative works on civil warfare in modern Latin America. Although they
all deal with issues of rebellion and political repression, none of them consider political
criminality a subject matter on its own, delve into the legal logics of state repression, or
problematize civil warfare in legal terms. This dissertation represents, in this light, an effort
to stimulate comparative studies on Latin American civil wars on the grounds of legal and
political problems that remain poorly explored this far. Studying these conflicts in the
region through comparative questions regarding the treatment of political crimes can offer
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valuable insights into the functioning of politics and law in the history of modern Latin
America.
Literature on rebellion and civil warfare in Colombia and Mexico involves similar
limitations regarding the study of political crimes and criminality. Scholarship on civil wars
is particularly rich in the case of Colombia. General overviews of the country’s many
internal conflicts include Alvaro Tirado’s Aspectos sociales de las guerras civiles in
Colombia (1976); Maria T. Uribe’s Las palabras de la guerra (2006); the volume Ganarse
el cielo defendiendo la religion (2006), edited by Luis Javier Ortiz; and Fernán González’s
Partidos, guerras e Iglesia (2006). These books cover a variety of political, social, and
even cultural aspects, but pay scarce attention to the legal side of these conflicts. That is
also the case of the most important works on the Thousand Days’ War, a conflict that
receives special attention in this monograph. Legal problematizations are practically absent
from the classical works by Charles Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia (1978);
Jorge Villegas, La guerra de los mil días (1979); and Carlos E. Jaramillo, Los guerrilleros
del novecientos (1991). Most recent scholarship on the conflict, including the volume
Memoria de un país en guerra (2001), edited by Gonzalo Sánchez and Mario Aguilera, or
the works by Brenda Escobar, have done little to fill these thematic and disciplinary gaps.55
Literature on the legal dynamics of punishment and mercy in Colombian civil wars
is scarce. Before 2019, only a few works by Mario Aguilera and Joshua Rosenthal paid
direct attention to the legal strategies that governments used to repress rebels and restore
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peace during and after civil conflicts.56 The volume Paz en la república, published in
January 2019, represents perhaps the most notable contribution in this regard. Edited by
Margarita Garrido, the book examines how nineteenth-century governments managed to
give formal and legal closure to the many internal conflicts that erupted throughout the
period. This monograph engages Aguilera’s work by questioning its analysis of the logics
of state punishment and leniency underlying governmental responses to rebellion during
the period. It also addresses Garrido’s volume by offering a more detailed analysis of the
legal instruments that governments used to punish and pardon political criminals, and by
proposing more complex interpretations of the roles of punishment and mercy in contexts
of civil war.
Although less developed than its Colombian counterpart, Mexican scholarship on
rebellion and internal warfare in the nineteenth century also focuses on a variety of political
and social issues. Works like the volume Porfirio Díaz frente al descontento popular
regional (1986), edited by Friedrich Katz; Leticia Reina’s Las rebeliones campesinas en
México (1980); John Tutino’s From Insurrection to Revolution (1986); and Paul
Vanderwood’s The Power of God Against the Guns of Government (1998) are seminal
studies combining approaches from both social and political history. That is also the case
of Will Fowler’s series on Mexican pronunciamientos, which include the volumes Forceful
Negotiations (2011); Malcontents, Rebels, and Pronunciados (2012); and Celebrating
Insurrection (2013). Despite the diversity of their approaches, none of these studies pays
considerable attention to the legal dynamics intervening either in the development of these
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insurrections or in the relationship between authorities and insurrectionists. This relative
neglect of the legal logics of rebellion and civil warfare in Mexico is also present in more
political approaches like the ones by Allen Wells and Gilbert Joseph in Summer of
Discontent, Seasons of Upheaval (1996), and Elliot Young in Catarino Garza’s Revolution
on the Texas-Mexico Border (2004). By problematizing Mexican rebellions in the latenineteenth century through a series of questions that scholars have not explored before in
a systematic way, this monograph opens new ways to understand and analyze the
experience of insurrection in modern Mexico.
Literature on law, crime, and criminality in modern Latin America also entail
analogous limitations concerning the study of political offenses. Comparative volumes like
Reconstructing Criminality in Latin America (2000) and Crime and Punishment in Latin
America (2011), both edited by Carlos Aguirre, only offer and indirect and mostly
superficial approach to the ways in which governments in the region understood and
responded to political crimes. Similar limitations characterize Rosa del Olmo’s
comparative history of Latin American criminology, América Latina y su criminología
(1981). Recent scholarship on crime and criminality in modern Mexico pays a great deal
of attention to the treatment of common offenses and the evolution of criminal law ideas
during the Porfiriato. An example of these works are Pablo Piccato’s City of Suspects
(2001), Elisa Speckman’s Crimen y castigo (2007), and James A. Garza’s The Imagined
Underworld (2007). Although fundamental for understanding the treatment of certain
forms of criminality in the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz, these studies tend to overlook how
important responses to political criminality were in the shaping of the legal experience of
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the Porfiriato. This monograph represents, in this light, an effort to contribute to a new,
more balanced understanding of the functioning of law and politics in Díaz’s regime.
The Colombian case offers a slightly different situation regarding the place of
political crimes in the scholarship on law, crime, and criminality. Although there are no
specific historical studies on the treatment of political crimes in nineteenth-century
Colombia, there is a small but significant number of legal works more or less focused on
the history of political criminality in the country. The most important book in this regard
is Iván Orozco Abad’s Combatientes, rebeldes y terroristas (1992), a study that provides
valuable information regarding the legal treatment of civil warfare in the nineteenth
century. Legal literature on political crimes in Colombia also includes Rafael Flores
Camacho’s El delito político and Luis Carlos Pérez’s Los delitos politicos, two pieces of
legal theory from the 1930s and 1940s. More recently, works like Vivir en Policía (2007),
by Miguel Malagón, and Governar, reformar y encarcelar (2010), by Lina Adarve, have
elaborated on the ways in which Colombian administrations from the late-nineteenth
century used the law to deal with problems of public order. These works, especially those
by Orozco Abad and Adarve, trace a line of legal and historical scholarship that this
dissertation hopes to enhance.
By studying issues of politics, law, public order, and civil warfare, this monograph
also engages more general overviews concerning the political history of Mexico and
Colombia in the late-nineteenth century. Although these broader perspectives are rich in
details about the workings of politics, law, and state power and repression in both countries,
they barely delve into more specific problems concerning political criminality and its legal
treatment. In the Colombian case, these historiographical limitations are particularly
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common in the political literature on the period. Some examples in this regard are Helen
Delphar’s Red Against Blue (1981) and James Sander’s Contentious Republicans (2004) –
still an exemplary study on popular politics in the nineteenth-century Colombia.
Approaches to the Regeneration from the perspective of intellectual history tend to pay
more attention to legal questions linked to matters of political repression, public order, and
civil warfare. That is the case, for instance, of María Melgarejo’s El lenguaje político de
la regeneración (2010), Antonio Barreto’s Venturas y desventuras de la regeneración
(2012), and the volume Miguel Antonio Caro y la cultura de su época (2002), edited by
Rubén Sierra Mejía. Studies directly concerned with issues of public order and civil
warfare during the Regeneration involve clearer references to issues of legislation and
public criminality, offering this monograph a useful bibliographical ground. These works
include, among others, Charles Bergquist’s Coffee and Conflict, Mario Aguilera’s
Insurgencia urbana en Bogotá (1997), and the volume edited by Leopoldo Múnera La
regeneración revisitada (2011).
General overviews on Porfirian Mexico involve different degrees of interest on
issues of political criminality. Questions about the legal workings of Díaz’s
authoritarianism or the ways in which authorities during the Porfiriato responded to
rebellion and insurrection are practically absent from those accounts that privilege social
and intellectual approaches. William Beezley’s Judas at the Jockey Club (1987), together
with Charles Hale’s The Transformation of Mexican Liberalism in the Late-Nineteenth
Century (1989) are two illustrative examples. Overviews privileging a political approach
tend to pay more attention to these questions. That is the case, for instance, of Elisa
Speckman’s contributions to the volumes Nueva Historia Mínima de México (2008) and
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Nueva Historia General de México (2010), or of Romana Falcón’s articles on rebellion and
repression in the Juárez’s and Díaz’s eras.57 Another example in this regard is Paul Garner’s
profile of Porfirio Díaz in the volume A Companion to Mexican History and Culture
(2011). Their study of the legal logics of Porfirian authoritarianism, nonetheless, is for the
most part superficial. It is possible to find more detailed and in-depth approaches on the
matter in literature that deal directly with Díaz’s practices of repression and political
persecution. This scholarship includes, among others, Paul Vanderwood’s Los Rurales
Mexicanos (1982), Collin McLachlan’s Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution (1991),
and Claudio Lomnitz’s The Return of Comrade Ricardo Flores Magón (2014). Certainly
useful for the purposes of this monographs, these works still lack a proper and consistent
legal perspective like the one inspiring this study and its problematizations.
Besides helping fill the mentioned gaps in the legal and political literature on
Mexico, Colombia, and Latin America, this monograph also makes intensive use of a series
of primary sources that scholars on the Porfiriato and the Regeneration have barely
exploited. As most of the literature reviewed above, this study relies on newspapers;
memoires; constitutions and criminal codes; collections of laws and decrees; legislative
debates; and legal and political essays from the period. Yet, unlike many of these works,
this monograph also relies on criminal expedients and judicial reports; rulings from the
Mexican and Colombian Supreme Courts; requests for judicial protection before different
authorities in both countries; petitions for pardon and other modalities of state leniency;
and other documents involving the quotidian negotiation of penalties for political crimes.
57
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These “other,” commonly untapped sources reveal a whole new facet of the legal and
judicial logics of state repression against political crimes and criminals, and provide this
study with fresh, original insights about the historical dynamics of law, governance, and
civil warfare in Mexico and Colombia.

Chapter Outline
This monograph consists of four major sections and six chapters. Each section focuses on
specific problems regarding the governmental treatment of rebellion and political
criminality in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration: legislation and lawmaking; prevention;
repression; and pardon. Section one explores the treatment of rebels and political crimes in
formal constitutional and legal terms. It explores how constitutions as well as criminal and
military codes in Colombia and Mexico understood political criminality, and how such
understandings materialized in particular criminal categories and specific sets of penalties.
It also analyzes how authors of legal doctrine, legal experts, and lawmakers discussed about
what political criminality was and what sort of punishments it deserved. Section two
focuses on matters of prevention, and studies how Colombian and Mexican governments
used in practice both legal and extralegal means in order to prevent episodes of internal
conflict and neutralize revolutionary plots and conspiracies. Section three deals with issues
of repression, and analyzes the repertoire of retributive practices that governments from
both countries had in order to suppress rebellions and punish rebels and other armed
dissidents. Finally, Section four looks at the treatment of political criminals from the
perspective of state leniency. It studies how presidents and other authorities in Colombia
and Mexico combined punishment and mercy in their responses to several modalities of
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political criminality, and analyzes the multiple functions that state mercy had in the
relationship between state and rebels.
The study of legislation comprises the first three chapters, all in Section one.
Chapter one analyzes the conception and treatment of political crimes and criminals in the
Mexican Constitution of 1857 and the Colombian Charter of 1886. It argues, among other
things, that Constitutional understandings of political criminality were closely linked to a
series of concerns regarding the need to maintain public order and institutional stability.
Constitutional dispositions on matters of public order contained several provisions
regarding political crimes and criminals. The particular nature of these provisions helps
explain, to a great extent, the singularities of the legal responses to political crimes that
authorities in Mexico and Colombia put into effect during the period.
Chapter two focuses on the Criminal Codes of 1871 in Mexico and 1890 in
Colombia, and studies how these codifications helped configure a criminal regime for the
definition and punishment of political offenses during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.
It also reflects on the characteristics of the resulting regimes, as well as their impact on the
ways in which Mexican and Colombian authorities criminalized and prosecuted internal
enemies during the period. The chapter shows that both criminal codes addressed political
criminality in relatively similar ways. Yet, there were important differences regarding the
classification of political offenses and the repertoires of offenses defined in each case as
“political.” It also argues that, in both countries, the definition and classification of political
crimes gave governments ample wiggle room for legal interpretation and reinvention
regarding the treatment of “dangerous” political dissidents.
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Chapter three reconstructs and analyzes a series of conversations that accompanied
the making and enactment of constitutional and criminal law prescriptions on political
criminality. These conversations encompassed a wide variety of positions and perspectives
about what political crimes were, what made them criminal, and what made them political.
While some jurists and lawmakers conceived political criminals as enemies of society,
others merely perceived them as political fanatics led by misunderstood notions of “justice”
or “patriotism.” The lack of clarity and consensus on these matters had serious political
and legal consequences both in Mexico and Colombia, playing a substantial role in the
particular ways in which the Porfiriato and the Regeneration responded to political
criminality respectively.
The study of prevention, repression, and mercy corresponds to chapters four, five,
and six, respectively. Chapter four studies how both countries used their respective legal
and constitutional frameworks to prevent civil war, contain revolutionary waves, and
neutralize potentially subversive political dissidents. Focusing on the preventive treatment
of both political crimes and press offenses, it delves into the legal and judicial logics of
political repression vis-à-vis actual or potential threats against public order in the
Regeneration and the Porfiriato. It also sheds lights on the multiple ways in which
governments in both countries understood “prevention” and defined what a “threat against
public order” was. Overall, the chapter argues that governmental efforts aimed at
preventing rebellion and internal turmoil were grounded in a series of laws and decrees that
shaped, in both countries, alternative regimes of legality. Revolving around issues of press
freedom and maintenance of public order, these “parallel legalities” put the prosecution
and judgement of threats against the government and public peace outside the reach of the
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formal laws and ordinary justice. Another effect of these alternative legalities had to do
with the shaping of a practical equivalence between political crimes and press offenses
against public order, which put dissident journalists, rebellion suspects, and political
agitators in a similar criminal category as enemies of the state.
Chapter five reconstructs and analyzes the different responses that Mexican and
Colombian authorities gave to rebellion and revolutionary movements during the period
under study. How did governments use the law and the justice system as mechanisms to
punish rebels and revolutionaries? How “legal” and “judicial” were these responses, and
to what extent did they combine both legal and extra-legal punitive practices? Those are
some of the questions that the chapter tackles. It claims that governmental responses to
rebellion in Colombia and Mexico encompassed a variety of legal, political, and military
purposes that demanded a combination of both “legal” and “non-legal” measures. State
repression, in consequence, was as formal and legalistic as it was informal and extralegal.
In times of internal turmoil, it unfolded simultaneously in the legislation, the courts of
justice, and both within and outside battlefields, involving not only actual rebels and active
combatants but also dissidents of all sorts. Responses to rebellion in both countries turned
political offenses into a flexible criminal category in which crimes and punishments were
mutable and subject to constant redefinition.
Chapter six studies the logics of state mercy by uncovering the multiple ways in
which political criminals in Mexico and Colombia could obtain leniency from their
governments. It reconstructs the multiple forms in which authorities in both counties
administered mercy, and analyzes the functioning of some of the most recurrent
mechanisms for pardoning political offenders in the period –namely, amnesty laws and
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pardon decrees. Besides exploring the workings of these official, legalistic manifestations
of state mercy, the chapter delves into the different ways Mexican and Colombian political
criminals used to negotiate their penalties and claim mercy. State leniency not only
consisted of acts of governmental magnanimity that authorities decided to perform at
certain points during or after an internal conflict across the board or for collective benefit.
It was also something that criminals could obtain in their individual interactions with the
state. The chapter shows that, one way or another, state mercy always came at a price.
Pardons, amnesties, and even individual bargains for mercy, demanded from criminals
their legal and symbolic submission to the state’s authority, as well as the reinvention of
their role as political dissidents. State mercy, in this light, was not only a mechanism for
granting criminals some redress from the logics of state repression, but also a tool to
reinforce state legitimacy, bolster governmental authority, and ensure political submission
and obedience.
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II. CHAPTER 1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC ORDER
AND POLITICAL CRIMINALITY IN THE PORFIRIATO AND THE
REGENERATION

The story of Ricardo Flores Magón, and by extension the experiences of dozens of fellow
political dissidents in Mexico and Colombia during the period, raises a first series of
questions regarding the rules that regulated their actions as citizens. What were the rules
that organized the interactions between citizens and state, established the limits of what
citizens could do as political actors, and limited what the state could and could not do in
its relationship with them? What was the basic normative framework that allowed people
like Flores Magón to carry out their activities as political dissenters while setting the
conditions that made them legal? What were the rules that determined what governments
could do and how far they could go in their responses against the threats posed by political
dissenters? The answers to these questions lie in the constitutional frameworks of both the
Porfiriato and the Regeneration.

Constitutions set up the most basic framework for the legal definition and treatment of
political crimes and criminals in Mexico and Colombia. Prescriptions from criminal codes,
legislative and administrative decrees, executive orders, and every other legal act that
criminalized and punished political offenses in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration drew to
a certain point on constitutional provisions on the matter. This chapter explores how the
Constitutions that were in order during the period conceived and understood political
crimes. It also reconstructs and analyzes how these Charters laid down the foundations for
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the further crafting of legal responses to political criminality during the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration. How much attention did these Constitutions pay to issues of political
criminality? What kind of definitions and treatments of political crimes did they involve or
make possible? What were the major concerns that, in these Constitutions, were linked to
matters of political criminality? And, ultimately, how did these constitutional frameworks
help understand the particular ways in which authorities in the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration responded to political crimes and criminals? These are the major questions
guiding this chapter.
The Chapter focuses on the 1857 Mexican Constitution and the 1886 Colombian
Charter. Part one reconstructs the history and trajectories of the constitutional regimes that
were in place during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. It pays special attention to the
ways in which these regimes addressed concerns about public order and state power. Part
two offers a comparative exam of the ways in which both Charters addressed issues of
public order, internal conflict and turmoil, “dangerous” dissidence, and political
criminality. Focusing on four sets of constitutional prescriptions, this section explores how
the search for order, peace, and stability shaped in both nations similar provisions regarding
rights and guarantees, limitations of state power, and even administration of punishment
and mercy. Part three offers, by way of conclusion, an analysis of the legal frameworks
stemming from these prescriptions, and of the ways in which they helped shape the
authorities’ treatment of political crimes in Colombia and Mexico throughout the period.
On the whole, the chapter develops four major arguments. The first claim is that,
despite their different origins, both Charters coincided on their insistence on the need for
maintaining public order and institutional stability. The second argument contends that this
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premise materialized in a relatively common set of prescriptions limiting liberties,
suspending guarantees, and providing extraordinary powers in cases of emergency. A third
contention is that concerns about political criminality were present, directly and indirectly,
in almost all of these prescriptions. A final argument, linked to the previous one, affirms
that most of these provisions concerning political crimes had a vague nature that provided
authorities with a great window for legal interpretation and reinvention. It is this vagueness
what helps explain, to a great extent, the particularities of the legal responses to political
crimes that authorities in Mexico and Colombia put into effect during the Porfiriato and
the Regeneration.

Constitutions in Context: From 1857 to 1886
The Mexican 1857 Constitution: from Atuyla to the Porfiriato
The 1857 Mexican Constitution was born out of the triumphant Revolution of Ayutla, the
civil war that overthrew dictator Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in 1855. It was the product
of a coalition of liberal and conservative forces that had rebelled against a highly
centralized, authoritarian, and personalistic regime.58 In correspondence with this
revolutionary spirit, the charter leaned towards liberalism and thus heavily emphasized the
protection of individual rights, the separation and independence of public powers, and the
federative nature of the Mexican Nation. It also created a popular, representative, and
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federal republic, and established a political regime in which Congress concentrated most
of the public power at the expense of the Executive. Against a past of despotism, the new
Constitution attempted to reduce the President’s powers almost to its minimal expression,
granting the Executive only the authority necessary to be respected both within the nation
and abroad.59 Additionally, and for the first time in Mexican history, the Constitution
included a comprehensive bill of rights and set up the Federal Government as its guarantor.
These rights granted Mexicans complete equality under the law, freedom of press and
speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of education, among other individual rights.60
The novelty of this bill of rights allowed Mexican constitution makers to proclaim that they
had enacted the “most democratic” constitution that the nation had ever seen.61
The inclusion of a bill of rights at the very beginning of the Charter not only
represented to Mexican constitution makers a major step towards the liberal and
enlightened ideal of a citizenry with full individual rights. It represented, as well, a crucial
mechanism of defense against despotism and state authoritarianism. Constitutional rights
set the limits of state power and authority in the daily routine of politics and public
administration. The establishment of the mechanism of judicial amparo, another novelty
of the 1857 Constitution, reinforced these limits and provided Mexicans with a means to
defend themselves against eventual abuses from judicial authorities. The amparo
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mechanism allowed individuals to request, before the nation’s Supreme Court of Justice,
the revision and eventual suspension of judicial sentences that, in their opinion, violated
their constitutional rights.62 Through the constitutional amparos, the 1857 Charter ensured
the existence of a judicial system regulated by the law and guarantor of people’s rights.63
By the time Porfirio Díaz came to power, the 1857 Constitution had experienced
important challenges and reforms. In 1858, right after its enactment, president Ignacio
Comonfort suspended it with the argument that it was impossible to govern with it. It would
not be the first time a Mexican president would disown the new Constitution under such
pretenses.64 Additionally, the progressive dissolution of the revolutionary alliance between
liberals and conservatives brought civil war back. The Reform War shook Mexico between
1858 and 1860. Its outcome gave way to the French Intervention and the creation of
Mexico’s Second Empire between 1862 and 1867. Almost a decade of civil warfare left
behind important constitutional changes and a complete redefinition of the priorities
regarding law and order. Reforms included the enactment in 1859 and 1860 of the “Leyes
de reforma,” a series of provisions separating State and Church and secularizing the
nation’s political life. Further modifications throughout the 1870s altered the structure and
functioning of the legislative power. More importantly, during the 1860s and 1870s, the
social and political turmoil caused by civil warfare and foreign intervention gradually
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turned “order” into a more important premise than “law.” Overall, the Constitution
responded to the changing priorities and veered towards the right.
Growing concerns about public order and peace characterized the post-Intervention
administrations of Benito Juarez (1868-1872) and Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (1872-1876).
Such concerns materialized in a progressive concentration of public powers in the hands
of the President. The restoration of the republic after the Intervention hastened a gravitation
toward a strong executive at the expense of the Congress.65 The decade preceding the
arrival of Porfirio Díaz witnessed increasing levels of centralism and presidentialism, as
well as continuous suspensions of constitutional rights as a means to fight banditry and
political insurgency.66 The late years of Juarez’s administration left in their wake a
personalistic style of governance, a strengthening of the Executive, a legacy of electoral
manipulation and co-optation, and an authoritarian and repressive trend concerning the
maintenance of public order and peace.67 By the time Díaz came to power, little remained
of the foundational spirit of the 1857 Constitution. To a certain point, Díaz’s constitutional
authoritarianism was the result of two decades of political and legal transformations
fostered by Juarez and Lerdo.
Diaz gave continuity to the trend of concentrating power initiated by Juarez and
Lerdo. After the Tuxtepec revolution that brought him to power, “peace,” “order,” and
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“progress” became the government’s top priorities. After decades of civil warfare, and
facing a long legacy of internal conflict and division, peace seemed to be Mexico’s utmost
desire. Peace, in terms of the prominent Porfirista Justo Sierra, was meant to become
Mexico’s political religion. It demanded the sacrifice of everything, even the Constitution
itself.68 Such goal required a powerful Executive, capable of ruling without interferences
from other public powers. Overtime, Diaz would succeed in concentrating the sum of all
powers without threatening or altering –at least not significantly- the constitutional model
of Ayutla. Respectful of the division of public powers, he managed to control both the
Congress and the courts via cooptation, eroding the independence of both powers and
turning them into mere appendixes of the Executive.69
In general terms, the Constitutional framework of the Porfiriato remained relatively
loyal to the original forms and precepts of the 1857 Charter: separation of powers –at least
formally–, respect for individual rights, and subjection of public powers to the rule of law.
The interpretation and application of these precepts during the age of Díaz, nonetheless,
would differ significantly from the original goals of the Constituents of Ayutla. This would
prove particularly true in matters concerning the managing of public order and the
protection of individual guarantees for political dissidents, rebels, and other internal
enemies of the government, as we will see in the next sections.
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A Charter for Colombia’s Regeneration: The 1886 Constitution
The Colombian 1886 Constitution was the result of a story relatively different from the
Mexican one. In contrast to its Mexican counterpart, it emerged out of a failed rebellion:
the Liberal uprising of 1885. The government’s victory in the war marked the demise of
the radical, libertarian, and federalist regime in place in the nation since the early 1860s.
Soon after the conflict’s end, president Rafael Nuñez, a moderate liberal that throughout
the decade had managed to win the support of both conservatives and liberals alike,
organized a Constituent Assembly. Its goal was to reform the Constitution enacted in 1863,
considered by many as the main cause of the political instability facing the nation since the
mid 1860s. The resulting charter was very different from the Mexican case. The new
Colombian Constitution replaced the federative model adopted in 1863 with a centralized
political and administrative regime, and established limits to the unrestricted liberties that
the previous Constitution had granted. Along the same lines, the 1886 charter created a
weak Legislative power in benefit of the Executive, and recognized the Catholic Church as
a vital institution in matters of public education, social order, and national identity. It was,
in short, a deeply conservative constitution, meant to bring order and stability through a
strong central government, a narrowing of constitutional guarantees, and a concentration
of public powers in the hands of the Executive.
Like the Mexican charter, the Colombian Constitution of 1886 pursued a radical
rupture with the past. In this case, the constitution makers aimed to break up with a past of
disorder, administrative chaos, and civil warfare engendered –at least in the Constituents’
opinion– by the federative system and the unrestricted liberties that the 1863 Constitution
had granted. The long series of regional uprisings experienced between late 1860s and mid-
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1880s, together with the eruption of two national civil wars in 1876 and 1885, seemed to
support their calls for a radical normative change. Delegates to the 1885 Constitutional
Assembly focused on two major problems that, to moderate Liberals and Conservatives,
had turned Colombia into an “organized anarchy” –an anarchy that could only lead to the
perpetuation of civil warfare and the nation’s defragmentation.70 The first problem had to
do with the federative model adopted in the previous Constitution. To Nuñez and his
people, mid-century federalism had been nothing but “a desire for disorganization” that
had been carried out to the point of “dividing what is indivisible by nature.”71 The
“exaggerated” decentralization introduced by the 1863 Charter was and had been, in their
opinion, a major source of chaos, disorder, and internal strife.
The second problem had to do with the generous bill of rights that the previous
Constitution had established. To the 1885 delegates, the 1863 charter had granted too many
rights but not a single actual guarantee.72 The unrestricted nature of such liberties implicitly
invalidated the duties that should counter-balance those rights.73 Furthermore, the overly
generous liberties had annulled another crucial right: the government’s right to repress any
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abuse of other liberties.74 All these liberties, in their account, had proven harmful to social
order. The unlimited right of association had fostered the emergence of revolutionary
groups. The absolute immunity of the freedoms of speech and press had made legitimate
the appeal to all sorts of crime, especially crimes against the government and the public
order. The incorporation of the International Law in cases of civil warfare –a mechanism
that the 1863 Constitution had adopted in order to regularize and humanize internal
conflicts– had legitimized rebellion and guaranteed the total impunity of political
criminals.75 The 1863 Constitution, in short, had consecrated a series of “new,
contradictory, and inapplicable” principles that had proven incapable of creating a stable
social order.76
The 1885 delegates conceived order and stability as the outcomes of two premises:
strong government and limited liberties. Nuñez believed that young nations like Colombia
required a great degree of state intervention and control. In correspondence, he advocated
for a strong, centralized, and efficient state, able to inspire respect for authority, secure
political stability, and limit individual rights for the benefit of society.77 He also believed
that society’s needs should set the limits for individual freedom, and that the goal of politics
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was to promote the general well-being over the particular needs and interests of
individuals.78 These beliefs were in tune with the ones of the Conservative Miguel Antonio
Caro, who drafted the bulk of the project for the new Constitution. Caro conceived society
as an organic whole that was superior than the sum of individuals composing it. To him,
the state was supposed to protect society’s rights, instead of securing individual freedoms.
Society was a community in which every single individual had to give up some of their
rights in order to benefit the collectivity, and the state was meant to protect the existence
of that community.79
Guided by such premises and conceptions, the 1885 delegates aimed to create a
Constitution able to guarantee national unity, social order, and political stability over and
above the protection of individual rights. Colombia’s regeneration required a realistic and
protective Charter, not a “chimerical” and “prejudicial” work like its predecessor. Its
central goals should be the prevention of any further subversions of public order and the
achievement of peace, as the first and foremost condition for social, economic, and political
progress.80 To Núñez and his people, the achievements of such goals depended on the
materialization of three central principles: political centralization, presidentialism, and
authoritarian control of public liberties.81 In correspondence with these premises, the new
Constitution turned the Executive into the strongest public power, while respecting the
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basic premise of division of powers. The Delegates extended the presidential period from
two to six years; gave the president wide administrative and judicial powers; allowed him
to intervene in legislative matters; and gave him almost unrestricted extraordinary powers
in cases of emergency.82 This concentration of power would prove decisive in issues
regarding public order and internal warfare throughout the next decades. As we will see
later, the legal management of rebellion, insurrection, and “dangerous” political opposition
would become almost exclusively a matter of emergency legislation by the Executive.

Mexico and Colombia: Between Differences and Commonalities
As legal productions and artifacts, the 1857 Mexican Charter and its 1886 Colombian
counterpart emerged from different processes, circumstances, and needs. Born out of
different historical moments, both Constitutions originally established dissimilar political
and administrative regimes, and even entailed different perspectives regarding public
liberties, individual guarantees, and public order. Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth
century, the constitutional trajectories of both countries would share a common ground of
strong presidentialism, political centralization, and management by the Executive power
of issues pertaining to public order.
The need for preventing political disorder and internal strife would become a major
priority for Mexican and Colombian governments alike, shaping over time relatively
similar political and constitutional transformations. In both cases, the search for order,
peace, and political instability ended up transforming the mid-century idea that
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Constitutions and public powers had to protect the individual against the state’s power –or
against state’s abuses. As a result, by the end of the century, the prevailing idea was that
charters and governments had to protect society against individuals abusing their own
liberties. This transition from the individual to society as subject of constitutional
protection was not exclusive of the Mexican and Colombian cases, and in fact characterized
many Latin American nations by the end of the century. It was yet another manifestation
of the parable of modern republicanism in nineteenth-century Latin America.83
These similarities regarding individual rights, state power, and maintenance of
public order help explain the multiple coincidences between the ways in which the
Porfirian and the Regenerationist governments conceived political criminality and
responded to rebellion, insurrection, and “dangerous” political dissidence. It is time now
to take a closer look at those Constitutions, in order to see with detail their prescriptions
and understandings in matters of public order, individual liberty, civil conflict, and internal
enmity.

Liberties, Order, and Internal Enmity in the Mexican and Colombian Constitutions
Mexico’s and Colombia’s respective Constitutions tackled issues of public order, internal
conflict and turmoil, “dangerous” dissidence, and political criminality through a relatively
similar set of mandates and prescriptions.84 Overall, these common mandates had to do
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with the application of the death penalty and other punishments, the delimitation and
restriction of certain individual liberties, and the granting of extraordinary powers to the
Executive in cases of public emergency. Although only a few of these provisions included
specific references to political crimes, they all revolved around issues directly and
indirectly linked to matters of political criminality. “Disruptions of and conspiracies
against public order,” “alterations of public peace,” and even “press crimes against the
government” represented some of the most recurrent examples in this regard.

Death Penalty, Political Crimes, and Constitutional Exceptions
One of the few literal references to “political crimes” included in both Constitutions
concerned the ban on the application of penalties of death and extradition for political
crimes. Article 23 of the Mexican Charter explicitly declared the abolition of capital
punishment for political criminals, but left it in place for a series of crimes including treason
during foreign war; road banditry (salteadores de caminos); arson; parricide; and homicide
with premeditation. Serious military offenses, as well as some “piracy crimes defined by
the law,” also fell into this category. Additionally, Article 15 of the same Constitution
established that political crimes were also exempt from the penalty of extradition –a
prescription not included in the 1886 Colombian charter but later include in its Criminal
Code (Art. 18). Mexican constitution makers of the 1850s celebrated the abolition of capital
punishment for political criminals considering it a first and significant step towards the
complete abolition of a “barbaric,” “ineffective,” and “sterile” punishment.85
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Colombian constitution makers did not have abolition in mind when they crafted
the charter’s prescriptions on death penalty. The 1886 Constitution, in fact, reestablished
capital punishment in Colombia after more than two decades of its initial abolition.
Delegates based its reestablishment on the grounds that the current situation of the country
and its problems of “instability” and “insecurity” demanded its reestablishment, mainly as
an additional guarantee for the “conservation of order” and the “consolidation of the new
institutions.”86 Colombian constitutional mandates on death penalty were relatively similar
to the Mexican case. Articles 29 and 30 prohibited the application of death penalty to
political crimes, but brought it back as a punishment for the most serious expressions of a
series of crimes. Such offenses included treason during foreign war, parricide, murder,
arson, piracy, some military offenses in correspondence with military law, and asalto en
cuadrilla de malhechores –an offense more or less analogous to the crime of banditry in
Mexico. It is noteworthy that, despite the significant legal and political implications of such
prohibitions, neither of these Constitutions clearly established what political crimes were.
These offenses would remain in both charters as part of an abstract criminal typology,
devoid of precise content, that judges and legislators could define –and redefine– at their
will.

Of Freedom and Order: Drawing the Limits of Individual Liberties
Out of the different individual liberties that both Constitutions granted to Mexican and
Colombian citizens, freedoms of speech and press involved the clearest and most direct
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links with constitutional concerns on public order, political turmoil, and internal enmity.
Articles 6 and 7 of the Mexican charter set the conditions for and limits of both freedoms.
Article 6 established that the manifestation of ideas was free from any judicial or
administrative inquiry as long as it did not attack morals, affect other people’s rights,
encourage the commission of a particular crime, or disturbed public order. Article 7
proclaimed the inviolability of the freedom of writing and publishing pieces on any subject.
No law or authority could establish previous censorship to publications or repress the
freedom or press. Three basic criteria, nonetheless, established basic limits to this liberty:
respect for people’s private lives, respect for morality, and respect for public peace. The
transgression of such limits constituted what the Article defined as “press offenses.” The
Constitution also created two separated tribunals for judging this kind of crimes: one that
decided on the criminal nature of the text in question, and another that imposed the
corresponding penalty.
Freedom of the press in the Colombian charter was subject of a simpler but less
precise definition. Article 42 merely established that the press was free in times of peace,
although accountable before the law when it attacked people’s honor, social order, or public
peace. Additionally, a transitory “Article K” prescribed that, while the authorities enacted
a printing act (ley de prensa), the government had all the power to prevent and repress
“print abuses.” Unlike the Mexican charter, the Colombian Constitution did not specify
what those “abuses” were. Throughout the rest of the century, governments would issue a
series of laws and decrees, mostly during moments of high political tension, defining and
redefining time and again these “abuses” and their corresponding penalties. None of these
further decrees had the character of a formal, stable, and definitive Printing Act, though.
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Legal developments on matters of freedom of the press involved several attempts
to limit this liberty under the pretext of protecting public order and peace. A first decree,
enacted on November 1886, established for the first time a definite set of press crimes
against social order and public peace.87 Crimes against public peace (tranquilidad pública)
involved publications encouraging people to disobey the law or exert violence against
public authorities. It also included publications that encouraged resistance to the
authorities’ orders, that “fired up passions,” or that incited people to riot or rebel. Penalties
in these cases ranked from short arrests and fines to the shutdown of the correspondent
printing press. New developments on the matter came with the enactment of Decree 151
of 1888.88 It prescribed that from then on it was the Executive, instead of the Judicial
power, the one in charge of adjudicating cases of press offenses against social order and
public peace. The 1888 Decree also created a new category of press crimes that fell under
the Executive’s jurisdiction: “press offenses against society,” comprising about a dozen
different crimes. Offenses included “attacking the mandatory force of laws;” “trying to
justify acts conceived by law as crimes;” “disregarding or insulting the prerogatives of any
civil or ecclesiastical authority;” and disseminating “fake news” that could lead to
alteration of public order. A law from August 1897 would make this list of crimes even
longer, by creating a category of “subversive press crimes” involving up to 17 different
offenses.89
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In the Mexican case, prescriptions on freedom of press also experienced important
developments. In February 1868, president Juárez enacted a Press Act that complemented
the prescriptions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Mexican charter.90 The Act defined with greater
detail than before the acts that represented press offenses against private life, public
morality, and public order. Article 5 defined as press crimes against public order those texts
that encouraged citizens to disobey the law or the legitimate authorities, or that incited
them to use force against authorities. The law also established a series of penalties for
offenses against public order (Article 8), consisting primarily of small periods of
confinement. A second major development in this regard took place in 1883, after the first
presidential period of Porfirio Díaz. This time, president Manuel González, considering the
tribunals for press offenses inefficient and troublesome, opted for suppressing them. A
reform ordered in May that year established that, from then on, all press crimes had to be
judged by ordinary tribunals like any other offense.91 The demise of press tribunals would
give federal and provincial authorities a better and more direct control over the prosecution
and punishment of press offenses and offenders, especially in relationship with crimes
against public order. By the late 1880s legislation on the press in both countries ended up
converging not only in terms of their classification of press crimes, but also in their decision
yo give governments a more direct control over press offenses against public order.
Compared to freedom of press, freedom of association was subject of a less detailed
elaboration. Its conditions and limitations, nonetheless, also reflected constitutional
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concerns about the maintenance of public order and peace, especially in the Colombian
case. Article 9 of the Mexican Charter established that all Mexicans had the right of
creating or being part of any association as long as it had a peaceful character and a lawful
goal. Only Mexican citizens could be part of political associations or establish collectivities
with the aim of taking part in the nation’s political affairs. Finally, no armed collectivity –
i.e. the military– had the right to engage in political deliberation. Restrictions were greater
in the Colombian case. Article 46 of the 1886 Constitution prescribed that people were free
to reunite or associate in a pacific way, and gave authorities the power to dissolve every
meeting or congregation that took a tumultuous or riotous nature. Article 47 allowed
Colombians to create and make part of public and private associations as long as they were
not contrary to public morality or legal order. The article also banned permanent popular
political associations. It was a prohibition tending to contain the emergence and functioning
of masonic lodges, “democratic” and “popular” societies, and other similar popular
political associations.92 Many of the constituents of 1885 considered that the boom of these
associations during the 1860s and 1870s had significantly contributed to the political
instability and turmoil prevailing during the Federative period.93
Colombian regulations on the right of association also experienced important
developments throughout the period, especially on matters of public order and
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“subversive” agitation. A law from May 1888 granted the president the right to suspend or
shut down every society of institution that, under scientific or academic pretenses, were a
“focus of subversive ideas or revolutionary propaganda.”94 More than a decade later, a
decree from October 1904 established that authorities had the responsibility of policing all
meetings and reunions in order to identify their “true tendencies” and intentions.95 The
Decree authorized national police to inspect every current or future association and make
sure they did not involve activities or purposes tending to endanger national security or
promote crimes, riots, or other alterations of public peace. Additionally, the Decree
prohibited the formation of any political society or association with political goals, and
established a series of fines and penalties of arrest for people promoting these sort of
gatherings of taking part in them. Finally, the order established that political rallies and
meetings had to request a previous authorization from the local police chief to take place.

Public Order and Emergency Powers: Redrawing the Limits of State Power in times of
War
Separation and independence of public power represented one of the foundational premises
of modern Constitutionalism in Mexico and Colombia, and both the 1857 Constitution and
the 1886 charter aligned with this principle respectively. Constitutional provisions in this
regard not only aimed to prevent extreme presidentialism, but also were meant to avoid, at
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least theoretically, the politicization of the legislative and judicial functions. Article 50 of
the Mexican Constitution and 75 of its Colombian counterpart implicitly or explicitly
prohibited the fusion or reunion of two or more powers into a single individual or
corporation. In addition, the Mexican Charter forbade that a single individual concentrated
the nation’s legislative power.
The separation and limitation of public powers, nonetheless, were conditional. As
constitutional principles, their existence remained limited to times of peace and normality.
Disorder, war, and internal turmoil represented conditions of exception that, according to
both charters, made possible their redefinition. In times of severe disruption of public
peace, these Constitutions authorized their respective governments to grant the Executive
“extraordinary faculties” or “emergency powers,” a measure that allowed presidents to
legislate without the intervention of the Congress. The concession of extraordinary powers
implied a temporal and partial interruption of the constitutional regime, allowing not only
an appropriation of legislative functions by the Executive, but also eventual suspensions of
constitutional guarantees.
Constitutional states of emergency in Mexico and Colombia did not necessarily
coincide. The Mexican Charter, in Article 29, established that during moments of foreign
invasion, severe disturbance of public peace, or any other situation that “put society in great
danger or conflict,” the president could suspend the individual liberties and guarantees
granted in the Constitution. The suspension, which also granted the Executive legislative
powers in matters of constitutional liberties, did not include those guarantees that protected
people’s lives. In the Colombian case, two articles established complementary dispositions
on disorder and emergency powers. Article 61 of the 1886 Charter established that, in
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times of peace, no person or corporation could simultaneously exercise civic, military, or
judicial authority. This implied that, in cases of a major disruption of public peace, the
seizure of judicial functions by non-judicial authorities emerged as a possible and
legitimate option. Additionally, Article 121 prescribed that, in cases of “disruption of
public order,” this is, in circumstances of “external or internal commotion,” the president
could establish the state of siege all over the republic or in parts of it. According to the
article, the declaration of the state of siege invested the Executive will all the powers
“granted by the national law and the law of nations” to “defend the nation’s prerogatives
or to prevent the uprising.” As in the Mexican case, these powers included the faculty to
legislate without the interference of the Congress.
Provisions on states of emergency in Mexico and Colombia had at least three major
points in common. First, they made the Executive the central figure in the management of
public order, strengthening its faculties to the point of granting it true legislative powers.
States of emergency were, therefore, junctures of strong presidentialism. Second, an urgent
sense of “social danger” legitimized this extraordinary concentration of public powers.
Society was “in great danger” when public order was disrupted and public peace ceased to
exist. The source could be an external threat, but also, and predominantly, a plausible
internal menace: an “internal conflict,” like the Mexican Charter implied, or an “internal
commotion” or an “uprising,” as stated in the Colombian Constitution. Third, these
situations of danger, conflict, or commotion were rather abstract and imprecise. Besides a
“foreign invasion” or an “uprising,” there were no major indications in the Constitutions
regarding which circumstances in particular made a state of emergency possible or
demanded a state of siege. In both cases, the vagueness of these dispositions shaped a sort
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of “constitutional grey area” that governments during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration
used to their advantage on more than one occasion.
In Mexico, the administrations of Juárez, Lerdo, and Díaz constantly resorted to
these prerogatives in order to enact special laws against bandits and salteadores, and even
against insurrectional and rebellious groups.96 By the turn of the century, the constitutional
suspension of individual rights allowed president Díaz to strengthen his legal responses to
the emerging forces of anarchism, socialism, and labor unionism.97 Similarly, between
1857 and the final days of the Porfiriato, the Mexican Congress granted the federal
Executive extraordinary powers on a number of occasions.98 During the last two decades
of the nineteenth century, President Díaz used these powers to create special military units
and extend the power and jurisdiction of military tribunals in the prosecution of
“dangerous” civilians. A law from December 12, 1884, for instance, gave Díaz special
power (“las facultades necesarias”) to reorganize the national army and navy, as well as
to reform the administration of military justice.99 Although the law established that these
powers were valid only until November 1885, Díaz managed to invoke this law in order to
legitimize “special” legislation even by the turn of the century. That was, for instance, the
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case of the law that created, on October 1900, the infamous Segunda Reserva,100 an army
unit commonly used for political purposes during the early 20th century. A decree from
May 1901 would grant Díaz similar legislative powers that he would use for erecting new
military tribunals and reforming the current penal and procedural laws concerning military
justice and its jurisdiction.101
In the Colombian case, these “grey areas” gave Regenerationist authorities plenty
of room for legal reinvention in matters of public order and political repression. A law from
May 1888 that partially regulated the exercise of extraordinary powers, for instance,
authorized the president to administratively prevent and repress all crimes and offenses
against the State that impacted public order.102 Offenses included “conspiracies against
public order,” as well as attacks against private or public property that involved, to the
president’s eyes, threats of perturbation of public peace. Penalties for such offenses
included temporal loss of political rights, confinement, and even expatriation. Colombian
authorities declared the state of siege at least twice before the turn of the century, and in
both cases used the state of constitutional emergency as a vehicle for passing laws and
decrees against political opponents. A riot in Bogotá in early 1893 led President Caro to
establish the state of siege in the city for 40 days. During that period, authorities shut down
several liberal newspapers and ordered the confinement of several rioters, many of them
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members of the Liberal party and journalists from the opposition.103 In 1899, four months
before the outbreak of the War of the Thousand Days, President Sanclemente established
the state of siege in a portion of the country fearing an internal uprising sparked by a recent
revolution in Venezuela.104 Again, the state of siege allowed conservative authorities to
arrest and imprison several members of and journalists from the liberal party, accused of
conspiring against public peace.105
The constitutional experiences of Colombia and Mexico regarding states of
emergency and extraordinary powers did not represent an anomaly or a rarity in the Latin
American context of the time. Nineteenth-century Latin American nations enacted about a
hundred different constitutions, and only a couple of them –curiously, the Colombian
constitutions of 1853 and 1863- did not include provisions for regimes of emergency.106
Provisions of emergency included, sometimes individually, sometimes together,
suspension of individual rights, voiding of specific rights and liberties, as well as
significant expansion of the government’s authority through extraordinary powers.107 On
the whole, constitutional regimes of exception in Latin America stemmed from the
combination of a variety of factors including militaristic tendencies within the ruling
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parties; contexts of entrenched internal strife or civil warfare; deep-rooted legacies of
authoritarianism; and even conversations with constitutional developments from the
United States and, specially, Europe. Problems of order, internal conflict, and state making
were not exclusive to Latin American nations in the nineteenth century. In Europe, Spain,
France, Prussia and others were also dealing with extremely high levels of political
upheaval, and experimenting with different constitutional solutions merging remnants of
traditional absolutism with modern constitutionalism.108 Emergency powers became, in
such context, a recurrent resource for European constitution makers. The French
Constitution of 1814, as well as the Spanish Charters of 1837, 1845, and 1848, for instance,
played a major role in shaping Latin American constitutional regimes of exception.109
The inclination of Latin America’s nineteenth-century constitutionalism towards
states of emergency and extraordinary powers was not simply the result of automatic
authoritarian trends, desires for a “constitutional dictatorship,” mimicry of foreign
constitutional developments, or mere fears of political opposition. Neither was it a “natural
solution” to counter-balance the generally wide individual liberties and guarantees
established in the Constitutions of the time, as Loveman seems to suggest in his book on
states of emergency in Latin American constitutionalism. Constitutional exceptions were,
above all, preventive provisions aiming to provide governments with additional legal
resources to protect and restore public order and peace in nations plagued by conflict and
division. Nineteenth-century Latin American governments had to deal with racially and
culturally heterogeneous societies, political divisions, conflicting political cultures,
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regional rivalries of all sorts, significant degrees of political exclusion, commonly violent
partisan rivalries, territorial conflicts with neighboring nations, and even threats of foreign
invasion. Order, in such convoluted contexts, was a complex and difficult to achieve goal;
one that required significant degrees of legal intervention and political meddling. Mexico
and Colombia were not exceptions to that trend.

A Demanding Regeneration: Other Constitutional Prescriptions on Public Order in
Colombia
The Colombian Delegates of 1885 did not reduce their search for order to the previous set
of common constitutional provisions. Besides its restriction to press and associationism,
and its mandates on states of siege, the 1886 charter contained a few other dispositions on
matters of public order, internal threats to public peace, and political criminality. They
included limitations to procedural guarantees against potential subversives, selective
suspensions of the right to property, and dispositions on state leniency vis-à-vis political
crimes.
Procedural guarantees in the 1886 Charter did not greatly differ from other Latin
American constitutions of the period. Both this constitution and its Mexican counterpart,
for instance, recognized the principles of due process, nullum crime sine lege –no crime
exists without a previous formal law–, and no retroactivity of law.110 Articles 27 and 28 of
the Colombian Constitution, nonetheless, established important limits to these guarantees.
Article 27 prescribed that they did not prevent, at any point, public authorities from
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arresting or fining people that “slandered” or “offended them” in matters concerning their
job and functions. In such cases, a quick, efficient punishment seemed to be more important
than any legal or judicial formality. This prescription would have a significant effect on
the way in which Colombian authorities attempted to control the exercise of political
opposition, and particularly the actions of dissident journalists. As for article 28, it
established a second and more serious exception. It stated that in times of tranquility, if the
government had serious reasons for fearing a sudden alteration of public peace, state
authorities were able to arrest and detain people suspected of infringing or conspiring
against public order and peace. These arrests had a preventive nature and did not have to
follow usual legal or judicial formalities. Neither did they have they to correspond to a
specific or pre-established crime. To the Regenerationist constitution makers, the need for
protecting order was above the need of protecting Colombians against eventual acts of state
arbitrariness.
The suspension of constitutional protections also affected the right to property.
Although the Colombian charter did not prescribe the suspension of individual rights in
times of emergency, it still contained a subtle but important exception: in times of turmoil,
property rights of internal enemies partially ceased to exist. Article 32 dictated that, in
times of peace, nobody could be deprived of their property unless there were formal and
previously established judicial reasons. Article 33, nonetheless, established that in times of
war, and only for the purpose of “helping the reestablishment of order,” authorities outside
the Judicial power were allowed to decree expropriations with no previous compensation.
It also allowed authorities to temporarily occupy properties as a selective pecuniary
penalty. In the context of an internal conflict, this penalty would logically fall on the
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government’s adversaries. The prescription, as arbitrary as it sounds, was nonetheless a
less drastic version of what some of the 1885 constitution makers originally wanted. At the
Constituent Assembly, several delegates had proposed that the charter allowed legislators
to impose penalties of confiscation –otherwise banned by the Constitution– against rebel
ringleaders. Such confiscations were meant to cover war expenses with the enemy’s
property and money. Delegates backed up the idea with the argument that, during a war,
the adversary was always accountable for the conflict’s costs.111 Although their proposition
did not succeed, this argument would loom large in the minds of Regenerationist
authorities, especially in the context of the Thousand Days War.112
The third additional feature in these matters, one that unlike the others mentioned
above Colombia’s Constitution did not share with Mexico’s, was its explicit reference to
political crimes in the definition of the faculties of both the President and Congress to grant
indultos and amnesties. Both charters determined that the administration of state mercy
corresponded to the Executive and the Legislative at different levels. While the Congress
was in charge of declaring general amnesties, the President could grant individual
indultos.113 Up to that point, there was no difference at all between the two Constitutions.
Yet, the scope of these official acts of mercy differed between one Charter and another: in
Mexico, amnesties and indultos had a general, comprehensive nature; in Colombia, on the
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contrary, they were mostly limited to political crimes.114 Article 119 of the 1886
Constitution prescribed that the president could commute death sentences, concede
reductions of sentence for common offenses, and grant indultos for political crimes. In the
same light, Article 76 dictated that the Congress could issue amnesties for political
offenses, but only in response to “serious motives of public convenience.” Specific
references to political crimes in these prescriptions can be interpreted as yet another sign
of the fact that, to a great extent, the 1885 delegates crafted a Constitution that foresaw
more moments of internal conflict than of actual peace.

Conclusions: Constitutions, Order, and Political Crimes
The 1857 Mexican Constitution and the 1886 Colombian charter set up the basic legal
framework for the development of conceptions of and responses to political crimes during
the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. Such framework essentially consisted of a series of
provisions that, without generally talking about political criminality in explicit terms,
referred in different indirect ways to questions concerning political crimes and offenders.
Prescriptions on individual liberties, procedural guarantees, punishment and pardon, and
even the division and limitation of public powers, shaped constitutional references to
political criminality in both Constitutions.
Most of these provisions had to do with the maintenance of public order and the
protection of public peace. These were not only major premises in the two Charters, but
also had represented part of the principal aims of the people that, during the 1850s and
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1880s, crafted new constitutional regimes for Mexico and Colombia. In both cases, the
conservation of order through the Constitution played, as a premise and a goal, a dual role.
On the one hand, it represented a reaction against a past of anarchy and internal conflict,
represented in Mexico by the Santa Anna era and in Colombia by the federative period and
the 1863 Constitution. The Ayutla generation and the first Regenerationists conceived
constitutional reform as the ultimate tool for breaking away from a legacy of arbitrariness
and personalism, in Mexico, and from the devastating effects of “chimerical” and illdesigned political institutions, in Colombia. On the other hand, the premise of order
involved a pledge for the future: a future in which strong governments, respectful of the
rule of law and the Constitution, were able to maintain national unity and peace. Here,
maintaining peace meant keeping it safe not only from external enemies, but also, and more
importantly, from internal threats.
It is in relation with these “internal threats” that constitutional references to political
criminality emerge. Always imprecise, vaguely defined, and scarcely mentioned, political
offenses were nonetheless everywhere, implicitly so. They were present, of course, in the
prescriptions banning death penalty and extradition to political offenders, and in the
provisions establishing conditions for the administration of state leniency. But they were
also present in other places: in the abuses that required the limitation of freedoms of speech,
press, and association, for instance, and in the multiple sorts of “press crimes” against
society. They also appear in the actions against the government and public peace that
demanded the suspension of guarantees and rights, and in the “uprisings,” “commotions,”
and other attacks against order that legitimized the reorganization and concentration of
public powers.
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Considering this subtle but somehow constant presence, what were exactly political
crimes to these Constitutions? More than specific, well-determined offenses, they were a
relatively abstract and generic set of crimes that shared a few common features. They were
attacks against order and peace, and against the government, the authorities, and the
nation’s institutions. Here, “respect for public order” and “respect for the government”
tended to become equivalent premises. On the one hand, attacks against public order were
at the same time attacks against the authorities that were supposed to protect and maintain
it. On the other hand, challenges against the government implied, in themselves, challenges
to public peace. These simultaneous challenges and offenses against order and the
government had another important feature: they were attacks from within. They were
always linked to internal conflicts; local turmoil, uprisings, and rebellions; and even
“abusive,” “offensive” or “subversive” manifestations of political dissidence.
Both the Mexican and the Colombian constitutions framed political crimes as
“special offenses” that required extraordinary legal responses. A first signal of this lays in
the distinction between “common” and “political” offenses present in some of the
provisions reviewed throughout the chapter. The establishment of differentiated penalties
for political offenders reinforced this separation. It created a regime of criminal
exceptionality in which penalties, procedural rules, and other constitutional precepts no
longer applied in their original form. It was a regime that exempted political offenders from
some penalties but at the same time punished them with a series of constitutional
exceptions. There was no death penalty and no extradition for political crimes. Yet,
simultaneously, their control, repression, and prosecution did not depend anymore on the
regular course of ordinary justice: the government, and more precisely the Executive
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power, was the one in charge of legally dealing with them. This was not the only
exceptionality in this regard. The legal treatment of political crimes according to these
Constitutions also implied the suspension of certain rights, the dodging of procedural
guarantees, and the use of indeterminate emergency powers. These exceptionalities were
in tune with the larger constitutional aim of protecting society against the abuses of the
individual, something clearly manifested in the 1886 Colombian Constitution –an aim that,
in the mind of Mexican and Colombian constitution makers, demanded the prevalence of
society’s rights over those of individuals.
The vagueness in the constitutional definition of political crimes would left its
imprint on the framework of exceptionality in which responses to political criminality
emerged and operated. Neither of the two charters clearly defined what political crimes
were. Additionally, neither of them established which concrete faculties comprised the
sphere of extraordinary powers, or what the government could or could not do during states
of emergency. This gave authorities in Mexico and Colombia a great discretion over legal
and constitutional interpretation, which in turn allowed them to invent and reinvent
political offenses, as well as to draw and redraw the line between common and political
crimes. Such reinventions would be especially recurrent in times of high political and
partisan conflict, as the following chapters will demonstrate. Furthermore, the fact that
governments could deal with these offenses in an administrative fashion –at least in
Colombia after 1888– gave authorities even more room and freedom to respond to political
criminality. The administrative alternative allowed governments to manage the repression
of political offenders without depending on laws passed by the Congress or on the
formalities of the Judicial power and the ordinary justice system. Even without this
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“administrative turn,” the obscure nature of these constitutional prescriptions ended up
shaping, in both countries, a series of “grey areas” in which authorities could dodge or
avoid constitutional prescriptions without violating the Constitution.115
Constitutional “grey areas” concerning the management of public order and peace
in Mexico and Colombia would play a critical role in the ways in which governments in
both countries reacted to political crimes during the period. Periods of commotion and
states of siege would become spaces for the reinvention of crimes and penalties against
rebels, “dangerous” dissidents and other internal enemies. Many of these reinventions
would end up contravening constitutional mandates and prohibitions –i.e. the application
of death penalty for political crimes. Yet, such contraventions would still maintain a
constitutional nature and thus legitimacy: after all, they all stemmed from constitutional
precepts. Uses and abuses of these “grey areas” would allow authorities in the Porfiriato
and the Regeneration to treat political crimes with a combination of harsh, borderline
unconstitutional authoritarianism, and formal adherence to constitutional rule.
Constitutional precepts on matters of public order in Mexico and Colombia shared
a relatively common ground. Despite their different origins, both charters drew heavily on
the premise of maintaining and protecting order and peace, as well as governmental and
institutional stability. These Constitutions coincided in the outlining of three different yet
complementary mechanisms for ensuring order: protections against eventual abuses of
individual liberties; selective suspensions of constitutional guarantees; and extraordinary
Executive powers in cases of emergency. Direct and indirect concerns about political
115
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crimes and criminality were present in almost all the constitutional provisions that turned
such mechanisms into reality. Most of these prescriptions maintained a vague nature that
allowed authorities to take the legal treatment of political crimes beyond the reach of the
Legislative and Judicial powers, and even to the frontier between the constitutional and the
unconstitutional. In both cases, criminal codification was supposed to bring clarity,
precision, and some degree of predictability to these abstract prescriptions. The next
chapter examines how and in which terms Criminal Codes in Colombia and Mexico
managed to establish more precise definitions and penalties for political crimes.
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III. CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL CRIMINALITY AND CRIMINAL LAW IN
MEXICO AND COLOMBIA: TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
CRIMINAL REGIME FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
POLITICAL CRIMES

Constitutional provisions on matters of public order and individual liberties do not
completely explain why people like Ricardo Flores Magón or Rafael Uribe Uribe faced
such hard times as political dissenters. Why did they experience prison and exile? How did
Mexican and Colombian authorities manage to label their actions criminal, and what were
the legal grounds for this criminalization? What were the rules that both in Mexico and
Colombia established how governments could punish “troublesome” dissidents like them,
and even dissidents that posed more serious threats? Did the way in which governments
treated Flores Magón and many other rebels and agitators in Mexico and Colombia
correspond to what these rules dictated? Tackling these sort of questions requires delving
into matters of criminal law and paying close attention to what criminal codes in both
countries said regarding the criminalization and punishment of political offenses. The spirit
and content of these codes had a crucial influence on the experiences of rebels and political
dissenters in both countries, defining much of their fate as targets of state repression.

Criminal Codes complemented Constitutions in shaping the overall standard framework
for the legal definition and treatment of political crimes and criminals in Mexico and
Colombia during the late 19th century and beyond. While Constitutions only outlined the
basic foundations for this treatment, criminal codifications set up the parameters for the
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definition, criminalization, and punishment of political offenses. This chapter reconstructs
these parameters, and analyzes their impact on the configuration of a criminal regime for
the definition and punishment of political offenses during the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration. It also reflects on the characteristics of the resulting regime, as well as on its
impact on the ways in which Mexican and Colombian authorities criminalized and
prosecuted internal enemies during the period. What were political crimes, according to
these Codes? How many modalities of political criminality and internal enmity did these
Codes recognize? Which actions of internal enmity were formally recognized as political
offenses? These are some of the central questions that this chapter addresses.
The Chapter focuses on the Criminal Codes of 1871 in Mexico and 1890 in
Colombia. Part one offers a general and introductory approach to the doctrinal and
philosophical foundations of criminal law in nineteenth-century Latin America, and pays
special attention to the influences shaping criminal legislation in Mexico and Colombia.
Part two briefly reconstructs the history of the Criminal Codes of the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration, and places both codifications in their corresponding doctrinal and
intellectual frameworks. Part three studies the multiple prescriptions through which both
Codes defined, classified, and penalized political crimes and other acts of internal enmity.
It offers a comparative exploration of criminal categories, typologies of offenders, and sets
of penalties for political crimes. The section includes a supplementary portion about the
way in which Military Codes understood and penalized some of these offenses. Part four,
finally, reflects on the criminal regimes for political criminality and internal enmity that
emerged out of these various criminal law provisions.
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The chapter develops three main arguments. First, it claims that the Criminal Codes
of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration, despite being enacted during the last decade of the
nineteenth century, still shared the basic philosophical and doctrinal bases of Latin
America’s criminal law from the post-independence period and the mid-century. In
Mexico, this was due to a slow process of modernization of national criminal legislation.
In Colombia, it had to do with failed attempts at reform, and to the urgency of updating
criminal codification after the constitutional reform of 1886. Second, the chapter argues
that Mexico’s and Colombia’s criminal codes addressed political criminality and internal
enmity in relatively similar ways. They relied on analogous criminal definitions and
equivalent sets of penalties. There were some important differences, though. Both codes
classified political offenders and other internal enemies using different criminal typologies.
Moreover, the repertoire of criminal manifestations of internal enmity tended to be larger
and more complex in one case than in the other. A third argument maintains that these
codifications produced a double regime of crimes and penalties for actions of internal
enmity, in which political crimes and offenses such as rebellion and sedition existed
separately. The resulting ambiguity would give governments of the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration a wide room for legal interpretation and reinvention regarding the treatment
of “dangerous” political dissidents.

Codes and Criminal Law in Nineteenth-Century Latin America
Enacted between the 1870s and the 1890s, Mexico’s and Colombia’s Criminal Codes still
shared the spirit that prevailed in Latin American criminal law for most of the nineteenth
century. After independence, legal thinkers and lawmakers in the region infused their
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nations’ criminal law with a combination of principles from enlightened natural law,
utilitarianism, and political liberalism. They would complement this set of inspirations by
mid-century, with the introduction of the premises of the European classical school of
criminal law.116 Up until the turn of the century, all these influences remained prevalent in
the continent, at least in its criminal codes. Criminology, criminal anthropology and other
currents of positivistic criminal law found during the late-nineteenth century a relatively
good reception among Latin American legal thinkers. The embrace of these new trends
was nonetheless disparate among nations –it was very wide in Mexico, but almost
nonexistent in Colombia– and did not have enough force to pervade the fields of legislation
and lawmaking. Actual positivistic Criminal Codes will not appear in Latin America until
well into the twentieth century.117
Enlightened discourses of natural law offered Latin American post-independent
elites a means to “modernize” their legislation in a way that fitted their purposes of building
rational and efficient states. Inspired by the rationalist iusnaturalism of Locke and
Rousseau, these elites believed that social life should be subject to laws that were inherent
to human nature, and that legislation should identify and reflect those principles.118 The
116
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reflections on the Mexican legal thinker José M. Lozano illustrate this belief, still in place
in Mexico during the 1870s. Lozano maintained, among other things, that “the elementary
principles of [modern] criminal law are all the same for all peoples and nations, for reason
and morals are the same for them all.” To him, Basic notions of criminal law were inscribed
in the nature of human societies, and linked to humankind’s fate.119 Notions of “right” and
“justice” were therefore universal, and should represent the main subject of law and
legislation. Bentham’s utilitarianism added to these conceptions the ideas that laws should
be simple, and that legislation should depend on the organization of a rational,
straightforward system of laws.120 Latin American lawmakers also borrowed the
Benthamist notion that criminal laws should find “the absolute minimum level of
punishment that would deter criminal behavior.”121
Liberal perspectives on criminal law were somewhat in tune with these notions of
natural law. Laws were inscribed in society and they emanated from it, not from the simple
will of a sovereign or a ruler. Legislation, therefore, reflected –or should reflect– people’s
will. As an interpretation of society’s nature and will, laws had the primary goal of
defending and maintaining the social contract, in correspondence to universal feelings of
social conservation. Crimes and penalties had a social nature: crimes were actions that
broke this contract up, while penalties were defensive social responses tending to restore

119

José María Lozano, Derecho penal comparado, o el Código Penal del Distrito Federal y territorio de la
Baja California concordado y comentado (México: Imprenta del Comercio, 1874), 6.
120

Jaramillo Uribe, El Pensamiento, 153-154.

121

Kathryn Sloan, “The Penal Code of 1871: From Religious to Civil Control of Everyday Life,” A
Companion to Mexican History and Culture, ed. William H. Beezley (Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2011),
304.

90

it. This implied a departure from more traditional ways of conceiving crime and
punishment: in Colonial times, for instance, crimes represented direct attacks against the
sovereign, while penalties were acts of royal vengeance as well as displays of state
sovereignty.122 The liberal perspective also infused criminal law with the same principles
shaping constitutions like the Mexican 1857 charter, including separation of powers, legal
equality, and protection of individual rights. Such principles would shape a criminal
legislation revolving around at least five major principles: a) the independence of the
judicial power; b) the idea that all citizens should be judged by the same tribunals and the
same laws; c) the notion that judgments should be based on the crimes themselves and not
on the criminals; d) the premise that penalties should be proportional to their correspondent
crimes; and, e) the protection of the procedural guarantees of suspects, defendants, and
convicts alike.123
Influences from the classical school of criminal law combined multiple authors
from different parts of Europe, and specially from Italy and Spain. The theories of the
Italian Cesare Beccaria played a major role in shaping Mexico’s and Colombia’s criminal
legislation, for instance. Beccaria’s vision of crimes and penalties matched the above
mentioned liberal and contractualist principles, and was in tune with the enlightened goal
of crafting a more lenient and humanitarian criminal law. His ideas on the “preventive”
and “deterrent” nature of penalties would shape in both nations criminal codes that made
more emphasis on issues of “prevention” than on matters of “retribution” or
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“vengeance.”124 Other influences behind criminal legislation in Mexico and Colombia
include include the works by the Spanish Joaquín F. Pacheco and Pedro Gómez de la Serna,
by the French Joseph L. Ortolan, and by the Italians Francesco Carrara, Giovanni
Carmignani, and Pellegrino Rossi –these three of special importance in the Colombian
case.125 Most of these works emphasized on matters regarding the social nature and purpose
of punishment, the preventive character of penalties, the ways of defending society against
criminality, and the rational nature of both crime and punishment.
The classical school influenced Latin American criminal law in multiple ways, but
its most important legacy had to do with its understandings of “crime.” Partially inspired
on the ideas of natural law, classical legal thinkers perceived criminality through the
perspective of free will: as part of a universal society, all men shared the same ideas of
good and evil, and could rationally and willingly choose between one and another.
Therefore, they had the possibility, the freedom, and the capacity for deciding about their
actions. Crimes, in this light, were free and voluntary infractions of a penal law; rational
actions willingly committed by a free individual conscious of the criminal nature of such
act. Criminals, then, were those individuals that, in a voluntary, free, and conscious fashion,
acted against society’s order, morals, and rights.126 It was this action against society’s rights
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–whether individual or collective– what gave crimes their criminal nature. Since laws and
norms protected such rights, crimes represented, at their most basic level, infractions to
these norms –hence the principle that no action could be considered criminal unless a legal
act had previously typified it as such.127 These notions differed significantly from previous,
more traditional understandings of crime as “sin,” typical of colonial times. They would
also differ from those interpretations of crime that would become popular by the turn of
the century, including the perspective of criminal anthropology according to which crimes
were symptoms of physical and mental dysfunctionality.128
Definitions of “crime” in the 1871 Mexican Code and its 1890 Colombia
counterpart condensed the basic precepts of the classical school. Article 1 of Mexico’s
Code defined crime as “the voluntary infraction of a criminal law, by doing what it forbids
or not doing what it orders.” The Colombian version was no different. Article 1 of the 1890
Code established that crime was the “voluntary and malicious violation of the law, for
which a penalty is incurred.” Both definitions were in tune with other contemporary codes
across the Atlantic. For instance, in his comments to the Mexican Code, José M. Lozano
noted that its opening article paralleled the 1850 Spanish Code in the idea that crime was
a voluntary action or omission penalized by law; the most recent 1870 Spanish Code, in
the notion that crimes were voluntary actions or omissions; and, their Bavarian counterpart
in the statement that crimes were voluntary infractions of the law.129
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Understandings of “penalty” and “punishment” in Colombia and Mexico were also
in tune with liberal and classical ideas. Punishment was not a simple automatic retribution
or vengeance on society’s part. It was, above all, a tool for correction, regeneration, and
deterrence in the name of society.130 In correspondence with the classical perspective,
criminal legislations in both countries gave penalties a double purpose. On the one hand,
they had to be exemplary and discourage society from criminal impulses. On the other
hand, they had to be afflictive and correctional, in order to prevent recidivism. That
deterrence and correction, nonetheless, had to be “reasonable and proportioned,” as well
as in benefit of prisoners, tending always to their “moral reformation,” as the Colombian
jurist Demetrio Porras wrote in 1889. Unnecessary severities, he pointed out, not only were
prejudicial to prisoners and defendants, but also led to discontent and rebellion against the
law.131
These were, in general terms, the basic doctrinal and philosophical foundations of
the Criminal Codes in force in Mexico and Colombia during the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration. The next section offers a brief summary of the history of these codes, as a
way to contextualize their prescriptions and penalties on matters of public order and
political criminality.
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The Criminal Codes of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration
The Mexican 1871 Code: A Belated First Attempt at Modernization of Criminal Law
In the context of Latin American modern criminal codifications, Mexico’s first national
Criminal Code came to life somewhat belatedly. While countries like Bolivia, Colombia,
and Ecuador enacted their first national codes before the 1840s, and Venezuela decreed
theirs in the 1860s, Mexico had to wait until 1871.132 A protracted independence war
(1810-1821), together with Santa Anna’s dictatorship (1858-1861), the Reform War (18581861), and the French intervention (1862-1867), severely hampered efforts to design
modern codifications of a national scope, not only in criminal matters but also in civil
affairs. It was only until the early 1870s that Mexico could count with actual national Civil
and Criminal codes.133 This does not mean that up until the 1870s Mexico lacked modern
criminal codes. The State of Mexico, for instance, drafted a code in 1831, and the State of
Veracruz counted with one since 1835.134 Modern criminal legislation at the federal level,
nonetheless, remained undeveloped under well into the century.
Prior to the 1870s, national criminal legislation combined laws both from the
colonial period and the post-independence era –mainly sporadic laws on criminal matters
and constitutional mandates on criminal law. This legislation did not exist as a unified and
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systematic body of laws, but as disperse sets of rules and prescriptions. Colonial legal
sources, including the Novisima Recopilación (1805), the Real Ordenanza de Intendentes
(1786), the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias (1680), and even the Siete Partidas, remained
relatively in place until the late 1860s. A decree from 1838 declared them valid for the
Mexican nation as long as they were compatible with the new system of government, its
institutions, and their legislation. A first effort to create a proper national codification took
place in 1862, but it was hampered by the French Intervention. A second, more successful
effort followed in 1868. Led by Antonio Martínez de Castro, José María Lafragua, Manuel
O. de Montellano y Manuel M. de Zamacona, it would become the basis for the 1871
Code.135
At least two major goals inspired the efforts towards crafting and enacting a modern
national Criminal Code in Mexico. There was a need for replacing an “outdated” legislation
that had little to do with the current forms of government, in first place. To some
contemporary legal thinkers, surviving colonial laws and sources were not only disused,
but also rejected by public sentiment, by the customs and ideas of the time, and even by
the spirit of the nation’s new institutions. These laws were also a major source of
arbitrariness: arbitrariness of the legislators, who monopolized “the terrible right to punish
and repress offenses,” and arbitrariness of the judges, who imposed penalties obeying to
nothing but their own discretion.136
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There also was an urgency to “modernize” national legislation, in second place.
This implied not only crafting new laws, but also –and primarily– creating a legal system
in which law corresponded to the principles of “reason” and “science.” Inspired by liberal
and classical ideas on criminal law, Mexican lawmakers believed that criminal laws should
no longer emanate from the arbitrary will of a monarch or any other authority. On the
contrary, they should correspond to “principles stemming from reason, morals, [and] men’s
nature,” as José M. Lozano pointed out in 1874.137 Likewise, national criminal laws should
not exist anymore as a disperse and unsystematic collection of mandates enacted by
different authorities at different times. Legal modernization also meant systematization,
predictability, and, above all, codification. It was thus necessary to produce an actual, allencompassing code; homogeneous codification that, as a single and definitive legislative
act, organized in a logical, methodical, and articulate fashion all aspects and possibilities
of a particular legal field.138
These principles and influences, combined with the same liberal spirit that inspired
the Ayutla revolution and the 1857 Constitution, shaped the overall goals of the 1871 Code.
Like the Charter, the Criminal Code and its subsidiary codifications –like the Code of
Criminal Procedures, enacted in 1880– aimed to develop the principles of separation of
powers, independence of the judiciary, legal equality, and defense of individual
guarantees.139 The Code conceived of individual guarantees as the manifestation of natural
rights whose respect and protection should represent the primary goal of social institutions.
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In consequence, it established that criminals were subject of juridical protection and their
judgement should follow standard and homogeneous procedural rules. It also stated that
individual rights limited the reach of state’s retribution, and provided a series of
prescriptions for preventing unfair or arbitrary arrests and imprisonments. Arrests, for
example, should not extend for more than three days without a formal judicial order
following the verification of an actual crime. Likewise, in correspondence with the
Constitution, the Code reinforced the suppression of the plurality of legal subjects and
special tribunals that characterized Mexico’s colonial and early republican law –remaining
only the fuero militar and related tribunals of military justice. All criminals, regardless
their condition, should be subject to the same tribunals and prosecuted by the same laws.140
Similar principles would inspire the crafting of the 1890 Colombian Criminal Code,
although its story was far less lineal and straightforward than that of its Mexican
counterpart.

The 1890 Colombian Code: Between Attempts at Reform and Continuities
The criminal code of the Regeneration has a very different story than its Porfirian
counterpart. The 1890 Colombian Criminal Code, unlike the 1871 Mexican Code, did not
entail a significant rupture with previous forms of and sources of criminal legislation. The
1837 Code had marked for Colombians the departure from colonial criminal legislation
and the first major step towards the modernization of national criminal law. Further reforms
to this initial codification, including the Criminal Codes of 1873 and 1890, basically
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reproduced its central principles and prescriptions, while introducing slight changes in the
definition and classification of some crimes and the duration of some penalties. The
trajectory of Colombian criminal codification between the statutes of 1837 and 1890 was
not straightforward, though. Regime changes, failed attempts at reform, and disagreements
among contemporary codifiers and lawmakers marked the evolution of this legislation,
particularly the making of the 1890 Code.
The creation of a modern criminal codification in Colombia responded to similar
needs than in the Mexican case. There was a need for replacing dispersed, unsystematic
and outdated colonial legislation with unified, comprehensive, and methodical codes.
Likewise, there was a need for new legislation in tune with the political institutions and
forms of government that emerged after independence. First attempts at modernization of
Colombian legislation date back to the late 1820s and were inspired, like in Mexico, by the
works of Bentham. The goal, at that moment, was substituting the “barbarity,” “disorder,”
and “obscurity” of Spanish legislation with a uniform and simple system of rules and norms
–a rational system of legislation able to foster state’s efficiency. “Well written Codes that
make the chaos of the Laws of Indies disappear,” claimed the Conservative writer Juan
García del Río, “are the most beautiful present that we could give Colombia.”141
The 1837 Code was the model for the subsequent Codes of 1873 and 1890, as well
as the basis for all Colombian criminal legislation throughout the rest of the century.
Between this first codification and the 1873 Code there were no major transformations.
The establishment of a federative regime between 1863 and 1886 brought a multiplication
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of criminal codes at the regional level that did not differ too much from one another. The
most important changes between the 1837 statute and the criminal codes of the federative
period had to do with the incorporation of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty,
the reduction and humanization of penalties, and the suppression of infamy-driven
punishments.142 The enactment of the 1886 Constitution would demand further changes,
mostly in terms of re-unification and centralization of both civil and criminal law. The
1885 Constitutional Assembly established that, until the enactment of a new codification,
the nation would adopt as its criminal code the 1858 Criminal Code of the State of
Cundinamarca, also a “readapted copy” of the 1837 codification. Later on, the early
Regenerationist administrations ordered the drafting of a new criminal code and appointed
a commission for this purpose. The task fell on four members of the Council of State:
Demetrio Porras, Clodomiro Tejada, Luis Carlos Rico, and Juan Pablo Restrepo.143
The Commission had the task to prepare a project of criminal code that, instead of
reproducing former codifications, corrected their errors, filled their gaps, and incorporated
contemporary developments in legal doctrine. Porras drafted the bulk of the project, which
drew heavily on foreign codification. Two recent projects of criminal codification
concentrated Porras’s attention: the one presented by Francisco Silvela to the Spanish
Courts in 1884, and the one presented around the same time by Giuseppe Zardanelli to the
Italian parliament.144 These were not the only codifications that inspired the project. Codes
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from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Hungary also served as major
sources on inspiration. Even Latin American codifications from Chile, Brazil, and Mexico
helped shape Porras’s work.145 Unlike previous criminal codes in Colombia, Porras’s draft
gave wide legal and doctrinal development to procedural matters including the regulation
of preventive imprisonments, judicial cautions, and penalties of “subjection to the
authorities’ surveillance.” Such developments were also internationally inspired, and drew
upon the works of Ortolan and Gómez de la Serna.146 Another mayor novelty had to do
with the incorporation of the figure of “preparatory liberty,” a type of probation or
conditional release previously adopted in the 1871 Mexican Criminal Code and also
present in European contemporary codifications such as Portugal’s.147 As the same Porras
declared, the project’s prescriptions of preparatory liberty were almost literally copied from
the Mexican code.148
Porras’s project never came to fruition. Porras died before finishing the second part
of his work, and soon after his death the rest of the commission members discarded his
draft. To the Council of State, the project was extremely long, complex and detailed, and
relied exaggeratedly on foreign models. The draft proposed an overall extension of the
nation’s criminal laws, and that, to the Commission, was “the best means to make them
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ineffective.”149 The Council, then, commissioned Juan Pablo Restrepo to design a simpler
draft. Restrepo would present a new draft compiling dispositions from Cundinamarca’s
1858 Code and the 1837 Criminal Code. The idea, in Restrepo’s words, was to “quickly
review what already exists and reunite it in a single code, harmonizing their different parts,
filling the resulting gaps, and making partial or secondary adjustments […] without altering
the general plan of what today exists.” Once that compilation was in place, it could be
possible then to study foreign codifications and see whether or not their reforms could be
progressively applied to the local circumstances.150 Restrepo’s project, which finally
became the 1890 Criminal Code, did not involve significant changes in comparison with
the original 1837 codification. It was basically a reproduction of it without the penalties
that, throughout the century, had been progressively suppressed –penalties of infamy,
forced labor, and public infamy, for instance.151

Enacted during the last third of the century, Mexico’s and Colombia’s criminal codes still
maintained the spirit of the first modern codifications in post-independent Latin America.
It was something natural, considering that the Mexican Code was Mexico’s first modern
national criminal code, and that its 1890 Colombian counterpart was a readapted
reproduction of the first modern code enacted in the nation. It is time now to see if the
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common foundations of both Codes shaped similar definitions of and penalties for political
crimes in the two nations.

Political Crimes in Mexican and Colombian Codes
How did Criminal Codes in Colombia and Mexico addressed political criminality? Did
they define a precise set of offenses clearly typified as “political”? Did they reproduce the
abstract and vague notions of their correspondent Constitutions? This section shows that
the 1871 Mexican Code and its 1890 Counterpart did little towards advancing more precise
definitions of what political crimes were. Their multiple criminal typologies included
different sorts of offenses against public order, public peace, and the government, but no a
specific and well-defined category of “political crimes.”
Political crimes, nonetheless, were present everywhere in these Criminal Codes, as
they were in the Constitutions. They materialized in the different criminal categories that
defined and penalized treason, rebellion, sedition, and other offenses against public order
and peace. They also surfaced in additional prescriptions concerning the classification of
crimes and criminals, the administration of certain penalties, the dispensation of state
leniency, and other procedural matters. These categories, definitions, penalties, and
supplementary prescriptions made up the standard legal framework for the governmental
responses to political criminality during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.

Defining Criminal Categories
The definition and differentiation of criminal categories offer a first clue about how these
Codes understood and addressed political crimes. Both the 1871 Mexican Criminal Code
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and its 1890 Colombian counterpart defined these crimes in a relatively similar way, but
arranged them as part of different criminal categories (see Table 1). While the Mexican
Code organized the bulk of these offenses in two major categories, the Colombian
codification distinguished among three different typologies. The Mexican Code only
distinguished between crimes “against the nation’s external security,” which basically
included treason, and offenses “against nation’s internal security,” comprising the crimes
of rebellion and sedition. The Colombian Code distinguished among crimes “against the
nation,” including treason; offenses “against internal peace, the current government, and
the Constitution,” comprising different modalities and degrees of rebellion; and “crimes
against peace and public order,” including sedition, riot (motín o tumulto), and uprising
(asonada). In the Mexican case, riot and uprising were part of a different category and
involved definitions that, as we will see, differentiated them completely from sedition and
rebellion.

Table 1.
Criminal Categories and their Corresponding Crimes
Mexican Criminal Code (1871)
Crimes against the nation’s
-Treason
external security

Colombian Criminal Code (1890)
Crimes against the nation

-Treason

Crimes against the nation’s
internal security

-Rebellion
-Sedition

Crimes against internal peace, the
current government, and the
Constitution

-Rebellion

Crimes against public order

-Riot
-Uprising

Crimes against peace and public
order

-Sedition
-Riot
-Uprising
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Despite such differences in terms of classification, both codes conceived treason,
rebellion, and sedition in analogous ways. They were crimes against the nation, against
peace and order, and against the government and its constitutional foundations. Taken
together, these categories signaled different expressions and gradations of a same
phenomenon: a series of actions that not only disturbed “public peace” but also
compromised the existence of the government and even, in the worst cases, of the nation
itself. The political character of these criminal categories lay, primarily, in the nature of
what was at stake: the legitimate government, the Constitution, and the existence of society
as a political community.
One of the major differences regarding these categories has to do with the way in
which both codes understood and classified crimes against “public order.” In the Mexican
case, these offenses comprised about a dozen crimes including vagrancy and mendicancy;
raffles, lotteries and other “prohibited games;” tombs desecration; disobedience and
resistance to the authorities; riot and uprising (motín and asonada); and recurrent
inebriation (embriaguez habitual).152 It was thus a wide category that combined individual
and collective offenses against “public tranquility,” “public morality,” or “public civility,”
with certain non-political modalities of “illegal” collective action, as well as some form of
“civil resistance” or disobedience. These forms of resistance, nevertheless, did not seem to
involve a major political nature, judging from the way in which the Code defined such
crimes. Article 919 of the Mexican Code, for instance, defined riot and uprising as a
“tumultuous meeting for the commission of a crime other than treason, rebellion, or
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sedition.” Crimes of disobedience and resistance, according to Article 904, basically
referred to acts in which people refused to obey an order or a mandate by any public
authority. None of these acts involved a questioning of these authorities’ legitimacy, let
alone endangered their existence.
Crimes against “peace and public order” in Colombia had a clearer political content
and involved a more direct challenge to public authorities.153 Besides sedition, riot, and
uprising, these offenses also included illegal raising of troops, resistance to law
enforcement and disobedience to the authorities’ orders, and cuadrillas de malhechores –
groups of people collectively organized to commit crimes against people and properties.154
This last offense also existed in the Mexican code (Art. 951), but as a crime against “public
safety.155 Riot and uprising had more complex definitions in the Colombian Code. Article
217 defined riot (motín o tumulto) as “the insubordinate movement and the illegal and
turbulent meeting of a portion of people… joined together in order to demand, by force,
cries, insults, or threats, that authorities perform or stop performing a fair or unfair act.”
Article 219 conceived of uprising (asonada) as “the illegal movement and reunion of
people… organized with the goals of disturbing a public act or celebration; taking justice
into their own hands; abusing or intimidating other people, or forcing them to make a fair
or unfair thing; or provoking in any way a public scandal or disturbance…” Unlike its
153
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Mexican counterpart, which grouped both crimes as part of the same offense, the
Colombian Code conceived them as different modalities of illegal collective action, with
diverse levels of political engagement and political consequences. While the Mexican
codification conceived “public order” in terms of public tranquility and civility, the
Colombian Code interpreted it, at least partially, as a matter of political obedience and
compliance.

Defining and Penalizing Crimes
The way in which both Codes defined, ranked, and penalized the major crimes of treason,
rebellion, and sedition offers even more clues about their conceptions of political
criminality. Which action represented the most serious political offense and why? Which
criteria defined and separated the levels of “dangerousness” of these crimes? The different
criminal categories through which both codes organized these offenses offer a first answer.
Treason was the most severe offense, for it involved a harm against the nation itself and its
existence as a community. Rebellion was the most serious crime against the government
and the constitution in Colombia and against internal security in Mexico. Sedition, in both
cases, represented a less drastic expression of rebellion (see Table 2). These typologies,
nevertheless, conceal significant differences between one crime and another, and even
important differences in the ways in which the two codes defined and penalized these
offenses. It is necessary, then, to pay closer attention to the precise definitions and penalties
that these crimes had in the referred codifications.
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Table 2.
Key Definitions of Treason, Rebellion, and Sedition
Treason
Rebellion
Sedition

To take up arms against the nation. Collaborating with external enemies or foreign
invaders. Commonly applicable in cases of international war.
To attack the nation’s form of government, its political organization, and its public
powers and their functions. Also includes offenses against the Constitution.
To engage public authorities in violent ways. Includes minor insurrections and other
episodes of collective violence that do not escalate to the levels of a rebellion.

Treason, according to the Mexican Code (Art. 1017) was an attack “against the
independence of the Mexican republic, its sovereignty, its freedom and its territorial
integrity […] in case of a foreign war.” This attack could manifest in different ways, ones
more serious than others: it could be an actual, direct attack, by taking up arms against the
nation and joining active enemy troops (Art. 1080). It could also be a formal, serious and
direct invitation to commit it; a conspiracy among multiple people to do it; or even an
“indirect” treason consisting of “deliberately concealing or helping enemy scouts or spies.”
(Arts. 1072-1075). Other modalities of treason, according to the Mexican code, included
espionage for the enemy, collaboration with the enemy in the execution of invasion plans,
and even the recruitment of troops for the enemy side (Art. 1081). All these acts
represented, to the Code, parts of the same crime. The Colombian code, on the contrary,
distinguished between two modalities of treason. Acts of treason could be either “serious”
or “minor,” both of them referring to circumstances of external or international war.
Serious cases of treason included taking up arms against the nation, changing sides during
military actions, working as a spy for the enemy or helping enemy spies, helping the enemy
with resources and other aids, and even facilitating a foreign invasion (Art. 151). Minor
acts of treason involved exciting a foreign nation to invade Colombian territory, changing
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sides outside military operations, and sharing classified information with the enemy,
among other actions (Art. 153).
Death was an usual punishment for cases of treason, although not the only possible
one. Mexico prescribed capital punishment to nationals that worked as spies, helped the
enemy carry out an invasion, or helped it with troops (Art. 1081). People changing sides
and taking up arms against the nation received a differentiated treatment depending on their
ranks and roles. Generals of regular troops, as well as leaders of irregular bands were
punished with death. Colonels and other lower officers were exempt from death and faced
twelve years of prison (Art. 1080). Past experiences regarding international war and loss
of territory to its northern neighbor, as well as invasion by and partial submission to a
foreign power could have influenced the severity of these penalties against traitors in
Mexico. The Colombian code was slightly more lenient, or at least prescribed the death
penalty for a more reduced number of offenders. In cases of “severe” treason, capital
punishment was reserved only to public officers and employees, because their quality of
public servants aggravated their treason. Other nationals, instead, faced between ten and
twenty years of prison (Art. 152). “Minor” cases of treason received between three and five
years of prison, with three additional years in the case of public servants (Art. 155) (see
Table 3).
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Table 3.
Crimes, Criminal Gradations, and Punishments
Crime

Mexico

Colombia
-Public officers and employees: Death.
-For “Severe or High Treason:” Between 10
and 20 years of prison.
-For “Minor Treason:” Between 3 and 5
years of prison.

Treason

-Generals and Ringleaders: Death.
-Other officers: Up to 12 years of
prison.

Rebellion

-Directors, Chiefs, and Ringleaders: 6
years of prison.
-Other High-Rank Officers: 5 years of
prison.
-Low-Rank Officers, up to captains: 4
years of prison.
-Corporals and Sergeants: 3 years of
prison.
-Rank-and-File Soldiers: 1 year of
prison.
-Indirect supporters: Up to 2 years of
prison.
-For encouraging rebellion: Up to 2
year of prison.

-Promoters and Ringleaders: Between 8 and
10 years of prison.
-Other Leaders: Between 6 and 8 years of
prison.
-Other Participants: Between 4 and 6 years
of prison.
-Rank-and-File Soldiers: No penalty, unless
they were responsible for common crimes.
-People charged with other attacks against
the Constitution and the government:
Between 6 months and 4 years of prison.
-Minor attacks against the Constitution and
the government: A fine.

-Involving consummated acts of
violence: 5 years of prison.
-With arms, but no consummated acts
of violence: 3 years of prison.
-Conspiring to commit sedition:
Between 6 months and 1 year of
prison.

-Chiefs od armed seditions: Between 7 and 9
years of prison.
-Other leaders: Between 5 and 7 years of
prison.
-Other participants: Between 2 and 4 years of
prison.
-For encouraging sedition: Up to 8 months of
prison.
*Plus additional economic penalties against
the inhabitants of insurrectionist towns.

Sedition

Rebellion comprised a more diverse series of acts. Article 1095 of the Mexican
code defined it as a “public and overtly hostile” uprising pursuing at least one of six
different goals. Goals included changing the nation’s form of government; abolishing or
reforming its Constitution; blocking the election of any of the nation’s supreme powers,
the reunion of any of these corporations, or their liberty to deliberate; removing the
president or his ministers from office; raising a portion or the totality of either the nation
or the army against the government; and usurping the faculties and attributions of any of
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the nation’s supreme powers. Acts of rebellion included not only leading or being directly
involved in the uprising. They also comprised planning and plotting it, inviting people to
rebel, conspiring with others with the same aim, and voluntarily providing rebels or
conspirators with men, weapons, ammunition, or money. Giving rebels provisions, food or
means of transportation also fell under this category of offenses (Arts. 1066-1101). A final
type of rebel referred to people that directly excited or promoted rebellion through
telegrams, messengers, printed media, and others. The Code treated them as “authors” in
case that the rebellion erupted, and as reos de conato (culprits of an attempt) if that was
not the case (Art. 1110). To the Mexican code, rebels were not only those who directly
organized, promoted, and participated in the uprising, but also all those who, directly or
indirectly, and always willingly, had taken part of or collaborated with the movement.
The Colombian Code also comprised different actions under the notion of rebellion.
Article 169 defined rebels in terms of a series of offenses that had in common the goal of
“changing substantially the nation’s overall organization.” These offenses included taking
up arms against the government, whether to overthrow it or to change the Constitution;
attempting to alter, by force, the constitutional separation of public powers, or the people
or corporations in charge of them; blocking or impeding the reunion of the Congress or one
of its chambers; or trying to dissolve it by force. Additionally, the Code included a series
of actions that, without being formal and direct acts of rebellion, also counted as crimes
against internal peace, the government, and the Constitution. These supplementary
prescriptions (Arts. 187-190) criminalized acts such as attempting to persuade others to
neglect or disobey the Constitution; propagating “maxims or doctrines directly tending to
destroy or disturb the Constitution;” giving “seditious speeches” against the Charter; and
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“provoking, through satires, jokes, or invectives, the breach of the Constitution.” All these
“subversive” acts could take the form of speeches or written pieces, involving from a
simple remark in public to a leaflet or a newspaper article. Although these offenses were
certainly distant from the crime of rebellion, they were still linked to it. To the Code, they
were also acts of hostility towards the government, as well as dangerous manifestations of
discontent that could spark major offenses against the institutions.
In addition to these prescriptions delimiting and defining the crime of rebellion,
both Codes included supplementary articles specifying which actions should –and should
not– be considered as a “natural” accessory to events of rebellion. The consummation of a
rebellion implied necessarily the commission of other offenses –related crimes or delitos
conexos. It was necessary, then, to distinguish between those “related” actions that were
“logical” and “inevitable” parts or ingredients of a rebellion, and those that were not and,
in consequence, represented additional crimes. Article 1113 of the Mexican Code, for
instance, established that rebels were not responsible for any death or injury caused in
combat. Nonetheless, homicides or injuries caused outside the battlefield were still
considered crimes and made their authors accountable for them. The same applied to
common crimes committed during the rebel movement, according to Article 1114. The
Colombian code was more detailed in its differentiation between what could be included
and what could not. Seizing of weapons, recruitment, removal of public servants,
replacement of public authorities and appropriation of public functions, resistance to public
and military authorities, deaths in combat, and even the collection of contributions and
“war taxes” made up the offenses that the Code considered “innate” to rebellion. Actions
against people’s lives and properties were still criminal and penalized, as were pillage,
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arson, homicides outside the battlefield, the freeing of common prisoners, and assaults to
rural properties without a formal order of a rebel leader (Article 177).
Punishments for rebellion in Mexico and Colombia were as diverse as the
modalities of the crime, and followed a scale of penalties corresponding to a parallel
hierarchy of offenders (see Table 3). The Colombian Code distinguished among four levels
of involvement in a consummated rebellion: promoters and ringleaders; participants with
some degree of power, leadership, or jurisdiction in the movement; “other” participants;
and mere soldiers (Arts. 170 and 171). The first category of rebels faced between eight and
ten years of prison. The second, between six and eight years of the same penalty. The third,
between four and six years. Soldiers, as long as they had not received any sort of promotion
and had not committed any common offense, were exempt from any penalty.
Outside this classification, the Code also distinguished among different levels of
responsibility concerning people that, in times of peace, attacked the Constitution and the
government by written word of speech. People encouraging the neglecting of the
constitution, and therefore its partial or total suspension, faced between one and four years
of prison. People propagating “subversive maxims” received between six months and two
years of the same penalty. Finally, people “insulting” the Constitution through satires and
similar ways, received only a fine. Additionally, they all lost their political rights (Arts.
187-190). This supplementary classification of crimes and criminals traced a link between
“actual” rebels, who waged war against the government, and “subversive” dissidents,
whose attacks were perhaps subtler but no less hostile. Such link set them apart in terms of
the nature of their crime –attacks in the battlefield and attacks in the arena of public
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opinion–, but at the same time made them all responsible for a similar set of offenses. They
were, after all, offenses against internal peace, the government, and the Constitution.
The Mexican Code, in its administration of penalties for rebellion, involved a more
complex grouping of criminals. Rather than establishing a single, straightforward
classification of offenders, it delimited two main criteria of categorization. A first criterion
had to do with matters of responsibility and authorship. Article 111 distinguished between
“leading authors” and “accomplices.” The first term included people who promoted, led,
or conducted a consummated rebellion. It also comprised people who collaborated in the
conception, planning, and execution of the movement; individuals that while having the
power to prevent or stop it let it occur; and people who publicly excited the rebellion
whether by speeches or by printed publications. In the case of a failed rebellion, and
according to Article 112, the Code penalized as “leading authors” all those who had
claimed the voice of the movement and appeared as writers of publications inciting the
uprising. All participants whose involvement in the rebellion did not match these criteria
were considered simple “accomplices.” This differentiation between “authors” and
“accomplices” did not have effects in itself, but rather functioned as a guiding principle for
the gradation of the penalties corresponding to the different typologies of rebels established
by the second criterion.
The second criterion paralleled the way in which the Colombian Code classified
rebels, but included a larger number of categories. Article 1102 of the Mexican codification
arranged offenders according to their degree of involvement in the movement. Directors,
chiefs, and ringleaders were at the top of this criminal hierarchy. Superior or high-rank
officials followed. A third level corresponded to low-rank officials up to Captains. A fourth
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level was composed of corporal and sergeants, while the lowest rank corresponded to
soldiers. Offenders at the highest level received six years of prison, that became five for
second-level criminals, four for the next category, and three for the four levels. Unlike the
Colombian case, the Mexican Code did punish soldiers, and gave them up to a year of
prison. The Code authorized judges to raise these penalties up to a third of the
corresponding punishments in case that the rebellion became an armed movement waging
actual acts of war (Art. 1103).
A supplementary categorization put together two different types of “indirect” rebels
(Arts. 1096-1101). The first type included people who, without taking part in a rebellion,
supported rebels directly and willingly. This support could take the form of men, weapons,
ammunition and money, or of provisions and means of transportation. The Code considered
this support an indirect involvement with the movement, and therefore penalized it with
prison up to two years. The second category comprised people who helped prepare a rebel
movement independently of its outcomes, whether conspiring with aims of rebellion or
inviting other people to rebel. These other criminals faced up to one year of prison. A
comparison between the penalties established for both types of rebels shows that, for the
Mexican code, supporting a rebellion after it started was a more serious offense that
attempting to start one.
The potential commission of common crimes opened another front for the
criminalization and punishment of rebels. The Mexican Code established additional
penalties for rebels any time they executed war prisoners; incorporated bandits and
filibusters to their ranks; committed attacks against private property; and kidnapped people
for economic purposes (Arts. 1104-1109). The first aggravating condition turned charges
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of rebellion into charges of homicide; and, it authorized judges to impose the death penalty.
The second condition added to the rebel’s punishment up to ten additional years of prison,
if it was followed by the perpetration of acts of violence. The third circumstance turned
rebellion into “robbery with violence,” and the last one turned rebels into mere plagiarios
or kidnappers. These two final conversions also allowed judges, in correspondence with
the Constitution and the Criminal Code, to punish rebels with death. A final condition
established the time of involvement of the rebel in the movement as an additional
aggravating circumstance.
The Colombian Code was less specific than its Mexican counterpart in this point,
but it also established that rebels should face any additional charges and penalties for
common crimes that they had committed during their insurrection (Article 179). The most
important provision in this regard had to do with the conversion of rebels into bandits or
reos en cuadrilla de malhechores. According to Article 178, anytime rebels collectively
performed acts of “ferocity and barbarism” condemned by the Law of Nations, such as
cruelty towards war prisoners, tactics of torture and starvation, or violence against women,
children and other harmless people, they became a cuadrilla de malhechores. The
Colombian Military Code of 1881, still effective during the Regeneration, prescribed an
analogous treatment in cases of internal conflict. Article 1099 of this codification
established that rebel or insurrectionist armies that committed crimes against people or
properties, and whose acts of hostility remained outside the dynamics of formal and
permanent armies, should be punished as thieves or bandits. Like the legal conversions
allowed in the Mexican case, these conversions had major legal implications, for they made
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rebels subject to the death penalty, as established in the Constitution and in Article 252 of
the Criminal Code.156
Sedition, according to both codes, was a minor insurrection that challenged public
authorities without the goals of attacking, overthrowing, or replacing them. As an event of
violent collective action, it was politically oriented and motivated. At the most basic level,
it supposed a collective effort to hinder, on purpose, the actions of public authorities. Under
a more elaborated perspective, it represented an excessive collective demand against a
given authority in order to request something of common interest. The criminal nature of
sedition did not stem from the demands at stake, but from the act of engaging authorities
in violent and tumultuous fashion. The Mexican Code understood sedition in its most
simpler connotation. Its Article 1123 defined the crime as the reunion of at least 10 people
that resisted or attacked authorities with either of two goals: impeding the promulgation or
execution of a law, or the celebration of a popular election; or hindering the exercise of the
functions of a given authority. The Colombian codification, instead, leaned towards the
second, more complex interpretation of the offense. Article 210 defined sedition as “the
tumultuous uprising of people with the aim, not of disobeying the nation’s government, but
of opposing, with or without weapons, the execution of any law, any constitutional, legal,
or judicial act, or any legitimate service […] by the authorities.” Violent collective acts of
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Article 248 of the Colombian Criminal Code defined as cuadrilla de malhechores “all meeting or
association of four or more people, gathered together with the purpose of committing, together or separately,
but in concert, any crime or crimes against people or properties, whether they are public or private.” Article
252 prescribed that “the most serious case of asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores takes place when it involves
voluntary manslaughter, raping of a woman, or deliberated injury or mutilation that leave the victim blind or
disabled. This crime will be punished with death penalty."
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resistance against authorities also counted as sedition, as long as they involved more than
40 people.
Penalties for sedition usually were less drastic than those corresponding to the crime
of rebellion (see Table 3). The Mexican Code prescribed three years of prison if the sedition
included the use of arms, and five if the movement actually performed acts of violence or
achieved their goal (Art. 1125). People conspiring with seditious purposes faced between
six months and one year of the same penalty (1124). Like in the case of rebellion, judges
could strengthen the corresponding penalties in the case that the sedition involved the
commission of common crimes, and especially of offenses against individuals, their lives,
and their properties (Arts. 1124 and 1126). The Colombian codification included a more
diverse and harsher set of penalties. Chiefs of armed seditions faced between seven and
nine years of prison, while other leaders received between five and seven years of the same
penalty. The rest of participants in the movement were punished with prison between two
and four years (Arts. 211 and 212). People charged with promoting a sedition or inviting
others to that end, regardless their success, faced prison up to eight months, and remained
subject to the authorities’ surveillance for up to two years (Art. 215). Individuals that
publicly promoted a sedition through speeches or printed publications also fell into the
category of sedition and would be prosecuted as fautores or helpers of the crime. (Art.
230).
The Colombian codification took penalties for sedition even further. Given the
political nature of the crime, and the caliber of the challenges to authorities that it involved,
it was natural that the Code prescribed for it more drastic penalties. Articles 231, 232, and
233 extended the responsibility in events of seditions from the actual seditious to the rest
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of the population in which the movement had taken place. To the Code, anytime a sedition
or a riot required the mobilization of armed forces to repress it, it was necessary to charge
the offenders for the expenses of the operation. These expenses, nonetheless, did not
exclusively fall on the movement’s leaders and participants, but also on “all the inhabitants
of the district or districts in which the insurrection occurred, who could have opposed it”
(Article 231). The monetary penalty should take the form of “forced contributions” whose
amounts depended on each one’s economic capacity. The only people that were exempt
from the contribution were those who had actively resisted the movement once it started.

Additional Provisions and the Notion of Political Crimes
Whether directly or indirectly, all of the aforementioned crimes had a political nature,
evident in most cases in the very definition of the offenses and the offenders. Nevertheless,
neither of the two Codes defined or classified them explicitly as “political crimes.” This
does not mean that this notion was completely absent from the codifications. Both in
Mexico and Colombia, Criminal Codes involved additional provisions directly concerned
with the concept of political crimes –as a general criminal category, not as a concrete set
of offenses. The Colombian Code, for instance, prohibited extradition for political crimes
in its Article 18. Provisions in this regard were much wider in the Mexican case. Article
93 delimited the number of possible penalties for political crimes: a series of 13 options
including, among many others, fines; light penalties of incarceration or reclusión simple;
suspension of civil and political rights; confinement; and different levels of exile –ranging
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from estrangement from a city or a state to expatriation. This list of penalties excluded
others such as minor and major arrests, ordinary prison, and judicial cautions.157
Other provisions from the Mexican code regulated the imposition of some of these
specific penalties. Article 139, for instance, dictated that confinement was an exclusive
penalty for political offenders. The government was in charge of deciding the defendant’s
destination taking into consideration “both the exigencies of public peace and the
prisoner’s needs.” Article 141 clarified the difference between reclusion simple and
ordinary prison. Reclusión simple only existed for political crimes, and consisted of
detention in an establishment where no other types of criminals were allowed. This penalty
corresponded to the ideas that common and political prisoners should remain separated,
and that the prison regime for the latter should be “highly humanitarian.”158 Article 142
established that expatriation could replace detention or reclusion simple for treason or other
political crimes, but only in two circumstances: in the case that the permanence of the
defendant in the nation put public tranquility and risk, or in the case that the defendant in
question was a chief or ringleader. Finally, Article 172 dictated that political offenders,
once they had finished their respective sentences, had to remain subject to the authorities’
surveillance for an additional period. None of these supplementary articles specified,
beyond the offense of treason, which crimes classified as political.
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Political Crimes and the Military Jurisdiction
The previous rulings on matters of treason, rebellion, sedition, and others were not the only
prescriptions that formally delimited the legal definition and punishment of political crimes
in Colombia and Mexico at the time. Outside the jurisdiction of the regular Criminal Codes
and ordinary justice, there was the legal and jurisdictional domain of the military. Both
Constitutions recognized the independence and autonomy of military tribunals, as long as
their jurisdiction remained exclusively focused on military matters –this is, those involving
military personnel and crimes.159 Civilians were subject to the military tribunals only as
long as they were involved as accomplices and co-authors in military crimes. Even in these
cases, their prosecution followed the proceedings and prescriptions of the ordinary
justice.160 Military justice and tribunals commonly functioned in times of war, whether
during an international conflict or in the context of an internal confrontation like a civil
war or a major rebellion. The 1881 Colombian Military Code and its 1892 Mexican
counterpart contained the basic principles for the application and function of military
justice in both countries during the Regeneration and the Porfiriato.
Like ordinary Criminal Codes, these Military Codes also contained their own
criminal categories, with their own definitions of crime and criminality and the
corresponding penalties for each case. Criminal typologies and definitions in Military
Codes did not necessarily paralleled those in the ordinary codifications, for both kinds of
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codes dealt with different actors, actions, and circumstances. Such differences are
particularly evident in the ways in which Military Codes in Mexico and Colombia defined
and classified the crimes of treason, rebellion, and sedition. Out of these three offenses,
only treason was subject to a definition relatively similar than in the ordinary codes.
Rebellion and sedition, on the contrary, involved a marked military tone that, in most cases,
had little to do with the political offenses reviewed above.
The Mexican Military Code understood treason exclusively under the perspective
of a foreign or international war. Article 1048 defined as traitors all members of the military
that supported in any way the nation’s external enemy. This support could consist on
changing sides; surrendering fortresses, military posts, ships, and weapons to the enemy;
destroying roads and telegraphic lines in order to favor the invader; spying; and guiding
foreign expeditions in national territory; releasing war prisoners; and even inviting others
to commit the crime. Death was the penalty for all cases of military treason, with no
exceptions or mitigating conditions of rank and degree of involvement.
Colombia’s military justice, on the contrary, conceived military treason under two
different yet complementary perspectives. To the Code, treason could take place whether
in an international war or during an internal rebellion against the nation’s government. In
either of these cases, according to Article 1645, traitors were all members of the military
that switched allegiance, maintained correspondence with the enemy –external or internal–
, helped their military operations, and protected them during actions of war. Additionally,
Article 25 defined a supplementary series of acts of “high treason,” all of them referring to
circumstances of internal conflict. Such actions included attempting to overthrow the
legitimate government; trying to dissolve the Congress or block their meetings; attacking
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public officers and employees, and even hindering the performance of their constitutional
functions. To the Colombian Criminal Code, these offenses represented, basically, acts of
rebellion. Nevertheless, under the perspective of military justice, they had more serious
implications –they were acts of treason. Although the Code, enacted in 1881, prescribed
for traitors up to ten years of prison or exile, the later Constitution of 1886 established the
death penalty as a possible punishment for serious cases of treason during foreign war (Art.
29).
Both in Mexico and Colombia, military definitions of rebellion and sedition tended
to be less political than in the ordinary Criminal Codes. This de-politicization was
particularly marked in the Colombian case, where treason already represented the ultimate
political crime for members of the military. Rebellion and sedition made part of a same
criminal category, and only described different degrees of a same offense: military
insubordination. To the Code, sedition was a military uprising with the aim of demanding
anything or rejecting an order by using threats and manifestations of resistance (Article
1638). Rebellion merely implied not following orders, or taking up arms without
authorization, or executing acts of violence against a superior’s command (Art. 1639). As
acts of insubordination, both crimes received penalties of ten years of prison for chiefs and
leaders, and up to five years of the same penalty for their main accomplices (Art. 1640).
The Mexican case was slightly different. While the definition of sedition in
Mexico’s Military Code (Art. 879) pretty much paralleled Colombian prescriptions on the
matter, the notion of military rebellion still entailed some degree of political content.
Article 1040 of the Code defined it as a subtraction from obedience to the government and
a hostile uprising with the aim of opposing a Constitutional precept or mandate, punishing
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it with the death penalty. The code prescribed less drastic penalties, which were harsh
nonetheless, for rebel rank-and-file soldiers, as well as for servicemen that merely invited
others to rebel. In these cases, defendants could face up to ten years of prison (Arts. 1041
and 1042).
These prescriptions delimited the legal framework for the definition and
punishment of treason, rebellion, and sedition as military crimes –or as crimes subject to
the military jurisdiction. This does not mean, however, that they were the only definitions
available in the military legislation for cases of international war, internal conflict, or
military insurrection. At least in the Colombian case, the Military Code contained an
additional series of articles elaborating on the notions of rebellion, insurrection, and civil
war. These articles did not have the purpose of adding extra punishments to the penalties
already reviewed. They only offered wider definitions of these concepts based on notions
from the Law of Nations, with the intention of clarifying in which precise circumstances
this extraordinary law could and should apply. The definitions were, to a certain extent, a
legal development of the polemical Article 91 of the 1863 Constitution, under whose
regime the 1881 Military Code came to life.
Drawing on the definition of the Law of Nations, Article 1335 of the Colombian
Code understood “civil war” as the war that two or more parties, within the same nation,
fought for the control of “supreme” (state) power. Each one of these parties, additionally,
claimed for itself the exclusive right to rule the nation. It was, in short, an internal war
between at least two enemies claiming sovereignty for themselves and denying it to the
other. Rebellion, according to Article 1334, was another form of internal war, but one that
did not imply a conflict for sovereignty. It was, instead, an insurrection that broke out in a
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large portion of the nation and became a declared war against the legitimate government
with the aim of subtracting from its authority and establishing an independent government.
This notion of rebellion combined a war against governmental institutions with a
secessionist conflict, and presupposed a major rupture in terms of territory and sense of
nationality. The Article also ordered military officers in a war of rebellion to differentiate,
in the rebel territories of the nation, between “loyal” and “disloyal” citizens. “Disloyal”
citizens should be divided, at the same time, between citizens that, despite being
“notoriously addicted to the rebellion,” did not actively supported it, and citizens that,
without taking up arms, voluntarily supported and helped rebels (Art. 1344). Rebellions,
in this light, were also a matter of loyalty, not simply a matter of political or partisan
rivalries or disagreements.
Insurrection, finally, was a less serious political movement that, nonetheless,
involved the risk of becoming a more serious movement. Article 1333 defined the notion
as “the uprising or armed people against the established government, a part of it, one or
several laws, or one or several of its employees.” The Article also specified that
insurrections could be limited to mere episodes or armed resistance, or could lead to more
threatening manifestations of collective political violence such as revolution. One way or
another, they represented actions that were not only criminal in military terms, but also
primordially political.
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Conclusions: Criminal Regimes of Internal Enmity in Mexico and Colombia
The Criminal Codes of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration had several common points.
They both responded to similar doctrinal and philosophical influences, understood crimes
and penalties in a parallel fashion, and classified offenses in different but still relatively
analogous ways. They also addressed political criminality and internal enmity through a
common perspective. Crimes of a political nature represented serious attacks against
society as a whole. Here, the nation, the state, the government, the Constitution, and the
public order took the place of the “society” that these crimes put at risk. Offenses against
it ranked from simple episodes of collective violence directed against public authorities to
major acts of rebellion against the constitutional government, and even included attempts
at cooperation with a foreign power to harm the nation’s very existence. According to the
principle of free will, political offenders and other internal enemies were rational subjects
that freely and voluntarily acted against their own society. Their voluntariness, and
therefore their attributes of criminality, could be measured and graded in correspondence
with their degree of involvement in such attacks.
Penalties against internal enemies followed a similar gradation, corresponding not
only to degrees of involvement and voluntariness, but also to levels of political threat
associated to the attacks in question. It was a double hierarchy involving crimes and
criminals alike. Penalties for treason (an attack against the nation) were harsher than
penalties for rebellion (an offense against the government and the constitution); and these
in turn were harsher than penalties for sedition, riot, or asonada (attacks against public
authorities). Chiefs, ringleaders, plotters, and even conspirators were also at the top of this
criminal hierarchy and, in consequence, faced the most severe penalties. High- and
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medium-rank leaders or officers followed, conceived more as accomplices than actual
authors. Supporters or collaborators were also penalized as active and voluntary enemies.
Finally, at the bottom of this hierarchy, rank-and-file soldiers embodied the lowest degree
of involvement and compromise, and therefore the minimum possible level of political
threat. This is why, at least in the Colombian Code, simple soldiers were not considered
accountable for purely political crimes. In all these cases, penalties served at least two
different yet complementary purposes. On the one hand, they involved an element of
vengeance and retribution, manifested in the imposition of death penalty or in the
establishment of pecuniary penalties in cases of sedition. On the other hand, they
encompassed a component of prevention and deterrence, evident in the penalty of prison
as well as in the supplementary penalties of confinement, expatriation, or subjection to the
authorities’ surveillance.
Beyond these basic conceptions, the Mexican and the Colombian Codes defined
and understood political crimes in a way that paralleled their respective constitutional
prescriptions on the matter. Both Codes and Constitutions in Mexico and Colombia defined
political offenses as actions that simultaneously attacked the government and the public
order, performed and committed by enemies of the nation and the authorities. They also
conceived them as actions that required an exceptional, if not extraordinary, legal
treatment. Exceptionalities, according to the Codes, included the establishment of
exclusive penalties and the prohibition of others, the notion that political crimes, even if
designated otherwise, existed separately from ordinary offenses, and the premise that
political offenders required their own carceral spaces.
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The legal treatment of political criminals according to these codifications went
beyond these commonalities. Both in Mexico and Colombia, criminal codes reflected a
universe of crimes and criminals much richer than the one described in the previous
chapter. Episodes of “internal commotion” and other alterations of internal order and peace
materialized in concrete offenses clearly differentiated and hierarchized: treason, rebellion,
sedition, riot, and asonada. Additionally, each of these crimes encompassed a wide variety
of possibilities that accounted for the myriad of ways in which criminal law in Colombia
and Mexico conceived internal enmity. To the Codes, internal enemies were not “rebels”
or “seditious” in abstract. Modalities of internal enmity were much larger and full of small
divisions and differentiations. An internal enemy could be a rebel ringleader, an officer in
a rebel army, an insurrectional leader, or the head of a riot. Authors and instigators of
consummated rebellions were also internal enemies, in the same way that plotters,
conspirators, and supporters of failed or dissolved movements were. Somebody that,
without being an actual or active rebel or insurrectionist, showed some degree of sympathy
for “more active” internal enemies became an internal enemy too. Helping rebels with men,
weapons, money, supplies or means of transportation represented therefore acts of internal
enmity as well. The same applied to those that, independently of their involvement with
other political enemies, propagated “subversive maxims,” gave seditious speeches, or
attacked through written publications the government and the Constitution.
There was a subtle but important difference in the ways in which the two codes
conceived internal enmity, nonetheless. The repertoire of possible actions defining internal
enemies tended to be more diverse in Colombia than in Mexico. While crimes against
“public order” in Mexico did not properly entail acts of internal enmity, in Colombia these
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offenses involved a first –yet minimal– degree of challenge to public authorities. Sedition
and military treason also comprised clearer and more evident acts of internal enmity than
in the Mexican case. In addition, the Colombian code indirectly extended the crime of
rebellion to a series of subsidiary offenses penalizing seditious speeches, “subversive”
publications, and even pieces of political satire. This particular extension of the notion of
political enmity involved major legal and political implications in the Colombian case, for
it drew a very tenuous line between dissident journalists and rebels. The treatment of liberal
writers and newspapers during the 1880s and the 1890s would offer a myriad of examples
about the consequences of such parallelism. All in all, Colombia’s 1890 Criminal Code,
like its 1886 Constitution, seemed much more concerned than their Mexican counterparts
with possible future scenarios of political conflict and internal turmoil.
Both Codes, finally, provided governments with a wide array of options for
responding to episodes and manifestations of political enmity. Although at first glance
these possible responses seemed clear, systematic, and carefully graded, they were actually
marked by ambiguity, overlaps, and grey areas. Much of this ambiguity stemmed from the
existence of two simultaneous regimes for the definition and punishment of internal
enmity. Like their respective Constitutions, Colombia’s and Mexico’s criminal codes
referred to conducts –conceptually– equivalent to political crimes in an abstract way, with
no precise reference to a specific series of well-determined offenses. The parallelism
between dispositions on political crimes and prescriptions on offenses such as treason,
rebellion, and sedition, led to the configuration of two separate regimes of crimes and
penalties for the prosecution and punishment of internal enemies. On the one hand, there
was the special regime that both Codes outlined for political crimes, containing penalties
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and proceedings but no specific offenses –or formal, explicit criminal categories. On the
other hand, there was the ordinary regime of those concrete crimes like rebellion, sedition,
and others that, despite their evident political nature, did not formally represent political
offenses. Connections, differences, and boundaries between one regime and another were
unclear, and the Codes established nothing in this regard. What mediated between these
two regimes was yet another grey area for legal interpretation. It was an obscure sphere in
which internal enemies could be either common or political criminals depending on the
circumstances, and where the application of the extraordinary regime of political offenses
depended exclusively on discretion.
Additional sources of ambiguity had to do with the criminalization of non-violent
acts of political dissent, like in the Colombian case, and with the often tenuous
differentiation among “purely political crimes,” “related” crimes or delitos conexos, and
“purely common offenses.” While the distinction seemed clear on paper, in practice it was
almost impossible to trace a formal line between political and non-political crimes, as the
next chapters will show. With no precise indications for solving this confusion, the
Colombian and Mexican Codes ended up charging governments and other political,
judicial, and administrative authorities with the responsibility of deciding which crimes
were political and which not. During the Porfiriato and the Regeneration, these
uncertainties would work as a gray area that allowed authorities to shape and reshape the
sphere of political crimes at their convenience, without contradicting legal or constitutional
prescriptions on the matter. The practice of processing and punishing rebels as common
criminals, bandits, and malhechores, common in both countries during the period, would
be one of the most striking outcomes of such reshaping.
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Drawing on similar philosophical and doctrinal influences, the Criminal Codes of the
Porfiriato and the Regeneration understood political criminality and internal enmity in a
relatively similar manner. There were differences, of course, especially in the ways in
which they classified and criminalized actions of internal enmity and other offenses of a
political nature. Beyond these basic similarities and differences, both codifications ended
up producing a common outcome of great importance for this study: the production of
simultaneous regimes for the definition and treatment of political enmity. These regimes
coexisted in a parallel fashion, but their connections and boundaries were never clear. This
unclear parallelism shaped a framework of legal responses to political criminality in which
governments and public authorities, not criminal codes, had the last word regarding what
political offenses were and what kind of punishments they deserved. When it came to acts
of internal enmity, the theoretical consistency and predictability of these codes gave way
to the uncertainty of discretion. As the next chapter illustrates, these ambiguities, as well
as their legal effects, were the center of multiple debates and doctrinal developments during
the period.
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IV. CHAPTER 3. DEFINING AND PUNISHING POLITICAL CRIMES: LEGAL,
DOCTRINAL, AND LEGISLATIVE CONVERSATIONS

The legal experiences of rebels and other political dissidents in Mexico and Colombia were
not exclusively the result of constitutional and criminal law prescriptions. They were also
indirect, remote products of a series of legal conversations concerning the nature of
political crimes and the most appropriate ways to treat them. These conversations were
much more than simple theoretical or doctrinal elaborations disconnected from the legal
and political lives of individual and governments. Many of them influenced legislation and
legal change, and therefore played a role in the shaping of the relationships between
citizens and state as well as in people’s experiences as legal and political actors. Broadly
speaking, the stories of Flores Magón and many others, their interactions with Mexican
and Colombian authorities, and their fate as political criminals also carried the imprint of
these conversations and their impact on legislation.

Constitutional and criminal law prescriptions on political criminality illustrate only a
fraction of the overall framework for the definition and treatment of political offenses in
Mexico and Colombia during the period under study. The conversations that accompanied
the making and enactment of such prescriptions are equally important for understanding
how governments during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration responded to political crimes
and why they reacted the way they did. This chapter reconstructs and analyzes some of
these conversations, with the aim of illustrating the panoply of legal and doctrinal
arguments, positions, and perspectives that helped shape, in both countries, the framework
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in question. It shows that many of the norms reviewed in previous chapters were the
product of multiple reflections about the criminal nature of these offenses, the distinction
between political and ordinary crimes, and the best ways of punishing political offenders.
What were the major legal and political concerns behind these reflections? What sorts of
legal and doctrinal inspirations or influences did they involve? What do these conversations
reveal about the ways in which Mexican and Colombian jurists and lawmakers understood
the limits of state power, the boundaries of “legal” political dissidence, and the legitimacy
of specific modalities of political dissent? These are some of the main questions that this
chapter aims to answer.
A series of legal essays, studies of legislation, and constitutional and legislative
debates between the 1850s and the 1910s comprise the main sources of this chapter. Section
one explores how these reflections and discussions understood political criminality,
defined political crimes, and differentiated them from common offenses. Section two
analyzes how jurists and lawmakers argued about the need for defining a special, separate
regime of penalties for political crimes and criminals. Section three analyzes how
constitutional debates on extraordinary powers in Mexico and Colombia addressed and
perceived the nature, criminality, and punishment of political offenses. Section four offers,
by way of conclusion, a general perspective of the multiple ways in which these debates
and conversations assessed the nature of political crimes and its legal treatment throughout
the period.
Overall, the chapter argues that conversations and reflections about the legal and
constitutional treatment of political offenses encompassed in Colombia and Mexico a wide
variety of positions and perspectives about what political crimes were, what made them
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criminal, and what made them political. Not all these understandings agreed on the attribute
of criminality attached to these offenses, or on the sort of legal responses they demanded
from governments, constitutions, and criminal laws. While some jurists and lawmakers
conceived of rebels, revolutionaries and other “dangerous” dissidents as enemies of society
and the nation as a whole, others merely perceived them as political fanatics led by
misguided notions of “justice” or “patriotism.” There were also all sorts of alternative
interpretations in between both extremes. Many of these discussions revolved around the
differences between common and political crimes and the distinctions between “harmless”
and “dangerous” political dissidence. The lack of clarity –and consensus– about the limits
between these categories would give way to a lack of certainty with serious political and
legal consequences during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.

Defining and Differentiating Political Criminality: Assessing the Nature of Political
Offenses
The vague nature of political crimes in Mexican and Colombian legislation did not go
unnoticed among legislators and other legal experts throughout the period. Aware of the
legal and political consequences of an imprecise definition of political criminality, some
experts and lawmakers would make the effort to propose clearer answers to the question
about what political crimes were. Similarly, the outbreak and proliferation of internal
conflict in both nations would force legislators and others to reflect more thoroughly about
the limits between common and political offenses, as well as about the conditions under
which political crimes remained strictly political. Legal essays and journals, studies of
current legislation, and even congressional initiatives became spaces of reflection and
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debate about these matters. Such reflections shed light on the different ways in which legal
experts tried to solve the ambiguities explored in the previous chapters. More importantly,
they illustrate the ways in which these legal actors conceived and understood political
crimes, not only as criminal constructs but also as political acts. They show as well the
doctrinal and intellectual foundations of their conceptions.

The Mexican Experience: From 1874 to 1912
Three basic preoccupations stimulated these reflections in the Mexican case. The first one
had to do with the penalties that the Constitution and the Criminal Code prohibited for
political crimes. The second referred to the separation between common and political
offenses. The third one, finally, linked itself to a question about the criminal nature and
punishment of delitos conexos. A first position in this regard comes from a study on the
1871 Criminal Code by the jurist José María Lozano, published in 1874. Reflecting about
the article that forbade capital punishment for political crimes, Lozano pointed out that,
since the Code did not clarify which crimes were properly political, the precise definition
of these offenses should be subject to further legislation. This future legislation had to be
very cautious at excluding those common offenses committed “under the shadow of a
political plan or idea.” Neither robbery, assassination, kidnapping, arson, or rape had to do
“with a political plan aiming to change either current institutions or the prevailing legal
order,” Lozano maintained.161
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The distinction between political and “other” crimes was complicated, especially in
times of turmoil and war, the author acknowledged. In such moments, he explained, people
resorted without discernment to all elements that could further the victory of their cause.
In a revolution, for instance, the necessity of maintaining such elements forced chiefs and
ringleaders to tolerate all sorts of crimes and abuses. In such circumstances, it was also
common that “lost people,” following “their criminal instincts,” plunged franticly into all
classes of disorders and crime, considering the revolution “a license of impunity for all
their excesses.” Using revolution as an excuse for crime was inadmissible, Lozano argued.
Any political banner, he concluded, “could not conceal under its cover such debauchery,”
and justice had always the faculty to make those responsible accountable for such criminal
conducts.162 To the author, the distinction between common and political crimes was
basically a differentiation between illegitimate and legitimate acts of internal war. Political
crimes were violent acts of internal enmity directed against the government or the legal
order. They always entailed a clear political purpose, and were in tune with the purposes
of the conflagration. Common crimes, on the contrary, were simple acts of violence that,
despite taking place during the conflict, at no point entailed a legitimate political end or a
goal actually linked with what was a stake in war.
A second, somewhat different position dates from 1880. In his study of the same
Code, the jurist Antonio De Medina y Ormaechea justified the application of more lenient
penalties to political offenders on the grounds that political crimes were, somehow, “less
criminal.” Certainly, he acknowledged, sometimes political criminals acted out of “greed
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for power,” “personal hatred,” “humiliated self-love,” “a desire for prosperity,” or “any
other debased opinion.” Nonetheless, there were other times in which they sacrificed
themselves “for their convictions, a blind political fanaticism [or] mere fidelity to the
principles in which they believe.” They could also act on the grounds of “a misunderstood
notion of public wellbeing or a misconception on matters in which public opinion
hesitates.”163 Such considerations were reasons enough for separating political criminals
from the rest of offenders, and for penalizing them with more “humanitarian” penalties
than in other cases, the author affirmed. Unlike Lozano, who understood political
criminality from a war-centered perspective, Medina y Ormaechea conceived these
offenses mostly as “crimes of opinion.” Political crimes were different –or “less criminal”–
not because they represented legitimate acts of internal warfare, but because they
represented extreme, ill-fated manifestations of political beliefs and convictions.
The “nobility” of political crimes, nonetheless, did not cover the bulk of the actions
that political offenders could commit. Like Lozano, Medina y Ormaechea believed that
acts of robbery, plundering, arson, and other common crimes perpetrated by political
criminals still deserved punishment as common offenses. An episode of rebellion or a
sedition could involve both political and common crimes, but this did not mean that they
belonged to a similar sphere of criminality, the author claimed. Paraphrasing renown
French jurist and legal historian Joseph Ortolan, Medina y Ormaechea argued that although
common crimes were natural outcomes in a political struggle, they were different from it.
Their nature, in consequence, remained unaltered, and they were still subject to prosecution
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like any other common crime. They were, no matter what, separate crimes (“delitos
aparte”), ordinary offenses whose perpetration in political conflicts should be condemned
by all political parties. There was no other possibility, the Mexican jurist explained: leaving
unpunished common crimes associated to political offenses would encourage fascinerosos
(rogues, bandits) to proclaim a political principle anytime they wanted to get reduced
sentences or lenient penalties for their crimes.164
The revision of the 1871 Criminal Code after the fall of the Porfiriato gave Mexican
lawmakers another chance of discussing the question. It was 1912, Díaz had fled to exile,
and Mexico was in the early stages of a decade-long civil war. Within such a context, it
was natural that questions about the criminalization of rebellion and civil warfare
resurfaced and called the attention of revolutionary legislators. Revising the 1871
prescriptions on rebellion and its delitos conexos, Roberto Esteva Ruiz offered an
interpretation of the relationship between common and political crimes that somehow
differed from earlier understandings. Esteva Ruiz, unlike Lozano and Medina y
Ormaechea, did not insist on a clear-cut separation between the two types of criminality.
To him, the problem did not lie in the criminalization of all non-political offenses, but in
the identification of specific ordinary crimes that were actually inadmissible as part of a
rebellion. To him, it was impossible to establish, in practice, a precise and comprehensive
separation between political and non-political actions. Rebellions were similar to episodes
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of international war: they always implied an element of violence. Violence was, in fact,
essential to the purposes of a rebellion, and therefore could not be separated from it.165
There were other acts inseparable from rebellion, in Esteva Ruiz’s perspective.
Besides interpersonal violence, a rebellion almost always involved actions commonly
considered as political offenses: looting, arson, murder, and other “extreme” acts. To him,
it seemed that there had been, for years, an agreement about what to do with these “other”
actions: they were offenses that increased penalties for rebellion and counted as cumulative
offenses. The problem with this traditional perspective, Esteva Ruiz pointed out, was that
there was no rebellion in which these “other” actions were merely optional. In such
circumstance, what was the point of re-criminalizing rebels for acts that were innate to a
rebellion? The only solution in this regard, he maintained, was to make the same distinction
that International Law made in cases of international war: one between violent acts
demanded by the very needs of the war, and simple actions of vandalism.166 The core
problem, then, was identifying in which circumstances these acts could and could not be
considered as “aggravating situations.”
How to trace a line, then, between “connatural” and “aggravating” acts of rebellion?
To Esteva Ruiz, the solution was, again, in the adoption of prescriptions from International
Law. Mexican legislation should treat rebellions like international wars and, in
consequence, submit rebels to the laws of war, adopting its distinctions between
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“legitimate” and “illegitimate” acts of warfare. The works of the Italian jurist Pascual Fiore
offered useful clues about what international legislation permitted and forbade in those
circumstances, Esteva Ruiz argued. Fiore proposed, simply, to criminalize all acts of
violence “that increased for no reason the enemy’s suffering,” including the use of weapons
forbidden by the Law of Nations and war tactics that needlessly aggravated the suffering
of non-combatants.167 Like Lozano in 1874, Esteva Ruiz problematized political
criminality from a war-focused perspective and underscored the problem of distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate acts of war. This distinction, nonetheless, did not point
to an overall criminalization of all “non-political” acts of warfare, but to a more selective
illegalization of “extreme” war actions. The return of the war-focused perspective can be
interpreted as a natural outcome of the generalized civil war raging in Mexico since
November 1910.

The Colombian Case: Between 1885 and the Post-Thousand Days Era.
Reflections in the Colombian case were less concerned with the limits between common
and political crimes, and more linked to questions regarding the legal existence of political
offenses and the entities in charge of defining them. Colombian jurist Demetrio Porras’s
essay De la Extradición y los Delitos Políticos, published in 1885, illustrates some of the
questions and arguments surrounding these matters during the early years of the
Regeneration. Writing about what “political crimes” meant for extradition purposes, Porras
claimed that it was impossible to define political offenses through legislation. Laws were
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meant to be fixed and stable, while political crimes were mutable by nature –their nature
was always variable, depending on time and place. Certainly, it was possible to say what
they were and represented as a criminal category, he explained. European legal thinking
provided several examples of these definitions. To J. Stuart Mill, for instance, political
crimes were the ones committed during an internal or external war, or during an
insurrection or political commotion. To the Belgian Jacques J. Haus, they represented
attacks against public order. Likewise, to the Spanish Joaquín Escriche, they entailed
crimes against the Constitution, conspiracies against the nation’s institutions, and
rebellions against its legitimate powers.168 The problem, thus, was not in the definition of
the criminal category, but in its translation to concrete legislation and specific sets of crimes
and penalties.
To Porras, the major difficulty for defining political crimes through legislation –
especially in cases of extradition– lays on the question about who should determine the
“political” nature of these offenses. It could not be the Executive power, for it was not in a
position of deciding if rebels acted in accordance with an alleged “right” or, on the contrary,
were simple disturbers of public peace. The Legislative was similarly unable to decide on
the nature of these crimes, given their mutable nature. The Judicial power was, then, the
one in charge of deciding on the matter, not through general rulings but deciding case by
case, as suggested by the Italian jurist R. Fiori.169 Judicial decisions in this regard still had
to take into account the principle that common crimes did not represent political offenses
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despite their connections with political actions, warned Porras. No political principle could
excuse or legitimate the commission of common offenses. “The influence of a political
passion,” the author pointed out, “cannot modify the nature of the punishable act, because
this political passion does not exclude it from the overall rule: the [criminal] fact will
always remain the same.”170 This notion was in tune with the most recent doctrinal
developments in England, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, Porras pointed out, and had
the support of jurists such as the Italian Emilio Brusa.171
The distinction between common and political crimes in a rebellion, an insurrection
or a similar movement was not always easy to establish, recognized Porras. Political
criminality was, in its pure state, a reflection of the “hallucinations of a sincere and ardent
patriotism,” a manifestation of an “outraged public consciousness” turned against
tyrannical governments. Yet, in practice, it was almost impossible to find these “pure”
expressions of political crimes. Frequently, the author wrote, “we see [rebels] carried away
by unbridled ambitions […] or feelings of hate and revenge.” This was particularly true in
the Colombian case, where most revolts were the making of a few ambitious rogues and a
number of “wayward, malcontent, and unruly” individuals, exclusively interested in
exploiting working and peaceful people.172 In such circumstances, a distinction with legal
effects between common crimes and political offenses was more than necessary.
Further reflections and debates on the nature and definition of political crimes took
place right after the end of the Thousand Days. The legal dilemmas brought about by the
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reactions of President Sanclemente and Vice-President Marroquín to the Liberal rebellion
encouraged not only discussions on the matter, but also attempts at reforms of the Criminal
Code. A first example of these post-civil war discussions comes precisely from these
attempts. In October 1903, former President and now Senator, Conservative Miguel A.
Caro, presented a draft bill reforming the 1890 Criminal Code. His proposal focused on a
specific point: the lack of clarity regarding the definition of political crimes, and the alleged
“voids” existing in both Constitutional and Criminal prescriptions concerning these
offenses. To Caro, the idea that these voids actually existed, as well as their acceptance as
a natural element in Colombian legislation, had proven wrong and dangerous. It was on the
grounds of such voids that the Executive, during the war, had seized the power to decide
about the criminal nature of the rebellion and opted for treating rebels as common
criminals. To the Senator, the Executive had acted on the basis of a false assumption, for
political crimes did actually exist in the legislation. The fact that there were no special law
defining what political crimes were did not mean that the government had the faculty to
arbitrarily define them or to treat them as common offenses.173
To Caro, it was indeed false that Colombian legislation had not defined political
crimes. The Constitution mentioned political offenses at least three times: in the prohibition
of death penalty for political criminals, and in the two articles regulating the administration
of indultos and amnesties for –and exclusively for– these crimes. That was also the case of
the Criminal Code, particularly in its prescriptions about the granting of state mercy for
“offenses against public order” (Arts 110-116). In consequence, Caro concluded “political
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crimes” and “offenses against public order” were synonyms. The 1890 Code, thus, did
define political crimes.174 The problem, to the Senator, was not one of definition, but of
lack of clarity in the legislation. His draft bill, partially based on the works of Ortolan,
proposed that the Criminal Code formally established as political offenses the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, as well as the “minor” acts of treason established in Articles 153
and 156. Along the same lines, the Code also should consider “political” any other crime
that directly harmed the state’s rights regarding its social and political organization.175
Caro’s proposal went even further, in a clear response to the government’s legal
maneuvers during the Thousand Days. The bill also established that the Executive, even in
use of extraordinary powers, did not have the faculty to reform the existing criminal
legislation, define crimes, or decide on the criminality of offenders. Finally, it proposed
that, in cases of rebellion, sedition, or civil war, the law should treat delitos conexos as
political crimes as well, as long as they did not represented violations to the “civilized
practices” of war. Violations included execution of parliamentarians and war prisoners,
assassinations motivated by hatred or personal vengeance, and pillage for mere monetary
reasons. The assassination of the President, even if it responded to political goals, should
also be considered an ordinary offense.176 Caro, like the rest of the legal thinkers considered
in this section, understood rebellions and other episodes of internal conflict as events
involving both political and non-political crimes. Yet, like the Mexican lawmakers of 1912,
he did not call for the outright criminalization of the latter.
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The interpretation by Caro was by no means the only perspective circulating among
Colombian legal experts on this sensitive matter. A debate taking place in the legal
newspaper Anales de Jurisprudencia between July and October 1903 illustrates two other
“alternative” positions on the question of whether or not political crimes existed in the
legislation. The debate revolved around an essay by Eduardo Rodríguez Piñerez,
“Facultades del gobierno en tiempo de guerra.” A study of emergency powers in Colombia
since the 1830s, Rodríguez Piñerez’s work examined the government’s response to the
Thousand Days and came up with a conclusion that contrasted with Caro’s arguments.
Since there were no laws defining political crimes before the outbreak of the war, the
Executive had all the power to decide if the rebellion was a political crime or not. It was a
principle proclaimed by the Constitution in its Article 121. In this light, Rodríguez Piñeres
emphasized, the punishment of the Liberal rebellion as a common crime had not been an
arbitrary act but merely the exercise of a formal constitutional provision. There was no
previous law that forced the government to treat rebels as political offenders, for there were
no laws defining what political crimes were. There was no obligation to consider as
“political” crimes that the law had not previously defined as such. The Executive power,
in consequence, was free to treat those crimes as common if it wanted to.177
The editors of the journal did not share Rodríguez Piñerez’s position. One of them,
Vicente Olarte Camacho, reviewed the essay and concluded that its author was wrong. To
Olarte, Rodríguez Piñerez relied on the false assumption that there were political crimes in
the Colombian legislation. Crime was “a voluntary and malicious violation of a law,”
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reminded Olarte. If there was no law to violate, therefore there could not be a crime. That
was precisely what happened to political crimes in Colombia: there were no political crimes
because there was no legislation on them. Without a previous legal definition and
classification of political offenses, then, it was impossible to talk about actual political
crimes.178 This did not mean, as Rodriguez Piñerez wanted to believe, that the Executive
could issue norms in the absence of formal legislation on the matter. Neither was it
authorized to simply define rebellion as a common offense and therefore punish rebels with
the death penalty. This represented not only an erroneous interpretation of the nation’s
legislation, but also a contravention of the basic principles of the ius gentium regarding the
treatment of combatants in a civil war, Olarte concluded.179 His was an “essentialist”
position that denied from the beginning any legal elaboration on the base of the grey areas
of legislation on political crimes. On the contrary, Porras, Caro, and even Rodríguez
Piñerez maintained a more “interpretive” perspective, aiming to circumscribe and delineate
political offenses on the grounds of the existing legislation, its voids, and its ambiguities.

Reflections and debates on the nature of political criminality and the definition of political
offenses shed light on at least three crucial aspects of criminal law and doctrine in Mexico
and Colombia during the period. First, they show that the ambiguity of constitutional and
criminal prescriptions on political crimes did not go unnoticed. Such ambiguity, in fact,
became the center of a series of discussions about the possible meanings of Constitutions
and Criminal Codes, as well as about the limits of state authority in matters of legislation.
178
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Second, they illustrate the different legal and political concerns shaping reflections on civil
warfare, rebellion, and political criminality. Preoccupations about the limits of state power,
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” acts of war, judgement and punishment of ordinary
offenses, and even the legitimacy of rebellion as a political act, played a major role in
structuring these discussions. Finally, they evidence the extent to which the experience of
civil warfare impacted legal and doctrinal developments in both countries, as illustrated by
the tone and contents of these reflections after the Thousand Days and during the Mexican
revolution. Certainly linked to national circumstances and concerns, these discussions took
place within a broader, Atlantic doctrinal framework, involving constant allusions to
International Law as well as references to recent and contemporary European legal
thinkers. Such broader framework will also be present in the reflections about penalties
that the next section addresses.

Towards an Exceptional Regime of Penalties for Political Crimes
The regime of penalties for political offenders represented a second front of legal and
doctrinal reflection regarding constitutional and criminal prescriptions on political
criminality. Whether in academic essays, legislative sessions, or constituent assemblies,
legal experts and lawmakers in Mexico and Colombia widely discussed how criminal laws
should punish political offenders and which penalties were better suited to the nature of
political crimes. Taken together, these reflections by both Mexican and Colombian jurists
and legal thinkers hint at their agreement not only on the “special” character of political
criminality, but also on the fact that it deserved a separate and “exceptional” regime of
punishment. Although many of these discussions revolved around an analogous set of
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penalties, reflections in each country tended to focus on different punishments and legal
responses. Such differences not only corresponded to the particularities of constitutional
and criminal law in each nation, but also involved specific reactions to concrete political
conjunctures.

Common Preoccupations: From Capital Punishment to Exile
Death penalty, as well as punishments involving exile, confinement, and other similar
sanctions, called simultaneously the attention of Mexican and Colombian legal experts and
lawmakers. In both cases, reflection on these matters involved relatively similar arguments:
Capital punishment for political crimes was a barbaric penalty that deserved to disappear.
In contrast, penalties such as expatriation, confinement, and relegation were less severe
sanctions that actually fit the nature of political crime and effectively neutralized the threats
that political criminals posed.
Both Colombian and Mexican legal thinkers drew on similar arguments for
supporting the constitutional abolition of the death penalty for political crimes. For
instance, they surfaced during the intervention of Mexican Alberto Vieytez before the
legislature of Querétaro in 1868. As part of the discussions of a draft bill that eliminated
the death penalty for political crimes in the state, Vieytez argued against such penalty.
“Death penalty for political offenses,” Vieytez affirmed, “is the coldest and less noble
revenge of the victor over the vanquished, the legalized aggression of brothers against
brothers […], the funerary limit that prevents the union of all Mexicans.”180 Supporting
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Vieytez’s arguments, provincial congressmen Angel M. Domínguez y José Bocanegra
maintained that punishing political offenders with the death penalty “made us judges of
our own causes.” It was “the abuse of the right of the strongest,” and a penalty that did
nothing for convincing rebels that the state was right. Additionally, the congressmen
pointed out, political criminality was a variable phenomenon, since public opinion was
always changing: “yesterday’s executed is today’s hero; today’s hero might be tomorrow’s
executed […]. In this permanent change of opinions, who is actually right? Those who
execute? Those that decree an ovation? Perhaps nobody is right, but with no doubt the ones
that executed have no way of redressing their work.”181 Constitutional assemblies in
Colombia and Mexico also involved deliberations on the matter. In Colombia, the 1885
delegates would reformulate the terms of the original article prescribing the abolition of
capital punishment for political offenses. The article’s original version stated that the law
would not recognize as “political” the crimes of treason, murder, arson, and plundering,
even if they had political aims.182 The final version of the article would maintain the
restriction for political crimes without including the original exceptions. Discussions were
more complex in the Mexican case. Some delegates were particularly concerned with the
possible effects of an unclear distinction between political crimes and some of the other
offenses that remained subject to the penalty. That was the case, for instance, of Delegates
Francisco Zarco and Ponciano Arriaga.
Zarco’s and Arriaga’s preoccupations had to do with the risk that future
governments applied the notions of “traitor” and “salteador” to prosecute political
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offenders and thus legitimize their execution. Zarco, for instance, stated that the principle
that death penalty applied only to traitors was problematically vague, especially
considering that, in the nation’s history, “traitor” was a common epithet often used in
political and partisan recriminations. It was necessary, thus, to clearly define what treason
was, and to limit the concept to cases of foreign invasion. Otherwise, “partisan hatred
would make illusory the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes.”183 The notion
of “bandit” entailed a similar problem. To Santa Anna, Zarco reminded, the Ayutla
revolutionaries were bandits. Had they lost, they would have been hanged under such a
misleading charge. 184 Arriaga also feared that the term “traitor” could be subject to further
political instrumentalization by the government, and considered that nothing prevented
authorities from abusing the term “bandit” in times of civil war. To him, the Constitution
required more precise terms, like “treason in foreign war” instead of simple “treason,” or
another, “less inconvenient” term than “bandit.”185 Arriaga’s arguments would finally find
echo in the Assembly, and his clarification concerning the crime of treason made it to the
final version of the Constitution.
The aforementioned views remained around for decades. In 1897, for instance,
Colombian law professor Antonio J. Iregui explained that capital punishment for political
offenses was a particularly nefarious penalty, for it represented more an action of political
vengeance than an actual act of justice. To him, it was nothing but a “weapon of
extermination” that only benefitted the “despotism and intransigence of the party in power
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against its defeated adversary.”186 That same year, the provincial legislature of Nuevo
León, Mexico, revising the terms of Article 23 of the 1857 Constitution, considered that,
although the article required some modifications, its prescription about political crimes
should remain intact. Political criminality involved acts whose criminal nature escaped “the
ordinary rules of criminology,” members of the Constitutional Commission in the
legislature’s high chamber (Senado) argued. The criminality of political offenders was also
especial, for it depended on the observer’s point of view: for some people, they were
“execrable villains;” for others, “heroes or martyrs.” In addition, as per members of the
Commission, granting the government the right to punish political offenders with the death
penalty meant “turning justice into a partisan weapon” and an “instrument of terror and
personal vengeance.”187
Taken together, the legislators of Queretaro in 1868, their peers from Nuevo León
in 1897, and the Colombian Iregui, based their arguments on three essential points: first,
the “special” character of political crimes; second: the “relative” criminality of political
offenders; and third: an accepted need for limiting the state’s power of retribution against
dissidents.
On the whole, constitutional preoccupations with the death penalty and political
crimes in Colombia and Mexico were linked to a fundamental concern about the
connections between common and political offenses. This time, it was not a question
concerning the criteria separating the two criminal categories. It was, rather, apprehension
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over the legal and political consequences of merging common and political crimes at the
time of administering capital punishment. This unease entailed two completely different
preoccupations. In Colombia, it was a concern about common crimes being exempt from
the death penalty on account of their political façade. In Mexico, on the contrary, it was an
anxiety linked to the use of notions of common criminality for legitimizing the use of “nonlegitimate” penalties for political offenders. Such concerns evidence the fact that the
separation between common and political offenses was not only a matter of conceptual
differentiation, but also a distinction with crucial legal effects.
Less discussed in the legal literature than capital punishment, penalties of exile,
expatriation and the like also represented a common concern in Colombia’s and Mexico’s
legal thinking. Discussions about these penalties would entail additional conversations
about the nature of political crimes, the limits of state retribution vis-à-vis internal enmity,
and the best ways of dealing with “illegal” political dissidence. Both Colombian and
Mexican legal thinkers considered these penalties the most appropriate and effective
responses to political criminality. As the Colombian Demetrio Porras wrote in 1889, they
were punishments that “alienated culprits from the theater of their intrigues and made them
incapable, as much as possible, to bring to fruition their fratricide projects.”188
On the whole, the penalties in question included expatriation in its different
meanings

–extrañamiento,

expatriación,

exilio,

or

destierro–,

confinement

(confinamiento), and relegation (relegación) or subjection to the authorities’ surveillance.
Expatriation was the most serious penalty of this group, and it implied the offender’s
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removal from the nation’s territory. According to Porras, this was a common penalty
against “disobedient ecclesiastics” and major enemies of public order and peace. In the
latter case, he explained, the penalty was meant to fall primarily on rebel or revolutionary
ringleaders, punishing them with removal from their milieus as a means to neutralize the
political threats they posed.189 Mexican legal thinkers seemed less enthusiastic regarding
the effects of this penalty. According to the drafters of the 1871 Criminal Code,
expatriation as a penalty was neither egalitarian not exemplary: not only did the experience
of exile vary from person to person, but also people could not witness the expatriate’s
suffering and thus were unlikely to learn anything from it. It was, thus, an inconvenient
penalty that could only work on rare occasions, mostly in cases of treason or rebellion, in
which it represented the only way of maintaining public peace. Even in that rare and
extreme case, the drafters maintained, this penalty should fall only on rebel chiefs and
ringleaders.190 That was also the opinion of the Mexican José María Lozano, who argued
that exile only should apply to political criminals whose political prestige or military glory
posed a serious risk to public peace.191
Confinement was a less drastic and, to some, more convenient way of dealing with
political offenders. According to Lozano, confinement was a penalty that perfectly fitted
the purposes of punishment regarding political criminality.

Political crimes, to the

Mexican jurist, required political penalties, and these, unlike ordinary punishments, did not
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have an expiatory purpose. The main goal of political penalties consisted merely in “putting
offenders in a circumstance that made impossible for them to alter public order, by
depriving them of their natural means and resources for action.” That was, precisely, what
confinement made possible, the author pointed out. It took culprits “away from their places
or residence in which their presence was dangerous given their relationships, friendships,
knowledge, and resources.”192 Confinement, in short, served the same purposes of
expatriation, but in a less costly and more efficient way.
Relegation, finally, was a lesser version of confinement, as Demetrio Porras
asserted. Those dealing with this penalty, the Colombian jurist explained, enjoyed a degree
of liberty that was compatible with the government’s need for ensuring their custody, hence
their subjection to the authorities’ surveillance.193 The demise of Porras’s project of
codification hindered the adoption, in Colombia’s criminal legislation, of the penalty of
relegation for political crimes. That was not the case of Mexico. The makers of the 1871
Code established relegation not as a punishment in itself but as a subsidiary penalty for all
political criminals. According to the Code, political offenders should remain subject to the
authorities’ surveillance right after the end of their corresponding sentences. This
additional supervision, according to Lozano, responded simply to the nature of political
criminality as a political phenomenon. “Political passions tend to be more obstinate and
stubborn than others […] Born out of a conviction that often develops into true fanaticism,
they are difficult to silence, those embracing them endure all sorts of difficulties, and offer
as their only outcomes whether the glory of triumph or the glory of martyrdom.” In such
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circumstances, Lozano argued, common penalties were unable to produce any sort of
repentance or correction. Resistant to the regenerative effects of punishment, political
offenders should then remain under the authorities’ radar, “in order to prevent in a timely
manner the realization of new plans and conspiracies.”194
Reflections and concerns about expatriation, confinement, and relegation reveal an
understanding of political criminality that previous discussions reviewed in this section
have already suggested. The major criminal attribute of political offenses lay in the political
threats they embodied, this is, in their potential to alter order, disrupt peace, and put
government’s stability at risk. It was a criminality whose threats were somehow resilient
to ordinary repression; one that could be partially neutralized but never corrected. This
characteristic partially explains the “special” character that legal thinkers of the period
attributed to political crimes, and therefore the “extraordinary” regime of penalties that in
their view they deserved.

Outlining a Lenient Regime of Penalties for Political Crimes and other Mexican Concerns
Discussions in Mexico about the legal treatment of political criminals according to the
1871 Code and the Constitution were not limited to these “common” considerations. They
also involved conversations about the lenient treatment that political crimes deserved, and
the convenience –or inconvenience– of using extraordinary powers as a response to attacks
against public order. When reflecting on the provisions of the Criminal Code, Mexican
legal thinkers like Lozano and Medina y Ormaechea tended to underscore the
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correspondence between their codification and the principle that political crimes deserved,
above all, a lenient treatment. Lozano, convinced that penalties for political crimes should
only turn offenders politically harmless, believed that the standard penalties included in the
Code properly responded to the nature of political criminality. Formal prison, for instance,
did nothing to neutralize the offender’s political threats. On the contrary, sufferings linked
to prison reinforced the criminal’s aura of expiation, which in turn strengthened his
political determination and prestige. Suspensions of civil rights did nothing to contribute
to the ultimate goal of political penalties. Political crimes, after all, had a “sphere of
penalidad completely different, in its nature and purpose, from the one that the law
establishes for the punishment of common crimes.”195 This is why penalties such as
expatriation and confinement, and even incarceration (reclusion) and deprivation of
political rights, worked better in this case.196
These principles found wide reception among the authors of the 1871 Code. Medina
y Ormaechea, who had participated in the drafting of the codification, explained that one
of the purposes of the new Code had been to establish a series of “exclusive penalties” for
political crimes. Besides implementing the constitutional mandate prohibiting the
application of capital punishment to political offenders, the Code’s drafters also created the
penalty of reclusión, eliminated restrictions to indultos for political crimes, and even
limited the application of the penalty of expatriation. The Codification, which required all
prisoners to work during their time of incarceration, also released political prisoners from

195

Lozano, Derecho penal, 446.

196

Lozano, Derecho penal, 446.

156

this obligation.197 Reclusión, according to Medina y Ormaechea, allowed political
criminals to experience prison in a separate space or establishment. Such a seclusion aimed,
among other things, to prevent common criminals from “besmirching” (envilecer) political
offenders. There was, again, the idea that political criminals were “less criminal” than
others. The Code’s authors had adopted this penalty following “the opinion of modern
criminalists,” as well as the model of the Belgian Criminal Code.198
Reflections on expatriation, confinement, relegation, and reclusión revolved around
penalties that jurists and lawmakers deemed “convenient” and “acceptable” for political
crimes. This does not mean that there were no discussions about current or established
penalties whose application to political criminals was, to the opinion of jurists and
legislators, “inappropriate” and even “dangerous” or “harmful.” That was the case, for
instance, of the suspension of constitutional guarantees for salteadores and plagiarios, a
penalty that provincial and federal authorities commonly applied to political criminals and
other “dangerous” dissidents. The debates of the 1880 Mexican Congress illustrate the
concern of some legislators about the consequences of using this penalty against internal
enemies.199 An alleged increase of episodes of banditry and rural criminality during the
first months of that year led the Executive to request, from a portion of the Congress, the
suspension of constitutional guarantees for bandits, salteadores, and other rural criminals.
The Law that made the suspension official, enacted in March 1880, triggered a long debate
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in Congress about its constitutionality. Such debates also tackled the apparently
“customary” practice of applying this same treatment to political dissidents.
Most of the opponents to the Law argued, among other things, that the government
had enacted it without the avail of the whole Congress and on the grounds of false alarms
and events whose gravity had been exaggerated. There were, nonetheless, two
Congressmen who criticized the Law not only because it was unnecessary, but also because
it continued a long tradition of political abuses committed under this constitutional figure:
deputies Obregón González and Collantes. Obregón González pointed out that, considering
the levels of “political passion” that characterized Mexico’s local and provincial politics,
this Law would easily become a carte blanche for all sorts of abuses. If the Law remained
in place, the Deputy explained, “nobody’s life would be safe.” Its procedural prescriptions,
which required only the declaration of two witnesses and a 24-hour term for sentencing
any individual, proved particularly dangerous. There was nothing in the Law that prevented
local political chiefs and state governors from abusing these conditions, which made such
officials free to unleash political vengeances and get rid of “cumbersome” political
opponents.200
Deputy Collantes held a relatively similar position. In his opinion, Mexican
governments throughout the years had used these extraordinary faculties to seize the power
of the Legislative and Judicial branches, “turning therefore the Constitution into
dictatorship.” Under the shadow of these emergency powers, local and national authorities
had compromised the nation’s interests, dilapidated public funds, and harassed and
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assassinated “citizens discontented with their administrations or that have protested against
their abuses.”201 Those acts, to the Deputy, had no justification at all. Even in the case that
these “malcontents” represented an actual threat to public order, the Deputy maintained,
there was no need for replacing the Constitution’s regime with one of authoritarianism by
granting the Executive extraordinary powers. This, nonetheless, did not mean that
Collantes considered emergency faculties an “inconvenient” measure against political
criminality. To him, they were a fair, legitimate, and necessary response, but only in cases
of “actual” political crimes –this is, in cases of severe perturbation of public peace. These
kinds of measures were indeed indispensable in nations that suffered from criminal
organizations dedicated to attack and destabilize their institutions, as it was the case of
Prussia, Germany, Italy, or Spain, a clear reference to European anarchism. Those were,
to Collantes, real cases of political criminality.202
To the Deputy, the Mexican situation had nothing to do with what happened in
Europe. There was no “real” political criminality in Mexico. Mexican agitators,
conspirators, and other “dangerous” political dissidents were not as “important” and
“audacious” as European anarchists. No one, for instance, had attempted to assassinate the
President, Collantes remarked. The ones in Mexico were nothing but small problems of
“violent” dissidence that at no point required a response that included the suspension of
constitutional guarantees. That would be dictatorial and unconceivable. They deserved a
legal response, of course, but one within the limits of ordinary law –this is, nothing beyond
what already existed. Responses against rebellion only required soldiers and money.
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Actions against conspirators simply demanded a good police force. Episodes of sedition,
riot, and others could be easily suffocated through the intervention of the military.
Authorities could successfully face all these treats without suspending the normal
functioning of justice, the Deputy affirmed. All they needed to do was “to scrupulously
adhere to the prevailing legal forms and constitutional guarantees,” he concluded.203
Reflections in the Mexican case highlight a series of points regarding the treatment
of political criminals in correspondence with Constitutional mandates and prescriptions
from Criminal Law. First, they reveal that conversations about the regime of penalties for
political crimes involved both an interest about finding the most appropriate punishments
and different preoccupations about the limits of state retribution. Second, they show that
Mexican jurists and lawmakers conceived political crimes as offenses whose criminality
belonged to a different order than that of ordinary crimes. This other, “alternative”
criminality required a more lenient treatment involving not only exclusive penalties but
also a special regime of incarceration. Third, they make evident concerns about the ways
in which Mexican governments had historically responded to political criminality through
the use and abuse of Constitutional prescriptions. Finally, they suggest that Mexican law
experts considered and magnified political criminality and internal enmity in their country
viewing them against a European backdrop marked by political instability and organized
anarchism. Anxieties about the influences of European anarchism would loom large in the
ways in which authorities deal with political criminals during the late stages of the
Porfiriato.
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Extradition and Confiscation: The Limits of Punishment for Political Crimes in Colombia
Like in the Mexican case, reflections on Constitutional and Criminal prescriptions
regarding the treatment of political criminality in Colombia were not limited to
conversations about the death penalty and expatriation. They also involved discussions
about the convenience and necessity of certain other penalties for political offenses, as well
as about the general limits of the state’s power of retribution against internal enemies.
Reflections on the “inconvenience” of extradition for political crimes and the “fairness” of
punishing rebels with confiscation illustrate the nature of these additional conversations.
Issues of extradition and political crimes appear repeatedly in the works of
Demetrio Porras. His first essay on the matter dates from 1885, in the middle of a
controversy about the fate of a rebel from the most recent war who had fled to Jamaica and
was requested on extradition by the Colombian government. To Porras, the principle of no
extradition for political crimes represented a widespread premise implemented in many
European legislations as well as in several international treaties in Latin America. Italy,
Spain, and the states Helvetic Confederation had different laws and treaties prohibiting the
extradition of political exiles and refugees, for instance.204 In Colombia, although there
were no constitutional developments on matters of extradition and political criminality,
different international treaties tackled the question. A treaty with France in 1850 excluded
political criminals from extradition, Porras explained. Another one, signed in 1870 with
Peru, established the same provision but included delitos conexos as well. Additional
treaties of “friendship, navigation and commerce” with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Costa
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Rica prescribed the internment of political criminals within a given distance from their
international borders, under each nation’s request.205 They made no reference to matters of
extradition, but their intention was to prevent exiled political agitators from returning to
their home countries.
The protection of political criminals from extradition was also, to Porras, one of the
most important conquests of modern criminal Law. European jurists like the German
August Geyer, for instance, maintained that the right of asylum for political criminals was
sacred, because there was no way of judging the illegitimacy of their actions. Following
the German author, Porras explained that if a nation wanted to give a political criminal in
extradition, it had to decide first whether or not the government and the institutions that the
offender had attacked were legitimate. It was a question that no tribunal could solve,
lacking the necessary elements for making a fair decision. France’s legal thinking was also
in tune with these considerations, Porras suggested. Those had been, in fact, the arguments
with which the French Minister of Justice defended in 1841 his nation’s adherence to the
principle in question. To the French Minister, political crimes occurred in circumstances
that were extremely difficult to evaluate, often emerging out of “ardent passions” whose
justification was never clear. French historian and statesman Francois Guizot’s works
offered Porras an additional perspective. Political offenders, according to Guizot,
commonly acted on the grounds of amor patrio and “an admirable feeling of abnegation.”
Their acts did not have the “perversity and immorality” commonly associated to ordinary
crimes. Their immorality, in fact, was always relative and impossible to judge in a clear
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and impartial way. This is why, Porras concluded, governments were always unable to
fairly decide on matters of extradition of political refugees.206
These considerations, to Porras, were ultimately extralegal. According to him, the
principle in question did not obey clear legal or political reasons. Legal protection of
foreign political criminals, political refugees and exiles, and people defeated in civil wars
of other nations was more an issue of “nobility” and “magnanimity” than of actual justice.
That was, basically, the principal reason why nations protected foreign offenders. This
“noble” need for protecting political refugees was particularly important at the time, Porras
affirmed. The entire world was going through a moment in which societies “are intoxicated
with idealism, inebriated with the liquor of the seductive sophism of absolute freedoms,
those that subvert all orders and all principles.” It was a time in which people fell victim
of a “terrible vertigo that led them through the terrifying path of demagogical debauchery,
making them sacrifice the forces of social life, increasingly wasted in senseless and bloody
conflicts.” In such turbulent times, the Colombian jurist remarked, it was impossible to
deny foreign political offenders asylum and protection from extradition.207
Debates about confiscation and political crimes took place during the 1885
Constitutional Assembly. While the 1886 Constitution prohibited the imposition of
confiscation penalties (Art. 34), the original draft of this charter still allowed legislators to
establish them as a punishment for revolutionary ringleaders. In this particular case,
confiscations had the purpose of covering or compensating war expenses with the enemy’s
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property –a provision that followed the principle that, during a war, the adversary was
always accountable for the conflict’s costs.208
Three positions clashed in the Assembly regarding this peculiar exception
concerning ringleaders. One was represented by Miguel Antonio Caro, author of the
original article. In defense of it, Caro explained that the article did not consider the seizing
of the rebels’ property a formal act of confiscation. It was, rather, a simple act of
accountability for the expenses that their rebellion had caused. In any case, the delegate
explained, it was a limited penalty that only applied to ringleaders, not to rebels in
general.209 A second, intermediate position somehow accepted the possibility of imposing
the penalty to rebel ringleaders, but with a few precisions and clarifications concerning
what counted as confiscation and what did not. Delegate Calderón, in this light, proposed
to modify the article by stating that, while confiscation was prohibited as a punishment,
pecuniary penalties against ringleaders did not represented acts of confiscation. His
clarification was aimed to solve the “contradictory nature” of a prohibition that involved
in itself the conditions for its exception.210
This desire for clarification did not make Calderón less critical of the provision’s
spirit. To him, the concealed confiscations stipulated in the Article entailed two major
complications. On the one hand, it was a measure doomed to meet resistance and
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discontent, for it had a selective –and arbitrary– application and a clear purpose of political
retribution. On the other hand, considering the changing tides of Colombian politics, it
might at some point bounce back against conservatives and other regenerationists. In sum,
concluded Calderón, confiscation for political purposes did little to prevent public disorder
and rebellion and a lot to foster partisan hatred and future political conflicts.211
The third and final position straightforwardly claimed that the Constitution should
ban all sorts of confiscation penalties. As exposed by Delegate Casas Rojas, confiscation
was “a barbaric and cruel penalty currently abolished in all civilized nations.” As such, it
entailed many inconveniences including the fact that, as a general rule, it affected innocents
more than culprits, depriving the defendant’s family from their rightful property.212 Its
potential political effects were, therefore, almost null and clearly unfair. Confiscations, in
this light, should never exist, not even for political purposes. Based on these considerations,
Casas Rojas proposed a further modification to the Article, excluding the exceptions in
cases of rebellion and leaving only the general banning of confiscation. That was the
version of the Article that finally made it to the new charter.
Reflections about extradition and confiscation for political crimes involved in
Colombia at least two major legal and political concerns. First, there was in the mind of
the most progressive members of the constitutional convention a preoccupation about the
convenience or inconvenience of these penalties considering the particular nature of
political criminality. The preoccupation entailed deeper considerations about what made
political crimes “special,” or what made governments repress their own internal enemies
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while protecting those of other countries. It also involved a question about whether or not
it was plausible to reach solid conclusions about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of political
offenses. Second, there was a concern about how far could a government go when
punishing rebels and other internal enemies. Here, there was fear that an excessive exercise
of state retribution could not only lead to overt acts of arbitrariness and authoritarianism,
but also provoke resistance, discontent, and further political conflict. The instability and
bellicosity of Colombian politics made both options look completely plausible.

The question about a “special” regime of penalties for political offenders was central to the
conversations that, during the period, took place in Colombia and Mexico regarding the
treatment of political criminality in Constitutional and Criminal Law. On the whole, jurists
and lawmakers in both countries agreed that political offenses had a complicated criminal
nature. They were crimes, of course, but for different reasons than ordinary offenses were.
Theirs was a criminality imagined and measured in levels of political dangerousness and
potential to alter public peace. It was also a criminality whose attributes of “illegitimacy”
and “immorality” were always relative and impossible to grasp in an objective manner. All
these reasons justified –if not demanded– the existence of an “exceptional,” “separate”
regime of penalties for political offenders. The crafting of this regime involved discussions
about the nature and effects of “political penalties,” the dangers of treating rebels with
penalties designed for ordinary offenders, and the need of limiting state’s power of
retribution against internal enemies. In both countries, these discussions involved common
concerns and inspirations, reactions to specific events and conjunctures, and even
references to European legal thinking. Here, Europe offered Colombian and Mexican

166

jurists more than doctrinal inspiration: it provided them with additional sources of concern,
related to the spreading of “new” modalities of organized political criminality such as
anarchism. Fears of anarchism would be especially visible in the Mexican case after the
turn of the century.

Protecting Society from the Revolutionary Tide: Reflections on Emergency Powers
and Political Criminals
Constitutional debates on emergency powers represented in both countries another
important arena of reflection about what political crimes were and what kind of treatment
they deserved. Mexican and Colombian constitution makers addressed such issues, directly
and indirectly, in their different efforts to define extraordinary faculties, outline conditions
for the establishment of state of siege, and set up limits for the use of these powers. Two
major concerns related to political criminality and its constitutional treatment emerged and
clashed in these debates. On the one hand, there was an interest of protecting society and
public order from the attacks of subversives, rebels, and revolutionaries. On the other hand,
there was a preoccupation about what governments could –and could not– do when
responding to threats posed by their internal enemies. It was, in short, a conflict between
the need to defend society and the need to protect individuals against possible abuses by
the authorities. As the first chapter demonstrates, the Constitutions and prescriptions that
emerged from these debates would privilege the former order of needs over the latter.
Discussions on emergency powers revolved around rather different preoccupations
in Mexico and Colombia. In the Mexican Constitutional Assembly, debates on the matter
revolved primarily around the suspension of constitutional guarantees in cases of
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emergency, its justification, and its legal and political consequences. In Colombia,
Delegates to the Assembly were predominantly concerned with the crafting of a “war
legislation” meant to rule predominantly during times of internal turmoil. Beyond these
differences, debates in both nations equally involved issues concerning the limits of state
power in times of emergency and the maintenance of constitutional rule during moments
of war. They also revolved around the balance between the maintenance of society’s order
and the respect for individuals’ liberties –equilibrium that a Colombian Delegate
considered the quintessential problem of politics.213

Of Crimes Against Society and Constitutional Guarantees: The Case of Mexico
Judging from the debates surrounding the contents of Article 29, many of the supporters of
the suspension of individual guarantees in cases of emergency considered this provision a
necessary deterrent for futures episodes of violent internal enmity. It was, in their opinion,
a strong but efficient measure to neutralize the actions of subversives, revolutionaries,
conspirators, and other “adversaries” of society and public order. Delegate Cerqueda, for
instance, claimed that the Article’s prescriptions were the only possible way to preserve
the “general interests of society” protecting it from the constant threat of “mobs or rogues.”
Endangered by forces that disturbed public peace and “compromised the existence of every
sort of order,” Mexican society had no option but to strengthen the government’s power at
any possible cost. Those were turbulent times that required a severe, inflexible, and
energetic authority able to reestablish order, even if that meant neglecting the individual
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rights and lives of society’s enemies. After all, he concluded, the nation’s welfare
demanded their sacrifice. It could sound dictatorial and authoritative, the Delegate
maintained, but it was a demand consistent with society’s right to self-conservation. 214
Like Cerqueda, Delegate Mata considered that future Article 29, as authoritarian as
it sounded, simply followed the principle that society’s general welfare demanded the
sacrifice of individual interests. The suspension of constitutional rights in cases of
emergency was, in this light, merely a defensive means to “save” society anytime it faced
serious threats. It had the immediate and exclusive goal of preventing public order’s
enemies from harming society. Like his colleague, Mata understood “states of emergency”
primarily as circumstances of domestic turmoil linked to the actions of internal enemies of
society.215 Delegates Arriaga and Olvera also agreed on these points. The Article and its
prescriptions were necessary for the sake of society’s conservation, especially in moments
of great hardships that required swift and vigorous actions. Arriaga justified the existence
of emergency powers by explaining that there would always be extraordinary and
unforeseen circumstances that, unpredicted by the laws, demanded the immediate reaction
of authorities. Such a reaction, he pointed out, was particularly necessary in cases of
unexpected threats to social order by conspirators –understanding “conspirators” as people
responsible for crimes against society.216 Delegate Olvera was a bit more moderate in this
regard, and aimed to restrict situations of “emergency” to cases of “great conflict” that, like
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an international war or a “formidable uprising,” seriously threatened either the nation’s
independence or its legitimate of government.217 The idea of extraordinary powers as a
plausible and necessary response to some manifestations of internal enmity was,
nonetheless, still present in his arguments.
Positions against the terms of Article 29 revolved around the fear that an
exaggerated emphasis on the conservation of society could lead to future episodes of
authoritarianism and unnecessary violence against political dissidents. Delegate Moreno,
to whom the suspension of constitutional guarantees implied the suspension of life in
society, maintained that the Article set the conditions for the re-emergence of dictatorship.
218

His colleague Zarco reminded the Assembly that the nation’s past provided sufficient

examples of governments abusing their extraordinary powers, and added that Article 29
did not include the necessary provisions for preventing these abuses from happening again.
To him, the main problem lay in the vague conditions that allowed the establishment of a
state of emergency. They were not limited to specific circumstances of foreign invasion or
severe perturbation of public order, but also made reference to any other situation that
endangered or could endanger society. These other “eventualities,” in the delegate’s
opinion, could lead to several political abuses, as governments and authorities could use
them anytime in order to foster legislation benefitting their parties or to legitimate the
extermination of their enemies.219 Regarding this second scenario, Zarco argued, the
Article practically gave governments freedom to do what they wanted with political
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dissenters, including repressing them with “massive proscriptions, perverse prosecutions,
and attacks against property that ruined [their] families.”220
Even Olvera agreed with some of these objections, and conditioned his support for
the Article to the incorporation of some modifications. To the Delegate, it was necessary
for instance that the Constitution specified under which circumstances emergency powers
became necessary, for how long the government could retain those extraordinary faculties,
and which circumstances truly represented states of emergency. The point, to him, was
avoiding that those extraordinary powers ended up extending to the point of subverting or
destroying the nation’s constitutional form of government.221 His suggestions somehow
paralleled the recommendations that Delegates Zarco and Moreno made to the Article.
Zarco requested that the article stated “individual liberties” instead of “constitutional
guarantees,” in order to maintain some restrictions to the government’s use of these
faculties. Moreno, in a final act of resignation, suggested that if the article was as
indispensable as their supporters claimed, it could at least limit the suspension of these
guarantees only to those suspicious of causing the state of emergency.222 Even the critics
of the Article implicitly availed the possibility that the government targeted internal
enemies and “dangerous” dissidents with the suspension of their individual rights.
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Crafting a Legal Regime for Internal Warfare in Colombia
Debates about emergency powers at the Colombian 1885 Assembly also paid a great deal
of attention to the actions of subversive, rebels, and other internal enemies. Delegate
Miguel A. Caro drafted the initial version of Article 121 with the goal of setting the
constitutional foundations of a regime of “martial legality” in Colombia. To him, the
country lacked a clear and well-defined set of rules and principles on how to proceed in
case of a serious disturbance of public order. Article 121 did not establish a “war
legislation” in itself, but declared that the Executive was the primary power in charge of
enacting this legislation, by defining crimes and penalties for times of war. After all, the
Delegate pointed out, the Executive was the one responsible for “saving society from
anarchy and revolution.”223
The “martial legality” of Caro was, predominantly, a regime for circumstances of
internal warfare –of rebellion, revolution, sedition, and political turmoil in general. His
arguments at no point contemplated the possibility of a foreign invasion or an international
war. Article 121 intended to, first and foremost, give the Executive powers to act against
internal enemies and other “dangerous” dissidents. It was a defensive act that developed in
its own terms, since the government was able to punish its criminal adversaries with its
own series of penalties. The goal, in the delegate’s words, was to allow the government to
react against a revolutionary treat by designating as criminal “all acts that it considered
disturbing.” This did not imply a de facto suspension of the Constitution, the delegate
remarked. This government-made, extraordinary legislation was only part of a
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constitutional mechanism that combined “two orders of legality,” one for times of peace
and another for times of war. In cases of emergency, he explained, the latter would simply
“replace constitutionally” the former. The purpose of this double legality, Caro
summarized, was to give the government all the necessary powers for “saving society from
the revolutionary tide” and “repressing revolutionary violence.”224
Delegates Ospina Camacho and Samper led the opposition against Caro and the
original version of Article 121. The Article’s draft contained a clause authorizing the
Executive to establish the state of siege not only in cases of war or internal commotion, but
also anytime the government perceived that “peace or public security were endangered.”
While Caro described this prescription as “fair” and “benevolent,” for it allowed the
government to take preventive measures in an opportune fashion, Ospina Camacho
perceived it as a source of future and unjustified acts of authoritarianism.225 In his opinion,
the clause was dangerously vague. Based on it, a “fearful” or “susceptible” president could,
“for mere ill-founded reasons, […] declare public order disrupted and establish the state of
siege all over the republic, therefore replacing the quiet regime of peace with the state of
atrocity and violence typical of war time.” Ospina Camacho certainly agreed that the
government should have the necessary constitutional means to maintain public peace and
security. Yet, these special faculties should correspond to actual circumstances of
emergency, not to simple perceptions or opinions.226 Simple states of alarm only required
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the government to order recruitments, request loans for military improvements, suspend
the freedom of press, and order preventive imprisonments of potentially dangerous
dissidents. There was no reason for treating circumstances of alarm like if they were actual
states of war, the delegate concluded.227
Samper’s arguments revolved around the need for finding an equilibrium between
the need for preserving public order from internal enemies and the goal of preventing a
dictatorship against “harmless” dissidents and other citizens. The maintenance of this
equilibrium during states of emergency was critical, Samper maintained, for extraordinary
powers were always dangerous, regardless the nature of the emergency. They proved
especially harmful in cases of internal conflict, the Delegate explained. Since not all
citizens took part in a civil war, the government’s actions against its own people should
meet strict limits. During an internal conflict, “the nation became divided into three groups:
rebels or enemies of the government and the prevailing order; the government and its allies;
and a great mass of peaceful individuals.” While it was understandable that the two first
groups exercised violence and vengeance against one another, it was completely unfair that
the government also harassed neutral, innocent citizens, Samper commented. Why, in a
civil war, should it be permitted that peaceful, non-belligerent people were also subject to
the government’s arbitrariness? Why should the government ruin them as well, through
expropriations and war taxes, under the excuse of protecting or reestablishing public order?
“I am not asking for guarantees for the rebels’ property […] but I do believe that they are
necessary for the innocent, and therefore I demand them,” he concluded. It was necessary,
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then, to specify and clarify who should constitutionally be subject to state retribution and
which particular constitutional guarantees should be suspended in that case.228

Constitutional debates on extraordinary powers offer a different set of understandings of
and reflections about political crimes and internal enmity in Mexico and Colombia. Unlike
the doctrinal arguments previously reviewed in the chapter, these reflections underscore
the dangerous nature of political criminals and highlight their condition of enemies of the
nation as a whole. Here, political criminality and internal enmity were matters of “rogues,”
“anarchists,” “revolutionaries,” “conspirators,” “forces that disturbed peace,” and
“criminals against society.” Their actions put society’s existence at risk, and therefore
required “swift and vigorous actions” –ranging from the suspension of their constitutional
rights to the discretional re-criminalization of all their acts. Even the critics of the
functioning of extraordinary powers implicitly agreed on that. Beyond this basic
agreement, these debates reveal nonetheless that, at least to some delegates, not all forms
of dissidence were dangerous and not all the manifestations of internal enemy required
such strong measures. Some “harmless” or “pacific” forms of political opposition should
still remain under constitutional protection, as long as they stayed “legal” or “legitimate.”
The maintenance of this protection should keep in place the line between the fair and
necessary repression of internal enemies and the straightforward –and unnecessary–
authoritarianism and arbitrariness against every form of dissidence. As the next chapters
will show, this line was never clear neither was it unmovable.
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Conclusions: Assessing the Nature of Political Crimes and Their Legal Treatment
The legal and constitutional foundations of governmental responses to political offenses
during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration involved much more than provisions defining
crimes and punishments. They also entailed multiple conversations and debates concerning
the meaning, legitimacy, reach, and consequences of such provisions. Legislating on
matters of political criminality went far beyond the crafting of dispositions for the
criminalization and repression of a series of offenses against public order, the Constitution,
and the legitimate government. It implied, as well, reflecting on what political criminality
was, what its criminal attributes were, what made it different from other modalities of
crime, and what sort of legal treatment it deserved. Legislators and legal experts in Mexico
and Colombia paid close attention to these questions at multiple times and venues: during
the making of Constitutions and Criminal Codes, in studies of current legislation, and in
the defense of legal initiatives of different sorts. Jurists and lawmakers seldom tackled
these issues in a direct way; they commonly did it in relationship with larger legal and
political matters. Some of these “major” issues included questions about the limits of state
power and state retribution or the balance between “social order” and “individual liberties.”
Discussions about the definition and punishment of “illegitimate” acts of war; the design
of legal orders for times of warfare; and even the existence and legitimacy of “alternative”
constitutional regimes were also part of this set of larger matters.
What do these reflections show? In general terms, these conversations reveal a
panoply of understandings of and concerns about political criminality, its nature, and its
effects. There were no single or uniform ways of defining what a political crime was, what
made it political, what made it a crime, and what differentiated it from other offenses. For
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some jurists, political crimes were offenses against public order, the government, the
constitution, and the society in general. For others, they were acts of war –of internal
warfare, more precisely– with some degree of political inspiration or motivation. For a few
more, they were just exaggerated, unfortunate manifestations of patriotism or political
fanaticism. Under some perspectives, they represented one of the most serious and harmful
offenses against the society and the nation, completely “illegitimate” and “immoral.” From
other points of view, they were actions of simple political malcontents, extreme acts of
political dissidence whose legitimacy or illegitimacy was always relative. To others, they
were merely common crimes in disguise. All these understandings accompanied the
crafting –or at least the proposal– of specific legal responses to political criminals.
Responses ranked from vigorous reactions in the name of society’s right of selfconservation, involving selective suspensions of constitutional rule, to mild and lenient
“political penalties” tending exclusively to neutralize their political dangerousness.
Penalties in between shaped a sort of grey zone in which punishments for common and
criminal crimes converged and foreign political criminals enjoyed a greater deal of
protection than domestic rebels.
Some of these conversations tended to address the constitutional and legal treatment
of political offenders from a perspective that conceived political criminality in terms of
“absolutes.” On the one hand, there was society, protected by the government and the
Constitution. On the other hand, there were its enemies: subversive, revolutionaries,
conspirators and the like. Other reflections, nonetheless, tended to present more nuanced
and complex overviews. These “relativist” interpretations invited to differentiate between
“warlike,” “dangerous” or “violent” forms of dissidence, and “harmless” and “pacific”
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modalities of political opposition and dissent. Here, not all forms of dissent entailed the
same degree of political enmity, and not all manifestations of political enmity involved the
same level of dangerousness or criminality. Furthermore, not all participants in acts of
internal enmity were strictly political criminals, since their motivations were not “purely”
or “exclusively” political. Legal and constitutional responses to political criminality, then,
had to pay attention to these subtle, sometimes unnoticeable differences. The prevention of
“dictatorship” or sheer authoritarianism, as well as the maintenance of formal
constitutional rule, lay precisely in the clear identification of and respect for those multiple
variations of political dissent.
A relatively similar set of doctrinal, legal, and philosophical inspirations helped
shape this common array or arguments and concerns. Both Mexican and Colombian jurists
and lawmakers looked to Europe in search of legislative models, legal developments, and
doctrinal reflections on the matter, translated and incorporated them as part of their
arguments, positions, and legal initiatives. European influences were particularly notable
on issues such as the criminal nature of political offenses, the differences and connections
between common and political criminality, or the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate acts of internal warfare. Inspirations were also significant in relation to the
establishment of a separate punitive and penitentiary regime for political offenders, the
prohibition of extradition for political crimes, and the legal and constitutional protection of
foreign political offenders. European influences in this regard went even further,
nonetheless. When looking across the Atlantic, Mexican and Colombian legal thinkers also
translated a feeling of overall political turmoil and instability, as well as a fear of anarchism
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and anarchist movements. Such additional concerns would also play a role in shaping the
discussions in question.
The importance of this trans-Atlantic intellectual framework does not mean that
these debates and conversations developed in isolation from local and domestic
circumstances. The Mexican and Colombian experiences differed from one another in the
kind of questions and problems around which these discussions revolved. The different
emphases in the two countries responded to diverse domestic concerns and junctures.
Episodes of revolution and civil warfare in each country, local perceptions and anxieties
about criminality and public disorder, and even the need to replace or complement previous
national legislation represented some of these domestic preoccupations. Such a variety of
local conditions made reflections and translations in each country different despite the wide
framework of commonalities within which they emerged and developed.

Conversations and debates about the legal and constitutional treatment of political
offenders involved in both countries a wide variety of understandings about what political
crimes were and what sorts of penalties they deserved. Not all these understandings were
necessarily in tune, and some of them reflected very different positions about the nature of
political criminality and the reasons why it, after all, must be deemed criminal. Inspired by
European legal thinking and shaped by local and domestic concerns, these reflections paid
a great deal of attention to what made political offenses singular, their differences with
ordinary crimes, and the distinctions between “harmless” and “dangerous” political
dissidence. As some of the conversations reviewed in this chapter suggest, such distinctions
were neither clear nor absolute. The remaining chapters of the dissertation will demonstrate
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not only that there was never an agreement on the matter, but also that the drawing and
redrawing of such various differences had major legal and political consequences in both
cases.
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V. CHAPTER 4. BETWEEN THE LEGAL AND THE EXTRALEGAL:
GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING REBELLION AND
INTERNAL WARFARE IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA

The discovery by Colombian authorities of the revolutionary plot of August 1893 had
serious consequences for the Liberal Party. Governmental reactions to the plot involved
the confiscation of the Party’s funds, the shutting down of at least four Liberal newspapers,
and the apprehension of several partisan leaders both in Bogotá and in other parts of the
country. Liberal Santiago Pérez, president between 1874 and 1876 and current editor of the
paper El Relator, was one of the many victims of these reactions. After accusing Pérez of
conspiring against public order and promoting rebellion through his “subversive”
newspaper, authorities suspended the publication and sent him into exile.229 His forced
departure paralleled the experiences of Felipe Pérez, Modesto Garcés, Alfredo Greñas and
other fellow liberals that, between the late 1880s and the early 1890s, paid with
imprisonment and exile their activities as political dissenters and opposition writers. They
all faced similar charges: conspiring against public order and encouraging rebellion.
Certainly, none of these accusations had links with actual episodes of rebellion or
consummated subversive movements. If anything, the charges in question made reference
to alleged and unaccomplished threats against public order. The penalties that they made
possible had no other goal than preventing possible or potential outbreaks of rebellion and
insurrection. The imprisonments and exiles that Pérez and his fellows faced were, in this

229

Delpar, Red Against Blue, 157.

181

light, the result of a series of “preventive” endeavors that Regenerationist authorities
carried out in order to prevent rebellion and keep “potentially subversive” dissidents in
check. These cases exemplify the experiences of dozens of “troublesome” dissenters in
Mexico and Colombia that, during the period, faced prison and other penalties only for
“preventive purposes.” Preventive campaigns against subversion in both countries
facilitated the persecution and repression not only of presumed conspirators and rebellion
suspects but also of many political writers and opposition journalists. They also played a
crucial role in the criminalization of dissent in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. This
chapter reconstructs and analyzes the experiences of several Mexican and Colombian
dissidents that, either as potential rebels, rebellion plotters, or simple writers, suffered the
consequences of this criminalization.

The Constitutional and legal prescriptions examined in the previous chapters provided
Mexican and Colombian governments with a diverse set of resources for responding to
threats against public order, revolutionary alarms, and similar states of political or military
tension. These resources included both faculties and limits, which somehow traced a line
between what governments and authorities could do in this regard and what they could not.
This chapter explores and analyses how governments in both countries used this wide legal
and constitutional framework for preventing civil war, containing revolutionary waves, and
neutralizing “dangerous” internal enemies as well as potentially subversive political
dissidents. How did Mexican and Colombian authorities apply these laws and
prescriptions? How did they use them to enact preventive legislation on matters of public
order? What were the characteristics of this other, complementary legislation? How did
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these new laws and their application transformed and re-interpreted previous prescriptions
regarding the treatment of political crimes and the scope and limitations of state power?
By tackling these questions, the chapter delves into the legal and judicial logics of political
repression vis-à-vis actual or potential threats against public order in the Regeneration and
the Porfiriato. It also sheds lights on the multiple ways in which governments in both
countries understood “prevention” and defined what a “threat against public order” was.
The chapter draws on a wide array of sources including memoires; newspapers;
laws, decrees, and executive orders; court-cases, criminal expedients, and judicial archival
sources; legislative debates; and legal essays. Section one studies the laws, decrees, and
legal developments that, in addition to the constitutional and criminal law precepts studied
in Chapter 2, made up the legal backbone of governmental efforts for preventing rebellion
and internal turmoil in Mexico and Colombia. Section two explores how the “preemptive
endeavors” of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration combined the purpose of safeguarding
public order from actual or potential threats with an interest on repressing political
dissidence. Section three analyzes how governments in both countries used and applied
this “preventive” legislation in order to control, regulate, and repress “subversive,” and
“criminal” journalism. It also shows how the prevention of internal disorder in both
countries led to the criminalization, as political offenders, or actual rebels and opposition
journalists alike. Finally, section four offers a brief reflection on the multiple meanings that
“prevention” and “preventive repression” had in Colombia and Mexico during the period.
The chapter argues that governmental efforts for preventing rebellion and internal
turmoil were grounded on a series of laws and decrees that shaped, in both countries,
alternative regimes of legality. Revolving around issues of press freedom and maintenance
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of public order, these “parallel legalities” put the prosecution and judgement of threats
against the government and the public peace outside the reach of the formal laws and
ordinary justice. The application of this “other” legislation by local and national authorities
had a twofold purpose: protecting public order and governmental stability, and keeping
political opposition under strict control and surveillance. This double purpose made
possible a practical equivalence between “prevention” and “repression” that led to the
“preventive criminalization” of political opposition and its multiple manifestations of
dissent and protest. Such criminalization relied on the assumption that there were no major
boundaries between “opposition” and “subversion,” and therefore all manifestations of
dissent could be potentially criminal –at least to the eyes of authorities. This assumption
would legitimize intense and persistent campaigns of “preventive repression” in Colombia
and Mexico throughout the entire period.

Preventing Internal Conflict Through Legislation: Press and Public Order
Preventing internal turmoil during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration represented, first
and foremost, a matter of legislation. Governments in both countries heavily relied on law
and lawmaking as the most appropriate ways of containing the outbreak of civil warfare,
maintaining the stability of their regimes, and keeping “dangerous” or “subversive”
political dissidence in check. Preventive legislation had a more intense development in
Colombia than in Mexico. Such difference, nonetheless, does not mean that law and
legislation were more important in one nation than in the other. Both countries counted
with a relatively similar set of rules that, regardless their different nature, aimed to the same
goals, responded to similar motivations, and defined analogous ways of criminalizing and
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treating potential political criminals. This section analyzes and compares these legislative
efforts, paying attention to their implications on the management and control of political
dissent in the two nations.

The Mexican Legal Setting: The Multiple Meanings of “Public Order.”
The prevention of internal turmoil in Porfirian Mexico relied primarily on legislative
developments on public order and the press. It was a preventive legislation that involved
two major characteristics. On the one hand, it relied on a series of laws and decrees on the
press and public order that involved abstract and vague criminal definitions. On the other
hand, it attempted to outline “special” and “alternative” ways of treating and punishing
rebels and potential subversives. Although these laws and decrees entailed their own sets
of offenses and penalties, they maintained a great degree of correspondence with the
dispositions and classifications of the Mexican Criminal Code. It was also a legislation
that, in correspondence with the constitutional division of public powers, subjected most
modalities of “subversion” to the ordinary judicial authorities. Only rebels and other
insurgents captured and judged as “bandits” would remain outside the reach of the judicial
power, judged instead by administrative authorities like the police.
Preventive legislation in Mexico experienced a relatively timid development during
the Porfiriato. Many of the regulations on the matter in fact pre-dated the Tuxtepec
revolution, had their roots in legislative acts from the Lerdo and Juárez administrations, or
simply relied on the prescriptions of the 1857 Constitution. They also comprised, at least
at the federal level, a smaller set of laws, decrees, and legal reforms. A few constitutional
regulations, two laws about press, and some regulations on individual guarantees that the
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Congress re-enacted time and again with almost no variation comprised the bulk of this
legislation. Regulations from the Constitution refer to articles 6 and 7 on freedom of speech
and press; articles 15 and 23 on extradition and death penalty for political crimes; and
Article 29 on the emergency suspension of individual rights. Press laws included the
Organic Print Law from February 1868, together with the reform to constitutional Article
7 in May 1883. Other norms included the several laws or decrees ordering the temporary
suspension of constitutional guarantees for salteadores and bandits, that the Congress
enacted almost every year.
All these regulations, despite their diverse nature and origin, involved similar
characteristics. They aimed to prevent internal conflict and political turmoil through the
criminalization of a series of actions that “attacked” or “threatened” public order and peace.
Many of these “threatening” actions involved acts of political dissidence that authorities
might interpret as “subversive,” as “invitations to rebellion or disobedience,” or simply as
attacks against the Constitution, the laws, and the legitimate authorities. Other criminalized
actions were less political, as in the case of the different manifestations of rural banditry.
This did not prevent authorities from considering them threats against public order as well,
and to use them for launching “preemptive” campaigns against dangerous or potentially
subversive political dissidents. The next pages review the legislation that made possible
both kinds of criminalization. They also examine some contemporary reactions regarding
the impacts of these regulations on the way in which Mexican governments could treat –or
actually treated– potential rebels, dissidents, and political adversaries in general.
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Among the constitutional prescriptions on public order, already reviewed in chapters 1 and
3, regulations on freedoms of speech and press deserve special attention. They were the
basis for the preventive regulation of “subversive” and “dangerous” press during the
Porfiriato. Articles 6 and 7 from the Constitution guaranteed those freedoms as long as they
did not attack people’s private life, public morality, or public order. None of the articles
established what those notions meant or what represented an attack against them, leaving
considerable room for interpretation. Lawmakers and journalists criticized such vagueness
for almost the rest of the century, pointing out that it could lead –or actually led– to political
instrumentalization and abuses of power against political dissidents. In the late 1850s, for
instance, several members of the Constitutional Assembly manifested their fears about the
possible political misuses of these provisions. Recalling Mexico’s history, Delegate
Francisco Zarco argued that almost all Mexican constitutions had included analogous
restrictions to the freedom of press, and every single time such limitations had given way
to a myriad of “scandalous abuses” on the government’s part. An authoritarian, vengeful,
and partisan government could see a publication criticizing an authority or official as an
attack against his private life, and therefore prosecute it and its author. A political
statement, a satirical text, an innocent joke, could be interpreted as an attack against public
morality or public order. Often, he asserted, “public order is nothing but the peaceful reign
of all tyrannies.”230
To some Delegates, constitutional understandings of public order, at least in the
case of the press and press crimes, proved dangerously abstract. Going back to Mexico’s
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history, Delegate Díaz González maintained that, anytime the government feared a
conspiracy, it invoked the protection of “public order” and satisfied, in its name, “ignoble
vengeances.”231 That was also the opinion of Zarco. A government fearful of discussion
and dissent, he argued, saw attacks against public order and peace almost everywhere in
the press: in the disapproval of the acts of public officials, in the thorough examination of
a law, in the claim for social reforms, and in the petition for legal or constitutional reforms.
Under such restrictions, then, there would be no freedom or the press at all, he concluded.232
Delegate Cendejas went even further, and claimed that these prescriptions would make it
impossible to write about anything at all. Everything could be an attack against public order
because nobody knew what “public order” was, he pointed out. “What is order?” The
Delegate asked. Who could explain and dictate that order was? “The answer is clear,” he
responded: “it is the triumphant party, which tells the defeated one: ‘order’ is what I
establish; ‘order’ consists on me being on the top and you staying below me.” “These are
times of political passions,” Cendejas reminded, and within such a context the Article
would be nothing but a partisan weapon –a weapon of the government in its efforts to
neutralize their opponents.233
Further legislation on the press and press crimes helped delimit what “attacks
against public order” were. The 1868 Organic Print Law considered as such all publications
that encouraged citizens to disobey the law and the legitimate authorities, or to use force
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against them (Art. 5). Press offenses against public order received penalties of confinement
between one month and a year, and could include the removal of the defendant from the
state’s territory (Art. 8). In correspondence with the original version of Article 7 of the
constitution, the 1868 Law left the prosecution and punishment of all press offenses to a
special jury, putting the press relatively outside the formal justice system.234 This
parallelism in matters of justice administration came to an end in 1883, during the
administration of the Porfirista Manuel González. His reform of Article 7 in May that year
established that, from then on, the prosecution of all press crimes corresponded to ordinary
justice. The reform dissolved the press juries that existed since 1857, and put the legal
management of the press on the hands of both state and federal tribunals.235
During the Porfiriato, many dissident journalists complained that these reforms had
done little to create an actual legislation on the press involving well-defined crimes and
rules. In January 1895, for instance, the opposition newspaper El Demócrata maintained
that Mexico still lacked clear laws in matters of the press. Assassins, arsonists, and even
salteadores enjoyed a greater degree of legal security than journalists and writers. All of
them counted with actual laws that clearly defined their crimes and punishments, even
providing them with formalities for their defense. That was not the case of journalists,
“commonly subject to the whims of a vague, indeterminate will; one that works in the
shadows and that nobody knows who it belongs to.” The newspaper concluded with a
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calling for a more detailed legislation, a law “wisely done” and shaped on the grounds of
always consistent and predictable juridical decisions. To El Demócrata, it did not matter
how severe or strict this law might be, as long as it provided journalists with what they
lacked: legal and judicial security.236 Independent journalists would still voice this kind of
complaints during the 1900s. “One does not know then and how one transgresses the law,”
a writer complained at the end of the Porfirian period. “The government preferred not to
legislate about [the press] so as to be able to oppress all the better,” he maintained.237

Outside the sphere of the press, preventive legislation on public order relied on laws and
decrees regulating the suspension of constitutional guarantees for bandits, kidnappers, and
salteadores. These laws were not exclusive of the Porfiriato: the administrations of Lerdo
and Juárez had enacted similar acts in six different opportunities.238 Porfirian legislators
would enact –or propose– similar acts at least four times between 1880 and 1895, often in
response to alleged increases in rural criminality and “heinous crimes” –including murder,
robbery with violence, and kidnapping.239 The terms and conditions of these laws did not
differ substantially from one occasion to another. On the whole, they outlined vague
definitions of what a bandit or a salteador was, and established a gradation of penalties in
correspondence with the multiple crimes and levels of criminality involved. In addition,
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they prescribed some judicial formalities for the prosecution and judgment of this kind of
offenders. One of these decrees, from 1895, distinguished for instance between criminals
responsible for murders, serious injuries, or robbery with violence, and offenders
responsible for other, lesser crimes. The decree prescribed the death penalty for the first
group of criminals, and established prison penalties between 5 and 12 years for the others.
Authorities that captured criminals in flagrante could sentence them to death with no
previous trial and no other judicial formality than the preparation of a minute. In other
cases, they should process criminals through verbal summary trials, conducted whether by
political or military authorities.240
Variations between the 1895 Decree and previous legislation on the matter were
minimal. A similar Decree, from May 1886, had established the same treatment for bandits
and salteadores, but included more limitations for the application of death sentences –
available only for cases of murder and serious injuries. It also prescribed a maximum of 10
years of prison for those salteadores that dodged the death penalty.241 A project of decree
from 1880 prescribed similar penalties, and added up to five years of prison for abettors or
encubridores. Unlike the examples from 1886 and 1895, this project did not put all bandits
completely outside the reach of ordinary justice. While criminals captured in flagrante were
subject to an administrative treatment, other offenders still could appear before a local
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judge. Judges, nevertheless, had to solve their cases through verbal summary trials. To
Mexico’s lawmakers, these quick trials, devoid of the formalities and terms of ordinary
processes, had the goal of making the judicial treatment of bandits more efficient and
exemplary. The 1880 project, explained a Congressman, “aims to simplify the action of the
tribunals by shortening their terms and procedures.” The goal, in this regard, was to avoid
delays in the administration of justice that undermined both the credibility of the justice
system and the effect of its judicial decisions.242
Initially conceived as preemptive and repressive responses to rural common
criminality, these “anti-banditry” laws were abstract and comprehensive enough to allow
authorities to apply them in other circumstances. Actions of banditry did not differ
significantly from the acts of hostility commonly carried out in a rebellion or an uprising,
and judges or military authorities could easily charge a rebel with any of the charges
included in the decrees. Furthermore, authorities could simply treat rebels or dangerous
dissidents as bandits and subject them to the special regime created by this legislation. One
way or another, this legislation allowed the government and its representatives to treat
actual, potential, or alleged political criminals as salteadores, and to prosecute them outside
the formalities and guarantees of ordinary justice.
This possibility is what concerned the most contemporary critics of these decrees.
In their opinion, the suspension of constitutional and procedural guarantees in cases of
banditry would cause –or actually caused– the unfair punishment of lots of innocent
Mexicans, especially within contexts of electoral struggle or intense partisan conflict. In
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1880, for instance, the jurist Rafael Herrera claimed that the legislation “sacrificed the
presumption of innocence to the shortness of procedural forms,” which represented a
straightforward violation of the Constitution.243 It was also a legislation that basically left
people unprotected against the will of a despotic authority, one that from then on was
authorized to “shoot us five times whenever it wanted to.”244 That was also the opinion of
the journalist Adolfo-Duclós Salinas, an inveterate critic of Díaz and his administration in
the early 1900s. To Duclós-Salinas, the legislation in question elevated the discretional
power of the tyrant and the executioner to the category of law. Such decrees, he contended,
did not have the purpose of “appeasing, through an exemplary punishment, restless spirits,
[let alone of] subduing armed men that […] attacked the established social order.” They
merely had the purpose of allowing authorities to “perpetrate detrimental violence against
the lives of citizens.”245

In general terms, preventive legislation in Porfirian Mexico responded to concrete
questions about the most appropriate legal means for avoiding rebellion and civil war,
preventing the spread of “subversive” messages, and containing and repressing
“dangerous” political dissidence. Questions about the management of “subversion” and
political opposition through press legislation were also linked to concerns about the logics
and boundaries of state power and the need for limiting state authoritarianism.
Preoccupations about issues of jurisdiction and justice administration also played a part
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here. It is possible to perceive certain tendency to turn the legal treatment of public order
into an administrative matter, at least in the case of banditry. It is also possible to identify
some degree of mistrust towards the effectiveness of the processes and formalities of the
ordinary justice system regarding the management of this kind of crimes. Such mistrust,
nonetheless, did not make Mexican lawmakers advocate for a complete break up with
ordinary justice in the prosecution of crimes against public order –unlike what would
happen in the Colombian case.

Press and Public Order in Colombia: A Legislation in Constant Reinvention
Preventive legislation on public order in Colombia partially paralleled the Mexican
experience. As in Mexico, it was a legislation that combined concerns about the protection
of public order with preoccupations about the limits of the press. It was also a legislation
that involved vague criminal definitions and aimed to create an alternative legal and
judicial sphere for the treatment and neutralization of potential political criminals.
Differences between the two experiences were, nonetheless, significant. Preventive
legislation in Colombia was much more extraordinary in its nature. A big portion of it was
a direct product of states of emergency and owed its existence to executive decrees.
Similarly, and unlike the Mexican case, it established an overly-parallel legal regime for
the definition and punishment of the crimes in question, independent from the provisions
and punishments that the Criminal Code established on the matter. In addition, it was a
legislation that practically put all internal enemies outside the sphere and reach of the
ordinary justice system. Compared to the Mexican experience, the Colombian case offers
a more complex picture that deserves a more detailed examination.
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Preventive legislation in the Colombian Regeneration experienced a more intense
development than in Porfirian Mexico. Between the mid-1880s and the late 1900s, the
Colombian government issued a significant collection of decrees and laws on the matter
that exploited and built on the gray areas left by the Constitution on issues of public order.
Their dispositions would shape a legal regime that, like the “martial legality” defended by
Caro, paralleled the “normality” of the Constitution. Involving its own set of crimes,
penalties, faculties, and exceptions, this “alternative legislation” supplemented and made
more complex the repertoire of penalties and criminal categories contemplated in the
Criminal Code for cases of internal enmity. Most of this “alternative legality” remained in
place almost until the end of the period, turning the “exceptionality” of emergency decrees
into formal and permanent legislation.246
The decades in question witnessed the enactment of at least twelve laws and decrees
on matters of press and public order. Legislation on press was particularly dynamic
between the expedition of the 1886 Constitution and the Thousand Days, encompassing at
least 5 different executive decrees. The first of them dates from 1886 (Decree 635),
followed by another one in 1888 (Decree 151), and two more in 1889 (Decrees 286 and
910). A final one in 1896, took the form of law (Law 157). The Reyes administration (19041909) only issued a major press act in 1905 (Decree 4). Legislation on public order shows
an inverse development, with only one Law enacted before the Thousand Days (Law 61,
1888). Laws and decrees on public order had a more intense development during Reyes’s
five-year rule or quinquenio, with at least three decrees enacted in the last moths of 1904
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(Decrees 750, 845, and 948), another one in 1906 (Decree 11). The final was a law enacted
in 1908 (Law 13). The need for expanding and concretizing the Constitution’s vague
prescriptions on freedom of press in a context of intense partisan conflict helps explain the
rapid development of press legislation before the turn of the century. The proliferation of
public order decrees in the first years of the Reyes era, to a great extent, responded to the
urgent necessity of pacifying the country after the Thousand Days and preventing further
outbursts.
Overall, these decrees and laws encompassed a series of characteristics that
remained more or less stable throughout the decades in question. It was a body of norms
that depended almost exclusively on provisions of the Executive power, barely relied on
the authorities and processes or the ordinary judicial system, and revolved around
dispositions that did not correspond to those from the Constitutions and the Criminal Codes
reviewed earlier in this study. Additional characteristics included the management of
threats against public order as administrative matters under the control of the police; a
strong limitation of the freedom of press; a vague typification of the offenses against public
order; and the multiplication and intensification of existing penalties for potentially
dangerous dissidents and other internal enemies.247 The next pages explore and analyze
these characteristics through a revision of some of the most important and representative
pieces from this collection.
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Before the Thousand Days, the preventive management of public order in Colombia drew
on the dispositions of Law 61, 1888, best known as Ley de los Caballos (Law of Horses).
The Law was the reaction of President Núñez to an alleged state of emergency concerning
the mutilation of a few horses somewhere in the Department of Cauca, in May that year.
Interpreting the episode as the prologue of an upcoming uprising, Núñez convinced the
Congress to grant him legislative powers in order to suppress the movement before it
started.248 The resulting law gave the President wide and undefined faculties for
administratively preventing and repressing “offenses against the state affecting public
order” and “conspiracies against public order.” It also gave him powers to respond to any
attack against public or private property that, to the President’s judgement, represented “a
threat against public order.”249 Law 61 also established a series of penalties for those
incurring any of the mentioned offenses, including confinement, expatriation, and prison.
There was no fixed limit for such penalties, for they could be as severe and lengthy as the
President deemed necessary (Art. 1).
These punishments were as imprecise as the offenses that the Law created. The Ley
de los caballos did not define what “offenses” or “conspiracies” against public order were.
It all depended on whatever the President wanted those actions to be. Discretion and
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unpredictability surrounding both crimes and penalties were, thus, the major markers of
this legislation. It allowed the government to react and punish on the basis of mere
suspicions, and granted defendants no formal procedural guarantee. The administrative
treatment of these offenses meant that the Police was the one in charge of prosecuting
offenders, according to summary processes and without following the formalities of the
ordinary justice system.250 Conservatives widely supported the Law as a “wise prevision”
against revolts and an “effective remedy” against rebels and conspirators.251 Liberals, on
the contrary, perceived it as a major violation of the Constitution, for it allowed authorities
to punish people for crimes that had not been previously established in the legislation
current at the time.252 It was also law so wide and vague that practically entitled the
Executive to commit all sort of abuses, as pointed out by the Liberal Congressman Luis A.
Robles.253 Initially conceived as a transitory legislative act, Law 61 remained in force for
a decade, until May 1898.254
The Ley de los caballos operated in tandem with a contemporary decree on the
press: Decree 151. Enacted in February 1888, this piece of legislation represented the most
important and influential norm on press and journalism during the late 1880s and early
1900s. A central consideration inspired the Decree: press abuses deserved a differential
treatment depending of the offenses involved. The judgment of offenses against civilians
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and private individuals should correspond to ordinary justice, while the prosecution of
crimes against public order and peace fell into the government’s hands.255 In
correspondence with such principle, Article 1 of the Decree divided press crimes into
offenses against society, materialized through “subversive publications,” and attacks
against private individuals, realized through “offensive publications.” Article 2 put the
treatment of subversive publications in the hands of the Executive.
The Decree distinguished among ten different modalities of press offenses against
society (Articles 4 and 7). They included attacking the law and the government’s
institutions, encouraging people to disobey them, or justifying actions that the laws
considered criminal. Other offenses of a relatively similar nature involved attacking the
military; assuming the voice and representation of the people; promoting conflicts among
social classes; and spreading fake news that could cause either alarm or disruptions of
public order. Other modalities of “subversion” encompassed attacks against the Catholic
Church and the Catholic authorities; protests against judicial decisions; insults and threats
against judges; the revealing of official secrets; and even the impugnation of the recently
reformed monetary system. Penalties against subversive publications ranked from simple
warnings and demands for rectification to temporary restrictions to the promotion and sale
of the sanctioned newspapers. In the worst cases, authorities could suspend the publication
for a period between fifteen days and six months. A complementary decree from March

255

Decreto 151 de 1888 (17 de febrero): “Sobre prensa,” Diario Oficial 7299, February 17, 1888.

199

1889 established additional fines for subversive newspapers, and made their public vendors
(voceadores) subject to penalties of arrest up to ten days.256
Conservatives defended with political and legal arguments the “alternative” legality
that Decree 151 created for the press. “All the newspapers from the opposition that had
circulated in the last years,” complained Minister Ospina Camacho in 1889, “have been
characterized by the short-sightedness of their writers, their bold and aggressive language,
and their tendency to dodge the dispositions regulating the press.”257 A year before, Miguel
A. Caro had insisted on the necessity of the Decree on the basis of the “special nature” of
press crimes against society. Caro considered that these offenses were elastic and mutable,
and therefore escaped the rigid stability of the prescriptions from the Criminal Code. The
criminality of subversive publications was always subject to changing social and political
conjunctures. Press offenses were “elastic” crimes that required similarly “elastic” laws,
maintained Caro. They required special prescriptions that, like the Decree in question, were
always susceptible of reform.258
The Ley de los Caballos and Decree 151 had several features in common. They
outlined a parallel regime of crimes and penalties for potential rebels, conspirators, and
“dangerous” dissidents. They also shared the premises that internal enemies had to remain
outside the jurisdiction of the formal justice system and that their prosecution, carried out
through administrative means, should be exclusively under the Executive’s control. These

256

Decreto 286 de 1889 (27 de marzo): “Adicional al 151, de 17 de febrero de 1888, sobre imprenta,” in
Caro, Miguel Antonio. Libertad de imprenta: Artículos publicados en “La Nación” en 1888 (Bogotá:
Imprenta de La Nación, 1890), 39-140.
257

Caro, Libertad, 141-142.

258

Caro, Libertad, 68-69.

200

assumptions also implied that the government and its authorities were the ones in charge
of deciding over the criminality and punishment of the offenses in question. All these
considerations were grounded on the belief that the justice system was slow, cumbersome,
and inefficient. Such situation proved particularly counterproductive when it came to the
prevention of crimes against public order, for they required immediate and efficient
responses. This was why, Caro explained, “the timely suspension of a seditious newspaper,
carried out as a matter of Police, produces better results than a long trial.”259
There were additional reasons for leaving the repression of these crimes to the
Executive and the Police, in Caro’s opinion. The importance and repercussions of press
offenses against society made their prosecution by the ordinary justice untenable.
“Sedition, subversion, everything that disturbs public order and tranquility cannot be left,
without great inconveniences, to the examination and correction of ordinary tribunals,” he
wrote in 1888. This was particularly clear in the case of subversive newspapers, in his view:
“the more irresponsible the political press is, the less convenient the intervention of the
judicial power becomes.”260 Subversive publications demanded the direct intervention of
the government because they put at stake interests that were above the reach of common
judges: society’s feelings, public peace, and even the dignity of the nation’s highest
political authorities. In these cases, the government should intervene not only as a judge,
but also as a representative of society and ultimate guardian of social interests.261
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The dispositions of Decree 151 remained unchanged until December 1896, with the
expedition of Law 157.262 This law gave a new development to the repertoire of press
crimes against society delimited in 1888. While Decree 151 only distinguished among a
dozen crimes against society, Law 157 defined 17 offenses. Besides the offenses already
included in the 1888 Decree, the new law also considered subversive all publications that
“encouraged the nation’s dismemberment or the secession of a portion of its territory” and
“promoted uprisings and incited civil war.” New subversive acts also involved
“encouraging members of the military to perform acts of disobedience or rebellion,” and
even “insulting or slandering the person in charge of the Executive power and the nation’s
bishops.” (Art. 32). These changes in the repertoire of crimes against society were not
surprising, considering that only a year earlier a liberal uprising, in part fueled through
opposition newspapers, had escalated into a nation-wide civil war. Penalties for press
crimes also became more diverse and stricter. New penalties included fines and the
temporary closing of printing presses, as well as several prohibitions for editors and
printers. The law, for instance, forbade proprietors and directors of subversive newspapers
from performing those roles in any other publication for a period up to six months (Art.
36). Law 157 set the stage for an even more intense control of dissident and subversive
newspapers.
The end of the Thousand Days’ War in 1902 and the later secession of Panamá the
following year made the maintenance of peace a top priority for the Reyes administration.
This is why the first months of the quinquenio were particularly prolific in measures on
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public order, with the enactment of acts such as Decrees 750 and 948 from September and
November 1904 respectively. Both decrees aimed to prevent further episodes of internal
warfare by “disarming” the nation and containing the spirit of rebellion. Decree 750
ordered the collection of all war weapons and ammunitions that remained by the time in
hands of civilians. It gave Colombians a sixty-days term to turn in all weapons to the
authorities, and ordered the latter to treat as conspirators all citizens that, after the deadline,
were still in possession of such materials.263 The Decree formalized a modality of internal
enmity that did not exist before: the possession of war weapons that could be used to disturb
public order. Reyes believed that since after the war many civilians remained heavily
armed there was a serious threat against public peace, and ensured “enemies of the
constitutional order” the means for carrying out future rebellions. The measure, in this
light, represented an important step towards the consolidation of internal peace after three
years of civil war, as the President explained in a circular from November 1904. 264
The enactment of Decree 948 responded to the supposed circulation of rumors
predicting the outbreak of a new insurrection. It had, in Reyes’s words, the goal of
preventing “belligerent” people from putting at risk the rights of the rest of the nation.265
The Decree ordered the arrest, for up to ten days, of every individual that, whether in public
or in private, spread false rumors about the alleged upcoming revolt (Art. 1). It also
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established that all citizens that obstructed the authorities’ efforts to collect war weapons
from civilians should face fines and could be subject to any other penalty that the
government deemed convenient (Art. 3). Apparently, the weapon collection decree had not
been well received in many parts of the country, facing resistance specially from people
believing that the government’s plan was to re-arm Liberals.266 In 1905, the Congress
turned this presidential decree into a formal and conventional law: the Ley de Alta Policía,
the legal backbone of the Reyes administration in matters of public order.267 Decree 11,
from February 1906, turned these prescriptions into a more comprehensive and detailed
legislation.
The most important reform that Decree 11 brought on matters of Alta policía was
the definition and penalization of a specific set of political crimes. Political offenses
included in first place the crimes of rebellion, sedition, riot, and asonada, in the terms in
which they appeared in the Criminal Code. Hindering the gathering of war weapons by the
correspondent authorities and spreading fake news that caused alarm or fomented internal
turmoil were also political crimes. So were insulting or slandering high-rank public officers
and attempting to discredit the government and the authorities through speeches or
publications. Finally, the Decree considered a political crime the public resistance to the
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introduction and collection of taxes.268 The decree recognized 9 different modalities of
political criminality in total. In terms of penalties, the Decree allowed the President to
administratively punish offenders with reclusión up to one year, prison up to six months,
arrest up to one month, confinement up to two years, or expatriation up to four years (Art.
2).269
A final modification of this legislation would take place in August 1908, with the
expedition of Law 13.270 The Law would transform even more the previous repertoire of
criminal actions against public order, with the identification and punishment of six different
criminal modalities. New crimes included acts such as attacking the freedom or the life of
the President or any of his ministers, punished with the death penalty (Arts. 1 and 3). Other
criminal actions included in the law were, attempting to “overthrow legitimate authorities
or disobeying the nation’s Constitution and laws;” spreading fake news that disrupted
public peace; “discrediting” the government through speeches and publications. Two more
included the rebellion of public servants against the Constitution; and, the intervention of
foreigners in “political endeavors against public order” (Art. 1).

Preventive legislation on public order before and after the Thousand Days entailed both
continuities and changes. From the Ley de los Caballos to Law 13, 1908, the basic
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characteristics of these legal strategies remained almost unchanged. They all proclaimed
the seizing of the prosecution and judgment of internal enemies by the Executive power,
together with the almost complete inattention to the formalities of the ordinary justice
system. Similarly, they all turned the management of public order into an administrative
matter in the hands of the government and the police, and made the Executive an alternative
yet legitimate judicial and legislative organism. Developments and changes between one
law and another had to do, primarily, with the progressive transformation of the actions
considered “attacks against public order” and their corresponding punishments. By the end
of the quinquenio, the reasons according to which authorities could call somebody an
internal enemy were certainly more diverse than they were back in the 1880s. So was the
repertoire of penalties that the legislation allowed for those crimes, which from the
beginning included penalties that neither the Criminal Code nor the Constitution
established for political offenses –confinement, expatriation, and, later on, capital
punishment. Such legal developments represented systematic governmental responses to a
series of events and circumstances that gave authorities the impression of an apparently
growing state of political unrest. It was, on the whole, a dynamic legislation that evolved
together with the turbulent development of Colombia’s political life throughout the period.
How did Mexican and Colombian governments apply this legislation? How did
they enforce it, and what does its enforcement reveal about the ways in which authorities
in both countries tried to prevent rebellion and maintain “dangerous” political dissidence
in check? The next sections address these questions in an effort to uncover and analyze the
logics of state power vis-à-vis actual or potential threats against public order in the
Regeneration and the Porfriato.
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Fighting Rebellious Plots and Potential Rebels: The Legal and Judicial Logics of State
Repression
Governmental efforts to prevent rebellion and neutralize potentially subversive dissidence
in Colombia and Mexico fell primarily on partisan leaders, political malcontents, electoral
rivals, and even military adversaries. Drawing on the reviewed preventive legislation, these
efforts conditioned a repression of “dangerous” dissenters that, despite its undeniable legal
grounds, involved different decrees of “alternative legality” and extra-judicial activity.
This section reviews and analyzes some of the principal measures in which these preventive
efforts materialized, paying special attention to their legal implications and the ways in
which dissidents in both countries experienced them.

Between “the Judicial” and “the Extrajudicial”: Governmental Responses to Dangerous
Dissidence in Porfirian Mexico.
The preventive treatment of rebellion and subversion in Porfirian Mexico relied on a varied
set of legal, judicial, and extrajudicial strategies. A first strategy consisted in formally
arresting and processing potential subversives and “dangerous” internal enemies in
correspondence with the Criminal Code and under the jurisdiction of ordinary justice. A
second strategy involved the prosecution and treatment of “targeted” revolutionaries in
correspondence with the several laws ordering the suspension of constitutional rights for
bandits and salteadores. Here, the discretion of political and military authorities and the
scarce guarantees under summary trials replaced the formalities and protections available
under ordinary justice. A final strategy, barely founded upon legal or judicial formalities,
had to do with the discretionary and informal administration of punishments such as the
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death penalty for “dangerous” dissidents or potential revolutionaries. Extrajudicial
executions and selective political assassinations were frequently part of this third set of
practices.
The coexistence of the three strategies throughout most of the Díaz regime reveals
a parallelism between “formal” and “informal,” “legal” and “extralegal,” “judicial” and
“extrajudicial” modalities of preventive responses to political criminality. Such
simultaneity of strategies provided Porfirian authorities with wide legal –and extralegal–
resources for treating and neutralizing “dangerous” or merely “uncomfortable” dissidents.
Their implementation represented not only a resource for dismantling conspiracies against
public order, detaining conspirators, and suffocating attempts at rebellion or sedition. It
was also a tool for neutralizing political or electoral rivals, putting dissidents out of
circulation, and hindering the political activities of the opposition.
The “formal” strategy of prosecuting “dangerous” dissidents according to the
criminal code materialized, primarily, in the denunciation and arrest of dissenters for
“conspiring against public order” or “preparing subversive acts” against local or state
authorities. It did not matter that the alleged conspiracies never took place or were only the
result of exaggerated rumors. In 1886, for instance, fears of a potential rebellion led by
General Trinidad García de la Cadena put the state of Zacatecas in a state of alarm.
According to a contemporary writer, authorities arrested about a hundred people accused
of being part of the alleged revolutionary plot. According to the antiporfirista Adolfo
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Duclós-Salinas, the feared rebellion never took place, for it was nothing but a small, weak
uprising that did not last long and left no serious consequences.271
Analogous concerns between late 1890 and early 1891 led the government of
Nuevo León to request the United States the arrest and imprisoned of a group of Mexican
exiles. The targeted expats were apparently responsible for preparing a revolution against
Díaz’s and plotting against the life of General Bernardo Reyes. Authorities from Texas
arrested the suspects and presented them before an American court, which acquitted them
after the prosecution proved incapable of proving the actual existence of such plans.272 In
Monterrey, the preparation of a Liberal demonstration in support of Bernardo Reyes’s rival
to the upcoming state election provoked, between March and April 1903, the arrest of about
a dozen people under charges of conspiring against public order. Pro-government
newspapers backed the preemptive arrests, arguing that liberals “[invoked] rebellion,
promoted asonada, threatened [the City] with disorder, [and] made the establishment of
the state of siege an urgent necessity.”273
Another common practice in this regard was labelling opponents as “suspects of
rebellion,” which allowed authorities to arrest and imprison them for “preventive”
purposes. In March 1880, for instance, the Supreme Court conceded Amado Triviño an
amparo against the acts of the political chief of Baja California. According to the case’sfile,
the political chief had ordered Triviño’s prison after considering him a rebellion suspect.
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A military court had put the defendant in prison without a formal order of imprisonment,
an act that, according to the high court, violated basic procedural and constitutional
guarantees.274 Earlier that year, the Supreme Court had confirmed the sentence, dictated by
a judge from Michoacán, that absolved Jesús Odariza and others from imprisonment under
suspicions of rebellion. Apparently, the state authorities, wanting the defendants to remain
in prison, rejected the judicial decision and brought it before the high tribunal, whose
decision benefitted the prisoners.275 Years later, in May 1887, the paper El Tiempo
denounced that, as a consequence of the supposed revolutionary threat in the state of
Zacatecas 1886, authorities had sent several people to a state prison. Suspects of
participating in the alleged subversive plot, the prisoners had spent months in jail waiting
for a court to prove their crimes. The victims, according to the newspaper, were “expiatory
victims of an imaginary revolution.”276
“Preemptive strikes” of this nature seemed to intensify after the reorganization of
the Liberal Party and in the midst of the revolutionary wave of the late years of the first
decade in the twentieth century. In September 1906, authorities from Aguascalientes
arrested Félix Rubalcaba as a rebellion suspect. Weeks before, Rubalcaba had left Morenci,
Arizona, with the mission of distributing proclaims for the Liberal Party across northern
Mexico and organizing in the region a political club in its support. Authorities arrested
Rubalcaba as a rebellion suspect not only because of his political activities down the
border, but also for being member of a political association from Arizona that, in May that
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year, had delivered insulting speeches against Porfirio Díaz. The events from May had led
Mexico’s government to request the Governor of Arizona the permanent surveillance of
Rubalcaba, as well as his arrest at the slightest sign of a criminal or subversive activity. In
a telegram from September 24, a judge from San Luis Potosí requested the authorities in
charge of Rubalcaba to proceed with all the effectiveness and severity of the law. It is
possible to imagine the judge’s frustration when, a few days later, authorities reported that
the alleged revolutionary had ran away by jumping off a train’s window.277
Rubalcaba’s was just one of the many cases of arrest under suspicions of rebellion
between 1906 and 1907. In November 1906, for instance, the newspaper La Opinión
denounced that the law students Eugenio Méndez y Teodoro Hernández, together with a
lawyer from Veracruz, were in prison facing similar charges. Authorities accused Méndez,
an author of satirical articles, of maintaining correspondence with revolutionaries from
northern Mexico. The lawyer from Veracruz, on the other hand, was a suspect of
participating in a rebellious plot in the town of Acayucán. None of these accusations had
solid grounds, the paper maintained, and the arrests seemed to respond to “hidden
intrigues” and personal vengeances.278 Similar arguments used El Diario del Hogar, in
August 1907, to criticize the arrest of Leopoldo Álvarez and other people in Coahuila, all
of them accused of provoking a rebellion. A local judge processed Mayor Álvarez and
acquitted him due to lack of evidence. To El Diario, the case of Álvarez was representative
of what currently happened with many other people. “[Authorities] arrest them, imprison
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them for a relatively long time, and then have to release them because there is no evidence
that can prove their condition of agitators or revoltosos.”279
During the conflictive years of 1906 and 1907, suspicions of rebellion, rumors of
uprisings and conspiracies against public order, and even “imaginary revolutions”
provoked waves of preventive arrests, not only in México but also north of the border.
Right before the failed rebel movement of September 1906, a series of rumors about an
upcoming revolt of Mexicans in the American south raised the alarm in the United States.
As a result, American authorities arrested and sent back to Mexico 150 “pacific citizens
accused of the terrible crime of rebellion,” as informed by El Diario del Hogar. “Nothing
was true, well-grounded, or acceptable,” the paper remarked. The rumors proved
exaggerated, the feared rebellion never took place, and the tribunals in charge of judging
the deportees had already acquitted many of them by November 1907.280 Massive
imprisonments like the one denounced by El Diario seemed to have become common at
the time. Earlier in 1907, the paper Revolución complained that, since the start of the
revolutionary threats by the Liberal Party in 1906, the government of Díaz had been
persecuting “all those that the dictatorship considers rebellion suspects.” According to the
newspaper, persecutions equally included men, women, seniors, and even children, all of
them imprisoned without the minimal evidence or justification. “The jail of Orizaba
[Veracruz] hosts a multitude of women and children, eight and nine years old, accused of
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rebellion […] Ulúa also accommodates a great number of children accused of being
revolutionaries, whose ages rank between 8 and 11 years old,” the paper denounced.281

The strategy of persecuting, judging, and punishing “dangerous” dissidents as bandits or
salteadores also had a legal foundation –at least partially. Although there were no laws
authorizing this proceeding, some local and provincial authorities used the legislation
suspending the constitutional guarantees of bandits and salteadores for neutralizing or
getting rid of dissidents and political rivals. Under the pretext of fighting and preventing
rural banditry, several regional and local political bosses unleashed campaigns of political
repression that led to the summary judgement and extrajudicial execution of dozens of
dissidents. Implicated authorities put these executions in the hands of the Rurales or, more
frequently, the Acordadas, small private armies at the service of a local political boss that
carried the name of the judicial institution created in the early 18th century, in particular to
fight brigandage.282
The use of legislation against banditry for the persecution and punishment of
“potentially dangerous” dissidents was particularly common in northern Mexico during the
1890s and 1900s. That was precisely what, according to Duclós-Salinas, Bernardo Reyes
did in Nuevo León after the expedition of the aforementioned Decree from May 1886.
Reyes initially used the law to get rid of rural bandits, kidnappers, and assassins,
manufacturing long lists of names that he would later deliver to the chiefs of the Acordadas.
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According to the author, Reyes elaborated such lists on the basis of denunciations that no
authority cared inquire about much less prove. Lists in hand, the Acordadas would find the
targeted individuals, arrest them, and then applied them the popular ley de fuga or
“runaway law.” Troops would take one or several prisoners to a desolate place, shoot them
in the back, and then present them as “hunted” runaways. Over time, Duclós Salinas
maintained, Reyes would start adding to these lists the names of several dissidents and
political rivals.283
Judging from Duclós-Salinas’s account, by the early 1900s, the politization of the
Acordadas in Nuevo León had already reached dramatic levels. “The Acordada is not only
for criminals, and its acts rarely follow the commission of a crime,” he denounced in 1904.
“In general, the victims of the Acordada are opponents to the government. [Its goal] is
merely to disappear fearful people, whether bandits or political dissidents.”284 “The
Acordada is usually in charge of the personal enemies of the governor and the local
political bosses,” wrote in 1909 John K. Turner also on the case of Nuevo León.285 Almost
all of their victims were “political suspects,” Turner commented: “[people] that dared to
pronounce a single world against the governor […] I personally know a Mexican whose
brother was shot down by the Acordada only for yelling ‘long live Ricardo Flores Magón.’”
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According to both Turner and Duclós-Salinas, these scenes of clandestine executions

occurred not only all across Nuevo León but also in other northern states including
Coahuila and Tamaulipas.287 In Coahuila, Turner wrote, authorities gave an Acordada
leader orders of “discreetly executing all people along the [Mexican-American] border that
he suspected were in contact with the Liberal Party.”288 The victims of the Acordada
commonly exceed a hundred people every year, Duclós-Salinas maintained. “The Mexican
government is always whether author or accomplice of these acts,” he denounced.289
Political prisoners were particularly aware of these practices, and some of them
even publicly manifested their fears of falling victim of an extrajudicial execution. In May
1894, El Tiempo published the letters of two prisoners that, days before their referral to
other carceral institutions, wanted to put on record that they were not planning to run away.
One of the letters stated, among other things, that “since it is common that the escort parties,
with or without instructions, commit attacks against the people they are supposed to watch
[…], I beg you to publish in your popular newspaper that I will not try to run away for any
reason whatsoever.” “It is very important to make this clarification,” the letter continued,
“so people know that any attack against me would be highly unjustifiable.”290 These
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“clarifications” still seemed habitual by the mid 1900s. In February 1905, the paper
Regeneración published two telegrams from the wives of two political prisoners that
apparently were awaiting an extrajudicial execution. “Fearing his assassination by the
Acordada,” one of the telegrams said, “I ask for guarantees for my husband Toribio de los
Santos, made political prisoner by the municipal president Adalberto Viesca.”291 Fear of
the Acordada seemed to go beyond the denunciations of a couple antiporfirista writers.
The works of the Acordadas linked the still legal strategy of punishing “potential
rebels” as bandits with the sheer extra-legal practice of assassinating dangerous dissidents
and other political rivals. Outside the domains of the para-institutionality of the Acordada,
this third practice materialized in the selective assassination of dissidents, opposition
journalists, and “likely revolutionary” military leaders. Duclós-Salinas, for instance,
denounced the “strategic assassination” in 1886 of several military caudillos accused of
plotting rebellions against Díaz. The denunciations included the cases of Trinidad García
de la Cadena in Zacatecas, Donato Guerra, and General Ramón Corona in Guadalajara.292
General Ignacio Martínez suffered the same fate in February 1891, while allegedly plotting
an insurrection against Bernardo Reyes from Laredo, Texas.293 In his book De la dictatura
a la anarquía (1914), Ramón Prida denounced the assassinations of several opposition
journalists in mid-1895: one in Hidalgo, another in Puebla, one more in Tampico, and a
fourth one in Mexico City.294 During the early 1900s, according to Prida, Reyes’s
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“preemptive strikes” against potential revolutionaries in the north caused the disappearance
of at least 80 people “without the instauration of a process or the intervention of any
judge.”295 These preventive measures would parallel the reaction of Díaz and his governors
against the many uprisings that shook Mexico during the last years of the Porfiriato.

Preventive measures against rebellion during the Porfiriato were, to a certain point,
properly founded in the rule of law and the Constitution. They maintained some degree of
correspondence with the prescriptions of the Criminal Code and the formalities and
protections of the judicial system. Preventive imprisonments of conspirators against public
order and arrests under suspicions of rebellion somehow relied on these formalities, and
defendants could find some kind of redress by ordinary justice. This treatment,
nevertheless, represented just one of many other possible ways of preventing rebellion and
repressing “dangerous” dissidents during the Porfiriato. Porfirian authorities commonly
dealt with potential rebels and “uncomfortable” political opponents by criminalizing them
in a “preventive” way, and such criminalization, in order to work, required most of the time
alternative resources. A “preventive criminalization” could not have its desired effects if
ordinary tribunals had the option of protecting or acquitting criminals. It was necessary to
treat them, then, in a way that guaranteed their ideal punishment, whether it was through
summary trials, extrajudicial executions, or straightforward assassination.
The extrajudicial nature of many of these “alternative” methods allowed Mexican
authorities to act against dangerous or rebellious dissidents outside the formalities and
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protections of the justice system and the reach of state institutions like the police and the
military. As the reviewed cases exemplify, many political opponents in Porfirian Mexico
were subject to a vague, discretional, and often arbitrary criminalization and punishment.
The surprisingly scarce development of the legislation on public order in the Porfiriato
conditioned particularly high degrees of discretion in the acts and decisions of political and
military authorities, especially at the local and regional levels. The wide discretion that
governors, local political bosses, and leaders of Acordadas enjoyed for deciding who was
criminal and who deserved punishment is more than illustrative in this regard. Authorities’
reliance on the Acordadas for the purposes of intimidating and neutralizing potential rebels
and other “uncomfortable” opponents partially put the administration of state punishment
in the hands of private institutions. This partial privatization of repression turned the
treatment of political criminals in the Porfiriato into a matter that escaped the sphere of the
state and went beyond the action and intervention of state agents. State repression in
Porfirian Mexico, at least in its more extra-legal and extra-judicial expressions, was not a
monopoly of the state. Many of these attributes would also characterize the ways in which
Mexican authorities treated rebels and subversives during and after actual episodes of
internal warfare.

218

The Criminal Faces of Dissent: Preemptive Strikes Against Dangerous Dissidents in
Colombia.
As in the Mexican case, preemptive campaigns against dangerous dissidence in Colombia
targeted partisan leaders, critics of the government, and other political malcontents. Before
the Thousand Days, governments primarily targeted national and regional Liberal leads,
arresting and punishing them as conspirators. During the quinquenio, state repression
focused on neutralizing people that refused to adhere to the policies and spirit of the new
regime. The Ley de los Caballos and the legislation of alta policía made up the legal
foundations of these preventive endeavors against political dissent.
From 1886 to 1899, “preemptive” campaigns against the Liberal party focused on
the uncovering and dismantling of alleged conspiracies against the Conservative
government and public order. Such efforts often led to the arrest and expatriation of key
Liberal writers, candidates, and leaders. The repressive cycles commonly coincided with
moments of regrouping and reorganization of the Liberal Party as a political and electoral
force. In 1887, for instance, a Liberal meeting aiming to reorganize the party after their
military defeat in 1885 alarmed President Núñez and provoked a first repressive wave.
Nuñez considered the meeting “a subversive reunion” and a “conspiracy” against the new
political regime, and ordered the arrest and exile of several Liberal leaders including Daniel
Aldana, Carlos Martín, and the former president Aquileo Parra.296 A year later, in the
context of the elections that brought Carlos Holguín to the presidency, the paper El
Espectador would denounce the imprisonment of the Liberal candidate Felipe Pérez. The
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denunciation also reported the arrest and expatriation of all the members of Panama’s
Directorio Liberal that were in charge of coordinating the Deparment’s electoral
activities.297
From 1891 on, Regenerationist campaigns against Liberal conspirators counted on
the support of a “secret” or “political” police, created that year with the primary intention
of “uncovering plans from the government’s enemies” through surveillance and
espionage.298 The activities of this “secret” organization were particularly intense after the
Bogotá riots in 1893. Soon after the events of January that year, the “political” police
installed permanent spies in several points of the city. The measure responded to “wellfounded suspicions that in those places many persons formed meetings with subversive
purposes and with the aim of plotting conspiracies against the government.” Spies
inspected stores (tiendas) and taverns (chicherías) in search of “suspicious attitudes” and
“subversive conversations,” and reported their infiltration in at least two reunions in which
they had allegedly discovered several revolutionary plots against the government.299
Reports of alleged conspiracies and revolutionary plots by the secret police proved
fatal to many Liberal leaders. The discovery of the revolutionary plot of August 1893,
presumably headed by the Liberal leader Avelino Rosas, provoked the shutting down of
the newspapers El Relator, El Espectador, El Contemporáneo, and El 93, together with the
confiscation of the Liberal Party’s funds. The government also ordered the apprehension
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of the leaders Santos Acosta, Modesto Garcés, and Santiago Pérez. Authorities decreed the
exile of Pérez and Garcés almost immediately. Several liberals in many parts of the country
ended up in jail as well, some of them just for having brief conversations with the alleged
conspirators. Other “renowned bellicose” liberals like Javier Vergara, Abraham Acevedo,
and Juan de Dios Uribe received penalties of confinement, and the government sent them
to the island of San Andrés, off the Caribbean. The wave of arrests also affected two foreign
citizens from Spain and Italy, one as suspect of smuggling war material from Peru and
another accused of signing a political manifesto published in El Relator.300 This
“preventive” strike dissolved almost completely the national leadership of the Liberal
Party, and left it without a formal structure almost until the end of the war of 1895.301
Authorities applied similar preventive measures during the months previous to the
outbreak of the Thousand Days. The eruption of a revolution in Venezuela, together with
the circulation of rumors about an upcoming liberal uprising forced the government to
decree the state of siege in Cundinamarca and Santander on July 28.302 That same day, the
Minister of Government ordered the arrest of 13 liberal leaders in Bogotá, Cali, Palmira,
and Cartago. Authorities justified the arrests on the grounds that the implicated Liberals
plotted a revolution supported by Venezuelan rebels. The defendants spent only a few days
in prison, apparently because the government was incapable of linking them to the
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commission or plotting of any actual crime.303 The reaction of the liberal press was
energetic. “Nowadays, the pretext [of the conspiracy against public order] lacks originality
and is worn out,” wrote El Criterio in August 10. “The nation knows now what those
conspiracies mean […] People know that, lacking resources and the opinion’s support, the
government finds it convenient to create fictitious states of abnormality, inventing uprising
plots that it blames on the defeated party,” the paper maintained.304
Liberal newspapers considered both the imprisonments in question and the
declaration of the state of siege completely unjustified. In October 1899, El Ferrocarril
argued that the government’s legal motivations for enacting such measures were never
clear, if they ever existed.305 To El Espectador, the fact that the state of siege only covered
two departments was a proof that it was nothing but an imaginary conspiracy. Another
proof in this regard was the fact that the number of “preventive” imprisonments, compared
to previous states of alarm –like the one from August 1893, for instance–, was significantly
low. Additionally, the paper remarked, “the precedents of the current regime make us
doubtful [of the actual proximity of a revolution].” The Regeneration “has been extremely
suspicious since its beginnings, and more than once has filled the jails with prisoners [and]
the roads with outcasts, without being able to justify […] such serious and detrimental
measures.”306 That was also the opinion of El Criterio, which maintained that the alleged
plot “only existed in the sick imagination of some senile individuals […] and in the
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Machiavellian will of others [official instigators].” To the paper, the government had no
evidence at all of the existence of the alleged revolutionary plans. It had merely acted on
the grounds of “gossips invented by secret agents whose remuneration increases with the
seriousness of what they report.”307
Regenerationist campaigns against Liberal conspiracies left behind a wave of
repression that alarmed not only liberals but also some conservatives. In a letter to Carlos
Holguín in 1888, Conservative Marceliano Vélez commented: “There is something
alarming going on in the government […] These are times of peace […] Nonetheless, the
government keeps carrying out acts with all the characteristics of violations against
individual guarantees.” The imprisonment and exile of people like César Conto and many
others, maintained Vélez, “are delicate acts whose motivation and legality still await
proofs.”308 Years later, in 1896, Liberal Rafael Uribe Uribe commented that the
Regeneration had achieved peace on the grounds of sheer authoritarianism and fear. Armed
with the perennial pretext of preventing and neutralizing conspiracies, Conservative
authorities had destroyed any notion of security among Colombian citizens. Yet, the author
underscored, the government had remained unable to present clear proofs of at least one
single actual conspiracy.309 Writing in the 1930s about the situation of liberals in the 1890s,
Lucas Caballero recalled: “many of the most glorious men of the Liberal Party were exiled,
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[and] the secret police, together with the tyranny of local authorities, made life
insufferable.”310

Legal prevention of rebellion during the Reyes administration did not involve the extreme
traces of repression that characterized the Regeneration before the Thousand Days. The
partial incorporation of major liberal leaders into the new administration helped de-escalate
the hostilities between the two parties. Political rivalries, nonetheless, did not disappear
during Reyes’s regime of concord. The new administration would meet strong opposition
from hardcore Conservatives and other groups that resisted its government’s political and
administrative measures. During the quinquenio, then, “preemptive” campaigns against
potential rebels did not have the primary goal of hindering the activities of a particular
political party, but of preventing the appearance of any foci of subversion among the
emerging dissident factions regardless of party origin. Ultimately, the repertoire of
responses to potential subversives did not experience major changes between the two
periods. Reyes’s insistence in a regime of concord devoid of partisan hatred, together with
the fears of a new civil war like the Thousand Days, once more gave shape to a relative
equivalence between “dissidents” and “internal enemies.” The quinquenio’s set of
preventive measures also paralleled to a certain point those of the first decades of the
Regeneration: imprisonment of journalists, and arrest and confinement of alleged
subversives. There were important differences, nonetheless. Expatriations were
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uncommon, confinements became more recurrent, and there was a clearer willingness to
use the military against “stubborn” opponents.
The first manifestations of Reyes’s “preventive” style emerged in December 1904,
with the President’s reaction to a group of 14 congressmen that publicly manifested their
opposition to the new regime and its policies. Reyes considered the congressmen’s attitude
“rebellious” and ordered the confinement of those implicated. This “internal purge” also
included the removal of his vice-president, General Ramón González Valencia, under
charges of conspiracy.311 Later in 1905, Reyes would give the same treatment to Supreme
Court magistrates that dared to question the legitimacy of his electoral triumph in 1903.312
Reyes would in fact strengthen his control of “rebellious” opposition during the first
semester of 1905, through a series of orders and communiqués

encouraging the

enforcements of his legislation of alta policía.
Reyes issued the first of these communiqués on January the 2nd. The document
urged governors to punish all citizens suspect of violating the decree of alta policía. “It is
necessary that, at the same time [we] give our peaceful citizens all sorts of guarantees […]
[we] take preventive measures against agitators (revoltosos) in order to incapacitate them,”
Reyes remarked in the circular.313 Days later, on January 7, the president ordered a General
in Barranquilla to suffocate “any movement attempting to challenge the authority of both
the local and the national government.” “I trust you will be a jealous and relentless
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[defender] of the maintenance of peace and the [protection] of the guarantees of our
peaceful citizens,” Reyes told the General. The nation was “thirsty for peace and
tranquility,” the President maintained, and it was thus necessary to achieve these needs
“through an energetic and strict application” of the decrees on weapon collection and alta
policía. The circular also put the national army at the General’s entire disposal if he needed
to suffocate any movement against the government. “If it is necessary,” Reyes added, “I
will go by myself and subdue and punish the revoltosos.” “Make everybody feel that the
government is [respecting] the truce in matters of partisan hatreds […] so we can finally
focus on healing our patria’s wounds,” the instruction concluded.314
A final note, from April that year, offers additional details regarding the application
of Reyes’s preventive legislation. The note ordered another General from Barranquilla to
arrest several members of Cartagena’s local government for signing a letter of protest
against the presidential current project of territorial division. Reyes considered the letter an
act of rebellion, and its authors and supporters a group of revoltosos that pretended to
outsmart the government’s authority. “The entire country has applauded the project of
territorial division, with the exception of Cartagena’s Municipality, which has declared
itself in state of rebellion,” stated the note. The order instructed the General to capture those
responsible for the letter and send them back to Bogotá “strongly escorted.” Upon their
arrival to the capital, the government would decide on their place of confinement. Like in
previous situations, Reyes put the military at the service of the General, and even ordered
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him to mobilize to this end all the forces available in Barranquilla. Such a display of power
was necessary in order to “demonstrate the revoltosos that the orders from the national
government are not empty words, and that it would fulfill its duty of maintaining peace
[and] public tranquility.”315 A few days earlier, Reyes had issued similar orders against a
prefect from Antioquia who attempted to organize a movement to challenge the same
territorial division project. The President sent a hundred soldiers to capture the prefect and
his supporters, and later decreed their confinement.316
The enforcement of the legislation of alta policía at the beginning of 1905 did little
for neutralizing the opposition. In December that year, the government discovered a plan
to overthrow Reyes, plotted by an alliance of malcontent liberals and conservatives. The
discovery of the conspiracy provoked the arrest of over twenty people and their trial by a
court martial. Charges included rebellion, sedition, mutiny, and conspiracy against public
order. A presidential decree established the proceeding and conditions for the judging of
the conspirators: the court’s sentence would be indisputable (inapelable), and the President
had the faculty to modify it according to his own will. The military tribunal sentenced the
defendants to confinement between one and two years.317 Reyes’s reaction to this plot
would prove particularly lenient in comparison to the measures he would take months later,
after the attempt against his life in February 1906.
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The application of preventive legislation on public order during the Reyes era did not differ
significantly from what it had been before the Thousand Days. In both periods, authorities
accused dissidents of plotting rebellion and fostering civil warfare as a legal way of
neutralizing their actions and putting them out of circulation. It was an instrumental
criminalization whose recurrent use by authorities blurred the political distinction between
“opponent” and “enemy”, as well as the legal difference between “dissenter” and
“criminal.” Similarly, both before and after the war, the preventive repression of dangerous
dissidents depended on the application of an “alternative” legal regime mostly grounded
on extraordinary legislation and extrajudicial proceedings. If something changed in this
regard after the Thousand Days, it was the active role that Reyes gave to the military in the
enforcement of his preventive legislation. While the first Regenerationist governments
made public order a matter for the police, Reyes made it a military issue. Reyes’s tendency
to resort to the military for capturing potentially dangerous dissidents or eradicating
possible foci of subversion clearly paralleled the style of Porfirio Díaz in his campaign
against internal enmity in Mexico.

Campaigning Against Subversive Journalism: The Legal and Judicial Control of
Opposition Press in Mexico and Colombia
Governmental efforts to neutralize “dangerous” dissidence in Colombia and Mexico not
only targeted rebels and conspirators but also writers and journalists. The application of
press legislation to prevent internal conflict gave governments in both countries more than
a chance to hinder and punish the promotion and encouragement of rebellion through the
press. It also gave them an opportunity to legally repress opposition press through its
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criminalization. This final section reviews the ways in which authorities in both nations
applied these laws and gave them a political use. It also analyzes how this application
shaped a series of political, legal, and judicial practices whose primordial objective were
the subjugation of political dissent and the neutralization of opposition journalism.

Journalists on Trial: The Political and Judicial Treatment of Subversive Press in Mexico.
Preventive legislation in Mexico did much more than allowing authorities to act against
rebel suspects, potential subversives, and other dangerous dissidents that threatened public
order and peace. It also provided the Porfirian regime with legal tools for limiting the
exercise of political opposition, silencing “subversive” or “offensive” manifestations of
political dissent, and hindering the activities of dissident parties and factions. Legislation
on press and press crimes became a powerful legal weapon against the enemies of the
Porfiriato, allowing authorities of different sorts to criminalize opposition journalists as
both common and political criminals. The instrumentalization of this legislation by the
Mexican government provoked the shutdown of dozens of opposition newspapers and the
arrest of hundreds of dissident journalists under the pretexts of safeguarding public order,
protecting public authorities, and neutralizing potential acts of subversion. The repertoire
of criminal charges underpinning such repressive measures commonly involved “inciting
rebellion or sedition” and “defaming public authorities.” In the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz,
press offenses against “public order” and attacks against the “private life” of public officers
became practically equivalent to political crimes. While the law distinguished both kinds
of attacks as offenses of a different nature, in practice they tended to be part of the same
crime: offenses against the government and its representatives.
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Journalism remained under strict control during the Porfiriato. Díaz controlled
many of the major newspapers of Mexico City, ensuring their loyalty through constant
subventions. As a result, some of Mexico’s most notable newspapers, including El
Universal, El Partido Liberal, El Nacional, and El Siglo Diecinueve, were overtly
Porfiristas.318 Sponsored newspapers returned the favor by widely supporting the
government in its campaign against opposition press. In February 1893, for instance, El
Siglo Diecinueve defended the official persecution of the paper El Demócrata by declaring
it a dangerous publication driven by “a savage intolerance.” “El Demócrata has no
principles, no program, no ideas, nothing. Absolutely nothing. It only has the goal of
overthrowing the government,” the paper maintained. Its ways reminded El Siglo of the
position of another newspaper, La Voz de México, which once had said “if our words could
kill our enemies, much better!” To the porfirista newspaper, those were all symptoms of a
mental disease called “political crime:” “A sort of craziness drives El Demócrata to deem
everything as wrong, to attack everything, to bite everything, to destroy everything.” “That
is what we call a severely sick opposition,” the paper concluded.319 The words of El Siglo
Diecinueve comprise many of the arguments under which Porfirian authorities persecuted
and repressed dissident newspapers between the 1880s and the 1900s.
The preventive control of “dangerous” or “subversive” press in Mexico went far
beyond the suspension of newspapers or the arrests of writers and editors. The Porfiriato
extended its repression to printers, managers, sellers, newsboys, and even people that
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maintained indirect relationships with the sanctioned publications.320 In the late 1870s, for
example, a tribunal accused a group of printers of supporting the rebel Miguel Negrete
after printing a “subversive” proclaim with his program. Further inquiries demonstrated
that there was no relationship between the printers and the rebellion, and that their only
fault was to reproduce the document in their shop.321 Decades later, in 1905, two people
from San Pedro, Coahuila, went to prison for allegedly providing a newspaper with news
concerning the arbitrary acts of governor Miguel Cárdenas.322 That same year, an article
listing the many newspapers that authorities had punished throughout the last ten years
included the names of 76 people associated to all sorts of roles. The list included owners
and directors of opposition newspapers, writers, printers, proofreaders, and even paper
distributors.323
The prosecution and judgement of all press crimes corresponded during most of the
Porfiriato to the ordinary justice. Given the lack of precision in the legislation about the
specific circumstances that made a publication a “crime,” judges had a great deal of
discretion to decide whether or not a writing was criminal. Sometimes, it was not necessary
that the publication in question directly encouraged rebellion or insulted a particular
authority. Judges could convict writers only on the grounds of the assumption that their
intention, at the moment of writing, publishing, or circulating the publication, was criminal.
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Many contemporary journalists criticized this practice and considered it a “deviation” of
the justice system, for it allowed judges to decide, not on the basis of solid evidence but
of mere “psychological” considerations.324 Opponents of the Porfiriato called this practice
“judicial psychology” or the “psychological method,” and blamed it for the high and
constant number of convictions of dissident journalists during the period.
As a judicial practice, the “psychological method” originated in 1885. It was the
result of a judicial decision in a trial against a group of journalists and printers from Mexico
City accused of “attempted sedition through the press.” The case included about 15 people,
associated to the newspapers El Monitor Republicano and El Correo del Lunes, as well as
to a leaflet titled “Al pueblo: protesta.” Charges included different modalities of sedition
as well as insults and slander against public authorities. A first instance judge sentenced
the defendants to prison between three and seven months, and ordered them to pay fines
between 300 and 100 pesos. Although the defense appealed and a second judge revised the
sentence, the results of the revision, ratified by the Supreme Court, did not benefit the
defendants.325 The details of the trial illustrate many aspects of the ways in which judges,
prosecutors, and lawyers in Porfirian Mexico understood press offenses against public
order and debated about their alleged criminality.
The trial responded to a series of “subversive” writings that had circulated between
June and July that year. The process, initially, hat to do with the publication in El Monitor
of a collection of articles criticizing Díaz’s recent law on the payment of Mexico’s foreign
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debt.326 Their author, Enrique Chavarri, accused the president of being more arbitrary than
his predecessors Lerdo and Juárez, and considered the law in question the government’s
ultimate act of authoritarianism. The articles also included a few “incendiary” sentences
such as “we don’t believe revolution is either unlikely or impossible.”327 A few days later,
a group of students, apparently inspired by El Monitor, published the protest “Al pueblo.”
In the leaflet, the students called Díaz’s government “tyrannical” and “arbitrary,” and
manifested their wish that the Mexican people joined the protest “with energy and
patriotism.”328 Later on, the newspaper El Correo reproduced the protest, together with an
article, written by Adolfo Carrillo, that invited Mexicans “to organize clubs so they could
discuss, in every place or reunion, any issue in which the nation’s honor is at stake.” In the
article, Carrillo also called the government “autocratic” and “plunderer.”329
To the prosecution, all these publications insulted Díaz and his government and
represented clear and intentional attempts at encouraging people to commit sedition. The
defense claimed that there was no crime in any of the publications. Both Chavarri and
Carrillo pleaded innocent, and claimed that their writings neither insulted the authorities
nor had a subversive or seditious nature. The defense also maintained that the defendants
had done nothing but exercising their constitutional rights to voice their opinions and
protest against the authorities. “Looking at the articles,” the defense pointed out, “it is
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impossible to see where the crime is.” “There could be an offense, morally speaking, but
under the law there is no way of establishing whether or not there was a crime,” it
concluded.330
The tribunal’s response to this last argument set the foundations for the so-called
“psychological method.” Certainly, the tribunal admitted, the law did not provide means
for telling whether or not the articles and contents in question were criminal. Nevertheless,
judging from the context in which these writings had appeared, it was possible to attribute
the writers a criminal intention. Carrillo, Chavarri, and the students knew that the
circumstances were tense and even so voiced their seditious proclaims, calling people to
organize and protest. Their intention, concluded the judge, was clear: they wanted provoke
a sedition.331 The alleged “psychological” nature of this proceeding lay in two central
beliefs. There was, in the first place, the assumption that it was possible to presuppose a
criminal intention in the defendant’s action, regardless the probative material available.
There was, secondly, the idea that it was legitimate for a judge, based on his “legal
consciousness,” to decide in a subjective way about the criminality of an act, even in the
absence of formal proofs.332 This “method” accounts for the high degrees of discretion that
judges enjoyed during the period when dealing with press crimes against the government
and the public order. As a judicial practice, it represented a way of dodging basic
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procedural guarantees in order to ensure the sentencing and punishment of dissident
writers.
The “psychological method” would become common all over Mexico, shaping a
sort of “judicial habit” in the treatment of these offenses that would prevail during the rest
of the Porfiriato.333 In 1904, the journalist Adolfo Duclós-Salinas blamed the
intensification of judicial persecution against opposition press, from 1885 onwards, on the
rapid extension of this “habit” from Mexico City’s tribunals to the rest of the states.334 The
already mentioned list from 1905, with its 76 names, illustrates the extent of this
persecution in the years following the trial in question. All people from the list had faced
charges at least once for allegedly encouraging sedition, attacking public order, or
slandering political authorities. Many of the people had appeared before a tribunal more
than once. Some counted several processes but no sentences at all. Several more had been
in prison on repeated occasions. Yet others had remained imprisoned for several moths
awaiting trial and sentencing.335 There were cases in which journalists spent in jail longer
periods than the maximum time prescribed by the law for their crimes, awaiting a judicial
decision. Sometimes the decision came after a period that duplicated the duration of the
penalty imposed.336
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People from El Diario del Hogar, El Hijo del Ahuizote, and El Demócrata made up
some of the most extreme cases, according to the list. During these ten years, El Diario had
received 42 denunciations from public servants of all sort. El Hijo del Ahuizote had
published 468 issues in the last 9 years, and its director had spent in jail an almost
equivalent number of days. People from El Demócrata served prison terms of up to 15
months, the highest in the list; and, all their new journalistic endeavors –El Hijo del
Demócrata and El Nieto del Demócrata– similarly suffered from the state’s persecution.
Not even foreign journalists escaped judicial repression: a certain Mr. Henriot, director of
the Lanterne de Cocorico, ended up in jail three or four times.337 Persecution against
opposition journalists and newspapers after 1895 was similarly intense. Between 1896 and
1897, for instance, El Universal, once a Porfirista newspaper, faced more than a dozen
criminal accusations. One of its owners ended up in jail three times before fleeing the
country. His replacement also faced imprisonment, together with the owner of the printing
press, its manager, its employees, and even some of the people who defended them in
court.338 In 1902 alone, authorities from a dozen states including Mexico City ordered the
prosecution of 39 papers.339 It was a repressive wave that, in the words of El Hijo del
Ahuizote, pretended nothing but to punish a “new” political crime that had emerged in the
midst of Díaz’s regime: antiporfirismo.340
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The “psychological method” was not the only judicial practice responsible for the
intense persecution of the opposition press during the Porfiriato. The customary
intervention of the government in the administration of justice in these cases represented
another major feature in this regard. Although the law gave ordinary tribunals jurisdiction
over press crimes, the President, his governors, and other public authorities often managed
to control the functioning and decisions of these organisms. The Executive had the
authority to freely appoint and remove federal and provincial judges; and, regional and
local authorities could always appoint specific judges to particular cases. In consequence,
anytime an authority wanted to neutralize a newspaper, it only had to find a judge willing
to declare its content “subversive” or “slandering.”341 That was precisely the strategy that
General Bernardo Reyes used in 1901 to shut down the paper Regeneración, written and
directed by the brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón. Irritated by the newspaper’s
criticisms of his political maneuvers in northern Mexico, Reyes convinced a former
minister of justice to help him shut it down. Reyes and the former minister convinced a
local political chief from Oaxaca to bring a suit for defamation against the paper, and then
put the case under the jurisdiction of an allied judge. The judge put the brothers in prison
for a few months and ordered the suspension of the paper.342
Bernardo Reyes would use the same strategy against the brothers Flores Magón a
year later, this time through a judicial campaign against El Hijo del Ahuizote. Reyes
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declared war on the newspaper after it published a series of articles criticizing his political
use of the “Segunda Reserva.”343 The General ordered a subaltern to denounce the paper
before the military authorities for “insulting the Mexican army.”344 According to El Hijo,
the denunciation did not convince any current military judge, which forced Reyes to find a
new, more manipulable judge. He found a Mr. Telésforo Ocampo, a plain citizen with
judicial aspirations, invested him with a middle-rank military position, and made him a
military judge.345 Judge Ocampo ordered the arrest of the brothers Flores Magón and all
the employees of the newspaper. He also shut down and confiscated the corresponding
printing press. The defense, carried out by the lawyer Francisco Serralde, appealed the
judge’s decision before the Supreme Court and managed to get them a protective judicial
injunction or amparo.346 Serralde’s appeal maintained that that the brothers Flores Magón
had not committed any sort of military crime, and therefore their imprisonment and
judgement by a military court was unconstitutional.347
The granting of the amparo did not bring the case to an end. Although the Supreme
Court suspended the process and ordered the immediate freedom of the brothers Flores
Magón, a local judge jeopardized their release by charging them with the additional crime
of insulting the government. Apparently, after their first arrest, the brothers had yelled
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“death to tyranny” in several occasions on their way to the prison. Once again, Serralde
had to resort to the Supreme Court, arguing this time that yelling those kinds of words did
not fulfill the legal requirements of a criminal action –let alone being a crime of insult or
slander.348 The high tribunal backed the lawyer’s arguments, conceded a second amparo,
and the brothers Flores Magón could finally leave prison. 34 days had gone by since their
arrest. Their case was not unique. In the early 1900s, the authorities of Lampazos, Nuevo
León, imprisoned the journalist Felipe Naranjo, a collaborator of the newspaper Redención.
After over a month in prison, Naranjo managed to obtain an amparo. Nonetheless, as soon
as authorities in Lampazos heard of the decision, a local judge issued a new order of arrest
and sent the journalist to a penitentiary in Monterrey.349 That was also the case of DuclósSalinas, who, right after spending some time in a jail in Nuevo León, received another
prison sentence with no clear justification. Once he regained his freedom, authorities
threatened him with a third imprisonment if he continued publishing his newspaper La
Democracia Latina.350
The justice system not always worked against the interests of antiporifista
journalists. Judicial amparos were always an option that could eventually yield positive
results, as illustrated by the cases of the brothers Flores Magón and Felipe Naranjo.351
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Defendants could also appeal their sentences before an appeals or second instance tribunal
and, if needed, request the Supreme Court to revise the decision. In December 1894, for
instance, a second instance tribunal reduced the sentences of five people that worked for
the newspaper La República. Six months earlier, a first instance court had convicted them
for “provoking rebellion and slandering public servants.” The sentence had imposed on
them between 9 and 19 months of prison, and ordered, in addition, the confiscation of all
materials and equipment from their printing press. The defense appealed. A second
instance tribunal gave each defendant a reduction of between 3 and 6 months, and even
ordered the release of three of them. Although the prosecutor rejected the decision, the
defense took the case to the Supreme Court and obtained its ultimate confirmation.352
Not all journalists had to go to the extreme of filing a claim before the Supreme
Court. In some lucky cases, defendants could find judges that dismissed the accusations
for lack of evidence or because the publications in question were not, in their opinion,
criminal enough. In August 1902, authorities from San Luis Potosí arrested the director
and printer of El Demófilo, and confiscated their printing press, on charges of falseness and
slander against a local public officer. A lower court quickly disqualified the first charge
after considering it ill-founded and ordered the return of the confiscated materials. El Hijo
del Ahuizote, which reported the case, was confident that the judge would also dismiss the
second charge, considering that he “was an exception within this corrupt environment of
judicial prostitution.”353 A relatively similar case occurred in 1906, when an official from
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Mexico City’s Police denounced the papers El colmillo público and La revolución social
for their “subversive” content. In the official’s opinion, both newspapers “provoked the
crimes of rebellion and attacks against industry.”354 The tribunal disqualified the
accusations from the beginning, considering them exaggerated and, since there was no
crime to prosecute, put the officer’s claim on hold. A judge reopened the case in March
1911, only to declare that, by then, it was already statute-barred.355

What were the central characteristics that defined the “preventive” control of press in
Porfirian Mexico? It was, first and foremost, a control that authorities used as a political
tool against dissidents, repressing opposition journalists under the pretext of protecting
public order. This repression was legally grounded and operated on the basis of
criminalizing dissident writers as internal enemies. It was a notion of internal enmity in
which society’s adversaries were not only those who conspired against public order and
peace, but also those who attacked the dignity of public authorities. The relative
equivalence between slander and rebellion gave governments a particularly wide frame of
action against dissident writers. It extended the circumstances according to which a
journalist could commit a crime, and ensured the possibility of punishment even in the case
that authorities decided to pardon or disregard his charges as a political offender.
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Additional characteristics concern the functioning of Mexico’s justice system in
cases of press crimes against the government and the public order. It was a system that
relied on high degrees of judicial discretion, even against the procedural guarantees of the
Mexican law. It was also a system that did not operate independently from the Executive
power, and therefore was highly politicized. As a result of this, Mexico’s justice system
operated with almost the same degrees of discretion and legal insecurity that would
characterize the administrative prosecution of subversive journalists in Colombia.
Nonetheless, it was a system that, despite their arbitrariness and lack of guarantees, still
offered processed journalists some degree of judicial protection or redress, a possibility
that did not exist for Colombian Liberals during the Regeneration.

Responding to Subversive Journalism in Colombia: The Case of the Liberal Press Before
the Thousand Days.
The governmental treatment of subversive journalism in Colombia partially resembles the
Porfirian experience. Like their Mexican counterparts, regenerationist governments turned
legislation on the press into a legal tool against the opposition. There were some important
differences between both cases, though. While the criminalization of opposition journalism
in Mexico relied on a combination of political and non-political accusations, in Colombia
it depended almost exclusively on political charges. By labelling opposition newspapers as
“subversive publications,” Colombian authorities were able to shut down papers, fine
publications and writers, and arrest and even exile journalists. As in Mexico, the treatment
of opposition journalism involved high degrees of judicial discretion and legal insecurity.
Yet, in the Colombian case, discretion and insecurity were even higher, for the judgement
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and prosecution of “criminal” publications corresponded almost entirely to the Executive
power and unfolded completely outside the reach and guarantees of the judicial system.
The next pages analyze how authorities in Colombia applied and instrumentalized
this legislation on the press between the 1880s and the 1890s, a moment in which state’s
persecution against dissident journalism was particularly intense. During the decades
preceding the Thousand Days, Conservative authorities used this legislation to criminalize
many of the reorganization efforts of the Liberal Party after the war of 1885. This
“preventive” criminalization of the press would revolve around a series of criminal actions
that, despite not being related to political crimes such as rebellion and sedition, had a clear
political nature as well –they were criminal acts of political dissent. Their treatment as
“subversive acts” and their criminalization as threats against public order put them at the
same level with other, major political offenses. This would trace a link between the figures
of the subversive journalist, the “conspirator against public order,” and the actual rebel.
The practical parallelism among these three notions would allow authorities to treat
dissident writers as particularly dangerous internal enemies.
Repression against subversive press during this period relied on both the Ley de los
caballos and Decree 151. Governments made a wide use of both pieces of legislation to
keep dissident newspapers under a strict control and take Liberal journalists out of
circulation. Under the pretexts that their publications encouraged rebellion, and that their
leaders plotted conspiracies against the government every now and then, authorities
managed to neutralize almost all efforts of Liberalism to survive as a political party.
Arguments involving conspiracies and subversive plots loomed large in these reactions
against Liberal journalism. In the majority of cases, authorities penalized newspapers and
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writers on the grounds of charges of “conspiracy against public order,” and justified their
actions against papers and writers as “preemptive strikes” against “uncovered
conspiracies.”356
The Regenerationist campaign against “subversive” Liberal press involved, among
other measures, the suspension of at least 36 newspapers between 1886 and 1898. The list
included prestigious titles such as Santiago Pérez’s El Relator; La Crónica, directed by the
also former president Aquileo Parra; and El Espectador, directed by Fidel Cano, one of the
fiercest critics of the Ley de los Caballos. Many other newspapers received expensive fines
on more than one occasion, as happened to notable titles such as the Diario de
Cundinamarca, perhaps the most important Liberal newspaper in the late-nineteenth
century, and La Estrella de Panamá, one of the region’s most important newspapers.357
Repression against Liberal writers also fell on cartoonists like David Granados and Alfredo
Greñas, best known for his newspapers El Barbero and El Zancudo, and even on poets and
playwrights such as Adolfo León Gómez.358 Repression of liberal newspapers right after
the expedition of both laws seemed to be so intense that, in October 1888, El Espectador
complained that the government had managed to achieve “the almost complete suppression
of the oppositionist press.”359
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Penalties of expatriation followed the closing or suspension of newspapers in more
than one occasion. That was the case, for instance, of the paper El Liberal in 1888. The
government suspended the publication and imprisoned its director, the renowned Liberal
leader César Conto. Soon after his arrest, Conto abandoned the country “voluntarily” and
moved to Guatemala, where he died in 1892. Nicolás Esguerra, who tried to reopen El
Liberal after Conto’s arrest, suffered the same punishment. He got to bring out only one
issue of the newspaper before authorities suspended it again for six months and sent
Esguerra into exile. The exile of Santiago Pérez followed the suspension of El Relator in
August 1893. Authorities penalized the publication for considering it part of a
revolutionary conspiracy discovered that month.360 Earlier that year, Alfredo Greñas had
suffered the same fate. The Police of Bogotá arrested the author right after the January riots
in the city. Authorities sent Greñas to prison and later expelled him from the country
“without the mediation of a trial or a defense, not even a public sentence,” as denounced
by El Espectador. Authorities also suspended his newspaper El Barbero and shut down his
printing press.361 Conservative press defended such measures on the grounds that the
penalized newspapers were nothing but “publications of fanatic and revolutionary
propaganda that, instead of enlightening their readers, [aimed] to heighten their spirits,” as
El Orden remarked in June 1892.362
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Liberal newspapers reacted to and campaigned against these measures in different
ways. Many papers periodically published lists of suspended or fined publications, as well
as of arrested journalists and printers. A list from October 1890, published simultaneously
by El Combate and La Estrella de Panamá, informed for instance that their fellow papers
El Vigilante and El Demócrata had fallen victim of the government’s persecution. While
the former newspaper had received a fine, the later had its editor in prison. The list also
informed that a conservative printer from Medellín had received a fine after publishing an
apparently subversive leaflet for some liberals. “Acts like these,” El Combate denounced,
“happen time and again in Colombia by orders of the President, his minister, and his
governors.” “There are no abuses here,” the paper pointed out. “Everything is very legal,
in correspondence with the current legislation on the press.” Authorities “apply the law to
all those who still have the habit of saying what they think, regardless the existing
prohibitions.” “The ones that do wrong,” remarked El Combate in a satirical tone, “are the
journalists who say what it is forbidden […] It is a stupidity to write just to get beaten up
later.”363
Liberal newspapers also criticized the current press legislation and its enforcement.
In February 1899, El Carnaval from Bogotá mocked a recent wave of fines against several
satirical newspapers by saying “today, everything has a price, even laughter.”364 Later that
year, El Demócrata, also from Bogotá, argued that the current press legislation “depressed
and humiliated the Colombian press” by allowing the government to discretionally decide
what and who was criminal. This legislation, the paper maintained, consisted basically of
363
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an Executive decree “that tells the citizen: ‘you go on and publish, that I, a posteriori, will
declare you innocent or guilty [….] And if I decide to find you guilty, I will punish you
[…] according to my will.’” This, according to El Demócrata, was “a trait of audacity that
goes way beyond the limits of the believable in matters of arbitrariness.”365 Writing on the
legal insecurity stemming from the government’s excessive discretion, El Relator claimed
for a clearer and more precise press law. “Let the prior censorship come; let the fine come;
let whatever other measure come. Everything is better than the insecurity and the doubt,”
maintained the paper in March 1890. “No matter how rigid the [new] law could be, it will
guide the judgement of the public writer, so that if he breaks it, he will do it deliberately
[…] That is not what happens nowadays,” the paper concluded.366
Liberals denounced time and again the many governmental efforts for shutting their
newspapers down. In 1938, the veteran of the Thousand Days Lucas Caballero remembered
the 1890s as a terrible decade for Liberal journalism. “Our newspapers were all suspended
and fined, and their directors sent to prison and even exiled for the slightest critique,” he
wrote.367 During that same decade, Santiago Pérez claimed multiple times that the
“independent press” was the victim of innumerable acts of oppression. In an article from
1889, for instance, Pérez maintained that liberal newspapers and journalists suffered from
the worst and most lethal kind of calumny: “state calumny.” It was a calumny that had no
other purpose than “subordinating [the government’s] enemies and dominating through
terror.” State calumny went beyond the simplicity of words and materialized in “fines,
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confinements, imprisonments and expatriation, most of the time without any legal or
judicial formality.” “Anytime the government feels that the opposition harms it,” Pérez
explained, “it simply declares: ‘you all conspire.’ And on such grounds it sends its
opponents to confinement and jail; sometimes even leading them to their very death.”
Calling Liberal writers “conspirators” was, then, more of a political calumny than an actual
criminal accusation. It was, nonetheless, a calumny with serious legal consequences, for it
materialized in arrests, imprisonments, and exile.368
Liberal newspapers also underscored the multiple abuses stemming from the
government’s way of defining and judging press crimes against society. In March 1888,
for instance, El Relator denounced that the government’s persecution of liberal newspapers
entailed a crucial injustice: it relied on “the assumption of the commission of a crime”
instead of relying on the commission of an actual offense. This made no sense at all to the
newspaper, for according to the law, criminal responsibility stemmed from a crime, not
from simple “suspicions of a crime.” That was also the case with the “innocent action [that
the state] turned into a crime.” To the paper, it was yet another illegal measure since the
decision of whether or not an act was criminal corresponded to the ordinary justice, not to
the government. What was happening in Colombia, then, was not a legal campaign against
criminal publications, but merely an illegitimate, extrajudicial demonstration of state
retaliation disguised as “official punishment.”369
The customary treatment of journalists as conspirators also received harsh critics.
“Is there any actual conspiracy [involving the press]?” wondered El Relator. “No. There is
368
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discussion. A discussion allowed by the law, accepted by civilization under the form of
custom, and sometimes provoked by the government.” To the newspaper, the government
was unable –or simply unwilling– to take part in this discussion, and only responded to it
by “pushing laws aside.” Anytime a newspaper confronted the government, authorities
“requested the barracks a ‘constitutional help’ consisting of a corporal and four soldiers.”
All it took was a verbal order to make these “representantes del derecho social” put the
challenging journalists in prison or on their way to exile. The government celebrated the
strike and presented it as an unveiled conspiracy. Yet, El Relator insisted, there was no
conspiracy involving the press. Even further, the acts of a newspaper at no point could
entail a single trace of conspiracy. “To conspire means to secretly get together to overthrow
the government. Newspapers are public by nature […] therefore there is nothing more
unfair than accusing a paper of conspiring.” A newspaper can be “revolutionary, seditious,
immoral, deceitful, exaggerated, ardent, etc., but never conspirator, because nothing that is
published in a paper […] can be secret,” El Relator stressed. Accusing writers of
conspiracy then, meant shrouding them “with atrocities, delusions, [and] crimes, and
justifying a priori all measures, all proceedings applied against them.”370
Conservative leaders did not hesitate in discrediting Liberal complains on the
matter. Carlos Holguín, president between 1888 and 1892, maintained for instance that
Liberal denunciations were unfair and exaggerated. During his administration, he recalled
in 1893, arrests of journalists had been minimal, involving just four or five individuals that
had refused to pay their corresponding fines. Their arrests indeed had concluded as soon
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as they decided to pay. It was also false that, during his administration, the press had
remained muzzled. During this time, he pointed out, liberals had in fact flooded the nation
with newspapers, leaflets, and other publications “in which they said whatever they wanted
with no respect for truth or decency.” After all, they only wanted “to maintain the nation
in constant agitation, […] fostering unrest and mistrust.”371 There were suspensions of
newspapers and fines, of course, but many of them responded to the insistence of Liberals
in re-opening papers as soon as the authorities ordered their shut down. His alleged abuses
had only consisted in “seven temporary suspensions and twelve fines in a period of four
years in which newspapers from the opposition had multiplied by the dozen.”372 Many of
these punished publications were, in Holguín’s account, “nothing but hideous pamphlets
(pasquines inmundos).” The former president also denied that his government had sent
Conto and Esguerra into exile. While it was true that they had left the country, they had
done so voluntarily. “Mr. Conto […] left [Colombia] so exiled that he even came to my
house and said good bye.”373
Repression against subversive journalism after the Thousand Days revolved
primarily around the prescriptions and penalties of the legislation of alta policía. A circular
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from January 1905 illustrates the influence of these laws and decrees on the control and
repression of “dangerous” press outlets. In the document, Reyes recommended all his
governors, prefects, and military chiefs to ensure strict compliance with the prescriptions
of the decree of alta policía, “especially in all matters regarding the press.” The circular
ordered to punish with prison all individuals –journalists– that violated the regulations of
alta policía in that particular point.374
In correspondence with the spirit of this legislation, persecution of “subversive”
press during the quinquenio primarily targeted newspapers that, in the view of the
government, encouraged “resistance to the law” and fostered hatred among social classes.
Those were, precisely, the arguments under which the government declared the newspaper
El Faro “a publication highly dangerous for peace and public tranquility,” in June 1906.375
The government had used similar pretexts in February 1905 to order the capture and
confinement of six people, including the writers of the newspapers El Santo y Seña and
Ensayos Republicanos. All of them had violated, “with subversive manifestations,” the
decree of alta policía. The order underscored that the government could make no
exceptions in this regard. Otherwise, “it would put at risk the nation’s reorganization and
encourage tumultuous and “demagogical” scenes fostering civil war.”376
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The preventive control of subversive press during the Regeneration constantly swung
between the legal domain of current normativity and the extrajudicial sphere of state
retribution. There was a legislation on the press, and legal developments were more or less
constant. Yet, the contents and prescriptions of this legislation still allowed a great degree
of discretion in the definition and punishment of press crimes against society. A lack of
formal judicial and procedural parameters for the prosecution and judgement of these
offenses reinforced the legal insecurity ensuing. It was a legislation whose vagueness and
grey areas could easily turn its enforcement into a sheer exercise of state power, as it
happened many times before the Thousand Days –at least in the view of Liberal journalists.
Legally entitled to define who and what was “subversive,” the governments of the period
turned these laws into a political weapon for neutralizing and terrorizing their rivals.
Opposition journalism became thus a modality of internal enmity, one according to which
criticizing the government in a public manner was a political crime almost equivalent to
rebellion or conspiracy. The close relationship among these three crimes emerges clearly
out of the fact that state repression against journalists operated under the guise of a
preventive struggle against rebellion and internal turmoil. Both in the Regeneration and the
Porfiriato, the “preventive” criminalization of the press on the grounds of the defense or
public order fostered a legal and practical identification between “the rebel” and the
“opposition journalist.”

Conclusions: The Many Faces of Prevention
Preventing rebellion and internal turmoil in Colombia and Mexico was a complex and
challenging endeavor that shaped diverse legal and judicial strategies. Those strategies
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responded in each country to particular circumstances including political conflicts, partisan
rivalries, reactions to specific measures and policies, and even legal and constitutional
backgrounds. Different in their origins, preventive strategies in both cases had nonetheless
several features in common.
A first feature in this regard has to do with the fact that all these strategies had a
legal nature, no matter how “informal” or “extraordinary” they were. They were the result
of multiple acts of legislation: constitutional precepts, prescriptions from the criminal
codes, formal legislative acts, executive orders, and emergency decrees. Although some of
these acts could seem more “formal” and “constitutional” than others, they all represented,
ultimately, manifestations of the same law-making will –the state’s law-making will.
A second, more complex, feature is that these strategies configured in both
countries regimes of “alternative legality” for the legal and judicial treatment of actual or
potential threats against public order. These parallel regal regimes had their own sets of
crimes and penalties, often independent from the prescriptions, limits, exceptions, and
guarantees established in codes and constitutions. Overall, both countries seemed to share
the conviction that the prevention of internal conflict was an objective whose importance
and urgency was worth dodging the prescriptions, actors, and formalities of normal laws,
tribunals, and authorities. Such conviction encouraged the creation of alternative
jurisdictional spheres that put defendants outside the reach of formal law and the ordinary
justice system. This plurality of jurisdictions for the management of public order and the
“preventive” treatment of political criminality reveals that state’s legal logics for the
prevention and repression of political offenders were neither monolithic nor a monopoly
of a single institution or authority. Even when these logics seemed to be almost completely
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subordinated to the Executive power, no single power, authority, or jurisdiction could claim
an absolute monopoly over them. Problems concerning the monopoly of the functions of
state repression were particularly drastic in the Mexican case, in which state authorities
partially handed the administration of repression to private armies.
A third feature of these strategies refers to the characteristics of the “alternative
legalities” they shaped. Their conditions of criminalization were most of the time vague,
as were their criminal categories and the conditions for the administration and gradation of
penalties. The legislation backing these regimes was full of abstract notions and grey areas
that allowed for great degrees of discretion in the interpretation and application of the law.
They were also legal regimes that relied heavily on the decisions and initiatives of the
Executive power, even against the principle of independence of the judicial branch.
Whether through direct, sanctioned intervention (Colombia) or through indirect
manipulation (Mexico), the criminalization, prosecution, and judgement of threats against
public order became primarily a political matter in the hands of the government and its
agents. This political “twist” helps explain the fourth characteristic of the strategies in
question: the political instrumentalization that these “alternative legalities” experienced in
both countries. Governments in Colombia and Mexico applied this legislation not only to
contain the outbreak of civil warfare and extinguish real threats against public order, but
also to keep political dissidence in check through the criminalization of its actions, even
manufacturing artificial political plots if needed.
The twofold use of this legality had major political and legal consequences in both
countries. It dissolved in practice the distinctions among “preventing civil warfare,”
“protecting a regime’s stability,” and “repressing political opposition.” Practices such as
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charging dissidents with “conspiracy against public order” and treating them as “rebellion
suspects” made possible the practical identification between one purpose and the others.
Criminalizing opponents on the grounds of political charges –this is, treating dissenters as
potential political criminals– allowed governments to legitimate political repression under
the pretexts of safeguarding public order, preventing civil war, and protecting public
authorities. It was a legal way of legitimizing not only the penalization of dissent, but also
the application of a series of repressive and punitive practices that drifted away from what
constitutions and codes prescribed regarding the limits of state power and state retribution.
These practices furthered a systematic transformation of prevailing legal notions of internal
enmity and political criminality, and extended the repertoire of possibilities according to
which authorities could consider a dissident an “internal enemy.” Legal, judicial, and
administrative responses to “dangerous” dissidence and threats against public order
reinvented time and again the sphere of political crimes. Reinventions included the
politicization of common offenses like slander, the treatment of “conspiracy” as a political
crime in itself, and the conversion of a long series of acts of dissent and protest into crimes
against public order and the government.
Beyond these similarities, preventive strategies in Colombia and Mexico had their
own particularities. In Colombia, for instance, they were subject of multiple and constant
legal developments. Developments in Mexico had less to do with matters of legislation
than with issues of judicial practice and habits. The legal and judicial monopoly of public
order issues by the Executive in Colombia deprived dissidents from legal and judicial
protections that their Mexican counterparts could still enjoy. Despite their manipulation by
the government, Mexico’s justice system still offered defendants ways of finding
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protection against state vengeance. This does not mean that “preventive” repression in
Mexico was less intense, more legalistic, or more constitutional than it was in Colombia.
The Mexican case, in fact, involved significant displays of illegality, extrajudiciality, and
unconstitutionality, and was marked by displays of state retribution that, in more than one
occasion, went way beyond the limits of the rule of law. Preventive acts and displays of
state power were mutable, involving different legal and judicial responses in different
moments. The workings of repression in Colombia during the quinquenio were different
from what they were before the Thousand Days, for the end of the war brought important
transformations on the nature and dynamics of political conflict. In Mexico, state
repression became more intense, informal, and less law-bounded in the first decade of the
1900s, with the reorganization of the Liberal party and the wave of uprisings that predated
the Mexican revolution.
What do these strategies, measures, and displays of state power reveal about the
legal prevention of internal warfare in the Regeneration and the Porfiriato? The Colombian
and Mexican experiences show that “prevention” was a complex notion, linked to different
yet interconnected objectives. It could mean prevention of rebellion, civil warfare, and
internal conflict. It could also mean control of a subversive or incendiary press, as well as
neutralization of criminal or potentially criminal political dissidence. It could equally mean
deterrence of threats and attacks against public order and the government; surveillance of
the legality of the acts of the opposition; and even restriction to its capacity of hurting
established governments by military or electoral means. Here, the prevention of internal
warfare, the protection of public order, and the preservation of governments and regimes
seemed to be equivalent concerns –if not interchangeable. Within such a context, was there
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a “pure,” non-instrumental, non-politicized notion of prevention? Judging from the
Colombian and Mexican cases, it is difficult to imagine such a notion outside the purely
theoretical sphere of the law. What both countries had, in practice, was a series of strategies
of “preventive” political repression, and sometimes sheer displays of state power disguised
as “preemptive” measures. Legal and judicial campaigns against plots and conspiracies –
real or imaginary– easily turned into offensives against “dangerous” and uncomfortable
dissidents –sometimes against entire rival parties. Often, “prevention” and “repression”
simply operated like two sides of the same legal and political endeavor.
At least two factors contributed to this practical equivalence between prevention
and repression. The first, most obvious one, refers to the political instrumentalization of
these preventive strategies, evidenced for instance in the political uses of press legislation
and the imprisonment, as conspirators, of opposition journalists. The second one has to do
with the many grey areas that legislation on public order entailed. The lack of clear
parameters to define what “public order” was, what “subversive acts” were, and what
represented “crimes against authorities and the public order,” made this legislation a carte
blanche for the criminalization of everybody the government wanted to target. Such
criminalization came particularly in handy within contexts of revolutionary alarm, high
political tension, or strong electoral competition. These responses and strategies closely
paralleled the repertoire of legal and judicial measures with which governments in
Colombia and Mexico reacted to actual episodes of rebellion and civil warfare, as the next
chapter illustrates.
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VI. CHAPTER 5. THE MANY FACES OF STATE RETRIBUTION:
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CRIMINALITY IN TIMES
OF REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR

Perhaps no other Colombian liberal in the 1890s had a career remotely similar to that of
Rafael Uribe Uribe.377 One of the most prominent leaders of the Liberal Party throughout
the decade, Uribe Uribe was a Congressman, a journalist, a political agitator, and a rebel
leader during the wars of 1895 and 1899-1902. All these roles granted him multiple
opportunities to speak out against the Regeneration, the policies of the Nationalist
administrations, and the political exclusion that his party had suffered since the mid-1880s.
His multiple actions as a dissident leader, together with his constant attacks against the
Conservative regime, earned him an official persecution that extended from the office of
his newspaper, El Autonomista, to the battlefields during the Thousand Days. As political
agitator and opposition journalist, Uribe Uribe experienced the consequences of the
regime’s “preventive endeavors,” which for him included a short prison term and the
shutting down of his paper, right before the events of October 1899. As one of the three
major rebel generals during the Thousand Days, he became a high-priority military target.
Political and military authorities alike made him subject not only to the customary penalties
that Colombian laws established for rebellion and other political crimes, but also to
additional punishments including the death penalty. Uribe Uribe, nonetheless, managed to
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survive the conflict. His negotiated rendition in October 1902 represented the first step
towards the peace treaties that, a month later, put an end to the Thousand Days.
As one of the most versatile dissident leaders of his time, Uribe Uribe had to
experience both the effects of the “preventive” ventures of the Regeneration and the force
of the government’s repressive responses to the 1899 movement. His case, although
special, was not exceptional. Many other dissidents in Colombia and Mexico –included
Ricardo Flores Magón– also fell victim of this double logic of criminalization, either
because they switched from unarmed to armed modalities of dissidence or because their
governments simply believed they had. How different were those two experiences? What
differences separated the regime’s legal efforts to prevent rebellion from its legal strategies
to repress and neutralize actual rebel movements? Were there any substantial distinctions
between the logics of “prevention” and those of “repression”? Moreover, what did
“repression” mean? What characterized its logics? Addressing these questions requires
complementing the previous reflections on the dynamics of prevention with a closer look
to the logics of repression both in the Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian regeneration.

Many of the initiatives that characterized the prevention of rebellion in Mexico and
Colombia were also present in their respective responses to actual episodes of insurrection
and civil warfare. Reactions to rebellion shared with these preventive measures their
reliance on legislation, their tendency towards the construction of alternative legalities,
their realignment of jurisdictional spheres, and their propensity to criminalize political
dissent. This chapter reconstructs and analyzes the various repressive responses that
Mexican and Colombian authorities gave to rebellion and revolutionary movements during
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the period. How much did these responses rely on legislation and justice administration?
How did governments use the law and the justice system as mechanisms of punishment
against rebels and revolutionaries? How “legal” and “judicial” were these responses, and
to what extent did they combine both legal and extra-legal punitive practices? What do
these practices reveal about the nature and workings of state retribution against internal
enmity both during the Regeneration and the Porfiriato? Drawing on these questions, the
chapter reflects on the ways in which these governments treated rebels and other political
criminals, the punitive practices through which state retribution unfolded, and the multiple
meanings that internal enmity acquired in this context.
The chapter draws on a variety of materials. Primary sources include court-cases
and judicial archival sources; laws and decrees; legal and political essays; memoires and
correspondence; political manifestos; legal and political essays; and, newspapers.
Secondary sources include studies on rebellions in Mexico and Colombia during the period.
Section one explores the Mexican experience through an analysis of the role of ordinary
courts, national and trans-national strategies of law enforcement, and extra-legal
punishment practices in the Porfirian responses to a series of rebellions occurred between
the late-1870s and the mid-1900s. Section two looks at Colombia and offers an analysis of
governmental responses to rebellion during the Thousand Days War. It pays attention to
the roles of executive legislation, the justice system, international law, and a series of
extrajudicial repression practices in the shaping of logics of state retribution in the latenineteenth century. Section three offers some concluding remarks concerning the roles of
“legality” and “extra-legality” in the logics of state repression in Mexico and Colombia,

260

and about the nature of political offenses as criminal categories during the Porfiriato and
the Regeneration.
Governmental responses to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia encompassed a
variety of legal, political, and military purposes that demanded a combination of both
“legal” and “non-legal” measures. State retribution, in consequence, was as formal and
legalistic as it was informal and extralegal. In times of internal turmoil, it unfolded
simultaneously in the legislation, in the justice system, in the courts, and both within and
outside battlefields. It involved not only actual rebels and active combatants but also
internal enemies of all sorts –armed or not. Differences in the nature of political conflict
and the evolution of revolutionary movements shaped important distinctions between the
Colombian and the Mexican experiences. Although repression in both cases was strongly
legalistic, the “legality of retribution” in Colombia involved greater degrees of
exceptionality than in the Mexican case, for instance. Regardless these differences,
responses to rebellion in both countries turned political offenses into a flexible criminal
category in which crimes and punishments were mutable and subject to constant
redefinitions.

Responding to Rebellion in Mexico: Justice, Retribution, and Sovereignty during the
Porfiriato
Governmental responses to rebellion and internal turmoil in Porfirian Mexico involved a
set of strategies of state punishment and retribution that combined legal and judicial
practices with extralegal and extrajudicial means. These practices not only extended
throughout the Mexican territory but also beyond. The particularities of political conflict
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during the late Porfiriato would turn the regime’s legal war against insurrection into a transborder endeavor tending to ensure the punishment of antiporfirista rebels both in Mexico
and the United States. This singularity made the legal treatment of political criminality in
Mexico not only a matter of law enforcement and justice administration, but also an issue
of international diplomacy and bilateral relationships. This “trans-nationality” not only
involved Díaz’s “formal” and judicial responses to rebellion: it extended as well to his
regime’s extralegal and extrajudicial practices of punishment and repression. This section
examines and analyzes the diversity of governmental responses to rebellion during the
Porfiriato by grouping them into three categories: justice administration, trans-national law
enforcement strategies, and extralegal practices of state retribution.

Rebellion and Justice Administration in Porfirian Mexico.
Justice administration in cases of rebellion and insurrection during the Porfiriato
corresponded predominantly to ordinary courts and relied on the prescriptions of the
Criminal Code. The judgement of rebels and other political criminals commonly fell on
federal judges or Jueces de distrito, in accordance with the assumption that crimes against
public order always represented federal offenses. This position, grounded on a law from
1856 that turned all acts of rebellion and sedition into federal crimes, maintaining that all
disturbances of public order, regardless their scope, always affected general interests that
concerned the whole nation.378 Trials against rebels and other armed antiporfiristas often
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involved processes combining both common and political crimes, although cases
exclusively dealing with political charges were not uncommon. Political offenses included
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy, and “attacks against public order.” Common crimes
involved, primarily, homicide and different forms of robbery.
Judicial decisions tended to vary depending on the type of crime in question and
the nature of the people involved. Direct, first-instance acquittals were scarce, and seemed
to be reserved for light modalities of political criminality and low-profile political
offenders. That was the case, for instance, of Ramón Granados, processed in 1879 for
“insurrection and attacks against public order.” The prosecution accused Granados of being
part of a recent insurrectionist movement, a charge that in the judge’s opinion was not
“criminal” enough to earn him a prison sentence. The trial ended with Granados’s acquittal.
Although the prosecution appealed, a second-instance judge confirmed the decision, with
the subsequent support of the Supreme Court.379 That was also the case of a small group of
people involved in the failed insurrectionist movement of mid-1908. Despite being part of
a larger process for conspiracy and rebellion against important members of the Liberal
Party in Oaxaca, they managed to obtain a first-instance acquittal due to their lack of
political value.380 Sometimes a defendant had to wait for a second-instance judicial
decision, as happened to Sabas Lomelí in the late 1870s. Facing an initial sentence of five
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years in prison for conspiracy, Lomelí appealed the decision and an appealsjudge granted
him conditional release under the authorities’ surveillance.381
High-profile rebels, even if they only faced charges for political crimes, faced a
more complicated situation. In 1901, a process against the rebel Colonel Donaciano
González and his fellows in arms ended up in irrevocable prison sentences. González had
been on the authorities’ radar since 1897, when he took part in the rebellion of Canuto Neri
in the state of Guerrero, and was finally captured in November 1899.382 A judge sentenced
him to six years in prison as “principal responsible for the crime of rebellion,” and gave
ten of his people a couple years of the same penalty as accomplices. Although González
appealed and tried to obtain a shorter prison sentence, a second-instance judge ratified the
initial decision. He would die in prison before his process came to a definitive
conclusion.383 Something similar happened in 1908 to Plutarco Gallegos, Miguel Maraver,
and Gaspar Allende, arrested in 1906 under charges of rebellion and conspiracy and
processed in 1908 by a tribunal in Oaxaca. Active antiporfirista journalists and agitators,384
Gallegos and Maraver received, together with Allende, prison penalties of over a year plus
fines ranging from 800 to 1,000 pesos. Although the three of them appealed the decision
and obtained a sentence revision, the new sentence introduced insignificant modifications
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to the original penalties.385 Ángel Barrios, another agitator from Oaxaca who faced charges
of conspiracy in 1907, would receive a similar sentence. Barrios would not succeed either
in obtaining a significant sentence reduction after his appeal in 1908.386
Rebels facing trials for both political and common crimes would face even more
complicated situations. Combined charges often hindered acquittals, gave judges
additional reasons to punish rebels, and, like in Colombia, allowed tribunals to sentence
political offenders to death. The cases of Tomás Sánchez in 1886, and Pascual Reyes and
his fellows in arms in 1906, exemplify the first situation. Tomás Sánchez, together with 11
more people, appeared before a federal judge in Guadalajara under charges of conspiracy,
robbery, and homicide. The judge dismissed the conspiracy charges in all the cases, which
made possible the acquittal of eight of the defendants. Sánchez, nonetheless, also faced
charges for stealing a horse, and he and two more people charged with homicide had to
remain linked to the process and wait for their sentencing as common criminals.387 Pascual
Reyes’s case illustrates an opposite situation. Reyes, together with eight more people,
appeared before a tribunal in San Luis Potosí under charges of rebellion and “association
to commit attacks against property.” Unlike the previous case, a judge declared them
innocent of the common crime charge and issued sentence exclusively on the grounds of
their political crime. The sentence gave Reyes eight years of prison as “author” or leader,
gave other four people prison terms of over a year, and punished two “accomplices” with
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eight months of the same penalty. Reyes would appeal the decision and obtain a substantive
sentence reduction that would set him free in 1910.388
The trials against some of the antiporfiristas arrested after the failed insurrection of
September 1906 offer additional details of how judges administered justice when dealing
with both common and political crimes. The process against Juan Sarabia and other 15
people in January 1907 offers a first example in this regard. Sarabia was the director of the
oppositionist newspaper Regeneración, and had entered the state of Chihuahua from the
United States with a group of Liberal agitators exiled north of the border. Once in México,
the party tried to raid Ciudad Juarez’ custom house, with no success.389 Authorities from
the state charged the party with rebellion and other federal crimes of a common nature. A
judge declared Sarabia, together with Cesar E. Canales and Vicente de la Torre, guilty of
the crimes of attempted homicide, attempted robbery of federal funds, and attempted
destruction of public buildings. Each received between five and seven years of prison. In
addition, the judge sentenced Sarabia, Canales, and de la Torre on “conspiracy for
rebellion” and gave them an extra penalty consisting of a fine of 500 pesos. As an
opposition journalist, Sarabia would also receive a third penalty for slandering President
Díaz, and had to pay a second, much larger fine.390
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The rest of the defendants included in the process would face more lenient penalties.
Some of them received prison penalties over a year, as responsible in a lower degree of the
mentioned crime of conspiracy. The judge would even acquit six people for lack of
evidence. The sentence concluded with the petition requesting the extradition of the exiled
Liberal leaders Ricardo Flores Magón and Antonio Villareal. By March 1907, authorities
had sent all defendants to the infamous prison of San Juan de Ulúa, where one of them,
Francisco Guevarra, would die of tuberculosis. Although all defendants appealed the
decision, a second-instance judge confirmed the sentence in October that year.391
The second example from the events of 1906 has to do with the trial of Abraham
Salcedo and Bruno Triviño, members of a Liberal club in Metcalf, Arizona, and leaders of
a raid against the custom house of Nogales, Sonora.392 The process against them included
a total of 18 people, all of them charged with crimes of conspiracy and robbery. In May
1907, a judge from Querétaro sentenced Salcedo and Triviño as recidivist conspirators, and
gave them both 8 years in prison and a costly fine of 2000 pesos. Triviño, additionally
charged with property damage, would receive an additional penalty of seven months in
prison. Lázaro Puente, whom authorities accused of “formally inviting several people to
commit conspiracy,” would receive over seven years in prison plus an even larger fine.
Eight more people, processed as co-authors of the same crime, would face prison sentences
between five and six years, with additional fines ranging from 500 to 1800 pesos. Some of
the defendants appealed, and by December 1907 obtained important sentence reductions.
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A second-instance judge took two years off Salcedo’s and Triviño’s sentences and reduced
the amount of their fines. Other petitioners would receive reductions of a year and
equivalent discounts in their corresponding fines.393
The combination of common and political crimes in a process for rebellion could
lead to particular penalties like the one that authorities from Veracruz tried to impose on
Palemón Riveroll in December 1906. Riveroll was the alleged ringleader of a Liberal
uprising that had taken place in Ixhuatlán in October that year. During the uprising,
Riveroll and his people stole the funds of the town’s city hall and ordered the forced
collection of a sum of money among the inhabitants. Soon after the raid, the town’s
authorities requested the tribunal in charge of judging Riveroll for rebellion and robbery to
open a parallel process against him, this time for civil responsibility regarding his illegal
“collection” of money. The request included a list of 41 vecinos that claimed for
compensation, each claim ranging from two to two thousand pesos. The total of
reclamations amounted to 7,358 pesos. They all manifested their wish for Riveroll to
“return” all the money he had stolen.394 The incident with the people from Ixhuatlán did
not mark the end of Riveroll’s career as a rebel. By the outbreak of the Mexican revolution,
he had become a well-known “magonista” with some influence in Veracruz. Authorities
would capture him again in September 1911 under charges of rebellion.395
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Combined charges of political and common nature could also lead to death
sentences, as illustrated by the case of the half-bandit, half-rebel Juan Galeana. Galeana
had started his criminal career as a low-profile bandit in the state of Guerrero, somewhere
in the 1880s. In April 1899, his participation in a couple of bandit rides in the district of
Tecoanapa put him on the radar of Ayutla’s political chief, José Pandal. Pandal started an
intense but unsuccessful persecution against Galeana, who reacted by attempting twice
against the chief’s life, once in December 1889 and again in February 1890. The second
attack included a raid on Ayutla that ended up with a series of robberies and the
assassination of Pandal. In a letter to the state governor, Galeana and his people presented
the raid as an act of “popular justice,” by claiming that all they wanted was to liberate the
town from the chief’s iron fist. The events of February 1890 made Galeana a primary target
of the federal army. Feeling cornered, Galeana joined the forces of the rebel Cornelio
Álvarez, and together they launched a frustrated rebellion whose first and only episode was
an attack in April that year against the town of Cautepec. The rebels executed the local
judge, ransacked a few houses, and kidnapped a couple people. Díaz’s aggressive response
to the rebellion forced the rebel movement to disband, and after a few months the federal
army had either shot down or arrested the bulk of its members.396
The process against Galeana, Álvarez, and their people would extend for almost
two years, involving more than 120 people and encompassing all the events from April
1899 to April 1890. On May 31, 1899, a first-instance judge sentenced Galeana and
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Álvarez to death as principal authors of a series of crimes that included rebellion, sedition,
asonada, injuries, and homicide. Four more defendants also received death sentences for
their participation in the executions of Pandal and Cautepec’s judge. About 30 people
received prison sentences between 10 and 20 years, whether as authors or accomplices of
the multiple attacks addressed in the process. Five additional people, accused of hiding and
protecting Galeana, received 22 months in prison. The judge acquitted the rest of the
defendants.397 Galeana’s defense appealed the sentence by criticizing the way in which the
prosecutor had classified the crimes. To the prosecutor, Galeana and his people were
responsible for both political and common crimes. Political crimes included sedition,
related to the attack on February 1890, and rebellion, related to the events in Cautepec. All
the previous incidents represented nothing but acts of common criminality, with no
political meaning whatsoever. The defense, on the contrary, claimed that all the offenses
in question were part of a single, encompassing political crime. To them, all the events
between April 1889 and February 1890 had been “preparatory steps” towards the major act
of rebellion of April 1890. The robberies, murders, and kidnappings in questions
represented simple connected crimes (delitos conexos) through which the major and
continuous political crime had materialized.398
The defense’s argument did not convince the court, which insisted on processing
Galeana, Álvarez, and their people for both political and common crimes. The secondinstance tribunal, nonetheless, did not ratify their death sentences, for it found several
procedural irregularities in the initial organization of the process. There were no autopsies
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on the people that the rebels murdered during their incursions, and therefore there were no
formal proofs of the victims’ assassination. According to Mexican law, a judge could not
sentence a murder suspect to death if there were no sufficient proofs of the crime. The
tribunal, then, had no option but commuting the sentence in all cases. It was already
December 1892 when the court finished the revision of the original sentence and agreed to
modify the bulk of the initial penalties. The new judge gave Galeana 20 years of prison.
Álvarez and the rest of the defendants sentenced to death received between nine and ten
years of the same penalty. Many of the people that initially received 10 years now faced
between two and six years. The judge also acquitted about a dozen more people.399
Although Galeana’s life was spared, he would die in San Juan de Ulúa when a high tide
conveniently flooded his underground cell and drowned him.400
Galeana’s story deserves special attention because it comprises some of the most
important features that characterized the administration of justice in cases of rebellion
during the Porfiriato. First, it illustrates how judges dosed the application of state
punishment in correspondence with the crimes in question, the kind of criminals involved,
and their high- or low-profiles as internal enemies or disturbers of public order. Second, it
sheds light on how the justice system understood political and common crimes, and used
the combination of both kinds of offenses as a judicial tool for re-criminalizing rebels and
ensuring their effective and exemplary punishment. Finally, it reveals that, regardless of
the functioning of the justice system as enforcer of state retribution, tribunals and courts
still offered defendants some guarantees and protections in correspondence with the
399

Pedimento y réplica, 83-84, 100, and 159-168.

400

Salazar Adame, “Movimientos,” 116.

271

Constitution and the law. As in the Colombian case, legal and procedural formalities
mattered, and rebels could find in them a way to protect themselves against unbridled
displays of state retribution. The workings of second-instance tribunals and the Supreme
Court of Justice would prove crucial in this regard.
When it came to requests of protection of constitutional and procedural guarantees
in cases of rebellion, Mexico’s Supreme Court dealt with much more than appeals and
sentence revisions. Petitions before the high tribunal could also make reference to conflicts
of jurisdiction, for instance. In October 1885, the rebels Teodoro Roel and Eutimio García
requested the Supreme Court to solve a jurisdictional dispute between Monterrey’s juzgado
de letras and Nuevo Leon’s juzgado de distrito about the management of their case. The
tribunal would solve the dispute in favor of the latter institution, as the petitioners wanted,
for it was a federal tribunal and rebellions were federal crimes.401 Later on, in January
1886, Roel and García would address the Supreme Court once more, this time requesting
an amparo on the grounds that the authority that had ordered their apprehension was not
legally competent to do it. This time, nonetheless, the high tribunal would not favor them
and defended the legality of the proceeding.402 A petition from March 1899 by Ignacio
Brito would address analogous concerns. Brito, an alleged member of Donaciano
González’s army, claimed that his process had been deadlocked for three months because
no authority knew which jurisdiction should take care of his case. He would also maintain
that his imprisonment was illegal, since the authorities that put him in prison had apparently
violated several procedural rules. While the Supreme Court helped the petitioner regarding
401
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his jurisdictional problem, it decided that there was no procedural irregularity in his
imprisonment and ordered to keep him in jail.403
Other petitions involved complains about the slow development of judicial
processes, as the case of Rafael Mosqueda illustrates.404 In 1890, Mosqueda took part in a
frustrated rebellion in Guanajuato, and a result of this paid three years of prison in the town
of Celaya. His freedom did not last much, for he still had an ongoing process for rebellion
and robbery in the same state. In September 1896, authorities imprisoned Mosqueda once
again while this second process concluded and a judge dictated the corresponding sentence.
In January 1899, still in prison, Mosqueda decided to file a claim before the Supreme Court
in order to speed up the long-awaited judicial decision. According to the petitioner, nine
years had passed since his first imprisonment, and his judicial situation was still unclear.
The tribunal declared itself unable to help Mosqueda with his request. All he obtained was
an explanation as to why his process was taking that long. Apparently, the process in
question involved a large number of people responsible for the events in Guanajuato, many
of them current fugitives. Anytime authorities made a new arrest, they had to stop the
process and add new material to the file, already consisting of 941 pages. The fact that the
records had to go from one town to another anytime a new arrest was made compounded
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the situation. The explanation, in short, gave Mosqueda no hopes of a prompt solution to
his prolonged imprisonment.405
A final example sheds additional light on the variety of claims that political
prisoners would file before the Supreme Court in alleged defense of their constitutional
guarantees. In June 1894, Aniceto Villareal, a participant in Catarino Garza’s armed
expedition, wrote the high tribunal a letter denouncing a juez de distrito from Nuevo Laredo
for violating his right to a defense. According to Villareal, the judge had refused to accept
the lawyer he had appointed, Antonio Martínez Cáceres. The refusal was grounded on the
fact that Martínez Cáceres was under preventive imprisonment in the same town since May
that year, facing charges for rebellion as well. The judge maintained that he had not violated
Villareal’s right to a defense. The defendant had always been able to present all the
evidence he wanted, and had complete freedom to appoint any other lawyer as long as he
did not have any sort of legal impediment. Ultimately, despite the judge’s opposition,
Villareal would be finally able to appoint his fellow rebel as his lawyer. Martínez Cáceres
was still awaiting sentence, and therefore was able to exercise his civil rights.406 Villareal’s
defense, nonetheless, would prove incapable to save him from the severity of state
retribution. The tribunal in charge of his case sentenced him to death in August 1898, on
charges of rebellion, robbery, homicide, kidnapping, and arson. Villareal remained in
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prison until 1901. In May that year, after filing a petition of amparo, he decided to stop
waiting for the Supreme Court’s intervention and escaped from prison.407
On the whole, the administration of justice in cases of rebellion during the Porfiriato
reveals a dynamic of state punishment that relied heavily on the logics of the ordinary
justice system.408 It was also a dynamic that, instead of transforming current legislation and
attempting to craft its own –like in the Colombian case–, maintained a great degree of
correspondence with the existing legislation. From this perspective, and compared with
what would happen in Colombia, the Porfirian experience entailed a legal regime of
punishment that had no extraordinary nature and involved higher degrees of stability and
predictability. Regardless of their outcomes and the severity of their sentences, ordinary
trials against rebels in the Porfiriato ensured a relatively consistent administration of state
retribution, subject to clear laws and limited by concrete rules and guarantees. The regular
administration of justice against rebels in Porfirian Mexico worked in two ways. First, it
was a standard, formal practice for the application of state punishment in cases of internal
enmity. Second, it represented a ritualized display of state retribution aiming to accentuate
and reinforce state sovereignty over the nation’s internal enemies. Mexico’s justice system,
nonetheless, did not exclusively work as a theater and instrument of state retribution. It
also functioned as a mechanism through which rebels could find some sort of legal
protection against state retribution. As the reviewed stories of appeals, sentence revisions,
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and other claims before the Supreme Court illustrate, procedural formalities and
constitutional guarantees mattered, and defendants used them strategically in their benefit,
often with some degree of success.

Extending Law Enforcement and Retribution Beyond the Mexican Territory.
Diaz’s responses against Liberal rebels would extend state logics of justice, punishment,
and repression beyond the territorial limits of the Mexican nation. The flight of many
antiporfirista leaders and journalists in the early 1900 to the United States would make the
northern country an important center of political agitation against the Porfiriato in the
decade prior to the Mexican Revolution. This agitation would take different forms,
including aggressive press campaigns directed at both American and Mexican publics,
alliances with socialist and anarchist organizations north of the border, and even
revolutionary conspiracies and armed incursions into Mexican territory.409 The transnationalization of antiporfirismo would lead Díaz to, in turn, resort to additional strategies
in order to hinder and neutralize the workings of opposition beyond the Mexican border
and repress and prosecute trans-national rebel conspiracies and expeditions. Strategies
would include requests for extradition and deportation of alleged rebels before American
authorities, negotiations with American judges and prosecutors in order to ensure the
criminalization and imprisonment of “dangerous” Mexican exiles, and even “forced
deportations” of antiporfiristas. These responses would turn Diaz’s struggle against
internal enmity into a trans-national campaign of law enforcement involving not only
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Mexican authorities and diplomats but also American judges, prosecutors, and police
forces. Such a combination of actors, strategies, and jurisdictions would provoke multiple
clashes between Díaz’s strategies of legal and judicial repression and American practices
of justice administration.
Governmental efforts for repressing Mexican rebels beyond the Mexican border
preceded in fact the rise of trans-national antiporfirismo in the 1900s. The practice of
requesting American authorities the extradition of political criminals exiled north of the
border was already common in the early 1880s, as the case of Clodomiro Cota illustrates.
The Mexican government requested the extradition of Cota and other two rebels in late
1880. The way in which Mexican authorities made the request and tried to make their
extradition possible provides a first example of Díaz’s most recurrent strategy for ensuring
the return of political exiles to Mexico. A treaty from December 1861 regulated the practice
of extradition between Mexico and the United States. Like many extradition treaties of the
time, the 1861 treaty prohibited the extradition of political criminals and political refugees,
restricting this practice only to common offenders. Mexican authorities, in consequence,
faced the challenge of convincing their American counterparts that the people they
requested were common criminals and not political offenders. Unable to request the
extradition of Cota and his fellows on political grounds, Mexico’s government requested
them on charges of robbery and kidnapping. The request took effect. The governor of
California ordered the arrest of the three individuals and their delivery to Mexico’s consul
in San Francisco. American authorities could only arrest Costa, who managed to file a writ
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of habeas corpus right before his extradition to Mexico. The petition put Costa back under
the protection of the American justice system and ultimately frustrated Mexico’s plan.410
The revolutionary expeditions of Francisco Ruiz Sandoval and Catarino Garza in
the early 1890s would force Díaz to refine and strengthen his strategies for prosecuting
rebels north of the border. Bernardo Reyes requested Laredo’s police the arrest of Ruiz
Sandoval’s people right after their retreat to American territory in June 1890. Laredo’s
forces captured and imprisoned them under charges of violation of neutrality laws, and
prepared their prompt extradition to Mexico. After knowing that Reyes and Díaz planned
on executing Ruiz Sandoval and his fellow rebels once they were in Mexican territory, an
American prosecutor halted the process and handed the prisoners over to a tribunal in San
Antonio, Texas. Although Ruiz Sandoval would be released on bail, Mexican authorities
urged their American counterparts to put him back in jail. This time, the rebel leader would
face a trial not only for violation of neutrality laws but also for common crimes including
cattle rustling.411 The Mexican government would pay off a group of false witnesses whose
testimonies were supposed to incriminate Ruiz Sandoval in all the crimes he was charged
with. The court in charge of the case discovered the ruse and jailed many of the made-up
witnesses for perjury. By the end of the trial, charges against Ruiz Sandoval had become
completely political. The prosecution accused him of “[raising] a revolution and [plunging]
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the people of Mexico into a horrid war.” The jury, nonetheless, found him not guilty,
perhaps in consideration of the timid dimensions of his frustrated movement.412
Catarino Garza and his people faced a relatively similar experience after their
insurrection in September 1891. Soon after Mexican and American troops disbanded the
rebel movement on both sides of the border, Porfirian newspapers demanded the
extradition of the rebels captured in the United States as common criminals.413 Claims for
extradition did not find an echo, and the prosecution of the rebels in question remained in
the hands of a tribunal in Texas. Between 1891 and 1892, about a hundred Garzistas would
appear before a tribunal in San Antonio, after a federal grand jury accused them of violating
neutrality laws. Throughout the process, the prosecution succeeded in proving that Garza
and his people had organized a revolution against Mexico on Texas territory. The
prosecutor tried to convince the jury to declare the defendants guilty with the argument that
if American authorities did not restrain Garzista rebels, they would continue to organize
similar armed incursions until unleashing a war between Mexico and the United States.
The process against Garza’s people would extend until 1893, and conclude with prison
sentences for all the rebels that authorities had captured by then. Sentences varied
according to the involvement of the rebels in the movement, their degrees of criminal
responsibility, and their chances of appointing and being able to afford American lawyers.
Although prison terms ranged from one days to three years in jail, the average time of
conviction for all Garzistas was between five and six months.414
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Compared to other past and future experiences, Garzista rebels faced a relatively
less complicated situation. Mexican authorities did not formally push for extradition, and
their trials only involved political charges. From the early twentieth century on, that would
not be the case any longer. In 1905, Francisco de Paula Araujo experienced a situation that
resembled the case of Ruiz Sandoval and his people. According a note El Colmillo Público
published in May that year, Araujo was a political prisoner in the United States that
Mexico’s government had recently targeted for extradition. The Mexican consul in
Douglas, Arizona, had filed a first extradition request not long ago, but American
authorities had refused to authorize the proceeding by arguing that Araujo was a political
offender. Unable to have him back in Mexico on political charges, the Mexican government
would come up with a new strategy. This time, they would press charges against Araujo
for allegedly scamming a woman from Cananea, Sonora. To El Colmillo, this was a second
and totally illegal attempt to obtain Araujo’s extradition, grounded on trumped up charges
aiming to dodge his rights as a political criminal.415 A year later, Juan Arredondo, a prisoner
in Texas involved in the events of September 1906, would face an analogous experience.
The Mexican government requested Arredondo’s extradition in October that year on
charges of murder, robbery, and arson. Aware of his status as a political prisoner, Texas’s
governor delayed the authorization of the request until a court decided whether or not the
offenses in question had a political nature.416
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The events of September 1906 and the strengthening of U.S.-based antiporfirismo
during the second half of the decade forced Díaz and his diplomatic agents to strengthen
their strategies of trans-national repression. From then on, the central goal of these
strategies would be crushing, by all means possible, the leadership Mexican Liberal Party
north of the border. The prosecution, extradition, and punishment of low-profile rebels and
simple rebellious expeditioners would give way to the persecution and imprisonment of
major antiporfirista figures including Ricardo Flores Magón, Antonio Villareal, Manuel
Sarabia, and Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara. In correspondence with such goals, the Mexican
government would organize an elaborate strategy of information gathering by extending
its networks of consulates in the United States. Mexican consuls would lead intelligence
and espionage operations against renowned opposition journalists and agitators, often with
the help of specialized private services like the Thomas Furlong Detective Company –a
close ally of Mexico’s consul in St. Louis, Missouri. Consulates would report regularly to
Mexico’s embassy in Washington and the Minister of Foreign Affairs back in Mexico
City.417
Intense legal and judicial campaigns to obtain either the extradition or deportation
of journalists and agitators or their sentencing and conviction in the United States
complemented these intelligence strategies. Díaz and his agents would double their efforts
to extradite high-profile dissidents under common charges such as robbery and homicide.
That would be the case, among many others, of Ricardo Flores Magón, Manuel Sarabia,
Antonio Villareal, Libardo Rivera, Trinidad García, and five other people. The Mexican
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government would link them to the uprising of a liberal club in Jiménez, Chihuahua, that
had ended up with one murder and the robbery of some funds from the local post office.
The timely intervention of American judges that declared the actions in question political
crimes would ultimately prevent their extradition.418 Mexican authorities would also try to
convince their American counterparts to deport “dangerous dissidents” to Mexico on
charges of being “undesirable immigrants” –a category that involved immigrants linked to
anarchist organizations or other criminal activities in the United States. According to the
U.S. law, deportations on these grounds were indisputable and only required the approval
of an immigration officer. Free from the intervention of American courts and judges,
Mexican authorities managed to obtain in late-1906 the deportation of several rebels
captured in Arizona, including the already mentioned Lázaro Puente, Abraham Salcedo,
and Bruno Triviño.419
When neither extradition nor deportation were possible, Mexico’s government
would push American courts to sentence Mexican rebels to long prison sentences,
commonly on charges of violation of neutrality laws. More than two dozen antiporfiristas
would experience at least one prison sentence in the United States on these charges,
including, unsurprisingly, Ricardo Flores Magón, Antonio Villareal, Libardo Rivera, and
Manuel Sarabia. Persecution against these “violators of neutrality” concentrated on the
cities of San Antonio, Del Rio, and El Paso, Texas; Douglas, Arizona; and, Los Angeles
California. Although many of these arrests ended up in acquittals by U.S. courts, Flores
Magón, Rivera, and Villareal, together with other six people, would receive prison
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sentences between 18- and 30-months-long.420 Reflecting in 1909 on the impact of all these
legal strategies, John K. Turner would maintain that, for the last years, the only law
applicable to Mexicans living in bordering states had been, not the U.S. law, but Diaz’s
one. As a result of this, the author complained, American authorities had taken away from
Mexican citizens not only their right to asylum but also the basic protections they should
enjoy under the nation’s laws.421
The persecution, arrest, and trial of Ricardo Flores Magón in California offers an
illustrative example of how Díaz’s government deployed and combined these legal
strategies. Flores Magón arrived to Los Angeles in 1907, after fleeing from St. Louis and
clandestinely roaming the country for a few months. In Missouri, the Liberal leader and his
paper Regeneración had fallen victim of the harassment of the Furlong agency and its
people, a persecution that ended up with the shutting down of the publication and the
temporary imprisonment of its editors, Flores Magón included. Years earlier, he had fled
San Antonio, Texas, for analogous reasons. Once in Los Angeles, with the collaboration
of Libardo Rivera and Antonio Villareal, Flores Magón reopened his newspaper, this time
with the title of Revolución. By then, American authorities had offered a great reward for
his capture (20 thousand dollars, according to Turner), so Flores Magón and his people
opted to resume their journalistic activities in the underground. By August 1907,
nonetheless, members of the Furlong agency succeeded in tracking the journalists down
and proceeded to their arrest. As the same Thomas Furlong would declare before a L.A.
tribunal, he and his people carried out the arrest with no judicial order or formal warrant,
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acting under the orders –and payment– of the Mexican government. Right after the arrest,
Mexico’s ambassador in Washington, Enrique Creel, travelled to Los Angeles in order to
secure the extradition of Flores Magón.422
The trial against Flores Magón would be an exemplary display of Díaz’s multiple
efforts to manipulate the American justice system in order to achieve the punishment of his
adversaries. Charges against the three journalists involved resistance to authority, robbery,
homicide, criminal libel, and conspiracy for violating neutrality laws. In the case of Flores
Magón, these charges made reference to his journalistic activities, his alleged role in the
planning of the 1906 rebel expedition, and his presumed links with a recent Liberal uprising
in Jiménez, Coahuila. This last incident included the robbery of the city’s treasury and the
homicide of a person. By linking the Liberal leader with the events in Coahuila, the
Mexican government wanted to make a solid case for his extradition. The plan backfired.
A federal commissioner in San Antonio, Texas, had previously refused to extradite a group
of prisoners involved in the Jiménez uprising based on the fact that they were political
criminals. Thus, by involving Flores Magón in the incident, Mexican authorities achieved
nothing but ruining their chances of extraditing him.423
The failure of its extradition plans forced the Mexican government to resign itself
to indict Flores Magón and his people for crimes that could earn them a prison sentence in
the United States. After reviewing the available evidence, the Mexican government, in
partnership with a judge from Texas and a U.S. attorney from California, decided to link
the defendants with an ongoing case in Arizona. It was a process against two Mexicans
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indicted for violation of neutrality laws in Douglas, in December 1906. The alleged
connection of the California defendants with the Arizona rebels rested on the accusation
that the latter had acted with the encouragement of the former. This new accusation would
represent for Flores Magón, Rivera, and Villareal a new charge, this time for conspiracy to
initiate a military expedition against Mexico from Arizona. After a first hearing, American
authorities ordered their transportation from California to Arizona so they could stand a
new trial. It was already March 1909 when a United States marshal delivered the
defendants to Arizona. Jurors would reach a guilty verdict by May that year, and the judge
in charge of the case sentenced them all to 18 months in prison. The decision pleased the
Mexican government, which was ready to indict Flores Magón and the others under a
similar charge in Texas, in case they ended up being acquitted. The defendants would
remain in an Arizona prison until their release in August 1910.424
After the capture of Ricardo Flores Magón, the leadership of the Liberal party in
the United States and the publication of Revolución remained in the hands of Lázaro
Gutiérrez de Lara. It was not long before U.S. and Mexican authorities targeted the new
leader and pressed charges against him. Under instructions of Mexico’s Attorney General,
the Police of Los Angeles arrested Gutiérrez de Lara in September 1907 and charged him
with robbery, crime that subjected him to an imminent extradition. The charges in question
were full of inconsistencies that ended up benefiting the defendant. Initially, Mexican
authorities claimed that he was responsible for a vague, mysterious, and undocumented
robbery committed in 1906 somewhere in Mexico, and on these grounds requested his
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extradition. Unable to present solid evidence on this case, the Mexican government had to
come up with a new, slightly more precise denunciation for robbery, this time in the state
of Sonora. Although this accusation would not have any effect either, it was effective
enough to extend Gutiérrez de Lara’s imprisonment for over a month. In the meantime, the
defendant would file a writ of habeas corpus to no avail.425
Authorities in Mexico would not cease in their effort to keep Gutiérrez de Lara out
of circulation. By December 1907, they came up with a third accusation regarding the
robbery of some firewood in Sonora in August 1903. As in previous cases, the accusation
presented serious inconsistencies that made the plan backfire. According to Turner,
American authorities soon realized that the defendant had already been processed and
acquitted for the crime in question. There were other, more absurd inconsistencies in the
case. Back in 1903, a report in Mexico had valued the stolen firewood in an amount
equivalent to 8 dollars. Yet, in the 1907 accusation, the sum had experienced a mysterious
increase amounting now to 28 dollars. Mexican authorities had inflated the sum to make it
fulfill the minimum of $25 that the legislation required for the extradition of a thief. A
mistake in the calculation of the exchange value between the Mexican and the American
currencies would nonetheless render the accusation useless for extradition purposes.
Apparently, authorities in Mexico calculated the sum by using an exchange rate higher than
the official, which ultimately made the sum inferior to the minimum prescribed in the
legislation. The mistake costed Díaz and his people the freedom of Gutiérrez de Lara, who
was able to walk away from prison after 104 days.426
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Porfirian authorities did not limit their trans-national repressive strategies to these
practices of judicial and diplomatic lobbying. When neither formal deportation,
extradition, nor imprisonment in the United States were plausible options, Díaz and his
agents still had the option of directly kidnapping their adversaries and shipping them back
to Mexico. The “forced deportation” of Manuel Sarabia in June 1907 represents perhaps
the most popular example of this alternative practice –it was one of the few kidnapping
cases that became public in the U.S. and drew the attention of the nation’s authorities.
Sarabia worked as a clandestine printer in Douglas, Arizona, until the Mexican consul
Antonio Maza discovered him and requested the police his arrest. The police put him in
the city prison without having the support of a warrant or any other judicial order. The first
night of his imprisonment, a group of American agents working for the Mexican
government took him out of his cell, put him in a car, and brought him before a company
of Rurales south of the border. The Rurales delivered Sarabia to a prison in Hermosillo,
Sonora, where he remained awaiting trial.427 Díaz had been planning these procedures
since the early 1890s, when he manifested his desire of kidnapping Ruiz Sandoval in case
his trial did not come to a satisfactory conclusion. Another Mexican exile, Ignacio
Martínez, also made part of Díaz’s list of possible victims of kidnapping.428
Díaz’s trans-national strategies of repression reveal another facet of the dynamics
of state retribution in Mexico during the Porfiriato. The regime extended beyond the limits
of the Mexican nation its customary use of the judicial system as a mechanism for
criminalizing and punishing internal enemies. In doing so, it engaged other, non-Mexican
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jurisdictions and legal regimes, interacting with them in both collaborative and conflictive
ways. Rules for extradition between México and the U.S. gave the two nations a common
legal ground for joining efforts concerning the legal and judicial treatment of “dangerous”
or “undesirable” exiles. Yet, the same prescriptions that made this collaboration possible
also marked the limits of what both governments could and could not do with the targeted
expats. Such limitations would often prove detrimental to Díaz’s strategies of transnational retribution, and force him to devise alternative approaches in order to ensure the
punishment of his adversaries north of the border.
These alternative strategies involved different degrees of compliance with the
dynamics of American justice system and entailed diverse degrees of legality. Some of
them played straightforwardly by the logics of the U.S. justice, as in the multiple cases in
which Porfirian authorities helped American courts to indict actual or alleged Mexican
rebels. Other strategies, still within the institutional and normative framework of American
justice, entailed illegal practices that dodged basic procedural rules, like the arrests by
public or private agents with no previous warrant. There were also additional strategies that
involved direct actions of extralegal and extrajudicial retribution, like the attempts at
kidnapping or the “forced deportations” of Mexican exiles. These strategies, formal and
alternative, often clashed with the decisions of American judges, and even with guarantees
and prohibitions from U.S. law. This clash, nonetheless, did not prevent them from
ultimately pushing the legal limits of what the American justice could do with exiles and
political refugees. Pressed by the Mexican government, U.S. authorities denied petitions
of habeas corpus, authorized the extradition and deportation of political criminals, and
suspended legal protections that refugees were supposed to enjoy.
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On the whole, all these practices show that Díaz’s trans-national responses to
rebellion did not differ greatly from his reactions to political criminality within the Mexican
territory. Both within and outside Mexico, the Porfiriato tried to repress its internal enemies
primarily by resorting to judicial mechanisms of criminalization and punishment. The
premise in both situations seemed to be the same: ensuring punishment through the control,
or at least the manipulation, of the process of justice administration. Strategies of
criminalization both at the national and the trans-national level were also analogous. They
involved the combination of both common and political charges, as well as the depoliticization of political offenders and their acts, in order to ensure conviction and secure
exceptional punishments for political crimes such as extradition or the death penalty.
Extralegal and extrajudicial practices of state retribution would also be common in the two
cases. The combination of legality and illegality in the repression of “dangerous” dissidents
was at no point exclusive of Diaz’s trans-national strategies.

Punishment and Retribution Outside the Judicial Sphere
Governmental responses to political criminality within Mexican territory went way beyond
the logics of judicial punishment against rebels. Like Díaz’s strategies against his internal
enemies north of the border, Porfirian repressive tactics in Mexico also combined the use
of law with the use of force. Mexican authorities combined judicial resources against the
regime’s enemies with indiscriminate use of military power, extrajudicial and summary
executions, and other sorts of extralegal practices of retribution. As strategies of repression
and state retribution, these “other” practices involved diverse political and military
purposes. They were means for suffocating and neutralizing potentially dangerous
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insurrections, and “exemplary” punishments aiming to terrorize and intimidate internal
enemies. Similarly, they represented ways of repressing rebels without the formalities,
guarantees, and delays of the justice system, as well as displays of state sovereignty aiming
to underscore Díaz’s power vis-à-vis his political and armed contenders. Extrajudicial
practices of punishment and retribution accompanied the Porfiriato since its early stages
and extended all the way into the 1900s.
The Veracruz Massacre, in Late-June 1879, was perhaps the most dramatic
manifestation of these extrajudicial practices during the early Porfiriato. The massacre put
a quick and abrupt end to a military insurrection plotted and led by former supporters of
the overthrown Sebastián Lerdo. Lerdista rebels declared their disobedience to Díaz’s
regime and seized two warships in the port city of Veracruz. Díaz, who apparently had
previous knowledge about the revolutionary plot, ordered the state governor, General Luis
Mier y Terán, to capture all insurrectionists and execute their leaders as offenders caught
in flagrante –“aprehendidos infraganti, mátelos en caliente,” said Díaz’s order to the
governor. Mier y Terán’s forces shot nine people before the rebel ships went back to the
government’s obedience. The victims included two medium-rank officers and seven
civilians. The main leaders of the movement, a small group of generals and high-rank
officers from the Mexican army, managed to flee.429 According to some denunciations,
none of the people shot had direct and proven links to the insurrectionist movement, let
alone were part of its ringleaders. In the words of the antiporfirista Ramón Prida, the
execution of the two officers had no other purpose than intimidating the rest of the troops
429

Prida, De la dictadura, 63-64, and 68; and Di Fornaro, Díaz, 41-43.

290

stationed in the city, while the seven civilians were merely distant supporters of the plot.
Other reports would point out that no actual inquiries on the victim’s culpability preceded
their execution and that authorities had denied their request for a formal trial.430
Not all authorities in Veracruz agreed with Díaz’s proceedings. A few days after
the executions, Federal Judge Rafael Zayas Enríquez requested the Supreme Court to
intervene on behalf of the remaining prisoners. According to Zayas’s request, it was
imperative that Mier y Terán’s people submitted all the rebels before the ordinary justice
so they could stand a regular trial. The idea was not only to avoid a second wave of
shootings, but also to act in correspondence with the ius gentium, the Federal Constitution,
and the “basic humanitarian principles.” Zayas had decided to resort to the high tribunal
after failing at negotiating the prisoner’s judgement with different state authorities. Neither
the state governor nor the Navy’s main commander had been willing to assist him in his
recurrent requests, the judge complained. The reluctance of the authorities of Veracruz to
help Zayas Enríquez went to the point of prohibiting him from practicing an autopsy on
the nine victims.431
Zayas’s request would end up provoking a clash between the Executive and the
Judicial powers in early July. Alarmed by the judge’s complains, the Supreme Court
exhorted President Díaz to order the governor and his people to cooperate with Zayas and
stop hindering his constitutional functions. The exhortation did not please Díaz, who
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responded to the Court by arguing that it had no faculty or authorization whatsoever to give
the Executive that kind of orders. The high tribunal would respond Díaz that they both
represented equal powers before the Constitution, and berated him for not following the
constitutional charter’s prescriptions regarding the Executive’s duty to assist the Judicial
branch in its functions. The argument between the two powers did nothing for furthering
Zayas’s cause. Three weeks after the executions, the juez de distrito still reported that state
authorities were reluctant to let him proceed with the autopsies.432 Apparently, Mier y
Terán’s orders to his people included maintaining both prisoners and corpses outside the
reach of the justice system for as long as possible.
The early 1890s would give Díaz and his representatives at the regional and local
levels several opportunities to execute new acts of punishment and retribution outside the
legal and judicial spheres. The hunt and subsequent arrest of Juan Galeana in late 1890
offers a first example in this regard. Both federal and state troops participated in his chase,
which by November that year was coming to an end. By the end of the month, an army
officer informed Acapulco’s political chief that his men were close to finding Galeana’s
hideout and requested instructions. Instructions, in this case, were simple: they should
arrest Galeana and apply him the ley de fuga.433 Weeks later, nonetheless, authorities had
not been able to find the rebel leader. On December 27, Prefect Francisco Leyva wrote the
governor of Guerrero requesting his authorization to execute some of Galeana’s
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accomplices as a way of forcing them to reveal the exact location of his hideout.434 There
is no record of the governor’s response, but by the next day Galeana was already in the
hands of the federal army, who sent him to a military barrack in San Diego.
Following the orders from Acapulco, authorities from Guerrero immediately tried
to subtract Galeana from federal custody and take him to a local prison. None of their
efforts succeeded. Apparently, the federal forces in charge of the rebel had orders to deliver
him before the ordinary justice and were aware of the intentions of Guerrero’s prefects and
local political chiefs. On December 30, a frustrated Francisco Leyva would write
Acapulco’s chief that it had been impossible to retrieve Galeana from his prison in San
Diego.435 Leyva’s final attempt at seizing the prisoner included the dispatch of an emissary
to the San Diego barracks with the mission of requesting Galeana to undertake a highly
important legal procedure (“para la práctica de una diligencia importantísima”) in
Acapulco. The emissary went back empty-handed, since people in the barracks had orders
of delivering the rebel only by request of the federal army’s general command.436 Galeana’s
protection by the federal army did not save him from those who wanted him dead, as his
first-instance sentence demonstrates. It only bought him some time for appearing before a
judge and standing a formal trial. His case, nevertheless, illustrates how local authorities
in Mexico resorted to extrajudicial executions as a way of intimidating enemies and
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punishing rebels without the inconvenience of observing due process and abiding by the
justice system.
Díaz’s response to a millenarian insurrectionist movement in Tomochic,
Chihuahua, sheds light on additional dynamics of state repression that had little to do with
legal or judicial initiatives. The insurrection started and developed as a local peasant
uprising of heavy religious overtones. In December 1891, villagers from Tomochic
declared themselves in disobedience to the Mexican authorities and claimed exclusive
obedience to their god. Although the insurrection did not pose any serious military
challenge to the state government, it certainly affected the image and political carrier of
Chihuahua’s current governor, Lauro Carrillo. Standing for a reelection that he was unsure
to win, Carrillo perceived the local movement as a situation that his rivals could use to
question his capacity of maintaining public order in the state. In consequence, he opted to
downgrade its significance and presented it as an irrelevant protest by a few fanatic Indians.
The movement, nevertheless, called the attention of the federal government, already
concerned with the recent rebellion of Catarino Garza and unwilling to ignore another
insurrection in northern Mexico. Díaz ordered the federal army to intervene and crush the
rebellious peasants in the quickest and most discreet way. His orders would emphasize
time and again the verb frighten or escarmentar: punishment should be exemplary and
work as an example –an intimidating one– to the offenders.437
The military offensive against the rebels from Tomochic met an unexpected
resistance that would extend hostilities between the army and the insurrectionists until
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October 1902. During that time, Díaz’s troops would experience a few stunning defeats,
including a rebel ambush in December 1901, and a failed incursion on Tomochic next
September. Despite such drawbacks, by the end of October the army had managed to lay
siege to the town with more than a thousand men, determined to crush the rebellion once
and for all. After six days of combats, the army succeeded in raiding the town. According
to military reports, the offensive eliminated the enemy “to the last man.” The army
completely wiped out Tomochic, captured six survivors and shot them without any judicial
formality. On October 27, once the carnage was over, the state governor issued a circular
warning people from the region that anyone “who directly or indirectly assists the rebels
of Tomochic or their accomplices or sympathizers, or offers them any sort of protection
[…] will be punished.” The threat would provoke a wave of denunciations, many of them
product of personal grudges and local political rivalries. As a result, and despite the fact
that the military took no captives during the raid, authorities would still report the
dispatching of alleged “Tomochic indians” to Mexico City even two months after the
attack. According to an American newspaper, prisoners went to the capital only to find
their death after a brief interrogation regarding the uprising.438
The “invention” of war prisoners and the extrajudicial execution of alleged rebels
were also common practices in Díaz’s war against the people of Ruiz Sandoval and Garza
between 1890 and 1891. According to Duclós-Salinas’s memoir, Bernardo Reyes
responded to Ruiz Sandoval’s incursion with a huge military display that achieved barely
nothing. After all, the rebels had retreated back to the United States right after their first
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and only engagement with Mexican troops. Determined to show some results, DuclósSalinas maintains, Díaz’s strongman had no option but arresting a handful of “made-up
revolutionaries,” many of whom experienced the ley fuga.439 Reyes’s reaction to the Garza
movement would claim a more drastic toll. Ramón Prida’s account denounced, for
instance, that the General’s struggle against Garzistas south of the border included the
execution of over 80 people, all of them without any formal trial or any sort of judicial
intervention.440 Within the first month of the rebellion alone, denunciations of official
abuses mentioned the shooting with no previous trial of at least 25 rebellion suspects. As
part of his measures against the 1891 expeditioners, Reyes ordered his officials to “execute
without a great display” all suspects he got to arrest, no matter if they were actual armed
insurgents or just sympathizers distributing revolutionary manifestos.441
Reyes’s wave of executions against alleged Garzistas terrorized the U.S.-Mexico
border. It provoked the flight of many Mexican families to Texas, and even claimed the
lives of a few American citizens with no clear links to the rebel movement. The
assassination of the first two Americans, Juan Bazán and José Ángel Vera, forced Reyes
to warn his officers “to be careful not to execute prisoners if they turned out to be U.S.
citizens.” According to Elliot Young’s monograph on the Garza rebellion, Reyes regularly
informed Díaz about the extrajudicial executions his men practiced in the north. His reports
offered the President details about the name of the victims, their alleged charges, and the
execution methods applied in each case. To Young, “the casual tone with which eight of
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these murders were recounted to Díaz indicates that these sorts of killings were not
surprising or shocking for Reyes or for the President.”442 Several years later, after the
frustrated rebellion of September 1906, authorities in northern Mexico unleashed a similar
wave of extrajudicial executions that allegedly ended up with a great number of summary
assassinations.443
These other, extrajudicial modalities of repression reveal that state retribution in
Porfirian Mexico unfolded in different ways and in correspondence with multiple logics.
Law and justice mattered, of course, and law enforcement and justice administration
represented in fact important instruments of punishment against the regime’s internal
enemies. They also served as recurrent arenas for the performance of ritualized displays of
state power and sovereignty. Yet, law and “lawfulness” at no point encompassed the
totality of the logics of state repression vis-à-vis rebellion in the Porfiriato. State retribution
unfolded as well beyond the limits of the law and away from the reach of formal justice,
shaping punitive practices unrestrained by the law and unhindered by judicial rules and
proceedings. These extralegal practices allowed authorities to dodge constitutional
prohibitions regarding the application of the death penalty for political crimes, and to
punish internal enemies with a promptness and severity that no ordinary trial could grant.
They also represented informal, less public, non-institutionalized demonstrations of state
power that, just like their legal and judicial counterparts, aimed at underscoring and
reestablishing governmental sovereignty against those who had challenged or defied it. In
Porfirian Mexico, state retribution against internal enemies operated thus in two parallel
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levels. While one was formal, institutionalized, self-restricted, and legalized, the other was
informal, commonly unrestricted and extralegal.
What does this parallelism suggest about the nature and workings of state
retribution in the Porfiriato? Overall, it reveals that Porfirian practices of repression were
not unidimensional. They relied on the law and the justice system, but not exclusively.
Likewise, they entailed extralegal and extrajudicial punishment practices, but at no point
were reduced to them exclusively. Analyzing the Porfirian experience in terms of either
“legality” or “extra-legality,” understood as absolute, mutually exclusive notions, entails
the risk of addressing only a portion of the problem. As the Colombian case would suggest,
“the legal” and “the extralegal,” “the judicial” and “the extrajudicial” were not
contradictory categories but notions of reference for understanding complex repertoires of
retribution practices with more or less reliance on the law. Both sorts of practices worked
in the same direction, pursued analogous purposes, and represented equivalent practices of
state retribution as well as similar manifestations of state sovereignty.

Governmental

Responses

to

Rebellion

in

Colombia:

Legislation,

Justice

Administration, and State Retribution during the Thousand Days
As in Mexico, responses to rebellion in Colombia involved a combination of legal and
judicial practices with extralegal and extrajudicial strategies. Nevertheless, while Díaz and
his people grounded a great deal of their legal treatment of rebellion on the Criminal Code
and the ordinary justice system, Colombian governments relied heavily on extraordinary
legislation –emergency executive decrees– and court-martials to repress their rebels. The
extraordinary nature of this treatment and its heavy inclination towards the logics and
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procedures of the military justice was particularly evident in the context of the Thousand
Days’ war.

Responding to Rebellion through Legislation.
Governmental responses to rebellion during the Thousand Days were highly legalistic.
From the start of the war until the signing of the Wisconsin Treaty, Colombian
governments attempted to manage the conflict primarily through legislation. Both
Presidents Sanclemente and Marroquín would enact hundreds of executive decrees dealing
with all sort of matters, from appointments of public servants and adjustments in the salary
of military officers to issues of taxation and administration of mines. This rich and varied
legislation had, nonetheless, an extraordinary nature, for it stemmed from the emergency
powers that the Constitution granted the government in cases of disruption of public order.
Its many decrees were part of a legal regime of exceptionality whose foundations dated
back to the declaration of the state of siege in July 1899, and that would extend way beyond
the formal end of the war.444
This intense legal production involved, of course, the punishment and repression of
rebels and other armed and unarmed internal enemies. Legislation in this case drew upon
a series of decrees and administrative orders grounded on prescriptions from the Criminal
and Military codes. These legal acts redefined legal jurisdictions and juridical proceedings,
established and transformed penalties, imposed different measures tending to hinder the
activities of rebels, and reinvented notions of internal enmity. Such changes would bring
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about important redefinitions, not only in terms of the notions, criminal categories, and
penalties included in both codes, but also regarding the organization and functioning of
Colombia’s judicial system. These transformations would engender tensions between
constitutional precepts and limits, on the one hand, and the state’s powers of legislation
and retribution, on the other hand.
Some of these extraordinary decrees combined the purposes of broadening the reach
of military justice, establishing more expedite ways of judging political and military
crimes, and creating more severe and exemplary ways of punishing such offenses. Reforms
in these regard started almost as soon as the rebellion erupted, as illustrated by a decree
from October 20, 1899. The decree put outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary justice a
series of heinous crimes associated to actual or potential war actions, and made military
tribunals competent to prosecute and judge them. Crimes included serious cases of
homicide, poisoning, attacks against public authorities and servants, use of explosives
outside war maneuvers, and damages against telegraphs and roads.445 About two years
later, in February 1901, a second decree would extend even more the jurisdiction of these
tribunals, allowing them to judge though verbal court-martials an additional series of
common crimes. Offenses in this occasion included a very telling series—namely, arson;
asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores; all sorts of homicide; robbery with violence;
castration; mutilation; injuries against sick or defenseless people; attacks against catholic
priests; kidnapping; and property damage. The decree also established that sentences issued
by military tribunals were irrevocable and should be carried out immediately, unless they

445

Decreto número 484 de 1899 (20 de octubre): “Que contiene disposiciones en materia penal y de
organización y procedimiento judicial,” in Guzmán, Decretos.

300

involved the death penalty. In that case, the decree gave military authorities a 48-hour term
to confirm the decision with the corresponding department’s governor.446 An additional
decree from July that year added treason to the list of crimes subject to verbal courtmartial.447
The jurisdictional changes that the 1901 decrees brought about responded to the
conflict’s evolution. Regular rebel armies were scarce by 1901. In most of the country, the
continuation of the movement relied on the operation of liberal guerrillas that, at least to
the government’s eyes, were devoted to the execution of all sorts of crimes. In
correspondence with such consideration, the February decree stated that “many
individuals, taking advantage of their condition of rebel guerrilla members, [committed]
serious offenses that demanded immediate punishment.” They required a quick, effective,
and exemplary punishment that ordinary justice, with its “lengthy proceedings,” was
unable to grant, maintained the same decree. Considering the inefficacy of the formal
justice system to “remedying the war’s exceptional evils,” it was necessary that the military
justice, with its simpler and more expedient procedures, took up its place.448
Transformations in the military jurisdiction not only concerned the treatment of
crimes committed by Liberal rebels, but also the punishment of serious military crimes. In
May 1900, for instance, a decree ordered the establishment of a permanent and mobile
verbal court-martial for the crimes of treason, cowardice, desertion, and insubordination
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committed by members of the military. The measure was grounded on the idea that the
current state of war demanded the maintenance of the military’s “discipline” and
“morality,” and that the offenses in question represented serious threats against such
principles.449 The subjection of these crimes to a more severe treatment within the military
sphere illustrates how the Sanclemente administration understood internal enmity during
the first year of the war. To the government, cowards, deserters, and traitors were as
dangerous as armed Liberals, for their actions directly harmed the state’s legitimate cause
and indirectly benefited rebels. They were thus, in their own way, enemies of the
government.
War legislation on military justice remained in force until mid-1903. A law from
August that year derogated, among others, the decrees from October 1899 and February
1901. The law also reestablished the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals over the non-military
crimes included in the previous decrees, and reestablished the authority of the formal
justice system in the resolution of ongoing processes linked to such offenses. People
serving sentences imposed by military tribunals for these crimes could request a second
trial by an ordinary court.450 The restoration of the ordinary justice’s jurisdiction nine
months after the end of the war suggests that the transition to “judicial normality” after the
Wisconsin Treaty was gradual and did not have automatic effects on the treatment of
processed rebels.
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Extraordinary war decrees also gave place to significant redefinitions in matters of
crime and punishment. The most important transformation in this regard had to do with the
conversion of guerrilla members into “culprits of assault by a gang of thugs” (reos de asalto
en cuadrilla de malhechores) during the Marroquín administration. This conversion,
allowed by both the Criminal and the Military Codes (Articles 178 and 1099, respectively),
materialized itself in a decree from January 1901. The decree established, among other
provisions, that all guerrilla leaders that refused to surrender within a 30-days term would
be considered as authors of robbery in cuadrilla de malhechores. Marroquín’s decision
relied on two major considerations. He maintained, first, that Liberals did not count any
longer with regular armies and only had “guerrillas incapable of fighting formal battles.”
He claimed, additionally, that those irregular troops “live[d] off pillaging […] and [were]
incapable to triumph over the government.”451 Later that year, the governor of the province
named Bolívar would enact a similar decree, this time against the remnants of Rafael Uribe
Uribe’s Liberal troops that operated in the department. The governor’s order not only
declared the remaining rebels cuadrillas de malhechores, but also threatened with their
immediate execution if they refused to surrender.452
The decree by the governor of Bolívar sheds light on the legal and juridical
consequences of this conversion. By turning rebels into malhechores, authorities were able
to subject them to the military justice and process them through verbal courts martial. More
importantly, they were able to charge rebels with one of the few crimes that the Constitution
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and the Criminal Code punished with the death penalty. It was, in sum, a conversion that
turned political criminals into common offenders and put them outside the reach of the
formal justice system. It was also a legal maneuver that denied the political nature of the
rebellion and the rebels’ acts, and allowed the government to dodge constitutional
restrictions regarding the punishment of political offenses.
Transformations in terms of crime and criminality also included a progressive
extension of the repertoire of actions that the government considered acts of internal
enmity. As the conflict unfolded and intensified, national and regional authorities expanded
the conditions under which a person could be subject to punishment for political and warrelated reasons. Right after the beginning of the hostilities, for instance, a prefect from the
Department of Cauca enacted a decree declaring “enemy” all people that refused to offer
their services in defense of the government and punishing them with conscription. People
who refused to give their war weapons to the provincial authorities should also be
considered and punished as “disrupters of public order.”453 In an analogous way, a decree
from December 1899, this time from the national government, established a series of
pecuniary penalties that should fall on “sympathizers, authors, accomplices, and
accessories (auxiliadores) of the crime of rebellion.”454
This vague differentiation, that authorized the government to act indistinctly against
both armed rebels and simple liberal sympathizers, had its legal grounds in the Military
Code. Article 1344 of the Codification established that, in a “war of rebellion,” the
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legitimate government should distinguish, outside the battlefields, between “loyal” and
“disloyal” citizens. “Disloyal” individuals were those that, without being involved in the
hostilities, manifested some degree of sympathy towards the rebel movement or actively
supported it. Article 1246 allowed military authorities to act against “disloyal” citizens and
other “desafectos” (opponents, malcontents) anytime the war’s needs demanded it.455 The
article was an extension that made internal enmity in contexts of civil war not only a matter
of military confrontation, but also an issue of mere political affiliation and ideological
dissidence. The possibility of punishing unarmed Liberals as internal enemies led to the
enactment of measures like the one from 1901 that authorized the government armies
deployed in rebel provinces to “live off the assets of the desafectos al gobierno.”456
Legal understandings of internal enmity continued evolving during 1900 and 1901
In February 1900, another presidential decree considered “enemy” not only armed liberals
or Liberal sympathizers, but also all public servants whose compromise with the
government proved dubious. The decree ordered the removal of all official employees “that
by word or deed manifest[ed] hostile to the government, that refuse[d] to cooperate in the
defense of the institution, or that sympathize[d] in any way with the rebel cause.” The order
considered that all these actions not only harmed the government but also fostered “the
spirit of rebellion that maintain[ed] the nation in alarm.”457 Official notions of enmity
continued expanding during the Marroquín administration. In October 1900, a provincial
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decree ordered a pecuniary penalty against all the “government’s enemies” in
Cundinamarca. The decree considered enemies “all those whose political opinions gave
authorities motives to consider them as such.”458 The levels of discretion involved in this
order remind of the vagueness of much of the legislation on press and public order from
the first decade of the Regeneration. In January 1901, the same decree that turned guerrilla
leaders into malhechores also prescribed the imprisonment of all people that spread “fake
news” encouraging rebels to persist in their effort or people who helped them with any sort
of resources.459
An analogous extension took place with the enactment of the decree from July 1901
that established verbal courts martial for traitors. The decree declared traitors all
Colombians that invaded the national territory as parts of foreign or partially-foreign armed
expeditions. It was a response to the intensification, by early 1901, of the movement of
rebel troops back and forth along the border between Colombia and Venezuela, and to the
alleged existence of rebel armies composed of citizens of both countries.460 The decree’s
notion of treason also involved foreigners taking part in these expeditions; Colombians and
foreigners that worked as “revolutionary agents” promoting invasions before other nation’s
governments; and Colombians that helped both rebels and foreigners invade the national
territory. All these modalities of treason, with the exception of the last one, were subject to
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the death penalty.461 The decree also gave authorities the opportunity to punish with death
the several rebel leaders that between 1900 and 1901 had visited Venezuela, Ecuador,
México and various Central American countries in search of international support for the
rebellion. The list of potential victims of this measure included prominent rebel leaders
such as Avelino Rosas, Rafael Uribe-Uribe, Foción Soto, and Benjamín Herrera.462
Penalties for rebellion and other modalities of internal enmity also experienced
similar transformations. Some of these war decrees diversified the conditions for the
application of the death penalty and made it a possibility for crimes others than the ones
originally included in the Constitution. The conversion of rebels into malhechores in
January 1901 offers a first example in this regard. Transformations concerning the
application of capital punishment, nonetheless, dated back to the beginning of the conflict.
The decree from October 20, 1899, that extended the jurisdiction of the military justice
also established the death penalty as a punishment for cases of “espionage and treason in
civil war,” arson, and use of explosives outside war operations.463 These prescriptions
pushed the limits of the constitutional mandate that restricted the application of capital
punishment for treason to contexts of foreign war (Art. 29). It was a measure that, at least
in terms of penalties, made “states of internal conflict” and “states of international war”
equivalent. The decree from July, 1901, on treason would give new life to this equivalence,
punishing rebels as if they were part of a conflict of international dimensions.

461

Decreto número 855 de 1901 (17 de julio).

462

On these international visits, see: Caballero, Memorias, especially its seventh chapter: “Una correría por
el exterior,” 83-95.
463

Decreto número 484 de 1899 (20 de octubre).

307

Outside the sphere of the death penalty, changes in punishment focused primarily
on pecuniary penalties such as “war taxes” and “forced contributions.” Although monetary
punishments for political crimes in the Criminal Code only included fines, the codification
still offered authorities the possibility of making people accountable for the expenses
occasioned by the repression of episodes of sedition, mutiny, and asonada. Articles 231,
232, and 233 of the Code established that these expenses should fall not only on the leaders
and participants of the movements in question, but also on the inhabitants of the locality in
which they took place. This, nevertheless, was not a generalized punishment. The articles
differentiated between “active and direct opponents” of the insurgent episodes and “active”
or “passive” supporters, and limited the application of the penalty only to the latter. Right
after the outbreak of the war, President Sanclemente decreed the extension of this
possibility to the crime of rebellion, making all Liberals, armed and unarmed, subject from
then on to the eventual imposition of “war taxes.”464 During most of the conflict, both
national and provincial authorities used these pecuniary penalties in order to raise money
to support conservative troops and punish Liberals outside tribunals, prisons, and
battlefields.
Sanclemente ordered a first round of “forced contributions” in December 1899. The
president explained the measure by arguing that it was a principle of justice to make the
calamities of war fall on “all those who have contributed to promote it or have supported
it with their sympathies, their interests, of their involvement.” The decree imposing the
contribution ordered the collection of five million pesos, and distributed the sum among
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the nine departments or provinces in a way that paralleled their presumed degrees of
political and military dangerousness. More than a half of this amount corresponded to the
departments of Santander and Cundinamarca, where the rebellion had originally started.465
Almost two years later, in 1901, a decree by President Marroquín threatened Liberals from
all departments with the collection of a sum of eleven and a half million pesos if the
rebellion did not come to an end. The regional distribution of the 1901 contribution
illustrated the regional evolution of the conflict since late 1899. More than half of the sum
corresponded to the departments of Cundinamarca (four million pesos), Santander (a
million and a half), Bolívar (a million, two hundred fifty thousand pesos), and Tolima and
Boyacá (a million each).466 Bolivar and Santander were by then the theaters of operation
of the last regular forces of the Liberal Party, while Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Boyacá
concentrated the bulk of the rebel guerrilla activity. Marroquín justified the measure with
the same arguments that Sanclemente used back in 1899.
Regional authorities would follow the President’s example and impose similar
contributions in their departments, as happened for instance in Cundinamarca and Tolima
in October 1900. That month, authorities from Cundinamarca issued a decree that punished
all “enemies of the government” with a “contribution” that should equal the sum of their
corresponding property taxes.467 Almost simultaneously, Tolima’s government ordered the
collection, until the end of the war, of a weekly sum of fifty thousand pesos. The order
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encouraged local authorities and collectors “to use all available means” to apply the
measure. It also established that authorities would confiscate the property of all individuals
that fled the department in order to avoid the collection. To the department’s governor, this
was a response to the rebels’ obstinacy in “continuing a war that is causing the nation’s
ruin,” and a punishment against those “unarmed revolutionaries” that encouraged the
prolongation of the conflict.468 The imposition of these additional contributions in
Cundinamarca and Tolima proves unsurprising considering that both departments suffered
the most from the intensification of guerrilla warfare after Palonegro.
What do these decrees reveal about the legal responses to rebellion during the
Thousand Days and the workings of repression during the administrations of Sanclemente
and Marroquín? The first and most evident conclusion in this regard has to do with the
highly legalistic nature of the government’s repressive responses to the rebellion.
Colombian authorities reacted to the rebellion not only with weapons and armies, but also
with legislation. Executive decrees like the ones reviewed here allowed the government
not only to strengthen their reactions to armed liberals, but also to punish and repress the
rebel movement outside the battlefields. They also made possible the inclusion of unarmed
Liberals and other “potentially dangerous” opponents as subjects of state retribution during
the war. Armed with both weapons and decrees, the Colombian government managed to
generalize the state of war throughout the entire society.
This generalization of state retribution had major legal and political consequences.
The decrees in question redefined the boundaries between common and political offenders;
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challenged the distinction between “armed” and “unarmed” opponents; and made the
separation between combatants and civilians blurry. Also, by reinventing the distinctions
between “the rebel” and the “traitor in foreign war,” this legislation made “civil war” and
“international warfare” almost equivalent notions. In its effort to craft legal responses
against armed and unarmed liberals, the Colombian governments of the Thousand Days
ended up redefining the legal nature of the conflict itself and the parameters regulating its
treatment. These legal reinventions, nonetheless, did not correspond to a legislative will
that reinterpreted crimes and imposed penalties out of the blue. Regardless of the apparent
acts of arbitrariness that many of these measures seemed to involve and the unconstitutional
nature of a few of them, all the responses in question were solidly grounded in previous
legal and constitutional prescriptions. They were nothing but re-interpretations of current
legislation that elaborated on –and took advantage of– its many grey areas –those that
subtly allowed the government to strengthen its power of retribution without directly
violating any legal or constitutional limitation. Liberals, as expected, would disagree with
the legality of these reinterpretations and the measures and legal responses they shaped.
Liberals’ criticism of the measures in question revolved around a variety of issues.
Political prisoners from Bogotá’s Panóptico complained that the conversion of rebels into
malhechores and their judgement by verbal courts martial was both unfair and
unconstitutional. These measures criminalized actions that, to the Criminal Code, were not
criminal, and made liberals victim of “severísimas penas” that did not even exist in the
codification.469 Liberals also criticized the government’s decision of treating rebels as
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“bandits” and “traitors.” Earlier that year, in a letter to President Marroquín, Rafael Uribe
Uribe had also contested the accusation that he and his people were traitors working for
Venezuela. The letter criticized the 1901 decree on treason by claiming that it established
penalties created a posteriori, manufactured on purpose (“forjadas adrede”), and of a
retroactive nature. In addition, the rebel leader claimed, none of the “new” or
“reinterpreted” crimes addressed in the decree stemmed from formal, legitimate laws. They
were simply imposition of an executive decree that the government had issued in exercise
of “a dictatorial power that no one had granted it.” Finally, the General argued, there was
no reason for speaking of “treason in foreign war,” for there had never existed a declared
state of international warfare.470 Later that year, in October 1902, officials from the Liberal
army in Panamá published a document protesting “against the false imposture that we are
instruments of foreign governments to dismember the country. We say here to the entire
world that Colombian Liberalism has pacts with no one. Colombia’s honor is our life.”471
Other liberals, like José María Quijano Wallis, criticized the forced contributions
system. These contributions, the Liberal writer maintained, represented arbitrary
confiscations that the government imposed to a particular political collectivity as a
punishment against “a determinate number of citizens that are not criminals
whatsoever.”472 As acts of confiscation, they represented a punitive practice that the
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Constitution had banned. As punishments, they were illegal and illegitimate, since there
was no previous formal law that establish them as a possible penalty for the crime of
rebellion. Additionally, Quijano Wallis concluded, it entailed the absurd injustice of
treating mere sympathizers as criminals.473 Criticism of the decrees in question also came
from the Conservative side. Moderate conservatives were particularly critical of the decree
from January 1901, whose prescriptions, as they claimed in August 1902, had provoked a
regrettable wave of executions. According to conservative critics, the decree had implicitly
formalized the application of the death penalty for political crimes, which clearly violated
the Constitution. Applying this punishment through the conversion of rebels into
malhechores and their consequent judgement by verbal courts martial posed additional
legal and judicial predicaments, they claimed. Either the rebels were political criminals,
and therefore were exempted from capital punishment, or they were common offenders,
and in that case their judgement should correspond to the ordinary justice. At no point any
military tribunal should claim jurisdiction over crimes in cuadrilla de malhechores, for
they were offenses properly defined in the Criminal Code that had nothing to do with acts
of war.474

Criminalize or De-criminalize? Conversations on Civil Warfare and Belligerence.
Concerns about the legal treatment of rebels during the Thousand Days were not limited to
questions about the fairness and constitutionality of presidential war decrees. There was an
additional matter of contention that concentrated the attention of both government and
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rebels during most of the war: the recognition, on the part of the state, of Liberal combatants
as belligerents. The question of whether or not the state should recognize and treat armed
liberals as belligerents had serious legal and political implications. Treating rebels as
belligerents implied recognizing that the rebellion had escalated into a generalized state of
civil war in the terms and conditions of the International Law. Such a recognition implied,
among other things, that the government should treat rebels as combatants and not as
criminals. It also meant that governmental responses to the rebellion should rely on the
rules of the International Law instead of on the prescriptions of the Criminal Code. It was
a recognition that, additionally, turned rebels and government into “relative enemies”:
counterparts that, despite their “legal asymmetry,” agreed to recognize each other as
“morally symmetrical” and, therefore, were able to reach legal and political agreements.
Recognizing the belligerence of a party in an internal conflict meant, in practical terms,
adopting strategies for the “regularization” and “humanization” of the confrontation,
preventing the criminalization of armed opponents, and establishing mechanisms of
political transaction between rebels and the government.475
Conversations about civil warfare and belligerence were common in almost all
internal conflicts in nineteenth-century Colombia. Colombian governments of the period,
nonetheless, were always reluctant to give their armed opponents full recognition as
belligerents, and the Sanclemente and Marroquín administrations were no exceptions.476
Almost since the beginning of the war, Sanclemente rejected all liberal attempts at finding
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a negotiated solution to the conflict, and insisted on subjecting rebels to the prescriptions
and penalties of the Criminal Code. Sanclemente’s position on matters of criminality,
belligerence, and political negotiation became evident since November 1899, when he
rejected a petition by a group of pacifist Liberals to propose the rebels a truce. To the
president, it was unthinkable that the government proposed any sort of agreement in this
regard, even more considering that the rebels were the ones that insisted on keeping the
conflict alive. A truce in those conditions not only would give the impression that the
government was weak, Sanclemente maintained, but also involved the implicit recognition
of the rebels as “belligerents in civil war.” That, the president underscore, was an
impossible option, for Liberals in arms were “nothing but rebels according to the Criminal
Code.”477
A second letter, also from November 1899, offers additional details about
Sanclemente’s position. Responding to a second group of Liberals that requested him a
political pact with the rebels, the president manifested that, while he was willing to respect
all rights and guarantees, he would never consider insurrection a right. The rebellion was
criminal, illegitimate, and therefore deserved no special treatment. Proceeding otherwise,
the President pointed out, implied to tell all criminals, both common and political, that they
could demand concessions from the government anytime they wanted.478 Another letter,
this time from February 1900, would reinforce Sanclemente’s unwillingness to de-
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criminalize the rebellion. The letter was a response to a recent proposition for an exchange
of prisoners between the Liberal and Conservative armies. Sanclemente rejected the
proposal on the grounds that accepting it would imply admitting that the conflict was a
formal civil war, “which is a far cry from reality.” “What I see,” argued the President, “is
the nation’s legitimate government, on the one hand, and a group of insurrectionists that
with no reason have taken up arms in order to seize power, on the other hand.” Rebels, in
this light, had no right to take prisoners, while imprisoned rebels were nothing but criminals
subject to punishment according to the Criminal Code, Sanclemente concluded.479
Conservative newspapers would back Sanclemente’s decisions. In December 1899,
the paper El Orden Público, quite a telling name, manifested that it was unrealistic for
Liberals to expect the government to consider rebels “equals” and accept to negotiate with
them. It was as unrealistic as pretending to convince the government that the rebellion was
a right and not a crime. Drawing on an essay from 1862 by the Liberal Felipe Pérez, the
paper maintained that political crimes were the most serious crimes there were and
deserved a punishment that corresponded to their seriousness. Political crimes affected
society as a whole and thwarted morals, law, and reason alike, “giving robbery and murder
deceitful and forgiving forms.” The practices of treating rebel leaders as “equals” to the
government and granting them pardons that brought nothing but impunity was, in this light,
more than paradoxical.480 By bringing up the words of a liberal, El Orden Público aimed
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to underscore the lack of moral and legal grounds of the rebel’s claims for a negotiated
solution to the conflict.
Sanclemente would insist on his position until the end of his administration. Soon
before the coup of July 1900, a group of liberals sent him a petition asking for both the
regularization of the conflict under the terms of International Law and the subsequent
recognition of the rebels as belligerents. Sanclemente, once again, denied the petition by
arguing that it was necessary to respond to the rebellion with the Criminal Code and that
any other treatment would grant armed liberals nothing but impunity. To the President,
revolutions would be less common in Colombia if governments put a halt to the deeprooted practice of granting rebels “guarantees and impunities of all sorts.”481
The events of July 1900, a coup staged by a member of the President’s own party,
did not bring any change regarding the government’s opinion on the legal and political
status of Liberal rebels. Soon after his possession, Marroquín declared that, while he was
willing to treat with leniency all rebels that surrendered, he would not grant the rebellion
any political concession. A political, non-criminal recognition of the rebels, in the
President’s opinion, would do nothing but encouraging them to continue the rebellion in
order to push for more political compromises.482 A year later, Marroquín would discredit a
series of recent petitions asking him to give the conflict a negotiated solution. He claimed
that Liberals requested “concessions that neither the law nor the government’s decorum
allow me to grant.” Acceding to the rebels’ claims and demands implied to subvert the
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nation’s entire legal and political order. In the same light, the government could not
negotiate with its armed opponents without abdicating its constitutional duty of repressing
them as disturbers of public order. Similarly, the state could not allow that a group of
people, by “violent” and “criminal” means, succeeded in fostering any legal, constitutional,
or political reform. Agreeing to both things meant to admit the possibility that any
alteration of public order could lead to the annulment of all legitimate institutions and the
derogation of all laws. “Maintaining the opposite is like affirming that the commission of
a crime implied the immediate derogation of the Criminal Code,” Marroquín concluded.483
Marroquín was not alone in his decision of not granting rebels any sort of political
recognition or treatment. That was also the position of his War Minister, José Vicente
Concha. In November 1901, Concha would reject a petition by the rebel General Foción
Soto requesting the application of the international law to the conflict in order to humanize
it. In his petition, General Soto maintained that the hostilities had reached alarming levels
of barbarity and the conflict seemed to drift away from the limits that civilized nations
recognized in cases of international or civil warfare. To Soto, the government was at least
partially responsible for this situation, since its obstinacy in treating rebels as criminals had
ended up damaging the common sense of all its representatives and officials.484 The
Minister’s response was no different from what Marroquín and Sanclemente had stated
before: the conflict was a mere insurrection and not a civil war and, therefore, should
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remain subjected to the Criminal Code. To Concha, the rebellion did not deserve a
treatment according to international law because it did not have the features that, according
to this legislation, characterized “formal” civil wars. The rebels, the minister argued, did
not count on an established government, did not permanently control a portion of the
territory, and neither administered justice nor exercised sovereignty in the areas where they
operated. In these circumstances, there was no legal obligation to recognize Liberal armies
as belligerent, let alone to declare the nation in a state of civil war.485
Foción Soto’s petition was not the only request that Liberals made in this regard
during the Marroquín administration. More than a year earlier, in July 1900, José M.
Quijano Wallis and eleven more people had written the Minister of War a lengthy
manifesto requesting the recognition of Liberal rebels as belligerents. The manifesto’s
arguments were similar to those from Soto’s petition. Almost a year of war had brought
nothing but destruction and barbarity: “twenty thousand men dead in the battlefields […]
Thousands of injured and mutilated people; [and] lots of women and children engulfed in
orphanage and misery.”486 The humanization and regularization of the conflict were, in
these circumstances, more than urgent. Its regularization did not require major legal or
political sacrifices, the manifesto maintained. It only took the state to recognize the rebels
as “armed enemies against the government” and not as offenders subject to the Criminal
Code. The idea, simply, was that the relationship between state and rebels followed the
practices and principles of “good war” established by international law for these kind of
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conflicts.487 To the petitioners, all these requests were in tune with the Constitution, which
encouraged the government to use the ius gentium in cases of “internal commotion.”
Furthermore, they were grounded on the nation’s past, full of precedents of political
transaction between governments and rebels.488 Quijano’s petition sums up many of the
questions and claims that made up the debates about belligerence during the Thousand
Days.
Conversations about belligerence and International Law tackled important matters
regarding the workings of law and state retribution during the Thousand Days. Questions
about the validity of the ius gentium in the context of the war entailed deeper
preoccupations about the limits, scope, and authority of Colombian law regarding the
punishment of the country’s internal enemies. It was, also, a concern about the tensions
between state and international law concerning the legal status and treatment of rebels and
other political offenders. Regardless what Regenerationist authorities decided in that
regard, what is clear is that the legal treatment of political criminality during the conflict –
as it had happened in previous civil wars– was a question that extended beyond the limits
of Colombia’s state law. The definition of the legal status of rebels, together with their
legal treatment, did not depend exclusively on provisions from Colombian law, and
somehow involved a legal and legislative sphere that existed way beyond the limits of the
state. Like in Porfirian Mexico, the fate of political criminals was a matter that surpassed
–at least at a discursive level– the power and authority of state law.
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Debates about the recognition of rebels as “relative enemies” of the government
also involved questions about the political and legal nature of the rebellion, and about the
ways in which Sanclemente and Marroquín perceived armed liberals as internal enemies.
Discussions on the recognition of the conflict as a civil war involved concerns about the
legitimacy of the armed movement and the state’s right to react to it through its
criminalization. They also entailed queries about how the government understood “internal
enmity,” “political crimes,” and “common criminality” in the context of the rebellion, and
how authorities could –and should– react to them. All these issues also raised questions
about the normative framework that should guide and limit state retribution against liberal
rebels, as well as the adequacy of the nation’s criminal code to underpin legal practices of
state retribution. The government’s position in these regards evidences a perception of the
conflict not only in terms of an unquestionable criminalization, but also in terms of a threat
deserving retributive responses free from political considerations and concerns about the
“good war.” These responses, as arbitrary and unfair as they might have seemed to some,
still maintained a legal nature and relied on complementary judicial practices that would
give state repression some degree of “procedural formality.”

Rebels on Trial: Administering Justice in Times of War
Judicial practices during the Thousand Days differed from the dynamics of “preventive
justice” that characterized the Regeneration between the 1880s and 1890s. Although during
the war there were no formal ordinary tribunals for the judgement of rebels and other armed
Liberals, political and military authorities still made an effort to give repression and
punishment a façade of judicial formality, rationality, and security. Whether by
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administrative judicial procedures or by courts martial, authorities during the war
attempted to administer punishment primarily through judicial ways. Multiple purposes
converged in this judicialization of punishment. There was, for instance, the purpose of
applying, in a strict and unquestionable fashion, the prescriptions from the Criminal Code
regarding the treatment of rebellion and other political crimes. There was also the intention
to reinforce state sovereignty through a strong reliance on its mechanisms for the
prosecution and punishment of criminality and internal enmity. Finally, there was the
purpose of buttressing state power by underscoring the ritual ways in which it operates.
The regular functioning of a justice system during the war could have represented, in this
regard, an effort on the state’s part to reinforce its sovereignty through the accentuation of
its ritual displays of power and retribution.
The judicialization of state punishment during the war fell on multiple modalities
of crime and criminality, involved diverse modalities of internal enmity, and extended to
both rebels and members of the Conservative armies. Trials against rebels commonly
involved political crimes like rebellion, sedition, and treason; common offenses such as
homicide, arson, and robbery; and “mixed” crimes like the ambivalent offense of asalto en
cuadrilla de malhechores. The results of these trials tended to depend more on the
characteristics of the defendants than on the nature and severity of the crimes involved.
Rebel officials of medium- and high-rank were more likely to receive death sentences than
their subalterns. That was the case, for instance, of the rebel chiefs Antonio Suárez Lacroix,
Juan Vidal, and Julián Lezama, executed in July 1902, or the liberal officials Cesáreo
Pulido, Gabriel María Calderón, and Anatol Barrios, executed in September that year.
Different courts martial sentenced them to death under charges of “rebellion in cuadrilla
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de malhechores” and treason.489 That was also the case of the German citizen Otto
Hiurichs, a sergeant major charged with rebellion and arson and sentenced by a military
tribunal in February 1901.490
Minor officials and rank-and-file soldiers often had better luck. In August 1901, a
court-martial opted to give a group of minor-rank rebel officials lenient treatment. The
tribunal initially charged the officials with rebellion, asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores,
robbery, and damages to telegraphic lines, crimes that made the defendants subject to an
almost a certain death sentence. Nonetheless, after hearing the defense, the tribunal opted
to sentence the defendants only for rebellion and considered the rest of crimes simple
delitos conexos. In addition, the tribunal declared that the officers in question did not play
a significant role in their army and could not be considered neither directors, ringleaders,
nor promoters of the rebellion. They were, in this light, “petty rebels” that should not
receive more than the penalties established for the lesser modalities of rebellion. The
tribunal ended up giving the defendants penalties of prison ranging between one to four
years.491 Months later, in April 1902, a court-martial sentenced to prison the soldiers Juan
Clímaco Herrán, Gratiniano Sánchez, Pablo Amaya, and Jesús Caro, together with other
fellow combatants. The tribunal, in a similarly lenient treatment, only charged them with
rebellion, with no supplementary charges of cuadrilla de malhechores.492
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“Accomplices” and “auxiliadores” of the rebel movement also obtained lesser
penalties, as illustrated by the judgement, in November 1901, of five people from Palmira,
accused of providing rebels with weapons. The trial was conducted by Palmira’s municipal
authorities, which decided that the act qualified only as sedition. It had merely been an
action of hostility towards the government, which had not implied a direct involvement
with the rebellion. Authorities sentenced them all to prison, and imposed one of the
defendants –the owner of the house in which the weapons remained stored– an additional
forced contribution of five thousand pesos.493
Trials against members of the Conservative armies commonly involved offenses of
treason and supplementary charges of desertion and/or insurrection. “Traitors” from the
military were often responsible for actions or omissions that, to the authorities’ eyes,
involved some degree of support for or complicity with the rebellion. Some of the people
subjected to these trials faced accusations for deserting and switching sides, like it
happened to the soldiers Víctor López and Feliciano González, from the southern province
of Cauca, in April and May 1901, respectively.494 The trial of the soldier Manuel Esteban
Camacho in October that year sheds light on another modality of military treason. A courtmartial sentenced Camacho to 40 years of prison in Panamá for stealing five rifles and
selling four of them to the rebels of the Cauca Valley. After a first revision, a military judge
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reduced the sentence to 20 years in the prison of Palmira, considering that the defendant
was a minor and deserved a less strict penalty.495
The case of the prison guard Gregorio Sánchez offers additional details on the
government’s understanding and criminalization of military treason during the war.
Sánchez had to appear before a court-martial in August 1901, after apparently being
involved in a prison mutiny and a jailbreak while he was on duty. The tribunal charged him
with “triple treason.” To the court, Sánchez had committed treason by not giving alarm
when the mutiny started, by joining the runaways in their escape, and by deserting from
his post as a prison guard. His desertion was aggravated by the fact that, by escaping with
the runaways, he had implicitly joined the rebels and therefore the rebellion. The
prosecution requested that the court punished the guard “to the full extent of the law.” Yet,
a medical examination proved that Sánchez was mentally handicapped and therefore
unable to commit a crime in the terms of the Criminal Code. The trial resulted in an
acquittal and a call to the government to improve its system of recruitment.496 Sánchez was
not the only soldier that authorities charged for treason after a jailbreak. That was also the
case of a captain and three soldiers in Cartago, court-martialed for treason and desertion in
July 1901.497 An analogous case occurred in Bogotá after a massive escape of Liberal
prisoners in November 1901. A verbal court-martial accused the inmate Régulo Ramírez
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of orchestrating the break and, since he was a spy at the government’s service, sentenced
him to death under charges of treason.498
How did verbal courts martial work and what sorts of guarantees and protections
did they offer? Military trials were commonly brief and did not last more than a week.
Usually, before the installation of the tribunal, a war auditor decided whether or not the
case in question corresponded to the military jurisdiction.499 If his concept was favorable,
the court-martial could take place. Despite the trials’ short duration, there was a brief space
for defense. Time limitations made it difficult to defendants to pick a lawyer of their
preference, and most of the time they had to accept an ad hoc military lawyer. Once the
defense had made its arguments, the tribunal debated whether or not the defendant
committed the crimes in question, decided on his degree of criminal responsibility, and
inquired about possible “aggravating” or “mitigating” circumstances. Finally, the tribunal
issued a sentence.500 Although the law prescribed that court-martial sentences were
undisputable and irrevocable unless they involved the death penalty, sentence revisions and
appeals were not uncommon.
In practice, court-martialed rebels and servicemen could request sentence revisions
regardless the penalties they faced. Death sentences required the revision and confirmation
of a local political and military chief. As illustrated by the case of the rebel Gerardo
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Vásquez, sentenced to death June 1901 for homicide and robbery in cuadrilla de
malhechores, the chief in question had two responsibilities. First, he had to inquire if there
were procedural reasons that could lead to the annulment of the sentence. Second, he had
to decide whether or not there were motives for either reaffirming or commuting the
penalty. In the case of Vásquez, the chief confirmed the legality of the sentence and decided
that there was no place for commutation. The prompt “reparation of society’s moral order”
demanded the penalty as “indispensable.” Similarly, the chief maintained, the nation’s
security required “the sacrifice, in the name of the law,” of all those that breaking away
from any legality had provoked “the most dreadful disorders.”501 It was a decision that
seemed to respond more to the “social” and “moral” convenience of the penalty than to the
specific circumstances surrounding Vásquez’s crimes.
Confirmed death sentences could still be subject to further revisions, as illustrated
by the case of Otto Hiurichs. Despite being sentenced to death by a verbal court-martial,
Hiurichs managed to take his case to the Supreme Court. The German citizen grounded his
appeal on the arguments that the military tribunal that judged him was incompetent to
decide on his case, and that his trial involved several procedural inconsistencies –
especially, he did not legally receive his acta de enjuiciamiento. The high court partially
supported Hiurischs’s first claim, and considered that while military justice was competent
to process him for arson, it had no jurisdiction at all over crimes of rebellion. The Court
considered the second claim completely valid as well, and concluded that it entailed a
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procedural informality that rendered the entire process null. This conclusion would save
Hiurischs’s life.502
Revisions of sentences that did not involve capital punishment also paid special
attention to judicial formalities that could potentially annul the decisions of verbal courts
martial. After his initial sentence to 40 years in Panamá, Manuel Esteban Camacho
appealed and obtained a reduction of half the time in a less hostile place. Camacho,
nonetheless, would request a second revision based on procedural inconsistencies. His
second attempt proved successful as well, and forced the annulment of the sentence on the
grounds that the authority that summoned the court-martial did not have the power to do
so.503 Not all revisions of prison sentences were successful, tough. In June 1902, the rebel
Jesús Caro appealed the court-martial decision that put him in jail before the Supreme
Court, claiming that his trial had been unfair. The high tribunal considered that, while it
had jurisdiction over these sort of claims, the defendant’s appeal lacked all formalities that
the law required in these cases. According to the Court’s concept, Caro had not requested
the revision through a representative of the judicial power. Neither had him grounded his
claim on any of the causes of revision (causales de revision) that the law allowed. The
tribunal ended up rejecting the appeal and suggesting the defendant to wait in prison until
the Excutive decreed an indulto.504
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On the whole, the functioning of justice during the war aimed to give state
repression some sort of ritual formality that reaffirmed the government’s power while
legitimizing its practices of retribution. Administrative judicial processes and, more often,
verbal courts martial represented spaces for administering punishment and retribution in a
“regulated,” “rational,” and “formalized” way. These judicial practices allowed the
government to exercise its right to defense and retribution without ignoring or violating, at
least formally, the rights and guarantees of its enemies. Administrative and military trials
always left place for defense –no matter how minimum or restricted it was–, and their rules
and procedures somehow granted defendants a few guarantees and protections. Despite the
alleged arbitrariness, discretion, and partiality of these ways of administering justice, the
cases reviewed here show that procedural formalities mattered and that courts-martial did
not necessarily give the government a carte blanche for eliminating enemies. These
formalities could also work on the defendants’ benefit and give them additional
safeguarding against state retribution. The judicialization of punishment, nonetheless,
represented only a face of the government’s strategies of repression and retribution during
the Thousand Days.

Punishment Beyond Courts: The Arbitrary and Extrajudicial Side of State Retribution.
Practices of state punishment and retribution during the Thousand Days went way beyond
the proceedings and protections of the judicial sphere. Outside the formalized, regulated,
and ritualized field of justice administration, state retribution operated in more direct and
straightforward ways, without the mediation of procedural restrictions or legal and
constitutional limitations. Arbitrary arrests, extralegal imprisonments, and extrajudicial
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executions were part of these “other” displays of state retaliation. As punitive practices,
they were common throughout the entire conflict and served multiple purposes. They were
public displays of state sovereignty; “exemplary” practices of punishment; means to
terrorize and intimidate Liberal rebels; ways of punishing liberals outside the battlefields;
and even strategies for “preventing” rebel outbursts in some areas.
Complains about arbitrary, extralegal, and unjustified imprisonments were usual.
In Medellín, a conservative town that never experienced a single battle during the war,
authorities arrested over 500 Liberals for “preventive purposes.”505 The bulk of these
arrests corresponded to Liberals accused of supporting the rebellion with weapons and
other materials, local and regional partisan leaders, and plain members of the Liberal party.
Sinforiano Arcila, for instance, faced prison between December 1899 and January 1900
after somebody accused him of hiding weapons for the rebels. In his petition, Arcila
claimed that the accusations were false and ill-intentioned, that he was a pacific man, and
that his imprisonment was nothing but the result of personal animosities.506 Other town
liberals faced prison for no reason other than their political sympathies. Juan Crisóstomo
Uribe, a prominent city Liberal, ended up in jail three times despite not having any –
proven– direct link with the rebel movement –twice in 1900 and once in 1901.507 Like him,
many other Liberals from Medellín would face consecutive prison sentences merely on
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grounds of their political affiliation, as they manifested in dozens of complaints before the
city authorities.508
Liberals in Cauca, south of the country, faced a similar situation. There, hundreds
of people would also file complains for unjustified or arbitrary imprisonments.509
Complainants pointed out that authorities from the Department had sent them to prison
with no order of arrest, no proof of their alleged criminality, and no consideration about
their pacific behavior and lack of compromise with the movement.510 Like in Antioquia,
several Caucanos ended up in jail due to false accusations product of personal conflicts.
That happened, for instance, to Euclides Salcedo, who attributed his arbitrary
imprisonment in Pasto to “the mala voluntad that the local mayor has towards me.”511
Cauca’s authorities also had the habit of arresting Liberals with no other reason than their
political sympathies and later processing them as rebels captured in combat. That was the
case of Emilio Burgos and his brother Benjamín, Santos Padilla, and Samuel Salazar,
arrested during the first days of January 1900 and then presented as prisoners from a
combat that took place on January 23rd.512 Octaviano Caicedo, also from Pasto, had a
similar experience at the beginning of the war. He spent about a year in jail as a war prisoner
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despite the fact that no combat had occurred in the region around the time of his arrest.
When reviewing Caicedo’s request for liberty, Pasto’s authorities admitted that once the
rebellion had explored in Santander, they had proceeded to arrest as many Liberals as they
could in order to prevent an analogous insurrection in the region.513
Arbitrary imprisonments intensified as the conflict dragged on. Interested in
showing positive results in their war against the liberalism in arms, military authorities
resorted to the strategy of arresting farmers and peasants and turning them in as war
prisoners. In Cauca, for instance, Conservative General Enrique Palacios sent to a prison
in Cali dozens of “humble folk people” disguised as Liberal combatants.514 In his memoir,
a former political prisoner from Bogotá’s Panóptico recalled that, during the Marroquín
administration, authorities imprisoned hundreds of innocent people “unable to tell the
differences between the Liberal and the Conservative parties.” According to him, the waves
of incoming prisoners included several children between eight and ten years old,
“completely incapable of understanding politics, let alone of harming the government.”515
During the last stages of the war, the Panóptico remained packed with “sympathizers” of
the rebellion and civilians that authorities presented as combatants. Some Liberals would
even accuse the current Minister of War, Aristides Fernández, of “collecting” political
prisoners “with the obsession of a stamp collector.”516
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Extrajudicial and unlawful executions were also common, especially as a practice
of retribution against rebels captured in combat. In December 1899, just a few months after
the outbreak of the war, Rafael Uribe Uribe denounced the “inhuman execution” of a group
of Liberal war prisoners in Santander.517 In Tolima, one of the main theaters of the guerrilla
warfare between 1900 and 1902, conservative troops executed 14 war prisoners under the
argument that taking care of them was a logistic nuisance. Tolima’s conservative armies
would also be responsible for the beheading of 25 Liberal prisoners by the Magdalena
River.518 The conservative response to the guerrilla warfare in the region included the
extrajudicial execution of seven members of Tulio Varón’s guerrilla, 18 political prisoners
from El Guamo’s prison, and 20 officers from Cesareo Pulido’s army. According to a
contemporary source, conservative troops escorted Pulidos’s men to a river, ordered them
to take a bath, and then opened fired against them.519 In his memoire, the liberal Adolfo
León Gómez recalled the execution of Colonel Martiniano Arenas, prisoner of
Conservative troops in the border between Boyacá and Santander. His guards accused him
to try to run away riding a mule, and both prisoner and animal fell victim of a machete
charge that reduced them both to pieces.520
Perhaps the most polemic Conservative attempt at executing war prisoners during
the Thousand Days had to do with the Prevención that Minister Aristides Fernández sent
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to the rebel leader Juan Mac Allister in February 1902. Mac Allister, leader of the Liberal
guerrillas in Cundinamarca, had recently ordered the delivery of four high-profile war
prisoners to a prison in Pore, a deserted, insalubrious town in the region of Casanare.
Minister Fernandez’s response came in the form of a manifesto that, under the title of
“Prevención,” circulated throughout all of Bogotá. In the document, the Minister
demanded Mac Allister the liberation of the Conservative prisoners within a 20-days term.
Otherwise, Fernández would order the execution of four high-rank rebel officials
imprisoned in the Panóptico. The manifesto also threatened Mc Allister with executing the
principal rebels in the hands of the government if the rebel troops dared to attempt against
the lives of the Conservative soldiers they had captured.521
The Prevención spawned rejection both within Liberals and Conservatives. In a
letter from March 1902 to President Marroquín, a group of over 200 political prisoners
from the Panóptico manifested their concerns about the measure and denounced that it
entailed three major injustices. First, it contradicted the constitutional principle that
prohibited the application of the death penalty for political crimes. Second, it violated basic
procedural guarantees by ordering the execution of people that had not had the chance of
being heard and defeated in a trial. Finally, it punished a group of individuals –already
subject of punishment– for crimes which they were not responsible for at all. All this, to
the eyes of the signatories, involved “something extraordinarily strange, if not
extraordinarily monstrous.”522 That was also the opinion of a group of Conservatives that,
around the same time, wrote Conservative General Ramón González Valencia a letter
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rejecting Fernandez’s ways. In their opinion, the Prevención entailed “an outrageous
proceeding” that contradicted “humanity’s natural laws.” “Since when can a member of
the government freely proclaim ‘I kill,’ ‘I execute’?” the letter asked. “Do not we have
already courts martial? Did this conflict already derogate all judicial processes?”, it
continued. To the signatories, Fernández’s initiative undermined the basis of the republic,
and, even worse, involved the risk of “turning crime into an institution.”523
A complementary punishment practice, also related to the extralegal application of
the death penalty, had to do with the intentional disregarding of both judicial sentences and
armistices. Writing to General González Valencia in September 1902, Luis Martínez Silva
denounced that Minister Fernández had recently annulled a court-martial sentence that
punished a rebel with five years of prison. Wanting a death sentence, Fernández had
summoned a second court-martial and forced it to punish the defendant with the desired
penalty. By the time Marroquín heard of the double-trial and decided to intervene, the
Minister’s people had already carried out the new sentence.524 Something relatively similar
would happen later in 1902 after the signing of the Treaty of Neerlandia. The peace treaty
did not prevent General Aristóbulo Ibáñez from being hunted down and executed.525
Neither did it impede Conservative General José Joaquín Casas from ordering a courtmartial apply a “suggested” death sentence against Rafael Uribe Uribe in October 30,
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1902.526 Legal agreements and judicial decisions were sometimes insufficient to contain
and channel the forces of state retaliation during the Thousand Days.
What do these arbitrary and extrajudicial punishment practices reveal about the
workings of state repression and retribution during the war? Overall, they show that it is
not possible to reduce the government officials’ logic to a simple opposition between “the
legal” and “the illegal.” State retribution during the Thousand Days was highly legalistic
and relied heavily on judicial rituals. Yet, it did not unfold in a complete and absolute
“legal” fashion. Arbitrariness was common, as were extrajudicial punishments, and the
logics of state repression often dodged –or straightforwardly ignored– existing
constitutional, legal, and judicial limitations. This, by no means, can lead to the conclusion
that state repression during the war was a simple matter of “illegality” or “legal
deformations,” as historian Mario Aguilera maintains.527 State repression was complex and
unfolded and manifested in different, even complementary ways, not exclusionary at all. It
never had a single, simple goal. On the contrary, it encompassed a panoply of military,
political, and legal purposes. The intertwining of “legal” and “extra-legal” responses to the
rebellion was nothing but a natural outcome of such complexity. Here, the legal and the
illegal, the judicial and the extrajudicial were never absolute, irreconcilable categories.
They were just points in a continuum of governmental responses to the rebellion that,
according to the purpose in question, could rely more or less on legal practices and judicial
resources.

526

“Carta de José Joaquín Casas a Juan B. Tovar. Bogotá, Octubre 30 de 1902,” in: Tamayo, La Revolución,
187.
527

Aguilera Peña, “Canje o fusilamiento,” 67.

336

The Thousand Days Experience in Context: From 1895 to 1906.
Governmental responses to the liberal rebellion of 1899 did not greatly differ from the
repressive practices that marked the reaction of Colombian governments to other episodes
of internal turmoil during the period. There were no major differences between the logic
of state retribution during the Thousand Days and that from the war of 1895, for instance.
Similarly, responses to the plot against Reyes’s life in 1906 would build on some of the
legal and judicial practices to which the government resorted between 1899 and 1902. On
the whole, governmental reactions to insurrections and junctures of civil warfare, during
the Regeneration and the Reyes era, did not experience any substantive transformation.
After all, they were manifestations of a “culture of governance” consistent with the basic
premises of the Regeneration and the principles of the 1886 charter. They reflected a style
of government whose fundamental tenets were the maintenance of public order, the
sacrifice of individual liberties to “society’s welfare,” and the prevalence of the Executive
over the rest of public powers. It was also a style that relied heavily on the law as an
instrument of control and punishment, and on the ritualization of justice and punishment
as a means for strengthening and reaffirming state sovereignty.
Legal responses to the war of 1895 included a series of measures that the
Sanclemente and Marroquín administrations would replicate years later. Measures
included, among others, the imposition of forced contributions, which by the 1890s
represented already a customary repressive practice for junctures of civil warfare. These
“war taxes” were indeed common during all the civil wars of nineteenth-century Colombia;
and, throughout the second half of the century, had evolved into a structured, generalized,
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and systematic scheme for the punishment of non-armed dissidents.528 The Colombian
custom of charging dissidents with forced contributions was in fact so particular that it
would even call the attention of contemporary experts on international law. That was the
case, for instance, of the Peruvian jurist Carlos Wiesse, whose Reglas de derecho
internacional (1893) criticized this practice as “contrary to the laws of war” and repudiated
by all international treaties.529
Repressive measures during the 1895 conflict also included the enactment of
legislation reorganizing the jurisdiction and attributions of military justice. A decree from
January 17 redefined and extended the limits of the military jurisdiction in almost the same
terms of Sanclemente’s decree from October 20, 1899. This same decree would also extend
the repertoire of crimes subject to the death penalty, and formalize the application of forced
contributions for the crime of rebellion.530 A second decree, from March, made legal the
celebration of verbal courts martial for the judgement of rebels that were reluctant to
surrender. The measure involved rebel ringleaders, officers of all ranks, and even people
responsible for “promoting or encouraging the uprising” and “working for the success of
the rebellion in any possible way.”531 As during the Thousand Days, defendants had the
option of requesting sentence revisions or taking their cases before the Supreme Court.
That was the case, for instance, of Domingo Rodríguez, a political prisoner that managed
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to obtain the annulment of a court-martial prison sentence by appealing to this high
tribunal.532 Something similar happened to the rebels Juan Bautista Martínez, Miguel
Marmolejo, and Fabio Victoria, who faced a court-martial for homicide that concluded
with two orders of imprisonment and one death sentence. The defendants appealed before
the Supreme Court, which ultimately annulled the sentence on the grounds of procedural
irregularities and “jurisdictional incompetence.”533
The attempt against President Reyes’s life on February 10, 1906 also provoked a
series of reactions that resembled the legal and judicial practices of the Regeneration. Right
after the attack, Reyes ordered the arrest of the conservatives José Joaquín Casas and
Aristides Fernández. The President acquitted Casas, kept Fernández in prison, and applied
to the former War Minister the formula that he (Fernández) had applied against Juan Mac
Allister back in 1902. On February 15, Reyes ordered the publication of a “Prevención”
in which he threatened Fernández with the death penalty in the case that the President’s
life were in danger once again.534 Days later, nonetheless, Reyes retired the threat and, in
correspondence with the legislation on alta policía, sentenced him and two other highprofile suspects to expatriation.535 Two days after the publication of the Prevención, the
President would enact a decree ordering the judgement by a verbal court-martial of all the
people captured either as authors or accomplices of the attack. The court-martial issued its
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sentence on March 5, a few days after the arrest of the three material authors of the crime.
The tribunal sentenced the three attackers to death and gave a dozen more people prison
penalties ranging from five to twelve years as accomplices and masking agents
(encubridores).536
According to the terms of the sentence, the court-martial considered the attack
against Reyes a common offense and not a political crime. The tribunal charged the
defendants with asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores, and declared that their actions had no
political nature whatsoever. Political crimes, the sentence stated, always pursued an
“abstract goal,” and what the plotters against Reyes intended was very specific. The crime
in question, in addition, was a heinous, monstrous one, with no precedents in the nation’s
history. It was an act that had profoundly moved the nation, entailed all the perils of
anarchism, and reflected a criminal impulse that required urgent and energetic extirpation.
The “extirpation” of the threat materialized in a death sentence that authorities carried out
as an organized, almost ritualized public display of state retribution. In correspondence
with the sentence, the execution took place in the same spot that the attack against Reyes
had occurred –a public road in the center of Bogotá–, and counted with the presence of the
rest of the defendants.537 The shooting of the three attackers in March 6, 1906, marked the
last time that a Colombian government applied the death penalty.
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Conclusions: Legality, Extra-legality, and the Legal Treatment of Political Crimes in
Mexico and Colombia
The responses analyzed in the previous sections do not comprise the totality of repressive
initiatives to which the Porfiriato and the Regeneration resorted in times of rebellion and
internal turmoil. Yet, they certainly include the most recurrent ones. Additional measures
in the Colombian case included, among many others, restrictions to the mobility and
circulation of rebels and other “dangerous” people both in the cities and in the countryside.
In Barranquilla, for instance, a decree from late 1901 established that “no Liberal [could]
transit the city’s streets, squares, and public places after 7 p.m.,” and prohibited the public
reunion of more than two “enemies of the government” during daytime.538 In México,
punishments for rebellion and insurrection also included conscription in the federal forces
stationed in Yucatán and Quintana Roo with the mission of fighting the Mayas.539
Repertoires of governmental responses to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia were
rich, diverse, and complex. They encompassed multiple, often parallel legalities,
jurisdictions, and legal authorities, as well as both national and international legal domains.
The Mexican case, for instance, involved jurisdictional tensions between state and federal
judicial authorities regarding the judgement of political criminals, as well as a difficult
interplay between Mexican and American law concerning the punishment of “dangerous”
political exiles. Analogously, the Colombian experience entailed conflicts between
ordinary and military tribunals, as well as multiple preoccupations about the role of
international –or extra-national– legislation in the criminalization and treatment of rebels
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and other political offenders. As in the case of the preventive management of political
criminality (see previous chapter), responses to actual episodes of rebellion emerged out
of a plurality of legal authorities and jurisdictional spheres. Even within the domains of the
state and state law, legal logics of repression were fragmented and did not exclusively rely
on a monopolistic authority or institution. State law concerning the treatment of political
criminality was, then, neither monolithic nor unrivaled by other international or extranational legal spheres.
These responses also involved elaborated combinations of of legal and extralegal
initiatives, judicial and extrajudicial punishment practices, and formal and informal
measures. These combinations were neither paradoxical nor contradictory. Here, “the
legal” and the “extra-legal” did not function as absolute and mutually exclusive categories.
“Legality” and “extra-legality” coexisted as complementary notions –and spheres– as
governments devised different strategies to tackle the many political, legal, and military
requirements of their war against rebellion. Responses to political crimes and criminals
were as legal as they were extralegal, and as judicial as they were extrajudicial. Their
different degrees of “legality” or reliance on the judicial sphere depended primarily on their
purposes, from underscoring state power and authority through the justice system and its
rituals to intimidating and crushing rebels through unbridled displays of state violence. As
illegal, unconstitutional, and arbitrary these extrajudicial practices might have seemed to
many, they were an integral part of the government’s repertoire of responses to
insurrection, rebellion, and civil warfare. They accompanied and complemented its roles
as law enforcer, administrator of justice, and guardian of public order. As practices of
retribution and displays of sovereignty, these “other” responses were in tune with the type
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of government –and governance– that both the Regeneration and the Porfiriato tried to
shape –one whose fundamental tenets were the maintenance of public order, the sacrifice
of individual rights to the society’s welfare, and the prevalence of the Executive over the
rest of the public powers.
Despite these basic similarities between the Mexican and Colombian experiences,
there were important differences between one country and another. In matters of law and
legislation, for instance, Colombian authorities relied primarily on extraordinary and
emergency decrees, shaping “new,” “alternative” legalities for the criminalization and
punishment of rebellion and other modalities of internal enmity. Mexican authorities, on
the contrary, drew predominantly on their regular legislation, charging and punishing
rebels in correspondence to their Criminal Code. This difference between “ordinary” and
“extraordinary” legalities is also manifested in the ways in which both countries
administered justice in cases of rebellion. While in Mexico the judgement of most rebels
remained in the hands of ordinary tribunals, in Colombia the government tended to make
it a matter of administrative proceedings and military tribunals. This characteristic
contributed even more to the “exceptional” nature of the legal and judicial treatment of
Colombian rebels. A third difference in this regard has to do with the nature of people
subject to punishment according to each country’s legislation and judicial practices. In
Mexico, legal and judicial punishment tended to fall on people directly and indirectly
involved in rebel movements or episodes of rebellion. In Colombia, on the contrary,
punishment involved, besides rebels and individuals with actual or alleged connections
with them, non-combatants and people with no links at all with a revolutionary movement.
Although both Mexican and Colombian governments recognized certain equivalence
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between dissent and criminality, it was in Colombia where authorities legally declared
dissent a subject of punishment.
The nature and evolution of rebellions and rebel movements in each country help
explain many of these differences. In Colombia, the conflicts of 1895 and 1899-1902 were
generalized civil wars that shook most of the country and put a big portion of the nation on
a war footing. In México, on the contrary, the reviewed rebellions and expeditions did not
evolve into nation-wide confrontations –these larger conflicts would correspond to the era
of the Mexican Revolution. Legal and judicial responses to rebellion in Colombia entailed
such levels of exceptionality mostly because they were reactions to generalized states of
emergency and nation-wide disruptions of public order. Governments perceived them as
serious threats against the nation that demanded quick, efficient, and energetic responses
that neither the ordinary justice system nor the current Criminal Code were able to offer.
The resulting exceptionality was not the product of a capricious, over-authoritarian power
placed above the constitution and the rule of law. Despite their undeniable traces of
authoritarianism, these “exceptional legalities” were deeply-rooted in prescriptions of the
Constitution and the Criminal Code regarding the management of public order. They also
drew heavily on the many grey areas that marked the 1886 Charter concerning the faculties
and limits of the Executive power.
Regardless of the degrees of exceptionality and alternative legality present in both
experiences, responses to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia subjected political crimes and
criminals to analogous processes of legal reinvention. Reinventions affected the logics of
state punishment and the sphere of crime and criminality alike. Penalties for rebellion in
the two countries were not reduced to the punishments that their respective legislations
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prescribed for it. Whether by charging rebels with both common and political offenses, or
by straightforwardly indicting them as common criminals, Mexican and Colombian
authorities managed to redefine what the law allowed and forbade in terms of penalties
against internal enemies. It was a reinvention of the limits and differences between
common and political crimes that allowed governments to repress their rebels in ways that
dodged the limits that constitutions and criminal codes established for the punishment of
political offenders. The imposition of forced contributions to rebels and Liberal
sympathizers in Colombia, the extradition of rebels and Liberal agitators in Mexico, and
the imposition of the death penalty to political offenders in both countries illustrate the
result of these reinventions.
Reinventions on the sphere of offenses, offenders, and criminal categories had
analogous legal implications. When responding to rebellion through legal and judicial
means, Mexican and Colombian governments criminalized a particularly diverse set of
people and actions. It was a set of crimes and criminals much wider and varied than those
that the respective criminal codes delimited in their definitions of treason, rebellion, and
sedition. Legal and judicial responses to insurrection and civil warfare extended and
redefined existing notions of rebellion to the point of criminalizing, besides actual rebels
and active supporters and advocates of rebellion, several other modalities of alleged or
actual internal enmity. “Extended” modalities of rebellion turned criminal the actions of
unarmed political agitators; opposition journalists; peaceful, non-combatant dissenters;
deserters from governmental forces; “untrustworthy” public servants; and people whose
actions or omissions could directly or indirectly benefit a rebel movement. If reinventions
in matters of penalties combined common and political crimes as parts of a same set of
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actions of internal enmity, reinventions regarding crime and criminalization brought
together, as subjects of punishment, both actual rebels and different sorts of dangerous
“non-rebels.”
Taken together, all these reinventions and extensions reveal that, at least in times
of rebellion and political turmoil, political crimes in Mexico and Colombia did not exist as
a clear, definite, and stable criminal category. Governments in both countries defined and
redefined these crimes –together with the penalties linked to them– in correspondence with
the evolution of political conflict and the always changing dynamics and needs of state
repression. Reinventions and redefinitions took place in different and simultaneous
scenarios. They emerged, first of all, in the legislation, whether through the reinterpretation
of current laws or the enactment of new ones. They did, too, in the judicial system, through
the combination of common and political charges and the treatment of political offenses as
common crimes. Trials and tribunals also played a role in this regard, with the intervention
of multiple actors and instances, each one with their specific understandings of what
political crimes were and were not. So did legal and judicial practices of punishment, which
extended the logics of state retribution against political criminals way beyond the original
limits of a political crime. Marked by their diversity, flexibility, and mutability, repressive
and punitive reactions to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia did not comprise the totality
of governmental responses to political criminality during the period. While punishment
and retribution played a major role in this regard, leniency and mercy also had an important
part to play.
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VII. CHAPTER 6. THE LOGICS OF STATE LENIENCY: THE
ADMINISTRATION OF STATE MERCY TO POLITICAL CRIMINALS AND
THE POLITICAL USES OF PARDON

Reactions against rebels, conspirators, and political agitators during the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration involved a myriad of cases like those of Ricardo Flores Magón, Catarino
Garza, or Juan Galeana in Mexico. They also encompass dozens of stories of people that
fell victim of political and military repression during the administrations of Marroquín and
Reyes in Colombia. Do these experiences of persecution, repression, prison, confinement,
and death sum up the bulk of governmental responses to political criminality in both
countries during the period? Were there other ways of dealing with actual or potential
rebels, or any alternative mechanisms for neutralizing the political and military threats they
posed? Was there anything else other than repression and punishment? This final chapter
delves into one of the most overlooked aspects in the literature on the Díaz regime and the
Regeneration, and in general in the scholarship on civil wars and late-nineteenth century
authoritarianism in Latin America: pardon. Both in Mexico and Colombia, the legal
treatment of political criminals not only included diverse displays of state retribution. It
also involved multiple manifestations of state leniency and many different mechanisms
through which political criminals and prisoners could obtain some degree of redress from
the, otherwise prevalent, logics of state retribution.

Repression, retribution, and punishment represented just one side of the overall repertoire
of governmental responses to political criminality in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.
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Multiple manifestations of state mercy, together with a handful of legal and judicial
resources that allowed people to negotiate or terminate their penalties complemented this
repertoire. How did these manifestations of mercy operate in both Mexico and Colombia?
How and in which conditions did Mexican and Colombian governments used mercy in
responding to political criminality? What were the purposes of state mercy for political
criminals, as well as their legal and political effects? And, how did political prisoners and
criminals take advantage of these options in order to improve their legal and judicial
situation? These are some of the main questions structuring this chapter, intended to
analyze the logics of state leniency in both countries and explore what they reveal about
the workings of state power in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.
The chapter relies on a diverse series of primary sources. Memoirs, newspapers,
and official bulletins shed light on the multiple opportunities in which governments in
Mexico and Colombia responded to political criminals with different manifestations of
mercy. Constitutions and Criminal Codes account for the legal framework regulating the
administration of state leniency. Pardon decrees and amnesty laws offer a glimpse into the
effects, conditions, and restrictions of these acts of leniency. Requests for pardon and
petitions for other forms of grace illustrate the language of these acts and how people
managed to obtain mercy by legal means. Finally, judicial records and other similar sources
reveal the ultimate outcomes of such requests, together with other details concerning the
interactions between the state and the people requesting mercy. Section one explores the
administration of mercy for political crimes in Porfirian Mexico, and pays special attention
to the dynamics of state leniency during the conflictive 1890s. Section two focuses on the
Colombian case, exploring a series of pardons and amnesties during the Regeneration and
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the Quinquenio. These sections also address a variety of issues concerning the individual
negotiation of mercy, especially during the early 1900s in Mexico and the Thousand Days’
war in Colombia. Section three, finally, includes a few reflections on the relationship
between retribution and mercy as expressions of state power in both Mexico and Colombia.
Overall, the chapter argues that the logics of state leniency for political crimes in
the Porfiriato and the Regeneration did not differ much from the logics of state retribution
previously analyzed. Such similarities stem from the fact that they both were parallel and
complementary manifestations of state power and sovereignty. State mercy was a powerful
tool for bolstering state hegemony, advancing the state’s interests in political and military
conflicts, stimulating relationships of allegiance, dependence, and patronage, and
attempting to turn unruly political dissidents into obedient and submissive citizens. In this
light, mercy, like punishment, played a key role in fostering sovereignty, neutralizing
internal threats, and helping ensure state hegemony.

Political Crimes and State Mercy in the Porfiriato: The Selective and Uncertain
Logics of Porfirian Leniency
The administration of state mercy for political crimes in Porfirian Mexico involved two
major mechanisms. On the one hand, there were formal, legal manifestations of state
leniency that took the form of amnesty laws or general pardons. These could emanate from
different authorities depending on the jurisdiction in question. They could be either federal,
granted by the President and the Congress, or provincial, issued by a state’s governor or its
legislature. It all depended on whether the crimes in question had a federal/national nature
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or not.540 On the other hand, there were multiple practices of individual petitioning and
bargaining that aimed to negotiate punishment and obtain redress from the workings and
effects of state retribution. Individual requests for presidential pardons represented the
most common practice in this regard. Taken together, all these mechanisms reveal
important details concerning the nature and functioning of both state power and state mercy
during the Porfiriato.

Pardons and Amnesties in the Porfirian Era.
Both the Constitution and the Criminal Code set the basic normative framework for the
administration of state leniency in Porfirian Mexico. Amnesties, understood as generalized
acts of grace that benefitted an indefinite number of people regardless of the crimes they
had committed, were a matter for the Legislative power. Pardons, more restricted in their
scope and commonly directed towards a determinate number of individuals, corresponded
to the Executive, which according to the Criminal Code had no restrictions for granting
this grace to political criminals. The pardoning of political crimes, according to the Code,
depended exclusively on the president’s “prudence and discretion.”
Presidential pardons always had a relative, incomplete effect, tough. According to
the law, pardoned criminals still had to remain subjected to the authorities’ surveillance,
and could face prohibitions regarding where they could go or where they could live. In
addition, there were other provisions regulating the request and administration of pardons
by the Executive power. Convicted criminals could request the President a pardon the same
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way they could ask the Supreme Court for an injunction or amparo. Requests for pardon,
nevertheless, had to count on the approval of the Junta de Vigilancia de Cárceles before
they could go to the Executive power. The Junta was an organism in charge of supervising
prisons and monitoring the behavior of their inmates. Anytime prisoners wanted to file for
a pardon, they needed to ask the Junta for a “certificate of good behavior.” According to
the organism’s regulations, its members could refuse to issue the certificate if they
considered the petitioner had not acquired “habits of order, morality, and work.” Prisoners
also needed to demonstrate the Junta that they had performed some sort of work during
their time in prison.541 Such requirements gave this organism and its members a great deal
of discretion regarding who could ultimately request a pardon and who could not.
Overall, official manifestations of mercy through legal acts were relatively common
during the Porfiriato, especially during the late 1880s and the conflictive first half of the
1890s. Most of the acts of leniency from this period came from state governors and
legislatures, and responded to the need to put down local and regional insurrections. In
October 1886, for instance, the governor of Sonora decreed a pardon to all people involved
in a series of riots that had recently shaken the region. The grace in question was limited,
nonetheless. Citizens willing to enjoy the pardon had to appear before the provincial
authorities in order to obtain a salvoconducto –a safeguard document– that protected them
from further official persecution. People that did not appear before the authorities a month
after the enactment of the decree would be considered accomplices of the riots and
prosecuted as salteadores. The decree also excluded from the grace those responsible for
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the assassination of a senior executive official (prefect) that apparently had been murdered
during the events.542
During 1887 and 1888, the governments of Campeche, Veracruz, and Puebla would
grant amnesties for episodes of political turmoil that went back to 1882. In May 1887, the
governor of Campeche decreed a general amnesty for the benefit of all those involved in
an insurrection that took place in June 1886. The decree ordered the suspension of all
ongoing processes related to the event that corresponded to the state’s judicial power, and
requested President Díaz to intervene in favor of those whose cases belonged to the federal
military justice. To the state’s official newspaper, the grace did not respond to the fact that
there were political prisoners after almost a year of the incident, but to the circumstance
that there still were handfuls of fugitives running away from justice.543 Veracruz
proclaimed theirs in July 1888, in reference to an uprising that occurred in September 1885
under the leadership of the rebel Faustino Mora. The grace had no restriction or condition,
and only left out people that, during the events, had committed crimes unrelated to the
movement.544 Finally, the grace from Puebla came in August 1888, when the state
legislature amnestied a group of people charged with rebellion for participating in an
insurrection in the town of Itacamaxtitlán in November 1882. Unlike the previous ones,
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this amnesty included no restrictions, probably as a result of the long time that had elapsed
between the events and the granting of the grace.545
The states of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Guerrero would grant analogous graces
throughout 1893. In September, Coahuila’s legislature granted an amnesty for all political
crimes committed in the state up to the date of the legislative act. The grace implied the
suspension of all ongoing process for political offenses, the release of all political prisoners,
and the restoration of their civil and political rights.546 The amnesty took place soon after
the insurrection of Emilio Carranza in August that year. The movement was a result of the
tensions between Carranza and the current governor, José M. Garza Galán, for the control
of the state Executive. Díaz would mediate in this conflict of regional strongmen by
ordering the replacement of Garza Galán and encouraging the state legislature to treat
Carranza and his people with leniency.547 A month later, the legislature of Nuevo León
would amnesty the participants in Monterrey’s April revolt. The grace left out all people
charged with homicide and injuries, as well as the authors of a publication from April 29
that, allegedly, attacked and slandered the state governor.548
Guerrero’s amnesty, proclaimed by the state legislature on November 1893,
followed the surrendering of the rebel general Canuto Neri after an insurrection against the
Governor Francisco Arce a month earlier. Neri’s conflict with Arce resembled, to a great
extent, the rivalry between Carranza and Garza Galán in Coahuila. It was also a struggle
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between two regional strongmen over the control of the state’s Executive. As in Coahuila,
the insurrection counted on the mediation of Díaz, who pressed not only for Neri’s
surrender but also for Arce’s resignation. Both moves proved successful, and the conflict
concluded soon. The grace in question would mark the end of the conflict, granting “the
widest and most complete amnesty” to all people involved in the movement, regardless of
the crimes they had committed. As in previous cases, there were some conditions. The
legislative act gave Neri’s people a 15-day term to appear before the state authorities and
turn their weapons in. Authorities also had to keep a record with the names of all
surrendering rebels, the date and hour of their surrender, and the number and type of
weapons they turned in.549 The amnesty certainly benefited Neri, but for many of his men
it did not bring about the promised effect. Many of Neri’s subalterns and soldiers would
fall victim of the federal army soon after the enactment of the grace.550
The initiatives of the government of Chihuahua during and after the rebellion in
Tomochic offer a last example of these provincial acts of grace during the convoluted
1890s. In June 1892, months before the government’s final strike against the indigenous
rebels, the state legislature studied a draft of an amnesty law that aimed to benefit people
involved in the demonstrations and attacks of December 1891 and January 1892.551 There
is no further evidence regarding the fate of this draft. Chihuahua’s government would not
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give rebels a formal offer of leniency until March 1894, when the state governor issued a
decree granting them a conditioned pardon. The grace involved “all Mexican citizens that
since September 1892 to today have taken up arms against the legitimate authorities,” and
only covered political crimes.552 In order to enjoy the effects of the pardon, rebels had to
present themselves before the state authorities within a two-month term. Once there, they
had to manifest “their submission to the supreme powers of the federation and the state,”
as well as their compromise to surrender any weapons and ammunition in their possession.
All rebels that failed to comply this requirement would be excluded from the grace and
subjected to prosecution as “disturbers of public order.”553 A second amnesty decree, this
time from January 1895, would offer a complementary and non-restricted grace to the
rebels involved in the events of January 1892.554
Formal acts of grace at the federal level were, in comparison, scarce. During the
1880s and the 1890s, Mexico’s Congress enacted only one amnesty law, involving a
rebellion that took place in Zacatecas during September to November 1886. Like many
other amnesty acts from the period, this law represented a grace for political crimes,
ordering the release of all political prisoners, and authorizing the suspension of all ongoing
judicial processes concerning the events.555 According to the legislative debates prior to
the law’s enactment, the amnesty had the primary goal of benefitting the prisoners who
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remained in the prisons of both Zacatecas and Mexico City. The rebellion had concluded
with the death of its ringleaders, and the rebels that authorities had sent to prison had neither
political importance nor a criminal background. Their release, therefore, would not put the
public order at risk. In addition, the authors of the amnesty project maintained, the
Zacatecas movement did not have the characteristics of other revolutions. Neither did it
cause the evils that civil wars commonly brought. As per the legislators it was, in sum,
nothing but “a revolutionary creature (engendro revolucionario) that died right after it was
born, leaving no other consequences but twelve graves and a handful of prisoners for whom
we request mercy.”556
Individual presidential pardons seemed to be slightly more common than federal
amnesties. Between the late 1880s and mid-1890s, Porfirio Díaz would pardon at least
three political criminals, one in May 1887, another in April 1894, and one more in June
that year. The first of these pardons corresponded to general Miguel Negrete, prisoner in
Tlatelolco “for political reasons.”557 The second one benefited a Colonel Marín, also
prisoner in Tlatelolco under similar charges.558 The last pardon, finally, involved a
journalist from one of the many newspapers that the government suspended in the 1890s,
who remained an inmate in the prison of Belém.559 Although individual petitions for pardon
by political criminals were common, Díaz was not always willing to grant former rebels
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mercy. When informing about the pardoning of Colonel Marín, the newspaper La Voz de
México wondered why the President did not treat the political prisoners from Belém with
the same leniency he had treated the rebellious colonel. Díaz selectivity in matters of
pardon was striking, the paper suggested. While in many cases he would deny petitions for
pardon with the argument that the law made him unable to intervene in the course of
judicial processes, in others he seemed to have no problem at all in pardoning political
criminals. It was curious, then, that political prisoners whose charges were similar to
Marin’s –and ever less serious– could not enjoy the same sort of grace he had been
granted.560
La Voz de México was not alone in his criticism of Díaz’s selective mercy and
overall disregard for political prisoners. In May 1894, the paper El Tiempo published a note
denouncing that, while common prisoners in Mexico City were able to receive daily visits,
political prisoners were not able to see any visitors at all. To El Tiempo, it was also unfair
that the President actively mediated in the granting of amnesties to regional strongmen like
Canuto Neri, while he did nothing to better the situation of the many journalists imprisoned
in the capital for political crimes. It seemed that Díaz considered Neri and other “estimable
rebels” “very respectable and worthy of consideration,” and deemed their insurrections as
mere results of their “bad mood.” In any case, the paper pointed out, Díaz did not seem to
be resentful towards armed strongmen, contrary to the way he felt about dissident
journalists.561
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The complains of El Tiempo and La Voz de México were not unfounded. Díaz’s
manifestations of mercy were not only selective but also strategic, as his mediation in the
insurrections of Neri and Carranza suggests. In both cases, the President’s managed to
appease the underlying power struggles by replacing the challenged governors and granting
amnesty to their respective challengers. The opportune replacement of governors in the
states allowed Díaz to strategically distribute regional power among the different
strongmen of every province, securing their submission and allegiance. The administration
of leniency to rebel regional leaders also played a part in this mechanism of political
cooptation, as Díaz’s tendency to pardon high-profile rebels from the regional elites
suggests. Neri and Carranza were not the only recipients of this sort of “strategic grace:”
so were people like Diego Álvarez in Guerrero and Luiz Terrazas in Chihuahua,
responsible for encouraging uprisings in their respective states during the early 1890s.562
Díaz’s strategic intervention in these regional conflicts would make antiporfiristas like
Ramón Prida insinuate that, ultimately, all these revolts had been plotted and encouraged
by the same President with the interest of safeguarding his interests in the states in
question.563
Partial, selective, politically instrumental, and even subject of criticism,
governmental acts of grace in Porfirian Mexico carried nonetheless the meaning of acts of
magnanimity that both expressed and reinforced state sovereignty. Congressmen and
newspapers alike tended to present amnesty laws and executive pardons as displays of
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mercy that fostered the government’s sovereignty and reinforced the President’s authority.
While discussing the amnesty law regarding the insurrection in Zacatecas, the project’s
supporters defended the importance of the grace in question by using arguments of this
sort. To them, “[state] authority [was] never stronger than when it [displayed] itself as
magnanimous, through the exercise of the derecho de gracia and the granting of pardons.”
“Forgiving the guilty,” the congressmen explained, “is one of the greatest attributes of
sovereignty,” as well as a “humanitarian right” that the Congress should exercise anytime
required.564
Analogous arguments guided the paper La Convención Radical Obrera when it
informed about the presidential pardon of General Miguel Negrete in May 1887. The note,
titled “Magnanimidad,” maintained that with the pardoning of the rebel official Díaz had
“given a demonstration of his greatness of spirit.” “The current government, strong,
respected, and loved, knows to defeat its adversaries with displays of generosity,” the paper
explained. “And we are positive that the brave General Negrete will know to appreciate
and value the magnanimous action of his former brother-in-arms,” they concluded.565 Later
that year, the official newspaper of the state of Campeche used analogous terms in
reference to two recent acts of governmental mercy. The first one was the federal amnesty
for the people involved in the Zacatecas rebellion, which the paper considered “an example
of magnanimity from the federal powers.” The second one was the recent amnesty that the
state governor had declared for the participants in the uprising of June 1886. With this act,
the newspaper claimed, the governor “had given the ultimate proof of magnanimity and
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clemency.” Both amnesties suggested that the current policy towards political criminals
throughout the country privileged pardon and leniency over “political resentments,” they
concluded.566
The interpretation of governmental leniency as manifestations of state magnanimity
and government sovereignty reveals an interesting detail regarding the workings of and
discourses about state power in late-nineteenth century Mexico. Arguments linking mercy,
authority, and magnanimity, as well as discourses emphasizing mercy as a demonstration
of the Díaz’s “greatness of spirit” –or presenting mercy as “one of the greatest attributes of
sovereignty”– had a striking similarity with colonial discourses about mercy and royal
sovereignty. These notions about authority, governance, and mercy in the late 1880s
seemed to present Díaz as a paternal figure of power modelled –at least partially– after the
image of a king. In the colonial Spanish Atlantic, the king was a sort of father whose
majesty and authority manifested both through acts of punishment and retribution and
through displays of leniency, kindness, and forgiveness. The dispensation of leniency,
indeed, was considered a prerogative of the king, who was expected to forgive criminals
regardless the severity of their actions. Royal mercy played multiple roles in the colonial
era. It helped instill obedience and loyalty in the crown’s subjects, strengthened the
legitimacy of the king and the monarchy, and fostered royal hegemony by promoting
gratitude.567 There are no major differences between these colonial discourses and the idea
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that Díaz’s manifestations of mercy were displays of generosity on the part of a “strong,
respected, and loved government.”
The critical decade of the 1900s closes with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution
in November 1910, the exile of Porfirio Díaz in May 1911, and, curiously, a generous
amnesty following Díaz’s departure. The amnesty seemed to bring closure to a complex
decade of failed insurrections, frustrated conspiracies, and strong repression against
antiporfiristas both in Mexico and abroad. Enacted by the interim president Francisco de
la Barra on May 27, the grace granted an unrestricted amnesty for political crimes and actos
conexos committed up to the date of the decree’s expedition. As in previous cases, the
amnesty ordered the release of all political prisoners and the suspension of all ongoing
processes. In addition, it established that no further criminal process could invoke or take
into account the crimes subjected to the grace. It was a long series of crimes including,
among others, rebellion; sedition; conspiracy; hiding or helping spies; providing rebels
with supplies, weapons, and means of transportation; recruitment rebels; helping revolts,
seditions, and rebellions to succeed; and even encouraging people to commit any of these
offenses. The amnesty also involved any military crime that the rebels had committed as
part of their other offenses, as well as any gathering of funds to finance insurgent
enterprises –as long as it did not correspond to acts of plunder, robbery, kidnapping, and
homicide.568 No formal act of leniency during the Porfiriato had been as generous,
comprehensive and detailed as the amnesty that marked the end of Díaz’s regime was.
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What does this overview of formal acts of leniency reveal about the workings,
purposes, and understandings of state mercy in Porfirian Mexico? A first aspect has to do
with the political uses of mercy and the importance of leniency as a mechanism to ensure
allegiance, submission, and obedience. At a discursive level, mercy was both an attribute
and an expression of state sovereignty; a practice that reflected the paternal magnanimity
of the sovereign and reinforced both his authority and people’s respect and love towards
him. These understandings of mercy, authority, and sovereignty drew upon a discursive
legacy from colonial times, which accounts for the survival of pre-independence notions
of governance and state legitimacy even by the end of the nineteenth century. At a more
practical level, the administration of mercy made possible the consolidation of political
relationships of dependence, negotiation, cooptation, and conflict resolution that helped
consolidate Díaz’s hegemony throughout Mexico in the 1880s and 1890s. This also helps
explain the concentration of pardons and amnesties in these two decades, in comparison
with the equally convoluted but –apparently– less merciful 1900s. The selectivity of
presidential pardons and the strategic uses of mercy as a mediation tool in conflicts about
regional power during these years illustrate this political instrumentalization of state mercy
during the first part of the Porfiriato.
A second aspect in this regard has to do with the decentralized nature of state mercy.
Amnesties and official acts of grace seemed to be more common at the regional level than
at the federal one. Although most regional insurrections during the Porfiriato counted on
the intervention of the federal military, the pardoning of the political crimes committed
during these episodes tended to remain a matter of provincial politics and legislation. A
third element concerns the restricted, conditional nature of most of the amnesties reviewed.
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Some of these acts of grace had a limited application and seemed to leave out some crimes
and criminals on purpose, as happened with the amnesty decreed in Nuevo León, in
response to the events of April 1903 in the state’s capital, Monterrey. Others simply did
not come fully into effect, as occurred with the amnesty for Canuto Neri and his people
that same year. Also, the willingness of state governors and the legislature to treat rebels
with leniency often contrasted with the many conditions established for the enjoyment of
the grace. Leniency was commonly conditioned by the legal and symbolic submission of
rebels to the authorities, their acceptance of the government’s legitimacy, and their
reconversion from unruly dissidents into obedient, submissive citizens. In Porfirian
Mexico, mercy had a political price that primarily benefited the government and its
authority.

The Nature and Fate of Individual Negotiations of Mercy in the Porfiriato.
Political prisoners in Porfirian Mexico did not necessarily had to wait for amnesties or
similar acts of leniency in order to achieve some sort of grace from the government. They
could also find their own ways to obtain a presidential pardon or a prison release by directly
negotiating their legal situation with the corresponding authorities. As mentioned in
previous chapters, appeals and amparos were always available options for walking out of
prison, and the law allowed prisoners to request presidential pardons as long as they met
the requirements of their respective juntas de vigilancia. Prisoners also had the option to
negotiate a conditioned release under the figure of “preparatory liberty” (See Chapter 2),
and even could negotiate a judicial bond (caución judicial). Commonly used in cases of
threats against individuals, judicial bonds were a mechanism that allowed criminals to walk
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out of jail after signing a compromise of not committing the crime or crimes they were
supposed to commit. A specific amount of money that the offender had to pay in case he
failed to keep his word reinforced the compromise in question. It was, in sum, a mechanism
for the prevention of certain crimes that authorities could use in order to secure the good
behavior of an actual or potential criminal.569
Common and political criminals during the Porfiriato seemed to be particularly
aware of the multiplicity of mechanisms they could use in order to negotiate their penalties
or walk out of jail. Many of them would even try to combine several of these resources as
part of their overall strategies to obtain a grace. As some of the examined cases illustrate,
this last strategy did not always lead to positive outcomes for the petitioners. Despite the
diversity of options available for negotiating punishment and mercy in Porfirian Mexico,
individual requests for pardon were often complicated processes that demanded a careful
navigation through a complex array of legal options and requirements.
The cases of Antonio Bustamante in 1894 and Aarón López Manzano in 1910 shed
light on the workings of judicial cautions during the period. Authorities from Nuevo
Laredo, Tamaulipas, arrested Bustamante and two other people at the beginning of May
1894, all of them under charges of rebellion. After just a few days in prison, Bustamante
succeeded in requesting a judicial caution that allowed him to walk out of jail.570 López
Manzano’s case was much more complicated. Arrested for his alleged participation in the
failed revolutionary plot of 1906, López Manzano still remained a prisoner in 1910. In
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April that year, a judge finally sentenced him to 6 years in prison. Two months after
receiving the sentence, the prisoner filed a petition for a judicial caution. Several months
later, in February 1911, the corresponding authorities let him know that they had denied
his request, with no further explanations. López Manzano appealed the decision before the
Supreme Court, but the high tribunal backed the original decision.571
It was not the first time that López Manzano requested his release from prison. After
receiving a first sentence in 1910, he had filed a petition of release under the mechanism
of preparatory liberty. The prisoner supported his second request with a document from his
Junta de Vigilancia certifying his good behavior. The certificate stated that, during his
years in prison, the petitioner had neither infringed the establishment’s rules nor been
subject of any sanction or reprimand. The response to the petition came a month before the
denial of his judicial bond: the authorities in charge of reviewing his case had decided to
reject the petition because the certificate of good behavior was not convincing enough.
According to them, the fact that López Manzano had had a “good negative behavior” in
prison –meaning not doing anything against the institution’s rules– did not automatically
make him worthy to obtain preparatory liberty. It was also necessary that the petitioner
demonstrated “positive facts” proving that he “had dominated the vicious passion or
inclination that led him into the criminal path.” Preparatory liberty required not only
respecting the prison’s rules, but also acquiring “habits of order, work, and morality,”
authorities explained. Since López Manzano had been unable to prove the acquisition of
such habits during his time in prison, he could not enjoy the benefit in question. It was the
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same response that, a short while before, authorities had given his fellow political prisoner
Juan Sarabia when he tried to request his preparatory liberty.572
The experiences of Agustín Villaraus, José Sagardi and Silvestre F., imprisoned for
their participation in an uprising in Jalapa, Veracruz, in August 1878, offer additional
examples regarding people filing simultaneous petitions for grace. Between September and
October that year, after spending no more than a couple months in prison, the four prisoners
decided to request a presidential pardon. In his petition, signed on September 26, Silvestre
F. argued that his participation in the movement had been involuntary and therefore he had
surrendered at the first opportunity. Sagardi filed his petition on the same day, mentioning
similar arguments concerning his involuntary involvement in the uprising. Villaraus’s
petition came a few days later, on October 1. Besides mentioning that his family was poor
and depended on him for their subsistence, the petitioner also argued that the uprising in
question had been insignificant. It had been a short-lived movement with no major actions
of war and no regrettable consequences. Furthermore, it had concluded with the prompt
and voluntary surrender of all insurrectionists.573
The petitions had different outcomes. A couple of reports from October 10 reported
that President Díaz had pardoned Silvestre F. and Sagardi. Two weeks later, a third report
mentioned that it was possible that Villaraus did not share his fellow’s fate, since he had
served the insurrection as a captain. The President also accepted the request of a fourth
prisoner, Vicente Zarelo, who had filed an analogous petition around the same time.
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Sagardi and Zarelo, nonetheless, had gone further than their fellow prisoners in their
requests for pardon, submitting not one but two individual petitions to the President. Either
because of their insistence or because their little value as political prisoners, both
petitioners managed to obtain a grace that seemed elusive to others.574
The simultaneous combination of strategies for the negotiation of penalties not
always worked in benefit of the petitioners. In October 1909, Bernardo Bargo Gómez,
prisoner in Yucatán under charges of sedition, tried to walk out of jail by requesting an
amparo from the Supreme Court. The reasons for the amparo had to do with irregularities
concerning his capture and subsequent imprisonment. The tribunal denied the request, not
because his complain was unfounded, but because of a technical reason. Bargo Gómez not
only had requested an amparo, but also had appealed the judicial sentence that put him in
jail, which complicated the situation and blocked any possibility of an immediate
intervention by the Supreme Court. Facing this situation, the high tribunal decided that it
could not annul the sentence before the appeal process came to a full resolution. Bargo
Gomez, in consequence, had to remain in jail.575 His case is just an example of several
other cases involving both political and common criminals whose simultaneous requests
for freedom or pardon ended up working against them for technical reasons. The case of a
prisoner sentenced to death, that in 1910 managed to obtain a presidential pardon but could
not enjoy the grace because he had an ongoing appeal process, offers a dramatic illustration
of the consequences of such technicalities. Apparently, this situation was so recurrent by

574

Relativo al levantamiento.”

575

SCJ, 1909, Expediente 2275: “Toca al juicio de amparo promovido ante el juzgado de distrito de Yucatán
por Bernardo B. Gómez contra el juez menor de Isla Mujeres.”

367

then that the Secretary of Justice issued a recommendation to all public defenders telling
them to file requests for pardon exclusively after exhausting all other available legal
means.576
How did state mercy work at the less solemn, more quotidian level of the individual
negotiation of penalties? The reviewed cases, as diverse as they are, reveal that although
state punishment was often subject of revision and bargaining, leniency was an elusive
outcome. The existence of a variety of legal and judicial mechanisms for requesting and
obtaining some sort of grace did not necessary mean that mercy was an easily attainable
goal. None of these mechanisms could grant it automatically or guarantee it beforehand.
Similarly, no argument seemed to have unequivocal effects concerning the granting of
denying of mercy. It did not matter that such arguments invoked the violation of
constitutional rights, “good behavior” in prison, a prompt surrender to the government, or
the lack of political and military significance of a given uprising. Mercy for political
crimes, in short, was always a possibility, but sometimes a remote one. It depended on
many factors including the legal strategies employed (case Bargo Gómez); the qualities
and background of petitioners or their value as political prisoners (case Villaraus); and even
the discretion of the authorities in case of reviewing the petitions (case López Manzano).
The uncertainty surrounding these individual requests shows again that, in the Mexico of
Porfirio Díaz, leniency for political crimes was commonly selective and a matter of legal
and political strategy.
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Mercy, Rebellion, and Regeneration: Political Crimes and the Administration of State
Leniency in Colombia
The administration of state mercy for political crimes in Colombia had several points in
common with the Mexican experience. Leniency could take the form of official acts of
grace like amnesties and pardons, or emerge out of individual negotiations leading to
judicial cautions and other classes of benefits and concessions. Regulations regarding
amnesties and pardons were relatively similar in both cases, although there were slight
differences concerning the definition, nature, and limits of these acts. Other general
similarities between the two experiences include the fact that, like in Mexico, leniency in
Colombia was also conditioned by the submission of rebels to the authorities, their
acceptance of the government’s legitimacy, and their conversion from unruly dissidents
into obedient, submissive citizens.

Amnesties and Pardons during the Regeneration and the Quinquenio.
The granting of amnesties and pardons during the Regeneration and the Quinquenio also
depended on a series of constitutional and legal regulations concerning the administration
of state mercy by the different public powers. Amnesties, according to these regulations,
were general, comprehensive acts of grace whose intentions were to “forget” or “overlook”
the criminality of certain acts and exempt criminals from the corresponding penalties.
Pardons, like in Mexico, worked in a different way. They did not necessarily have a
comprehensive scope and could target either an entire group or a single individual. Pardons
did not overlook the criminality of a given offense; they merely forgave the penalty that
should correspond to the crime. According to the definitions in the Colombian law, much
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more developed than their Mexican counterparts, amnesties “erased” the criminality of a
particular action, and their effects turned criminals into “non-criminals.” Pardons, on the
contrary, recognized such criminality and considered offenders subjects of punishment.
Their effects consisted only on forgiving the deserved penalty. According to the
Constitution, the administration of amnesties corresponded to the Legislative power, which
should grant them only in response to grave motives of public interest (“graves motivos de
conveniencia pública”), and always for political crimes, which marks another important
difference with respect to the Mexican case. Pardons, like in Mexico, were a matter of the
Executive power, which could grant them either for common or political offenses.577
The political and military turmoil of the 1890s and 1900s would give Colombian
governments several opportunities to administer state mercy through amnesties, pardons,
and other analogous modalities of grace. These acts of leniency materialized in diverse
ways, at different moments during a given conflict, and in response to multiple political,
military, and legal interests. Sometimes, a president could offer pardons in the middle of a
civil confrontation in order to “encourage” the surrendering of rebels. Analogous acts of
mercy commonly followed the end of a civil war and marked its formal end. Pardons, in
this case, represented the government’s compromise of not prosecuting –or hunting down–
its surrendered enemies, and allowed rebels to reincorporate to civil and political life free
from legal restrictions and criminal charges. Governments could also enact amnesties or
pardon decrees several years after the end of a conflict. These late manifestations of mercy
entailed both symbolic and legal purposes. On the one hand, they represented acts of
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governmental reconciliation with former internal enemies. On the other hand, they
commonly expanded the scope and effects of previous pardons, eliminating many of their
–always existing– restrictions and therefore making more people eligible for state mercy.
The series of amnesties and pardons for political crimes granted by Colombian
governments during the period offers several examples of how these modalities of
governmental leniency worked and unfolded.
A first example of these formal manifestations of state mercy comes from 1894. In
August that year, the House studied a draft of an amnesty law that aimed to give formal
closure to two years of internal turmoil and insurrectionist plots –which included the
Bogotá riots of January 1893, the frustrated insurrection of Avelino Rosas seven months
later, and a failed revolutionary plan in April 1894. The proposed measure granted a “broad
amnesty for crimes and faults of political nature, committed up to the date of the
promulgation of this law.” It also ordered the cancellation of all ongoing judicial processes
for political crimes, and allowed the return to the country of all political exiles and
fugitives.578 Although the project did not prosper, an analogous decree issued that year
ended up granting political prisoners a grace that mainly benefited those frustrated April
insurrectionists that by mid-year remained in prison.579
The civil war of 1895 involved at least two major formal manifestations of state
mercy vis-à-vis political criminals. In March that year, days after the battle that signed the
ultimate defeat of the Liberal forces, Conservative General Manuel Casabianca issued a
decree granting rebels some basic guarantees in exchange of their surrender. Casabianca’s
578

“Proyecto de ley sobre amnistía,” Anales de la Cámara de Representantes, August 17, 1894.

579

Aguilera Peña, Insurgencia, 379.

371

decree offered rebel ringleaders, officers, and rank-and-file soldiers liberty as long as they
laid down their arms and presented themselves before the corresponding authorities in
order to negotiate their legal situation. The offer excluded rebels responsible for common
crimes. The promised liberty, nonetheless, had significant restrictions. It was subjected to
the authorities’ surveillance and dependent on judicial bonds, which meant that
surrendering rebels still had to regularly present themselves before a local or provincial
authority and secure their “good political behavior” with a sum of money. In addition, the
Decree gave authorities the power to order the imprisonment of confinement of
surrendering officials “for special reasons,” and left to their discretion the criteria for
deciding what a “special reason” was.580
The state of siege that the government had declared by the beginning of the war
remained in place until November 1895, when President Caro finally succeeded in
pacifying the region of Casanare, southwest of the country. The formal reestablishment of
public order that month came together with the enactment of a pardon decree aiming to
offer the defeated Liberals better and less restrictive guarantees. The decree declared the
conflict terminated and granted pardon to all people involved in the revolution with a few
important exceptions. Rebels charged with common crimes, ringleaders accused of
organizing armed expeditions outside Colombian territory, and people sentenced in courtsmartial for the same offense remained outside the effects of the grace. The decree also
allowed political refugees to return to the country, as long as they formally promised “to
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maintain a peaceful and respectful behavior towards the legitimate authorities.”581 The
limitations and conditions in question met with rejection from the Liberal party. To Rafael
Uribe Uribe, the decree contained “wretched restrictions” (mezquinas restricciones) that
narrowed down the effects of the pardon rendering it applicable only to an insignificant
number of people. As a congressman in 1896, Uribe Uribe would propose an amnesty law
reforming the terms of the 1895 Decree, especially in those points pertaining the exceptions
to the pardon and the conditions for the return of Liberal exiles.582
Uribe Uribe’s project would meet serious resistance from the Conservative bloc in
the Senate, which insisted in keeping all Liberals accused of or processed for common
crimes outside the reach of the government’s mercy. It took the Congress two years to turn
Uribe Uribe’s project into an actual amnesty law –Law 14, 1898. The new legislative act
reformed most of the restrictions that the 1895 Decree had imposed, and made the pardon
accessible to all rebels and political prisoners with the exception of those who had already
been sentenced for common crimes. It also allowed exiles to return to the country without
the requirement of a formal promise of good political behavior.583
Pardons during and after the Thousand Days followed a relatively similar pattern.
Although both Sanclemente and Marroquín manifested in multiple times their willingness
to grant Liberals mercy in exchange of their surrender, an official offer of pardon would
not materialize until well into the third year of the conflict. It was already June 1902, when
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President Marroquín enacted Decree 933 granting pardon to all rebels that laid down their
arms. The offer, according to the President, responded to three circumstances. First, it was
a response to the clamor of “several honorable citizens [that have] requested, in lively and
patriotic ways, a grace for the revolutionaries still in arms, who are expected to lay them
down if the government […] grants them guarantees.” Second, it took into consideration
the facts that the revolution was virtually defeated and the rebels’ situation was “truly
deplorable.” It was, then, the “most conducive moment” for “experiencing the effects of
government’s benevolence.” Finally, it manifested that the government was “in its best
disposition to contribute –as far as its decorum, the nation’s laws, and the ius gentium
allowed–, to the rapid termination of the war.”584
The terms of the offer did not differ much from the conditions of Casabianca’s 1895
Decree. Decree 933 granted a “wide pardon” to all Colombians involved in the revolution
that were willing to capitulate and surrender their weapons and war material to the
government. If the major revolutionary armies accepted the deal, the Decree also promised
the release and pardon of all political prisoners. There were several restrictions and
conditions, though. Surrendering Liberals had to declare before the government “their
willingness to live subjected to the legitimate authorities and laws,” as well as their
compromise to “not take up arms against the government once again.” Similarly, and like
in 1895, the offer left out rebels charged with common crimes, leaders and promoters of
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foreign expeditions against Colombian territory, and people judged in courts-martial for
the same offense.585
Rebel ringleaders reacted to the Decree the same way their fellow Liberals reacted
to Casabianca’s offer during the previous war. In a letter from July 1902 to President
Marroquín, General Uribe Uribe maintained that the proposed pardon did nothing but
requesting from the rebels what the government had been demanding since the beginning
of the war: an unconditional surrender. To the General, if the rebel movement had to admit
its defeat and plead for state mercy, it would not settle for less than a formal amnesty.
Amnesties meant “a reciprocal forgetfulness of all past events, the beginning of a new life,
or at least the massive and anonymous remission of guilt.” A pardon, on the contrary, meant
nothing but simply the forgiveness of a deserved penalty. “Accepting the pardon would
amount to confessing that we have committed a crime.” Yet, the rebellion had not been a
criminal endeavor whatsoever, explained Uribe Uribe. To him, rebels had acted as
“defenders of freedom” committed to carry on a “virtuous action” that had no traces of
criminality at all. The general’s criticism also fell on the many restrictions that the Decree
included, which pretty much applied “to all Liberals and even to quite a few
Conservatives.” “There is no major difference between your Decree and an order to
reinitiate hostilities,” Uribe Uribe concluded.586 Ultimately, Decree 933 did not have any
relevant impact on the course of the conflict.
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The surrender of Uribe Uribe’s troops in the Caribbean region, on October 1902,
gave both rebels and government a new opportunity to discuss and negotiate issues of state
mercy. This time, the rebels tried to press for an agreement that, instead of granting
individual and limited pardons, offered Liberals collective and comprehensive
guarantees.587 Liberal negotiators also sought to eliminate the differentiation between “acts
of war” and “common crimes” from the resulting treaty, and to erase from it the terms
“pardon” and “amnesty,” which they deemed “humiliating.”588 Their efforts proved
successful. The Neerlandia Treaty, signed on October 24, gave new life to the July grace
by eliminating all its restrictions (Art. 8). It also established that the government could not
prosecute, judge, or punish surrendering rebels for any act they had committed as soldiers
in active military service (Art. 7). Other compromises included the release of all political
prisoners in the departments or provinces of Magdalena and Bolivar (Art. 9), as well as the
suspension of all forced contributions against Liberals from both regions (Art. 12). The
treaty also offered legal and judicial protection to all political exiles that decided to return
to the country (Art. 11). It also exhorted President Marroquín to use of his derecho de
gracia in benefit of Liberals sentenced by courts-martial and that, for any reason, were
unable to enjoy the effects of the treaty (Art. 8).589
The Wisconsin Treaty, signed on November 21 after the surrender of Benjamín
Herrera’s forces in Panama, extended the effects of state leniency over to the rest of the
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country. The agreement granted “wide amnesty and complete guarantees for both all people
involved in the current revolution and their property,” and ordered the immediate
suspension of all ongoing processes for political crimes (Art. 4). Following the lines of the
previous agreement, the treaty ordered the immediate release of all political prisoners in
the country (Art. 2), as well as the suspension of all forced contributions (Art. 3). Finally,
the agreement suspended the jurisdiction of military justice over common crimes
committed by the rebels, turning their judgement into a matter for the ordinary justice
system (Art. 5).590 A decree issued three days later would ratify and reinforce these
compromises by declaring the war terminated and granting Liberals a “general pardon.”
The decree declared pardoned “all individuals that, as a result of their involvement in the
rebellion, have been sentenced to presidio, prison, or any other penalty imposed by courtsmartial or any other authority.” It also ordered the immediate release of all political
prisoners remaining in all jails and punishment establishments throughout the country, and
stated that all political exiles were free to return.591
A couple of laws enacted in October 1903 would give further support to the legal
compromises that accompanied the end of the Thousand Days. On October 10, Congress
enacted Law 23, which granted common criminals a grace consisting of the reduction of a
fifth of their corresponding sentences. According to the Law, the grace responded to
extensive pleads for mercy from several places in the country, and represented a sort of
“reparation” for the hardships and privations that prisoners experienced during the three
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years of the conflict.592 A few weeks later, on October 31, a second law proclaimed a new
and wider grace for political criminals –Law 57. The Law conferred “wide pardon for the
political crimes committed during the time of the last rebellion.”593 These two additional
acts of mercy not only benefitted the legal situation of those Liberals formerly charged
with political crimes. They also helped alleviate the situation of those rebels that, as a
consequence of the legal and judicial reforms that took place during the war, had been
judged and punished as common offenders.
Governmental reactions to the plots of 1905 and 1906 against Rafael Reyes’s life
offer another example of these practices of state mercy during the period. Although the
government’s response to both plots was energetic and involved strong displays of state
retaliation, there was some room for leniency as well. On July 20, 1906, President Reyes
would enact a decree pardoning the five people that a court martial had sentenced in
February that year for their responsibility in the plot of December 1905. The decree also
granted pardon to “all individuals that are currently confined for political crimes.” The
grace, nonetheless, was limited. It did not apply to people involved in the attack of
February, and left out “those individuals that being notoriously dangerous in a particular
town had been confined to another place for the sake of public peace.” In addition, the
pardon in question did not have a general and immediate effect, but depended on special
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resolutions from the War Minister, who had the power to decide which people could and
could not enjoy the grace.594
This conditioned and very limited pardon did not represent the only formal act of
state mercy during the Reyes administration. In May 1907, the Congress enacted a law
ordering the suspension of all penalties against combatants charged with common or
political crimes during the last civil wars. The grace did not differentiate between people
at the service of the government or combatants enrolled in an insurgent army, and made
them both subjects of the pardon. The only people who could not enjoy the grace were
those whose crimes involved death sentences according to the Criminal Code.595 A second
law enacted the following year would eliminate this restriction and make the grace
accessible to everybody, as long as their respective judicial experiences proved their
condition as combatants at the moment of the commission of their crimes. In addition, the
law declared under the statute of limitations all penalties imposed –or susceptible to apply–
for common crimes committed before 1875.596

The different laws and decrees granting some sort of grace for political crimes between the
mid-1890s and the first decade of the 1900s reveal a series of important things about the
nature of governmental reactions to rebellion in Colombia during the period. The most
important aspect in this regard is that, although these reactions involved a great deal of
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repression and manifestations of state retribution, they also entailed significant displays of
leniency, mercy, and forgiveness. Legal responses to rebellion and political criminality did
much more than allowing the government to punish its internal enemies: they also set the
conditions for the negotiation of punishment and even for its eventual suspension or
forgiveness. As the experiences of 1895, 1902, 1907, and 1908 show, leniency was always
an option within the repertoire of possible governmental responses to episodes or rebellion
and civil warfare. Certainly, it was an option limited to specific circumstances and interests.
Yet, governments ended up falling back on it sooner or later throughout the course of a
given conflict. To forget and forgive criminal accusations and penalties was a means to
either encourage the surrender of insurgents or give legal closure to the confrontations,
while enhancing the regime’s legitimacy.
Legal manifestations of state mercy throughout the period were relatively consistent
in their effects but not completely uniform in their nature. Governments administered grace
in the form of amnesties, pardons, the releasing of prisoners, and sentence suspensions.
Each of these modalities had their own conditions and limitations. Amnesties seemed to be
scarce during the period, while pardons and sentence suspensions tended to be more
recurrent. To the logic of the Colombian governments of the time, it seemed easier –or
more convenient– to forgive the punishment their internal enemies deserved than to forget
or “erase” the criminality of their acts. In most of the reviewed cases, pardoned rebels
remained as “forgiven offenders,” not as “non-criminals.” Colombian authorities did not
seem prone to perceive and treat their surrender adversaries in a non-criminalizing way.
The contents, restrictions, and limitations of these legal acts of mercy reveal that
state leniency during the period was conditional and filled with exceptions. Many of these
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laws and decrees distinguished between common and political crimes, and limited the
effects of their grace to the latter. Some of them even differentiated between “serious” and
“less serious” political offenses, and excluded the former from the benefits in question.
Rebel ringleaders tended to have more difficulties than their subalterns for enjoying the
effects of state leniency, as illustrated by the pardons enacted during the war of 1895 and
the Thousand Days. That was also the case of high-profile rebels charged with treason, as
in the case of the same two conflicts, or processed for crimes punished with the death
penalty, as happened in 1907. Regardless of these limitations –often overridden by
subsequent legislative acts–, all the laws and decrees reviewed here reflect the existence of
two basic and fundamental premises regarding the government’s reaction to political
criminality. The first premise was that it was possible for the government, and even
expected from it, to forgive political crimes and criminals, either on the grounds of
“generalized pleads for mercy” or for reasons of “public convenience.” The second premise
was that political crimes could always be the subject of pardon, for they represented a
special, “less criminal” kind of criminality. The logics of state leniency, nevertheless, were
not limited to these formal manifestations of mercy, as the next section shows.

Negotiating Leniency One Case at a Time: Individual Petitions for Mercy during the
Thousand Days.
Like in the Mexican case, Colombian political prisoners were able to request mercy or
analogous benefits on their own initiative. As their fellow Mexicans, they could
individually negotiate and obtain sentence reductions, prison releases, and reassessment of
their penalties by directly negotiating their legal situation with local and provincial
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authorities. A series of petitions submitted by Liberals from Cauca and Antioquia during
the Thousand Days illustrates the characteristics of these individual negotiations of mercy.
What were the goals of these petitions and requests? What were the arguments and
discursive strategies that petitioners used in order to strengthen their claims? How did
authorities react to these petitions, and how much leniency were they willing to grant in
these cases? The examination of these petitions sheds light on how logics of state leniency
unfolded outside the formal sphere of legislative acts of mercy.
A first group of these individual requests includes petitions for prison release by
political prisoners claiming that their imprisonments were unfounded, unfair, or
exaggerated in light of their minimum or nonexistent compromises with the rebellion.
Requests of this kind commonly followed a similar pattern. They included the formal
petition, an explanation of the reasons why the petitioner considered he should not remain
in jail, and the indication of two or three witnesses who could account for the authenticity
of such reasons. In order to make a better case for themselves, most petitioners opted to
appoint witnesses that were either Conservative or well-known “friends of the
government.” Commonly, witnesses had to answer to three or four questions regarding the
criminal background of the petitioner, his political compromises, or his behavior during
the war. After hearing the witnesses, local authorities decided whether or not it was
convenient to release the petitioner.597
The fate of the requests commonly depended on the political background of the
petitioner and the discretion of local and provincial authorities. In November 1900,
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Secundino Rodríguez, prisoner in Popayán, requested his release on the ground that he
“had not intervened, neither directly nor directly, in the current revolution.” After
collecting the corresponding testimonies confirming Rodríguez’s claim, a war auditor from
Cali denied his petition arguing that “while the revolution continued, no political prisoner
should walk free.” An authority from Popayán would support this decision a few days later,
arguing that, since the petitioner was an enemy of the government, he could not walk free
until the rebellion ceased to disturb the department. Finally, in December that year,
authorities decided to release Rodríguez by confining him to the city and forcing him to
secure his good political behavior with a judicial bond.598 That was also the case of Rafael
Ágredo, who requested his release in November 1900 with similar arguments. Authorities
from Popayán denied his request by arguing that no enemy of the government could walk
free while the rebellion continued. Yet, later on, they would grant him home detention and
a bond. This “partial release” responded to the reason that, while it was true that he had not
taken up arms against the government, it was also true that he had done nothing to defend
it either.599 The argument that no prisoner should be released while the rebellion persisted
also allowed Cauca’s authorities to deny the request of Apolinar Santander the same
month.600
Prisoners accused of playing an active role in the rebellion and their armies
commonly had limited possibilities of succeeding with their petitions. In May 1900,

598

“Solicitud de Secundino Rodríguez, vecino de Túquerres,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin
número: “Solicitudes de presos políticos.”
599

“Solicitud de Rafael Ágredo,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número.

600

“Solicitud de Apolinar Santander,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número. Like in the two
previous cases, Santander had managed to succesfully prove his non-existent links with the revolution.

383

authorities rejected José Mera’s petition on the ground that he had been part of a rebel
company led by Primitivo Solarte, and therefore had taken part in the rebellion in an active
and direct way.601 That would also be the case of Eleuterio Rosero, a caucano prisoner,
who requested his release the same month because of his poor health. Authorities from
Popayán argued that the fact that Rosero had taken up arms against the government in the
town of Patía made him unable to enjoy the requested benefit.602 The case of Valentín Basto
offers a final example in this regard. Basto requested his release in November 1900
arguing, among other things, that the six months he had spent in a Popayán jail had caused
him a serious pulmonary disease. Despite counting on the favorable opinion of a medical
doctor, Basto’s request met the opposition of a war auditor that accused him of leading a
rebel squadron that operated in the region of Tambo, Cauca. Since he had been an active
combatant, he had to remain in prison. A month later, nonetheless, authorities would grant
him home detention while he recovered from his condition.603
Non-combatant Liberals tended to have better luck with their petitions and often
managed to walk out of prison after their first attempt. That was the case, for instance, of
Rogerio Montenegro, who in November 1900, and after two months in prison, was able to
prove that he had lent no support to the rebellion at all. In his defense, Montenegro also
mentioned that he had paid most of the installments of his corresponding war contribution
in a timely manner. Authorities from Popayán accepted the petition and let him walk out
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with a judicial bond.604 In May 1900, petitioner Euclides Caicedo, from Pasto, obtained his
release after five months of imprisonment once he proved not only his lack of political
compromises with the rebellion but also his extreme poverty. Caicedo, nonetheless, had to
publicly declare his obedience to the government and agreed to a judicial bond before
leaving prison.605 That was also the case of Sergio Parra, who requested his release the
same month arguing that he had to take care of his moribund 90-year-old mother.
Authorities accepted his petition and let him walk out with the same conditions they had
imposed to Caicedo. Parra, nonetheless, had to remain confined within the limits of
Popayán.606
Judicial bonds represented the standard procedure through which most political
prisoners in Cauca and Antioquia walked out of prison after negotiating their case with the
corresponding authorities. Originally established in the Colombian Criminal Code for
crimes involving threats against people’s lives, honor, and property, bonds were supposed
to work, like in the Mexican case, as “deterrent” mechanisms against the potential
commission of a crime. Bonds in Colombia consisted of a written promise of not
committing the crime in question, followed by the stipulation of a given sum of money or
fianza that the person should pay in case he broke the promise.607 Sometimes, the process
also involved the appointment of a guarantor or fiador, a third party in charge of paying
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the sum on behalf of the criminal if needed. As tools for preventing the further commission
of political crimes, Colombian bonds required from the subjects in question a promise of
“good political behavior,” as well as their compromise to appear before the authorities on
a regular basis. In Medellín, some people were forced to appear before the city’s alcalde
every single day until the end of the war.608 Others had to do it at least once every five
days.609 They also had to inform the authorities about their place of residence during their
confinement in the city. The breaking up of any of these compromises allowed the
government to collect the arranged fianza.
According to the language of these promises, maintaining a “good political
behavior” meant basically to stay away from any act or manifestation of political or
military hostility towards the government. Such a compromise could take many different
forms. In Medellín, Antioquia, one prisoner promised for instance that he would “maintain
a peaceful behavior both in word and deed,” and “would not take up arms against the
government or give the rebels any sort of support.”610 A fellow prisoner from the same city
assured that, once released, he would abstain from “participating in the revolution against
the government and from spreading news that did not appear in official bulletins.”611 A
third inmate also from Medellín went even further and declared that he “would not wage
war against the government or encourage, support, or recommend the rebellion in any
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way.” His commitments also included not criticizing the government’s acts, not
questioning the orders the authorities dictated, and not spreading news that were prejudicial
to the government and its supporters. Finally, the prisoner committed himself to not
supporting the revolution neither performing any act that could be construed as subversive
and contrary to public order.612 In Popayán, a prisoner promised, among other things, to
remain secluded in his house and refrain from hosting there any “suspicious” or
“conspiratorial” political meetings.613 Similarly, another inmate from the same city
undertook to live at his fiador’s house without receiving any visits from “enemies of the
current regime,” and to not attend any political meeting of a subversive character.614
Authorities kept a close eye on the released prisoners and looked after the
fulfillment of their political compromises, as the case of Antioquia illustrates. In April
1900, for instance, the department’s authorities asked Medellín’s alcalde to submit a report
about the state of political bonds or fianzas in the city. The report had to include detailed
information concerning the bonds that had been violated and thosethat had been collected
or were awaiting collection.615 The alcalde’s response included a series of cases occurred
between January and August 1900. There was, for instance, the case of Manuel Echavarría,
who not only broke the promise of showing up regularly to the alcaldia but also
disappeared from the place he had registered as his house. Apparently, Echavarría had fled

612

“Fianza política de José M. Escalante,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 159, Folio 459.

613

“Acta de compromiso de buen comportamiento político de Manuel M. Velasco, de Caloto,” ACC,
República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número.
614

“Acta de compromiso de Joaquín Cifuentes, vecino de Palmira,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 284, Legajo
44: “Documentos de fianzas.”
615

“Carta al Alcalde de Medellín, Abril 7 de 1900,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160.

387

the city and enlisted in a rebel camp near Panama.616 The alcalde also mentioned the case
of eight political prisoners that, after securing their freedom with a fianza, had participated
in a skirmish with government’s troops somewhere in Antioquia.617 There was also the
case of Liberal colonel Diógenes Zárate, who left his prison in Medellín but was later
recaptured for opening fire against Conservative authorities that were hunting down one of
his fellow Liberals.618 The index of political fianzas granted in Medellín between 1899 and
1902 shows that, out of the 510 prisoners that –at least once–walked out with a bond, 59
of them ended up returning to jail for recidivism. 48 of them went twice to jail, seven made
it three times, and four more people made it four times.619
Imprisonments and cautions were not the only penalties subject to negotiation
between “criminal” liberals and authorities. A second group of these individual requests
for mercy had to do with the revision, remission, and payment of forced contributions. The
language of these requests somehow paralleled the terms of the previous petitions. As in
the negotiation of prison releases, petitioners commonly stressed their “peaceful,” nonbelligerent character and their lack of commitment to the rebel movement. Other recurrent
arguments included complains about the costs of the contributions, the burdensome nature
of their monthly installments, and the overall unfairness of the penalty. Petitions commonly
followed a process that tended to vary from province to province. In Antioquia, for
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instance, petitioners commonly sent their requests to specific public servants that acted as
“state collectors.” In Cauca, people had to submit their petitions to a Junta Calificadora, a
group of local and provincial authorities in charge of assigning liberals in the region their
corresponding contribution, the number of installments, and their respective amounts.
Cauca’s Junta had its own rules for the filing and processing of these sorts of petitions,
including the principle that no request should be considered unless the claimant had not
paid at least the first installment of his contribution.620 In Antioquia, state collectors often
ignored first-time petitioners, and sometimes even disregarded any reduction or discount
they might have gotten from the authorities.621 In both regions, collectors and members of
the Junta could also force claimants to support their requests with witness testimonies.
Petitions grounded on financial arguments were relatively similar from one case to
the next. Petitioners often described themselves as poor people with minimal incomes and
meager assets, and in consequence claimed that the government reduced their installments
to a “fair and equitable” amount. In his petition from October 1901, the antioqueño Rafael
Ángel expressed that although he was willing to submit to the government’s will and pay
his contribution, the elevated amount of its monthly installments made it impossible. If the
government reduced the fine, he would pay it with no problem. Otherwise, Angel lamented,
his only possible option would be to stop paying and go to jail.622 That same month, Valerio
Sierra, from Medellín, requested a reduction of his monthly installments to an amount he
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could afford. After filing an unsuccessful petition months before, he filed a second request
accompanied by a series of letters from different people mentioning that he was the head
of a numerous family and had huge financial responsibilities.623
The cases of the antioqueño Rafael Lema and the caucanos Leandro Cuevas and
Fidel Ordóñez offer additional examples in this regard. In October 1901, Lema asked
Medellín’s collectors for a reduction of half his monthly installment. His petition included
a complaint against the unfairness of the way in which the local authorities had distributed
the contribution. Contributions, he maintained, had to be collected among wealthy Liberals
that supported the rebellion, not among poor people –like him– who could not pay their
fines without depriving their families of food, regardless of whether they were hostile to
the government or not.624 Around the same time, Cuevas demanded from the Junta in
Cauca the complete remission of his $100 contribution. His request included the
appointment of a few witnesses that should prove that he had maintained a pacific behavior
during the war, and that he had not moved from his hometown since the conflict started.
Cuevas’s witnesses also had to prove that he was a poor bricklayer completely incapable
of paying the mentioned sum. His petition succeeded partially. Although authorities did
not exonerate him from the war tax, they reduced his contribution to only $30.625 Ordoñez,
finally, had better luck with his petition, in which he explained that he was a poor saddler
unable to pay his $50 contribution. Authorities decided to exonerate him after confirming
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that since the beginning of the war he had not left his workshop and that there were no
criminal charges against him.626
Arguments of a political nature commonly accompanied petitions grounded on
financial reasons. Compared to these, political arguments tended to be more diverse. Some
people merely stated that they had remained neutral during the war, and had lent no support
to the rebel movement whatsoever. The petition of exoneration of the caucano Hilario
Escobar, in late 1901, included the testimonies of a group of “friends of the government”
accounting for his “peaceful behavior” and non-existent compromises with the rebellion.
Authorities denied his request with the argument that “it was impossible to exonerate any
disaffected person,” but still granted him a substantial reduction of his monthly
installments.627 That was also the case of José Isidro Victoria, also from Cauca, who based
his petition on the argument that he had remained neutral during the war and accompanied
his request with recommendation letters from two Conservative generals. He would also
obtain a reduction of a third of his original contribution.628
Other petitions involved more complex political arguments. In his request, the
mentioned Rafael Ángel admitted that, as a Liberal, he had to deal with the tax, and
understood that contributions had the purpose of punishing rebel activity in the department.
He had not taken any part at all in the movement, Ángel explained, and yet the government
had sent him once to jail and then charged him with a contribution. Although he understood
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that his imprisonment was “preventive,” for he was not charged with any crime at all, his
petition stressed time and again the fact that he had no compromise at all with the
rebellion.629 Similar arguments accompanied Valerio Sierra’s request, in which he
maintained that, besides his economic problems, he was completely uninterested in
political matters.630
Others, particularly in Antioquia, attempted to counter-balance their condition of
Liberals –and therefore alleged enemies of the government– with their past experiences at
the service of Conservative authorities. Miguel Navarro, for instance, requested a revision
of his contribution by arguing that since the beginning of the war he had provided supplies
for the Conservative troops, and that he currently worked for the government as a
telegraphist. In his opinion, authorities should not charge “helpful” Liberals –like him–
with contributions. They should be reserved for those “other” Liberals that, regardless of
their attitude towards de rebellion, did not provide the government with any service at
all.631 The petition of Tomás Zapata in October 1901 offers a similar case. In his request,
Zapata presented himself as a “friend of the government” and a “Liberal in name only,”
with no political compromises at all and no feelings of hostility towards the government.
He also was careful enough to mention that, at the beginning of the conflict, he had lent
Antioquia’s government 16 thousand pesos for supplying conservative troops.632 Agapito
Vargas, another petitioner from October 1901, mentioned that he was not only a peaceful
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Liberal with no trace of political compromise, but also had helped supply Conservative
troops in previous civil wars. Moreover, Vargas pointed out, his son was currently enrolled
in the Conservative army.633
Some petitioners went even further at the moment of supporting their requests with
political arguments. In his petition, the mentioned Rafael Lema maintained that he did not
question neither the legality nor the legitimacy of the contributions, but he did question the
assumption that every Liberal was an enemy of the government by default. To Lema, the
fact that a person had a given political ideology did not make him automatically an enemy
or a rebel, especially when ideas were devoid of any subversive aspiration. He was a
convinced Liberal, certainly, but he did not cause –or had caused– the government any
harm.634 In a similar light, the antioqueño Libardo López claimed in his request that the
government had wrongfully overestimated his political compromises. Political
compromises, explained the petitioner, were relative by nature, ranking from mere “evil
thoughts” to the actual action of taking up arms against the government. López had not
been in any rebel camp, was not a party leader, and had no had any contact at all with the
military elements of the party. His political allegiances, then, were closer to mere “evil
thoughts,” the lowest, less significant, and less harmful modality of political dissidence.635
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The negotiation of political imprisonment and forced contributions during the Thousand
Days sheds light on an often overlooked aspect of the logic of state mercy vis-à-vis political
criminality in Colombia: the individual, bottom-up bargaining of punishment and leniency.
Governmental offers of grace did not represent the only ways in which actual or alleged
political criminals could enjoy the effects of state leniency. Individual petitioning in search
of lesser penalties was as important as pardon decrees and amnesty laws were. It was a
widespread, recurrent practice that gave several people opportunities to search and obtain
redress from the severity –and often arbitrariness– of state retribution. Moreover, it was a
process that allowed the government to unfold its dynamics of state mercy outside the
immediacy of the battlefields, the formality of the legal acts, and the exceptionality of its
generalized manifestations of leniency. By allowing the people to personally request a
prison release, a judicial bond, or a lower contribution, the government was able to include
in its dynamics of mercy noncombatant dissidents, “peaceful” Liberals, and harmless
political adversaries –people who, despite their non-belligerent position, still were the
subject of state punishment. These intense yet discreet and somewhat hidden negotiations
helped, thus, to extend state mercy throughout the bulk of Colombian society. It was a
process that not only involved liberal petitioners and local and provincial authorities, but
also people from the two political parties acting both as bondsmen or fiadores and as
witnesses or recommenders.
What was the kind of mercy at stake in these individual yet generalized
negotiations? These were not great and solemn displays of mercy like those that pardons
and amnesties used to involve. They were much more modest, commonly partial acts of
leniency, conditioned not only by the qualities and background of the individual petitioner
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but also by the discretion of local and provincial authorities. Yet, they mattered to both the
people that requested them and the authorities in charge of administering them. For a
person charged with political crimes or simply punished for being a Liberal, for instance,
these small negotiations could make the difference between remaining in or walking out of
prison. Individual negotiations also bolstered the power of local and provincial authorities
by letting them act as dispensers of mercy in the name of the government, able to decide
who deserved mercy and who did not. Furthermore, they gave authorities a unique
opportunity to contact, measure, organize, classify, monitor, and control political
dissidence within the territories under their control.
This last effect deserves special attention, for it reveals important aspects of the
ultimate goals of state mercy in contexts of internal conflict and civil warfare. Leniency
benefited both the recipients of the graces in question and the government that granted
them. Requests of judicial cautions and petitions concerning forced contribution forced
Liberals to appear time and again before the authorities. This interaction gave authorities
the chance of gathering information about how many Liberals were in their respective
jurisdictions, their residence, their backgrounds, their actions, their connections, and their
whereabouts. Bonds put released prisoners under the direct and constant monitoring of
authorities, and the promises of “good political behavior” that accompanied them worked
as a ritualized practice through which dissidents re-submitted themselves to the
government. Such promises forced Liberals to redefine their roles as dissenters and
members of the Liberal party, and to rethink what they could and could not do as political
agents and members of a political faction. They also represented an attempt to turn
malcontents and potential rebels into submissive, harmless dissidents. Petitions concerning
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forced contributions, with their reiterative arguments of “good political behavior,”
neutrality, and disdain for the rebellion also worked in the same direction.
Taken together, all these practices of bargaining had similar effects. They forced
Liberals to recognize the legitimacy and authority of the government –as pardons and
amnesties did as well–, and to negotiate with authorities the terms, conditions, and
meanings of their political subjection. State leniency, either in the form of legal acts of
grace or expressed through of individual concessions, always had a cost for its recipients.
For pardoned and amnestied combatants, it was the recognition of their defeat and the
acknowledgement of the government’s legitimacy. For liberal dissidents and others, it was
the resignification of their political allegiances and their transformation into harmless
political subjects. Either way, the administration of state mercy always ended up with the
re-submission of the internal enemy to the government and the strengthening of the
authority and legitimacy of the state. The Mexican experience was not that different in this
regard.

Conclusions: Towards a Characterization of the Logics of State Leniency in the
Porfiriato and the Regeneration
Overall, the logics of state leniency for political crimes in the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration did not differ much from the logics of state retribution analyzed in the last
two chapters. The dynamics of both retribution and mercy relied on a wide set of formal
and informal practices, encompassed a very diverse set of political, legal, and judicial
actors, and unfolded simultaneously in multiple spaces. Even more importantly, they both
were parallel and complementary manifestations of state power and sovereignty. While one
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represented the state’s right to punish those who disturbed public order and took up arms
against it, the other manifested its prerogative to forgive them. Facing rebellion and other
modalities of political criminality, state power did not exclusively operate through displays
of force, repression and retaliation: it also unfolded and worked through demonstrations of
clemency, compassion, and mercy. By forgiving its internal enemies or allowing them to
negotiate their penalties, the state did not necessarily lose power or diminish its attributes
of sovereignty and legitimacy. The effect was, indeed, the contrary. State mercy was a
powerful tool for bolstering state hegemony, advancing the state’s interests in political and
military conflicts, stimulating relationships of allegiance, dependence, and patronage, and
turning unruly political dissidents into obedient and submissive citizens. Both punishment
and mercy were, in sum, expressions of state power that fostered sovereignty, neutralized
internal threats, and helped ensure political hegemony.
The logics of state leniency had their own particularities, though. Unlike the
workings of state repression, which tended to unfold in a vertical, univocal way, the
dynamics of state mercy often functioned in two directions. Political criminals could obtain
mercy whether through formal acts of state magnanimity or through individual petitions of
pardon or release. While the first mechanism involved a top-down dynamics whereby the
state reached its citizens, the second one implied a bottom-up approach where citizens
reached the state. It was a two-way relationship that in part relied on the premises that
political crimes could be pardoned, that it was expected from the state to forgive political
offenders, and that penalties for political crimes could be subject to negotiation and
bargaining. As some of the reviewed cases illustrate, negotiation of both punishment and
mercy was frequent. It was present, for instance, in the treaties that gave wars closure, in
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the political fianzas and judicial bonds that allowed political prisoners walk out of jail, and
in the petitions concerning forced contributions. Mercy, in this light, fostered interactions
between political criminals and the government that, at the same time, stimulated and made
possible the exercise and administration of state leniency. It was a cycle of legal and
political interactions whose outcomes included, besides the granting of different forms of
grace, the emergence of new relational arrangements between state and criminals –
arrangements of submission, good political behavior, and similar.
Many different actors intervened in these interactions and made the administration
of leniency possible. Rebels in arms; political prisoners; civilians charged with political
penalties; public defenders; political and military authorities of different sorts; legislators
and congressmen; judges, and even presidents. Not all of them intervened simultaneously,
but they all played a part in the overall process of requesting and granting mercy –a process
that, directly and indirectly, fostered multiple connections not only among the three public
powers but also between them and citizens. Almost as diverse as this network of legal and
political actors –and maybe more– were the arguments mediating in this process,
encompassing legal, procedural, political, military, and even economic reasons. Political
arguments were particularly important at the moment of requesting mercy both in Mexico
and Colombia. They reflected in many different ways the petitioners’ acceptance of state
authority as the primary condition for obtaining pardon, as well as their conversion from
dangerous or threatening dissidents into obedient, “well-behaved” citizens. Legal
arguments were equally important, especially to determine whether or not authorities
should grant mercy and who could or could not enjoy it. These arguments had to do not
only with the fulfillment of a number of legal, judicial, and technical steps and
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requirements, but also with the existence of conditions and restrictions that could make
mercy inapplicable to some offenses or criminals.
This last consideration sheds light on another important characteristic of the
administration mercy in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. State leniency for political
crimes was commonly limited and full of restrictions. Pardons and even amnesties in
Mexico depended, to a large extent, on Díaz’s willingness and on how much the graces
could further the President’s position in the many political conflicts taking place during the
Porfiriato. Similarly, the success of individual requests for mercy in Mexico was often
unpredictable and conditioned by circumstances of all sorts. The situation in Colombia was
not any different. Treaties and pardons used to leave people out for legal and political
reasons, acts of leniency tended to include some crimes and exclude others, and authorities
had the power of denying mercy requests on the basis of political and military
considerations. Restrictions and conditions tended to vary depending on the circumstances
that motivated the graces in question and their ultimate goals. As the Colombian case
illustrates, restrictions tended to be wider in pardons decreed in the midst of an armed
conflict and relatively minimal in amnesties enacted years after the end of a confrontation.
Similarly, acts of mercy aiming to force the rendition of rebels or the termination of a
conflict tended to include more restrictions than those that gave a war formal closure or
granted pardons for past conflagrations.
Acts of state leniency were diverse both in form and effect. There were important
differences between the kind of grace that pardons and amnesties entailed, for instance.
Likewise, there was a significant distance between these and other modalities including
judicial bonds, petitions of prison release, or any other form of negotiating a given penalty.
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While some of them represented formal manifestations of state mercy –amnesties and
pardons–, others were legal and judicial mechanisms through which criminals could obtain
some sort of redress from the punitive logics of state punishment. Although these forms of
redress did not properly represent formal, official acts of mercy, the logics of state
benevolence still played a role in them, and their effects somehow pointed in the same
direction that amnesties and pardons did. The Mexican case shows that, in some cases,
people combined these direct and indirect modalities of leniency with requests of
preparatory freedom or judicial amparos, merging the logics of state mercy with additional
strategies of legal and constitutional protection against state retribution.
There were important differences between the workings of state leniency in the
Mexican and Colombian experiences, as well. The Mexican case shows a decentralization
of state mercy that, for obvious reasons, did not exist in Colombia. Pardons in Mexico
remained a prerogative of the federal Executive, while amnesties were more frequent at the
provincial level. This particularity not only accounts for the regional nature of the uprisings
of the Porfirian era. It also reveals that, even when these events involved crimes against
the federal order, their management in terms of mercy tended to remain in the hands of
state legislatures. Another major difference between the Mexican and the Colombian cases
had to do with the political uses of mercy. Governments from both countries used amnesties
and pardons to force the termination of armed conflicts and the surrender of rebels, and
even to grant political prisoners and fugitives leniency after the end of a confrontation. Yet,
in the Mexican case, formal acts of leniency seemed to respond as well to greater dynamics
of political transaction and cooptation. Díaz administered mercy not only because it was
his duty as President, but also because it allowed him to mediate in conflicts over regional
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power and tilt the balance in his favor. It was an instrumentalization of mercy that seemed
to be much more evident in the Porfirian experience than in the logics of leniency of the
Regeneration.
A final difference between Mexico and Colombia refers to the language
surrounding the administration of state mercy and what it suggests about understandings
of state power in the two cases. In both countries, the figure of presidential pardon had its
roots on colonial conceptions of monarchical power and sovereignty, surviving as a
reinvention, with modern overtones, of the idea that the sovereign, as father of his people,
had the prerogative to forgive them. The singularity in the Mexican case in this regard lies
in the fact that its languages of mercy tended to accentuate these colonial legacies in order
to uphold the image of Porfirio Díaz as a traditional, patriarchal figure of power. By
framing leniency as an expression of Díaz’s generosity and sovereignty, languages of
mercy in Mexico reveal an understanding of state power in which the relationship between
state and citizens seemed modelled after the relationship between a monarch and his
subjects. Colonial notions of power and sovereignty still had an echo in late-nineteenth
century Mexico –and echo that had major political and legal effects.
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CONCLUSIONS: CHARACTERIZING GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO
POLITICAL CRIMES AND CRIMINALITY IN THE PORFIRIATO AND THE
REGENERATION

Several commonalities linked the experiences of opposition journalists, political agitators,
dissident leaders, conspirators, armed and unarmed dissenters, rebels, and other
insurrectionists in the Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration. For one thing,
they were all stories of political dissidents that dared to challenge by different means the
political exclusion, the concentration of power, and the traces of authoritarianism that
characterized both regimes. They were also stories of individuals whose political stances
and actions made them targets of surveillance, persecution, and repression by the state;
experiences of people that paid with their freedom and lives the price of their political
challenges. On a more personal level, all these cases tell stories of shut-down newspapers,
journalists and partisan leaders forced into exile, writers and common people imprisoned
for political reasons, and political prisoners often deprived from basic legal and judicial
guarantees. They were, too, stories of uprisings repressed by fire and sword; and rebels
hunted down within and outside battlefields; legal and extrajudicial executions, of striking
episodes of blood and violence, and even constant and consistent manifestations of mercy
and pardon.
Beyond the sphere of direct personal experiences, these cases tell many other stories
concerning the functioning of the Mexican and Colombian societies of their time. There is,
for instance, the story of the relationships between state and citizens in the Porfiriato and
the Regeneration, or the story of how state power worked and manifested in contexts of
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intense political conflict and internal turmoil. Other stories concern the evolution of
legislation on public order in a climate of almost constant political unrest, as well as the
tensions between the protection of individual rights and the safeguarding of order and
peace. That is also the case of the changing balance between public powers that marked
the evolution of both regimes, and the tensions between these changes and the
constitutional and legal frameworks structuring the political life in both countries.
Furthermore, there were the stories of constitutions, laws, and a wide array of legislative
and executive acts regulating all sorts of conducts and matters; and of their conception,
creation and enactment. The stories of how governments and political authorities
interpreted, applied, and enforced these laws, and how they affected the experiences and
expectations of rebels, dissidents, and other political actors are also fundamental parts of
this broader narrative. Repression against rebels and political dissidents in the Porfiriato
and the Regeneration offers a window into a wide variety of features characterizing
politics, law, and society in Mexico and Colombia.
Questions about the definition and treatment of political crimes and criminals were
present in all these stories, either directly or indirectly. Concerns about the meanings of
political criminality, its legal and political implications, its differences with other
modalities of crime, and the most appropriate ways to respond to it were everywhere in
these experiences. What were the differences between criminal and non-criminal
dissidence? What were the legal boundaries separating both types of dissidence? Was the
criminality of dissent exclusively and purely political? How many forms or modalities of
criminal dissent were there? Was the criminalization of dissent a legal, legitimate, and
efficient way of keeping political dissidence in check? What were the limits among
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criminal dissent, subversion, and overt rebellion? These and many other similar questions
link these experiences to the broader matter of political crimes and political criminality.
Were all those crimes political? What made them political, in that case? Were they purely
political? Which attributes differentiated it from common, ordinary crimes? Did that
difference exist beyond the spheres of law, legislation, and legal doctrine? The way in
which Mexican and Colombian governments during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration
addressed and tried to solve these questions represented the main subject of this study.

Defining and Punishing Political Crimes: A General Overview
Judging from the dozens of cases examined throughout the previous chapters, what were
Mexican and Colombian laws, governments, legal experts, and rebels talking about when
they talked about political crimes? There was no single, uniform notion defining what these
offenses were. Constitutions and criminal codes understood political crimes in an
ambiguous way. On the one hand, they conceived political offenses in terms of an abstract
criminal category deserving special treatment due to their political nature. On the other
hand, they defined a series of offenses of a political nature including a variety of acts and
behaviors against the nation, the constitution, the government, and public order. These
offenses, nonetheless, did not strictly had a “political” label, and remained associated to a
variety of other criminal categories.
Governments, political, military, and judicial authorities, also worked with
ambiguous, imprecise notions political criminality. To them, acts against the government,
the authorities, and public peace could be sometimes political, sometimes common, and
sometimes of a mixed nature. It all depended of the actions included, the people involved,
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and even the discretion of the authorities in question. Legislators, legal experts, lawyers,
and even rebels often equated political crimes with offenses such as treason, rebellion,
sedition, and other similar acts of collective political violence. Laws and executive decrees
entailed mutable notions of political criminality, switching from small series of offenses
involving different manifestations of collective violence, to large lists of crimes
incorporating a variety of “threatening” or “offensive” expressions of individual or
collective dissent. The fact that legal definitions of political crimes depended as well on a
variety of legal jurisdictions and authorities with different understandings of what political
crimes were and what made them criminal rendered this framework even more complex.
This plurality of jurisdictions accounts not only for a panoply of different, often rival, legal
regimes and authorities within the fragmented sphere of state law. It also accounts for
complex interplays between national and foreign legal regimes and legislations, and even
between state and “extra-national” legal spheres.
Regardless the scope, ambiguity, or vagueness of the definitions they involved, all
these notions and understandings agreed on a few basic ideas about what political crimes
were. First and foremost, they were actions and expressions of political dissent, violent or
non-violent, collective or individual, and clearly established in the law or not. Secondly,
they all had a criminal nature. Legislation, state authorities, and government officials
considered them criminal regardless their real nature and the original motivation of their
perpetrators. Third, their criminal nature stemmed from the fact that they entailed more or
less severe threats to the established structure of the government, governmental institutions
and their representatives, state authorities, and public order and peace. These fundamental
agreements conditioned a legal and political framework in which authorities could target
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almost any manifestation of dissidence as criminal, and where the label “political criminal”
could refer to both a simple opposition journalist and a major rebel ringleader. In the
Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration, political crimes were not a clear,
definite, and stable series of actions straightforwardly defined in a Code or in a specific set
of norms. Rather, they represented an abstract criminal category whose contents mutated
time and again both in the sphere of law and legislation and in the context of every day
politics. Political crimes were flexible and subject of constant redefinitions and
reinventions, in correspondence with changing legal, political, judicial, and even military
circumstances and interests.
Flexibility and mutability characterized not only the definition but also the
treatment of political crimes. Repertoires of governmental responses to political criminality
were not restricted to a particular, predictable set of penalties established in a Code.
Although these “codified” penalties certainly existed, governments and authorities often
broadened and reinvented them either through complementary laws and decrees or through
administrative acts and decisions. Under certain circumstances of intense political conflict
or severe internal turmoil, such reinventions could go far enough to clash with
constitutional and criminal law precepts concerning the treatment of both political offenses
and crimes in general. The judgement of political criminals by the military justice, their
subjection to court martials with no procedural guarantees, the extradition of political
offenders, and the establishment of the death penalty for political crimes illustrate the
ultimate consequences of such reinventions. These legal reactions by no means comprised
the totality of governmental responses to political crimes. Both in Mexico and Colombia,
governments resorted as well to extralegal and extrajudicial practices of punishment in
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order to deal with rebels and other “dangerous” political dissidents. It was a way of acting
against political criminals without the restrains and limitations established in the
Constitution and the law. These extralegal practices included, among others, extrajudicial
executions, uses of paramilitary forces against rebel suspects and dissidents, and even
political kidnapping.
Overall, what the Mexican and Colombian experiences reveal in this regard is a
slight yet significant change over time in the ways in which governments responded to the
threats and challenges that political criminals posed. From the late 1870s to the early 1890s,
responses to political criminality tended to involve energetic displays of state violence and
practices of repression and punishment that commonly challenged existing legal and
constitutional parameters. Here, both “legality” and “extra-legality” characterized official
reactions to rebels, political agitators, and other troublesome dissidents. Nonetheless,
between the late 1890s and the following decade, these responses, at least in their most
formal and “official” manifestations, tended to become less violent, less “extra-legal,” and
more legalistic and reliant on the workings of legislation and judicial authorities. This
progressive “legalization” of state repression did not put an end to other extralegal or
extrajudicial practices of retribution, though. They still existed, but not as part of those
“official” displays of state punishment. They unfolded in the shadows, like a parallel sphere
informally linked to the government but still serving its interests, as the Mexican case
illustrates.
This general overview raises a series of questions regarding the legal and political
workings of state repression vis-à-vis political crimes during the Porfiriato and the
Regeneration and their transformations over time. Some of these questions have to do with
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the political logics behind the definition and criminalization of political offenses. Others
refer to the many complexities that characterized the legal treatment of political crimes and
criminals. A final set of questions asks about the nature and functioning of a series of
apparent dichotomies that were present in the ways in which both Mexican and Colombian
governments responded to political criminality. These dichotomies included “the ordinary”
and “the extraordinary,” “the constitutional” and “the unconstitutional,” and “the legal”
and “the extralegal.” The relationship between “punishment” and “mercy” as possible
responses to political crimes also makes part of this set of alleged oppositions under
scrutiny.

The Mutable Nature of Political Crimes and the Many Faces of Internal Enmity
Political crimes in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration described a criminal category whose
contents were always imprecise and fluid. Barely defined in constitutions and criminal
codes, they took form and content over time through a complex series of legal
developments, judicial decisions, and reinterpretations of current legislation. Their
contents and scope were not only mutable, but also dependent on specific –and always
changing– political and military circumstances. These attributes of fluidity and
contingency, nevertheless, did not prevent historical definitions of political crimes in
Mexico and Colombia from having some degree of consistency. Regardless the multiple
forms and contents they took, political crimes always made reference to “criminal”
manifestations of political dissent. Understandings about what this criminality was or
entailed were also mutable and changed in each country in response to the evolution of
their respective political conflicts.
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Political criminality, thus, was first and foremost a matter of political dissent.
Governments and authorities labeled dissenters criminal anytime they perceived their
actions or intentions as “dangerous” or as “threats” against the constitution, the public
order, or the legitimate authorities and institutions. Such threats, real or not, turned political
criminals into enemies of the government and the larger political community it represented.
Their actions were, in this light, acts of internal enmity: political offenders were internal
enemies of the nation that threatened to undermine it with their threats against the
government and the public order. By labelling them as political criminals, governments
and authorities in Mexico and Colombia turned “dangerous” dissenters not into
“troublesome” political rivals, but directly into internal enemies of the nation.
Modalities of internal enmity were particularly diverse. Besides the typical acts of
treason, rebellion, sedition, riot, and asonada and their several gradations defined in the
criminal codes, internal enmity also involved a variety of actions whose criminal nature
did not depend on any code. The criminalization of these “other” actions emerged from
governmental responses to specific conjunctures of political conflict or internal turmoil.
Governmental campaigns against opposition press in Mexico and Colombia, for instance,
extended current notions of political criminality into the field of journalism and turned
dissident journalists into internal enemies. Counter-insurgent endeavors in Mexico during
the 1900s practically labelled as “enemy” all people belonging to or sympathizing with the
Partido Liberal Mexicano. Porfirian repression after the expeditions of Ruiz Sandoval and
Garza in the early 1890s fell not only on people that had been actually involved in the
movements, but also on a large number of dissidents with no clear links with them. The
logics of punishment and retribution in Colombia during the Thousand Days involved
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much more than rebel ringleaders, officers, and combatants. It also extended to non-armed
liberals that paid with imprisonment, fianzas, and forced contributions their political
inclinations. At some critical moments, notions of internal enmity in both countries also
involved people accused of providing rebels with any kind of support, and even citizens
that “did not do enough” in defense of their governments. Regional and national partisan
leaders, electoral contestants, and potential military adversaries were subject of political
criminalization at some point as well.
Both the Mexican and Colombian experiences show a diversification of political
crimes that increased over time. Between the late 1870s to the late 1900s, legal definitions
of political criminality became more and more encompassing. This diversification,
although simultaneous, had different sources in one case and another. In Mexico, for
instance, it emerged out of the judicial sphere, where judicial decisions and interpretations
produced a systematic extension of the crimes considered “political.” In Colombia, it was
primarily the result of legislation and lawmaking. It stemmed from a panoply of
consecutive laws and decrees expanding not only the scope of political crimes but also the
reasons according to which authorities could label somebody as internal enemy or criminal
dissenter. All in all, the systematic extension of political crimes in Mexico and Colombia
produced a series of “extended,” non-previously codified modalities of internal enmity that
had major repercussions on the exercise of political dissidence in both countries.
These other, “extended” modalities of internal enmity deserve attention not only
because of what they say about how far governments in Mexico and Colombia went in
their efforts to neutralize political dissidence through its criminalization. They also matter
because of the political and legal consequences they had. By targeting internal enemies

410

outside the sphere of actual insurgent movements and beyond battlefields, these “extended”
understandings of political criminality generalized internal enmity and state repression
throughout the bulk of society. This generalization, nonetheless, had different
manifestations and effects in Mexico and Colombia. In Mexico, it covered opposition
journalists, rebellion suspects, and other people actually or allegedly linked to the
subversive endeavors of the Mexican Liberal Party. In Colombia, it fell at different times
on “subversive” writers, political malcontents, “disobedient” public employees, and
unarmed liberals with no links at all with any rebel or insurgent movement. This last feature
was a striking particularity of the Colombian experience. Unlike the regime of Porfirio
Díaz, which criminalized its internal enemies on the grounds of actual or alleged charges
of subversion, the Regeneration criminalized not only “subversive” political dissidence but
also political affiliation as a whole. As the case of the Thousand Days illustrates, liberals
charged with forced contributions were subject to punishment not because they were part
of the rebellion, but merely because they belonged to the Liberal Party.
This distinction between the criminalization of certain acts of dissent and the
criminalization of political affiliations as a whole marks a substantial difference between
the Mexican and the Colombian experiences. Mexican notions of internal enmity, as
widespread as they were, maintained the logics of state retribution relatively circumscribed
to people directly or indirectly linked to subversive acts, materialized whether though the
press or through armed plots. On the contrary, Colombian conceptions of internal enmity
fostered an unrestricted dynamic of state punishment that made no major distinctions
neither between armed and unarmed dissidents nor between “dangerous” and “nondangerous” dissenters as targets of repression. The Porfiriato, with its high levels of
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authoritarianism and presidentialism and its infamous strategies of political repression and
persecution, still involved more contained displays of state retribution than the Colombian
case. As the reflections in the next section show, this would not be the only striking
difference between Mexico and Colombia in this regard.

Political Crimes and the Law: Between Legal Exceptionalities and Parallel Legal
Regimes
Legislation on matters of political criminality during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration
was neither uniform nor straightforward. It remained dispersed in constitutions, criminal
and military codes, and dozens of laws and legislative decrees. Similarly, it was a changing
legislation created and reinvented in different scenarios and through the intervention of a
variety of actors. Part of it emerged from congresses and analogous corporations, as the
result of legislative debates and agreements and doctrinal conversations. Part of it stemmed
from the Executive power and its interpretations and reinventions of current legislation in
the midst of specific political and military conjunctures. Some portions of it emanated from
the ordinary law, while others did from the parallel sphere of the military legislation.
Additional parts of it were merely the creation of diverse local and regional authorities. On
the whole, it was a non-systematic and mutable legislation gathering a wide array of voices
and emerging out of several places and contexts.
The complexity of this legislation goes way beyond these characteristics, though. It
also has to do with the conformation of a series of regimes of exceptionality concerning
the criminalization and punishment of political crimes. By defining a series of conditions
and limitations for the repression and punishment of political criminality, constitutions and
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criminal codes in Mexico and Colombia turned political offenses into a special criminal
category whose treatment depended on exceptional rules. As a consequence, political and
common criminals were subject to different laws, different punishments, and even different
carceral regimes. The exceptional nature of political crimes, together with the distinction
between common and political offenses, proved more than problematic issues, though. At
a theoretical and doctrinal level, this differentiation was never exempt from questioning,
and there were no clear agreements about what exactly separated these two criminal
modalities. At a more practical level, the exceptionality of political crimes often clashed
with the common practice of indicting rebels on both common and political charges. This
combination of charges forced a convergence, in the prosecution and judgement of many
political criminals in Mexico and Colombia, of the ordinary legal regime of common
criminality and the extraordinary regime of political crimes. These exceptionalities
illustrate what was one of the most striking characteristics of the legal treatment of political
criminality in both countries: the fragmented, “pluralistic” nature of state law regarding the
definition and punishment of political offenses.
The exceptionalities surrounding the legal treatment of political criminality went
beyond the “exceptional nature” of political offenses. They also had to do with the fact
that, unlike common offenses, political crimes did not necessarily depend on ordinary laws
or on the ordinary justice system. Both the Mexican and the Colombian constitutions put
the management of public order in the hands of the Executive power, and therefore allowed
governments and political authorities to freely legislate on matters of political criminality.
As a consequence, the legal treatment of political crimes depended not only on fixed and
stable codified precepts, but also on the will of an extraordinary legislative agent able to
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reinvent time and again what political crimes were and what sort of punishments they
deserved. It is yet another indicator of the aforementioned fragmentation of the sphere of
state law vis-à-vis political crimes –a de-centralized sphere that involved parallel legal
regimes, authorities, and jurisdictions. This particular characteristic was specially
notorious in the Colombian case, where legislation on public order and political criminality
became practically a monopoly of the Executive and unfolded almost completely outside
the spheres of the ordinary law and the formal justice system. It was a monopoly that gave
regenerationist governments powerful legal tools for acting against unarmed and armed
dissidents, and that submitted Colombian dissenters to a legal regime marked by the lack
of legal, constitutional, and judicial protections and guarantees.
Besides establishing a regime of exceptionalities for the treatment of political
crimes, and adding to the complexities already mentioned, criminal codes in Mexico and
Colombia shaped two different regimes for the penalization of these offenses. On the one
hand, there was an abstract regime of political crimes, involving penalties and procedures
but no concrete offenses. As a criminal category, political crimes existed in the codes only
in abstract –a notion that had legal effects but no specific crimes associated to it. On the
other hand, there was a series of crimes that had a clear political nature but no direct
recognition as political offenses. The differences and limits between one regime and
another were never clear, and therefore the recognition –and punishment– of specific
offenses as political crimes depended on the discretion of the authorities in charge of
applying and enforcing the codes. This parallelism and the uncertainties that came with it
shaped a series of legal grey areas that allowed governments and authorities to define and
redefine, at their convenience, what a political crime was and was not. Both the Mexican
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and the Colombian experiences offer multiple examples in which authorities denied, on
purpose, the political nature of some political offenses or retraced the boundaries between
common and political criminalities. It was a common strategy that allowed authorities to
repress political criminals without the restrictions that constitutions and criminal codes
established for the treatment of their crimes –a strategy that had serious legal and political
consequences, as well as elevated costs in terms of lives.
The practices of turning the management of public order an administrative matter
and leaving the punishment of rebels to the military justice made the situation even more
complex. Both strategies were particularly common in Colombia, and left an imprint of
uncertainty and legal insecurity on the legal and judicial experiences of armed and unarmed
dissidents alike. There, the “administrative turn” put the definition and punishment of
political crimes in a legal sphere separated from other offenses and outside the reach of the
Judicial and Legislative powers. It was a parallel, alternative sphere that depended
exclusively on the Executive and where the rules regulating the treatment of ordinary
offenses barely applied. Analogous effects had the intervention of the military justice in
the prosecution and punishment of rebels in contexts of civil warfare, which added another
dimension to the already complex panoply of alternative spheres and jurisdictions shaping
the legal treatment of political crimes. Involving its own set of rules and provisions, its own
system of penalties, and its own judicial procedures, the military justice put the punishment
of political crimes even further from the reach of the formal judicial power. Trapped
between two legal spheres that granted no legal security and had little regard for
constitutional procedural guarantees, political criminals in Colombia were, most of the
time, at the mercy of the government and its unbridled manifestations of retribution.
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The Colombian and Mexican experiences contrast significantly in this regard.
Certainly, the exceptionalities surrounding the treatment of political crimes, together with
the existence of parallelisms and grey areas concerning the definition and punishments of
these offenses were common to the two cases. So was the intervention of the Executive in
the management of public order at the expense of the independence and autonomy of the
Legislative and Judicial powers. Yet, the Mexican case shows a more centralized, less
complex legal context that relied less on extraordinary, alternative legislation and more on
the provisions of the criminal code and the proceedings and decisions of the ordinary
justice. Regardless the actual levels of independence and autonomy of Mexico’s justice
system, it still monopolized the prosecution and judgement of political offenders. This
difference is crucial for a variety of reasons. First, it suggests that there was a major
difference in the number of jurisdictional spheres that intervened in the treatment of
political criminality in one country and another. Second, it implies that the administration
of justice vis-à-vis political offenders in Mexico was much more centralized and
rationalized than it was in Colombia. Third, it demonstrates that political criminals in
Mexico, compared with their Colombian counterparts, enjoyed greater degrees of judicial
protection and greater procedural guarantees. As personalistic, centralized, and
authoritarian as the Porfirian regime might have seemed to its contemporaries, it still
granted its dissidents protections that dissenters in Colombia would never be able to fully
enjoy –at least not on a regular, systematic basis.
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The Fluid, Non-binary Nature of State Power and Punishment in the Porfiriato and
the Regeneration
What does the relationship between “the ordinary” and “the extraordinary” in the legal
treatment of political crimes in Mexico and Colombia reveal about the nature of the logics
of state power and punishment in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration? Above all, it shows
that, although there was conflict between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” ways of dealing
with political crimes through the law, such ways did not necessarily contradict or exclude
one another. The treatment of political criminals was at no point an exclusive matter of
either “ordinary” or “extraordinary” legal means. Regardless the conceptual differences
separating common and political crimes, “pure” political crimes barely existed in real life.
In practice, the treatment of political criminality combined things from the theoretically
extraordinary regime of political crimes with things from the ordinary realm of common
offenses. This does not mean that authorities, judges, and other political and legal actors
considered that political crimes had no special nature at all and therefore treated them as
yet another modality of common criminality. It simply means that, even though they
recognized and believed in the special nature of political offenses–and they certainly did–
, they commonly treated and addressed them in conjunction with other, less exceptional
crimes. In practice, “the ordinary” and “the extraordinary” were not mutually exclusive
notions. Instead, they marked two possible ways of action that usually complemented each
other as part of a major legal strategy concerning the criminalization and punishments of
certain actions of political dissidence.
It is possible to develop analogous reflections concerning the nature and workings
of the constitutional regimes that in Mexico and Colombia regulated the management of
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public order –and therefore the treatment of political criminality. Both the Mexican and the
Colombian charters allowed the Executive power to suspend or modify the force of the
constitutional rule in cases of internal turmoil, either by allowing it to suspend specific
rights or by providing it with almost unrestricted –and certainly undefined– legislative
faculties. Was there an actual contradiction between the normal, ordinary regime of the
Constitution, on the one hand, and the extraordinary legal regime emanating from these
emergency powers? On a superficial level, contradictions seem evident. The suspension of
certain individual rights in cases of emergency clearly contradicted basic constitutional
principles. So did many of the laws that the Executive enacted in use of these extraordinary
powers, as the establishment of the death penalty for political crimes illustrates. Yet, even
when these provisions seemed to contradict or annul the spirit of their respective
constitutions, they ultimately had a constitutional nature. They emanated from
constitutional precepts, and unfolded as part of a constitutional strategy for dealing with
actual or potential threats against public order. A significant portion of the logics of state
retribution against political criminals in Mexico and Colombia had solid constitutional
grounds, regardless how arbitrary –or even illegal– their repressive measures might have
seemed.
From this perspective, asking whether or not the logics shaping the legal treatment
of political crimes in Mexico and Colombia were constitutional becomes a misleading,
imprecise question. Certainly, these logics contradicted and entailed the suspension of
several constitutional principles. Yet, their foundations were primarily constitutional. In
both cases, constitutions made them possible and gave them force and legitimacy. In this
light, what would be a more appropriate way of assessing the constitutional character of
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these measures and capturing their historical specificity? An approach that does not
conceive “the constitutional” and “the unconstitutional” as absolute, exclusionary notions
could be useful in this regard. In Mexico and Colombia alike, the legal management of
public order, as well as the legal treatment of political crimes, involved attributes of
constitutionality and unconstitutionality at the same time. For the most part, they
functioned as the two sides of a same coin: behind the apparent unconstitutional nature of
a given measure, there were solid constitutional precepts backing it. Both in Mexico and
Colombia, legal and political authoritarianism did not necessarily mean “illegality” or
“unconstitutionality.” After all, both countries relied on constitutional frameworks that
overemphasized the role of the government in the prevention and repression of attacks
against public order, and that gave their respective Executives the required constitutional
tools for acting in that direction.
Similar considerations apply to the combination, in both Mexico and Colombia, of
legal and extralegal responses against political criminality. “Legality” and “extra-legality”
were not absolute and mutually exclusive notions. Responses to political crimes in Mexico
and Colombia were diverse, complex, and fluid, and entailed both formal and informal,
legal and extra-legal practices of punishment and retribution –and even state and private,
non-state practices of repression, at least in the Mexican case. Here, “the legal” and “the
extralegal” were basically points of reference in a continuum of punitive actions and
measures that, depending on their specific purposes, could lean more towards one extreme
or the other.
The explanation to this non-exclusive continuity between “legal” and “extralegal”
practices of repression lies on the fact that, both in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration,
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punishment and retribution did not work in a univocal, straightforward way. They entailed
multiple responses to a variety of legal, political, and military challenges. Likewise, they
unfolded in reaction to diverse circumstances and aimed towards a diversity of goals. In
some contexts, repression was nothing but a matter of law enforcement. In other situations,
it was just a political strategy that governments and authorities deployed against
“problematic” dissenters. Sometimes, repression had the primary goal of upholding state
sovereignty and legitimacy against political challenges that rebels and other “unruly”
dissidents posed. In some cases, governments used repression as an intimidation tool
tending to discourage the workings of both unarmed and armed dissidents. In other
circumstances, repression had no other goal than neutralizing such workings through
unbridled displays of retribution aiming to crush and defeat the dissidents in question. It
was a variety of factors, purposes, and situations that demanded an analogous diversity in
the ways in which governments responded to them. The merging of legal and extralegal
strategies in the repression of rebels and other dissidents emerged precisely out of this
demand. More than opposite, irreconcilable extremes, “the legal” and “the extralegal”
acted here primarily as complementary strategies serving an overall purpose.
A final dichotomy concerning the logics of state power and retribution in Mexico
and Colombia that deserves an analogous reconsideration has to do with the notions of
“repression” and “pardon” –or “punishment” and “leniency.” As concepts referring to
specific ways of treating political criminals, repression and pardon did not represent
exclusive options. Mexican and Colombian governments alike responded to rebellion and
other modalities of political criminality with a strategic combination of punishment and
mercy. Here, neither repression implied a total absence of leniency nor mercy entailed a

420

complete abandonment of punishment as a possible response to political crimes. Instead,
they both worked and complemented each other as manifestations of state power and
sovereignty. State power in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration not only operated through
displays of force, repression, and retaliation. It also unfolded and worked through
demonstrations of clemency, compassion, and mercy. Mercy was, indeed, a powerful and
effective tool for bolstering state hegemony, fostering political obedience, and even
neutralizing “dangerous” manifestations of dissidence –just as repression and punishment
were. Both in Mexico and Colombia, the inclination of governments towards a more
repressive or a more lenient treatment of political criminals within specific circumstances
depended, in every case, on a series of legal, political and military considerations. Here,
neither the administration of punishment nor the granting of mercy were incidental: they
all responded to specific needs and interests.

Comparing Mexico and Colombia: Concluding Remarks
On the whole, the comparison between the Mexican and Colombian experiences reveals
that political crimes had a fluid, mutable nature. Their meaning, always changing,
depended on a diversity of legal, political, and military circumstances, and emerged out of
the concurrence of multiple instances and interests. Governmental responses to these
crimes were as flexible as those meanings were. They involved a variety of changing
strategies, both legal and extralegal, that unfolded and evolved in correspondence with
concrete needs and purposes. Most of the time, these strategies pushed and redefined the
limits that laws and constitutions established in order to protect citizens from unbridled
displays of state power and retribution. Although such redefinitions took relatively
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analogous forms in Mexico and Colombia, there were important differences between one
case and another.
Three differences stand out here as the most striking in terms of their repercussions
for the experiences of political criminals in each country. The first one has to do with the
jurisdictional complexity involved in the prosecution and judgement of political crimes,
which was greater in Colombia than in Mexico. The next one concerns the levels of legal
and constitutional exceptionality underlying the treatment of political offenders, higher,
again, in the Colombian case. The last one refers to the maintenance of basic constitutional
guarantees and judicial protections in the punishment of political criminals, which was
much more effective in Mexico than in Colombia. These differences made the
administration of justice for political crimes in Mexico simpler and more straightforward
than in Colombia, and made possible that Mexican political offenders enjoyed greater
degrees of legal security and judicial protection than their Colombian counterparts.
The contrast in this regard is intriguing. The Porfiriato was a highly personalistic
and –relatively– autocratic regime, where matters of public order and political criminality
did not experience significant legal developments, and whose strategies against
“dangerous” dissidence involved a diversity of extralegal displays of state retribution. The
Regeneration, on the contrary, experienced regular changes of president, fostered
continuous legal developments in matters of public order and political crimes, and entailed
highly legalized responses to rebellion and other “criminal” manifestations of dissent.
Considering these circumstances, it would be tempting to think that the treatment of
political criminals was more unpredictable, unregulated, and devoid of basic protections in
Mexico than in Colombia. Yet, this study shows that the opposite was true. For most of the
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period under examination, political criminals in Colombia remained at the mercy of a series
of logics of state retribution that unfolded away from any formal legal, constitutional, or
judicial restriction. Constitutional and procedural guarantees for offenders were almost
inexistent, and the formal justice system could barely intervene on their behalf. It was a
situation that strikingly differed from what occurred during the Porfiriato. In Mexico, the
treatment of political criminals –at least of those that did not fall victim of Diaz’s extralegal,
semi-privatized, and overly-violent strategies of repression– commonly remained in the
hands of the ordinary justice system. Criminals also had a diverse repertoire of
constitutional guarantees that they could invoke to obtain some sort of redress from the
regime’s iron fist.
These conclusions raise a number of questions for future research. How did
Mexican authorities respond to political criminality during the Mexican Revolution, and to
what extent these responses parallel those of Colombia during the Thousand Days? What
characterized the legal treatment of other forms of criminality in both countries during the
Porfiriato and the Regeneration? Can the comparative study of these other criminal
categories reinforce or question the conclusions of this study? How did lawyers, legal
experts, and legislators discussed about the definition and punishment of these other
crimes, and what were the differences between these conversations and the ones revolving
around the treatment of political criminality? Did Mexico and Colombia share a common
intellectual framework for thinking about other crimes as they did in the case of political
crimes? From the perspective of other modalities of criminality, how similar or how
different were the legal cultures of Mexico and Colombia during the period? These are just
a few questions suggesting the potential of further comparative analyses between the
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experiences of Mexico and Colombia during the period. Additional questions could involve
comparisons with other Latin American countries, and even with other Atlantic
experiences throughout the decades in question. As this dissertation has demonstrated,
comparative studies of this nature are valuable not only because of what they reveal
regarding the nature and development of certain legal phenomena in specific historical
contexts. They are also crucial considering what they uncover concerning the very essence
of the workings of state power and the relationship between state and citizens in concrete
historical settings.
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